ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY
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FOREWORD

There could be no more opportune time than the start of the third millennium AD to produce an entirely new atlas of world history. Not only does this symbolic (if arbitrary) moment provoke a mood of public retrospection, but the pace of global change itself demands a greater awareness of “whole world” history. More than 20 years have passed since a major new atlas of this kind was published in the English language. In that period there has been an explosion of new research into the histories of regions outside Europe and North America, and a growing awareness of how parochial our traditional approach to history has been. In this changed environment, the demand for an un-biased overview of world history has steadily grown in schools and colleges, and among the general reading public.

Several developments within the study of academic history promote the seriousness with which histories of the world are now taken. First the accumulation of knowledge about the past of different nations has engendered excessive specialization. The sheer volume of publications and data about details of the past stimulates demand from students, scholars and a wider public for guidelines, meaning and “big pictures” that world history, with its unconfined time frame and wider geographical focus, is positioned to meet.

Secondly the broadening of traditional history’s central concerns (with states, warfare and diplomacy) in order to take account of modern concerns with, for example, ecology, evolutionary biology, botany, the health and wealth of populations, human rights, gender, family systems and private life, points the study of history towards comparisons between Western and non-Western cultures and histories.

Thirdly young people now arrive at universities with portfolios of knowledge and aroused curiosities about a variety of cultures. They are less likely than their predecessors to study national let alone regional and parochial histories. Schools and universities need to provide access to the kind of historical understanding that will satisfy their interests. To nourish the cosmopolitan sensibility required for the next millennium, history needs to be widened and repositioned to bring the subject into fruitful exchange with geography and the social sciences. Barriers between archaeology, ancient, classical, medieval, early modern, contemporary and other “packages” of traditional but now anachronistic histories are being dismantled.

Unsurprisingly, the implications of “globalization” for hitherto separated communities, disconnected economies and distinctive cultures have been analysed by social scientists. They serve governments who are unevenly aware that their powers to control economies and societies nominally under their jurisdiction are being eroded, both by radical improvements in the technologies for the transportation of goods and people around the world and by the vastly more efficient communications systems that diffuse commercial intelligence, political messages and cultural information between widely separated populations.

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON WORLD HISTORY

As the world changes at an accelerated pace, for problem after problem and subject after subject, national frameworks for political action and academic enquiry are recognized as unsatisfactory. Historians are being asked for a deeper perspective on the technological, political and economic forces that are now transforming traditional frameworks for human behaviour, and reshaping personal identities around the world. Philip’s Atlas of World History has been designed, constructed and written by a team of professional historians not only for the general reader but to help teachers of history in schools and universities to communicate that perspective to their pupils and students.

World histories cannot be taught or read without a clear comprehension of the chronologies and regional parameters within which different empires, states and peoples have evolved through time. A modern historical atlas is the ideal mode of presentation for ready reference and for the easy acquisition of basic facts upon which courses in world history can be built, delivered and studied. Such atlases unify history with geography. They “encapsulate” knowledge by illuminating the significance of locations for seminal events in world history. For example a glance at maps on pages 78 and 116-7 will immediately reveal why explorers and ships from western Europe were more likely (before the advent of steam-powered ships) to reach the Americas than sailors from China or India. More than any other factor it was probably a matter of distance and the prevailing winds on the Atlantic that precluded Asian voyages to the Americas.

Historical atlases should be accurate, accessible and display the unfurling chronology of world history in memorable maps and captions. The team of historians, cartographers and editors who collaborated in the construction of Philip’s Atlas of World History set out to produce a popular work of reference that could be adopted for university and school courses in world history. In the United States and Canada such courses are already commonplace and the subject is now spreading in Britain, Europe, Japan and China. New textbooks appear regularly. American journals dealing with world history publish debates of how histories designed to
cover long chronologies and unconfined geographies might be as rigorous and as intellectually compelling as more orthodox histories dealing with individuals, parishes, towns, regions, countries and single continents. The editors attempted to become familiar with as many course outlines as possible.

Their plans for the atlas were informed by the ongoing, contemporary debate (largely North American) about the scale, scope and nature of world history. For example, they were aware that most "model" textbooks in world history are usually constructed around the grand themes of "connections" and "comparisons" across continents and civilizations, and that a scientifically informed appreciation of environmental, evolutionary and biological constraints on all human activity are regarded as basic to any understanding of world history.

Through its carefully designed system of cross-referencing, this atlas promotes the appreciation of "connections", "contacts" and "encounters" promoted through trade, transportation, conquest, colonization, disease and botanical exchanges and the diffusion of major religious beliefs. It also aims to facilitate "comparisons" across space and through time of the major forces at work in world history, including warfare, revolutions, state formation, religious conversion, industrial development, scientific and technological discoveries, demographic change, urbanization and migration. Histories or atlases of the world are potentially limitless in their geographical and chronological coverage. Publications in the field are inevitably selective and as William McNeill opined: "Knowing what to leave out is the hallmark of scholarship in world history".

HISTORY IN ITS BROADEST CONTEXT
As I write this foreword conflict escalates in the Middle East. The crisis in the Middle East features in Part 5: "The Twentieth Century", but in the atlas it is also set in the context not just of our times, but of the whole span of history. The atlas opens with "The Human Revolution: 5 million years ago to 10,000 BC" placed within an innovative opening section dealing largely with archaeological evidence for the evolution of tools and other artefacts, as well as the transition from hunting to farming in all the continents except Antarctica from around 10,000 BC.

This first section also covers connections and comparisons across the first civilizations in Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, Egypt, China and Mesoamerica and South America as well as those later and more familiar empires of Greece, India, China and Rome. Yet the editors have also ensured that small countries (such as Korea), important but often forgotten traders and explorers (such as the Vikings), and the nomadic peoples of Central Asia, the Americas and Africa have found their place in this comprehensive atlas of world history.

Furthermore, coverage of the world wars of the 20th century, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and fascism, decolonization and the end of the Cold War and the events of the 1990s makes the atlas into a distinctive work of first references for courses in current affairs and contemporary history. Facts, brief analyses and illuminating maps of such seminal events in world history as the transition to settled agriculture, the inventions of writing and printing, the birth of religions, the Roman Empire, Song China, the discovery of the Americas, the Scientific, French and Industrial Revolutions, the foundation of the Soviet Union and of communist China are all carefully chronicled and represented on colourful maps drawn using the latest cartographic technology. Although any general atlas of world history will, and should, give prominence to such traditional, historical themes as the rise and decline of empires, states and civilizations, a serious effort has been made wherever possible in the atlas to accord proper emphasis to the communal concerns of humankind, including religion, economic welfare, trade, technology, health, the status of women and human rights.

The Philip's Atlas can be used easily to find out about a significant event (The American Revolution), the history of defined places and populations (India under the Mughals 1526-1765), religious transitions (The Reformation and Counter Reformation in Europe 1517-1648), or social movements on a world scale (World Population Growth and Urbanisation 1800-1914). Nevertheless the atlas has also been designed in the context of a remarkable revival in world history, which is now underway, and which represents an exciting alternative to histories narrowly focused on the experience of national communities. World history offers chronologies, perspectives and geographical parameters which aim to attenuate the excesses of ethnicity, chauvinism and condescension. The length and breadth of an atlas of world history covering all continents, and a chronology going back twelve millennia, can work to separate the provincial from the universal, the episodic from the persistent. It can expose the decline as well as the rise of societies, nations, cultures and civilizations. In so far as this atlas succeeds in these goals, and thus contributes to the widespread aspiration for an education in world history, it can also help nurture a cosmopolitan sensibility for the new millennium.

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The first humans evolved in Africa around two million years ago. By 9000 BC their descendants had spread to most parts of the globe and in some areas were beginning to practise agriculture. From around 4000 BC the first civilizations developed, initially in the Near East and India and subsequently in China, Mesoamerica and South America. In the centuries that followed, to AD 500, many states and empires rose and fell.

Some five to eight million years ago, a species of small African primates began walking upright. While there are many theories about the advantages conferred by moving on two legs rather than four, there is general agreement that the success of the hominid line (humans and their ancestors) is due in part to the adoption of this new method of locomotion. Between five and one million years ago, hominid species proliferated in East Africa and southern Africa, giving rise by 1.8 million years ago to the new genus, Homo, to which we ourselves belong (map 1).

The development by Homo of stone tools — and, we may presume, tools that have not survived, made of other materials such as bone and wood — was a major advance in human evolution, allowing our ancestors to engage in activities for which they lacked the physical capabilities. This ability to develop technology to overcome our physical limitations has enabled us to develop from a small and restricted population of African apes to a species that dominates every continent except Antarctica and has even reached the moon. Between 1.8 million and 300,000 years ago, members of our genus colonized much of temperate Europe and Asia as well as tropical areas, aided by their ability to use fire and create shelter. By 9000 BC the only parts of the globe which modern humans — Homo sapiens — had not reached were some remote islands and circumpolar regions.

FROM HUNTING TO FARMING

In 10,000 BC the world was inhabited solely by groups who lived by hunting and gathering wild foods. Within the succeeding 8,000 years, however, much of the world was transformed (map 2). People in many parts of the world began to produce their own food, domesticating and selectively breeding plants and animals. Farming supported larger and more settled communities, allowing the accumulation of stored food surpluses — albeit with the counterpoised risks involved in clearing areas of plants and animals that had formerly been a source of back-up food in lean years. Agricultural communities expanded in many regions, for example colonizing Europe and South Asia, and in doing so radically changed the landscape.
High agricultural productivity supported high population densities, and towns and cities grew up, often with monumental public architecture. However, there were also limitations in these regions, such as an unreliable climate or river regime, or a scarcity of important raw materials (such as stone), and there was often conflict between neighbouring groups. Religious or secular leaders who could organize food storage and redistribution, craft production, trade, defence and social order became increasingly powerful. These factors led to the emergence of the first civilizations in many parts of the world between around 4000 and 200 BC (maps 3 and 4 overleaf). A surplus of agricultural produce was used in these civilizations to support a growing number of specialists who were not engaged in food production: craftsmen, traders, priests and rulers, as well as full-time warriors – although the majority of soldiers were normally farmers.

Specialists in some societies included scribes. The development of writing proved a major advance, enabling vast quantities of human knowledge and experience to be recorded, shared and passed on. Nevertheless, in most societies literacy was confined to an elite – priests, rulers and the scribes they employed – who used it as a means of religious, political or economic control. In most parts of the world, the belief that there should be universal access to knowledge recorded in writing is a recent phenomenon.

**RITUAL AND RELIGION**

Although without written records it is impossible to reconstruct details of the belief systems of past societies, evidence of religious beliefs and ritual activities abounds, particularly in works of art, monumental structures and grave offerings.
Ritual and religion were a powerful spur to the creation of monumental architecture by literate urban societies such as the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, but also in smaller societies dependent on agriculture, such as the prehistoric inhabitants of Europe who built the megalithic tombs, or the moundbuilders of North America. Monuments also reflected other factors, such as a desire for prestige or to affirm territorial rights. Although such building activity implied the ability to mobilize large numbers of people, this did not necessarily require hierarchical social control; it could be achieved within the framework of a community led by elders or priests.

Concern with the proper disposal of the dead was displayed from Neanderthal times, more than 50,000 years ago. In the burial or other treatment of the body regarded as appropriate (such as cremation or exposure), the dead were often accompanied by grave offerings. These could range from food or small items of personal dress, to large numbers of sacrificed relatives or retainers as in tombs dating from the 3rd millennium BC in Egypt and the 2nd millennium BC in Shang China. The offerings might be related to life after death, for which the deceased needed to be equipped, but also frequently reflected aspects of the dead person's social position in life.
Grave offerings often provide valuable clues about past social organization. They also point to the important part played by artisans in the development of civilized communities, in particular producing prestige items for use by the elite and manufactured goods to be traded in exchange for vital raw materials. In developed agricultural societies, craft production was unlikely to be a full-time pursuit for more than a handful of individuals, but this did not prevent high standards being reached in many communities.

Unlike pottery, which was made by the majority of settled communities, and stone, used for tools worldwide from very early times, metalworking did not develop in all parts of the globe, due in part to the distribution of ores. Initially metal artefacts tended to be prestige objects, used to demonstrate individual or community status, but metal was soon used for producing tools as well. The development of techniques for working iron, in particular, was a major breakthrough, given the abundance and widespread distribution of iron ore.

**STATES AND EMPIRES**

By about 500 BC ironworking was well established in Europe, West and South Asia, and in parts of East Asia and Africa. States had developed in most of these regions at least a thousand years before, but for a variety of reasons the focal areas of these entities had changed over the course of time (map 4). The formerly fertile lower reaches of the Euphrates, cradle of the Mesopotamian civilization, had suffered salination, and so the focus had shifted north to the competing Assyrian and Babylonian empires. In India the primary civilization that had emerged along the Indus river system had suffered salination, and so the focus had shifted north to the competing Assyrian and Babylonian empires. In India the primary civilization had emerged along the Indus river system; after its fall, the focus of power and prosperity shifted to the Ganges Valley, which by the 3rd century BC was the centre of the Mauryan Empire.

Europe was also developing native states, and by the 1st century AD much of Europe and adjacent regions of Asia and Africa were united through military conquest by the Romans. The rise and expansion of the far-reaching Roman Empire was paralleled in the east by that of the equally vast Chinese Han Empire (map 5).

Military conquest was not, however, the only means by which large areas were united. The Andean region, for example, was dominated in the 1st millennium BC by the Chavin culture, seemingly related to a widely shared religious cult centred on a shrine at Chavin de Huantar. A complex interplay of political, economic, religious and social factors determined the pattern of the rise and fall of states.

On the fringes of the human world, pioneers continued to colonize new areas, developing ways of life to enable them to settle in the circumpolar regions and the deserts of Arabia and to venture huge distances across uncharted waters to settle on the most remote Pacific islands. By AD 500 the Antarctic was the only continent still unpeopled.
THE HUMAN REVOLUTION:
5 MILLION YEARS AGO TO 10,000 BC

Some experts believe that modern humans evolved from the early hominids in Africa, dating back between five and two million years ago when the forests had given way in places to more open savanna (map 1). A line of footprints discovered at Laetoli is vivid evidence that these now extinct early hominids (human ancestors belonging to the genera Australopithecus and Homo) walked upright. Hominid fossils from this remote period are rare, since the creatures themselves were not numerous. The remains that have been found probably belong to different species: some, such as A. robustus and A. boisei, lived on plant material; others, such as the smaller A. africanus, ate a more varied diet. By two million years ago the hominids included Homo habilis, small creatures whose diet probably included kills scavenged from carnivores. Unlike their Australopithecine cousins, H. habilis had begun to manufacture stone tools (called “Oldowan” after the key site of Olduvai), roughly chipped to form a serviceable edge for slicing through hide, digging and other activities which these small hominids could not perform with their inadequate teeth and nails. These developments, along with physical adaptation, were crucial in the amazing success of humans compared with other animal species.

The move into temperate regions

By 1.8 million years ago this success was already becoming apparent in the rapid spread of hominids well outside their original tropical home, into temperate regions as far afield as East Asia (map 2). This move was made possible by a number of developments. Hominids began to make new and more efficient tools, including the multipurpose handaxe, which extended their physical capabilities. A substantial increase in body size allowed representatives of Homo to compete more successfully with other scavengers, and by 500,000 years ago our ancestors were hunting as well as scavenging, using wooden spears and probably fire. Fire was also important in providing warmth, light and protection against predators, and for cooking food, thus making it easier to chew and digest. To cope with the temperate climate, hominids used caves and rock shelters such as those found at the famous Chinese site of Zhoukoudian.

There had been a gradual cooling of the global climate, with ice sheets developing in the Arctic by 2.4 million years ago. Around 900,000 years ago this process had accelerated, giving rise to a pattern of short ice ages approximately every 100,000 years. These ice ages were interspersed with short phases of temperatures similar to or higher than those of today, and much longer periods of intermediate temperatures. The pattern of ice advance and retreat had a major effect not only on the distribution of hominids and other mammals but also on the preservation of their fossils, so the picture that we have today is at best partial. During warm periods, hominids penetrated as far north as southern England; in cooler periods, sea levels fell and many coastal areas that are now submerged became habitable.

Many hominid species flourished in sub-Saharan Africa between five and one million years ago, but most died out. Modern humans are the only surviving descendants.
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN HUMANS

Around 100,000 years ago two hominid species were living in the eastern Mediterranean region. One was the Asian representative of the Neanderthals (H. neanderthalensis) – descended from H. heidelbergensis – who inhabited Europe and West Asia from some time after 200,000 BC; the other was an early form of Homo sapiens (modern humans) who had first appeared some 20,000 years earlier in southern Africa. By 40,000 BC modern humans were to be found throughout the previously inhabited world – Africa, Asia and Europe – and in Australia (map 3).

Opinions are divided as to how this came about. One school of thought holds that the descendants of the first hominids to colonize these various regions had evolved in parallel (diagram 1); there was continuous gene flow between adjacent regions, spreading adaptations and changes throughout the hominid world but with regional differences also present, as in the modern races. This view sees the emergence of modern humans as a global phenomenon.

The alternative and more generally accepted view is that the original colonists developed into different regional species (diagram 2). Modern humans emerged in Africa and were able to spread at the expense of other hominids, progressively colonizing West Asia by 100,000 BC, East Asia and Australia by 60,000 BC and Europe by 40,000 BC. Whether they interbred with the hominids they displaced or simply extinguished them is unclear, but almost certainly Homo sapiens was the only surviving hominid by about 30,000 BC.

From Asia modern humans moved into the Americas, crossing the Bering Strait during an ice age when the land bridge of Beringia was exposed, and migrating southwards later. The date of this colonization is still hotly debated, but the earliest incontrovertible evidence of humans in the Americas south of the glaciated area comes after the ice sheets began to retreat – about 14,000 years ago.

CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Early modern humans and their Neanderthal contemporaries used similar tools and seem to have been culturally related. However, although Neanderthals and even earlier hominids may have communicated with sounds to some extent, Homo sapiens was the first hominid to be able to communicate in a fully developed spoken language. This was a critical development, making possible detailed planning and discussion of group activities and interactions and, more importantly, allowing the knowledge acquired through individual experience to be shared and transmitted from generation to generation.

From about 100,000 years ago many aspects of human consciousness and aesthetic sense began to evolve, as evidenced by the finely shaped and consciously planned stone tools of both Neanderthals and modern humans, and by the beginning of burial. The emergence of human consciousness becomes ever more apparent in the art that dates from about 35,000 BC, and very probably earlier in Australia. Archaeologists have found exquisite figurines depicting both humans and animals, as well as magnificent animal and abstract paintings and engravings on the walls of caves and rock shelters. The most famous of these finds are in southern France and adjacent Spain, but early art has been found all over the world, with fine concentrations in Australia, Africa and Russia.
Evidences from many parts of the world indicates that during the final millennia of the last glacial age - between around 16,000 and 12,000 years ago - the range of foods eaten by humans broadened considerably. In the "Fertile Crescent" of West Asia (the arc of land comprising the Levant, Mesopotamia and the Zagros region) wild wheat and barley provided an abundant annual harvest that enabled hunter-gatherers to dwell year-round in permanent settlements such as Kebara (map 1). Nuts and other wild foods, particularly gazelle, were also important here.

Around 12,000 BC the global temperature began to rise, causing many changes. Sea levels rose, flooding many coastal regions; this deprived some areas of vital resources but in others, such as Japan and Southeast Asia, it created new opportunities for fishing and gathering shellfish. Changes occurred in regional vegetation, with associated changes in fauna. Throughout Asia, particularly in the southeast, plant foods became increasingly important.

In the Levant wild cereals at first spread to cover a much larger area, increasing the opportunities for sedentary communities to develop. A cold, dry interlude around 9000 to 8000 BC caused a decline in the availability of wild cereals and the abandonment of many of these settlements, but communities in well-watered areas began to plant and cultivate the cereals they had formerly gathered from the wild (map 2). By 8000 BC, when conditions again became more favourable, these first farming communities had grown in size and number and they began to spread into other suitable areas. Initially these new economies combined cultivated cereals with wild animals, but around 7000 BC domesticated sheep and goats began to replace gazelle and other wild game as the main source of meat.

Subsequent millennia saw the rapid spread of farming communities into adjacent areas of West Asia (map 3). They appeared over much of Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia by about 7000 BC, largely confined to areas where rain-fed agriculture was possible. Agricultural communities also emerged around the southeastern shores of the Caspian Sea, and at Mehrgarh on the western edge of the Indus plains. Pottery, which began to be made in the Zagros region around this time, came into widespread use in the following centuries, and copper also began to be traded and worked. Cattle, domesticated from the aurochs (Bos primigenius) in the west and from native Indian cattle (Bos indicus) in South Asia, were now also important.

In Anatolia cattle seem to have played a part in religion as well as in the economy: for example, rooms in the massive settlement at Çatal Hoyuk in Anatolia were decorated with paintings of enormous cattle and had clay cattle-heads with real horns moulded onto the walls.

**Diversification of Agriculture**

By 5000 BC the development of more sophisticated agricultural techniques, such as irrigation and water control, had enabled farming communities to spread into southern Mesopotamia, much of the Iranian Plateau and the Indo-Iranian borderlands. It was not until the 4th millennium BC, however, that farmers growing wheat and keeping sheep, goats and cattle moved into the adjacent Indus Valley and thence southward into peninsular India. The development of rice and millet cultivation by the Indus civilization (pages 28–29) led to a further spread of agriculture into the Ganges Valley and the south of India.

Eastern India also saw the introduction of rice cultivation from Southeast Asia, while sites in the northeast may owe their development of agriculture to contact with northern China. In the latter region farming probably began around 7000 BC and was well established by 5000 BC (map 4). In two areas in the Huang He Basin, at sites such as Cishan and Banpo, communities emerged whose...
economies depended on cultivated millet, along with fruits and vegetables, chickens and pigs, while further south, in the delta of the Yangtze River, wet rice cultivation began. Hemudu is the best known of these early rice-farming communities: here waterlogging has preserved finely constructed wooden houses and a range of bone tools used in cultivation, as well as carbonized rice husks and the remains of other water-loving plant foods such as lotus. Here also was found the first evidence of lacquerware: a red lacquered wooden bowl. Although water buffalo and pigs were kept in this southern region, both hunted game and fish continued to play an important role in the economy.

By 3000 BC wet rice agriculture was becoming established in southern China, northern Thailand and Taiwan, and millet cultivation in northern China. Communities in the northwest also grew wheat and barley, introduced from the agricultural communities of West or Central Asia. In Southeast Asia tubers and fruits had probably been intensively exploited for millennia. By 3000 BC wet rice was also grown in this region and buffalo, pigs and chickens were raised, but wild resources remained important.

The inhabitants of Korea and Japan continued to rely on their abundant wild sources of food, including fish, shellfish, deer, nuts and tubers. Often they were able to live in permanent settlements. The world’s earliest known pottery had been made in Japan in the late glacial period: a range of elaborately decorated pottery vessels and figurines was produced in the later hunter-gatherer settlements of the archipelago. Trade between communities circulated desirable materials such as jadeite and obsidian (volcanic glass). Around 1500 BC crops (in particular rice) and metallurgical techniques began spreading from China into these regions, reaching Korea via Manchuria and thence being taken to Japan. By AD 300 rice farming was established throughout the region with the exception of the northernmost island, Hokkaido, home of the Ainu people, where the traditional hunter-gatherer way of life continued into recent times.

Banpo, a typical early Chinese farming settlement, contained dwellings, storage pits and animal pens, a communal hall, a cemetery and lakes in which finely decorated pottery was fired. The villagers were probably already keeping silkworms, although most textiles were made of hemp. By around 3000 BC settlements were often fortified with tamped earth walls, implying intercommunity warfare. Clear signs of developing social stratification appear at this time — for example, elite burials containing prestige goods of bronze and imported materials such as jade, made by an emerging class of specialist craftsmen. Following the introduction of metallurgy from China during the 1st millennium BC, Korea and Japan also developed a sophisticated bronze industry.

By 4000 BC farming communities established in many areas of Asia were linked by trade. Areas of high agricultural productivity, such as southern Mesopotamia, were dependent on trade to obtain raw materials lacking in the alluvial environment, such as wood and stone. They were, however, able to support full-time craft specialists producing goods for export, particularly textiles and fine pottery, as well as surplus agricultural produce.
The postglacial conditions of the period 8000-4000 BC offered new opportunities to the hunter-gatherers of Europe. Activity concentrated on coasts, lake margins and rivers, where both aquatic and land plants and animals could be exploited; the ecologically less diverse forest interiors were generally avoided. Initially groups tended to move around on a seasonal basis, but later more permanent communities were established, with temporary special-purpose outstations. Dogs, domesticated from wolves, were kept to aid hunting. Some groups managed their woodlands by judicious use of fire to encourage hazel and other useful plants.

EUROPE'S FIRST FARMERS

From around 7000 BC farming communities began to appear in Europe (map 1). Early farmers in the southeast built villages of small square houses and made pottery, tools of polished stone and highly prized obsidian, as well as ornaments of spondylus shell obtained by trade. Once established, many of the sites in the southeast endured for thousands of years, gradually forming tells (mounds of settlement debris). By 5000 BC some communities were also using simple techniques to work copper.

Between 5500 and 4500 BC pioneering farming groups rapidly spread across central Europe, settling predominantly on the easily worked loesses (wind-deposited) river valley soils. They kept cattle, raised crops and lived in large timber-framed long houses which often also sheltered their animals. At first these groups were culturally homogeneous, but after about 4500 BC regional groups developed and farming settlements increased in number, spreading out from the river valleys.

The hunter-gatherers in the central and western Mediterranean came into contact with early farmers colonizing southern parts of Italy. They acquired pottery-making skills and domestic sheep and goats from these colonists, and later they also began to raise some crops. By 3500 BC communities practising farming but still partly reliant on wild resources were established over most of western Europe. Huge megalithic ("large stone") tombs were erected, which acted as territorial markers affirming community ties to ancestral lands. These tombs took many forms over the centuries and were associated with a variety of rites, generally housing the bones of many individuals, usually without grave goods.

THE USE OF METALS

By 3500 BC a new economic pattern had developed as innovations emanating from West Asia spread through Europe via farming communities in the southeast and the east, on the fringes of the steppes. These included the use of animals for traction, transport and milk, woolly sheep, wheeled vehicles and the plough. Plough agriculture allowed new areas and less easily worked soils to be cultivated, and there was a general increase in animal husbandry; specialist herders also appeared (map 2). Trade, already well established, now grew in importance, carrying fine flint and hard stone for axes over long distances in a series of short steps between communities. Major social changes were reflected by a significant shift in the treatment of the dead: in many regions communal burial in monumental tombs gave way to individual burials with personal grave goods, often under a barrow. New types of monuments erected in western areas suggest a change in religious practices, with a new emphasis on astronomical matters.

From around 2500 BC copper was alloyed with tin to form bronze. The need for tin, a rare and sparsely distributed metal, provided a stimulus to the further development of international trade in prestige materials (map 3). These were particularly used as grave goods and votive offerings, emphasizing the status achieved by their owners. Chiefs were now buried under massive barrows with splendid gold and bronze grave offerings, while lesser members of society were interred under barrows in substantial cemeteries. Command of metal ore sources gave certain communities pre-eminence, while others derived their importance from a key position at the nodes of trade routes. The Carpathian
By 3000 BC copper and gold metallurgy were practised across most of Europe. These metals were used to make prestige goods that enhanced the status of high-ranking individuals. Drinking vessels for alcohol were also status symbols – Corded Ware in eastern and northern Europe and, later, Beakers in central and western Europe. 

region enjoyed particular prosperity around this time; Scandinavia, which lacked indigenous metal ores, nevertheless now became involved in international trade, and by the late 2nd millennium developed a major bronze industry based on metal imported in exchange for furs and amber. Agriculture and livestock also brought wealth to favoured areas, and there was a major expansion of farming onto light soils formerly under forest. Substantial field systems mark the organization of the agrarian landscape in at least some regions. By the start of the 1st millennium, however, many of the more marginal areas for agriculture had become scoured or exhausted and were abandoned.

WARFARE AND RELIGION

By the late 2nd millennium warfare was becoming a more serious business. Often settlements were located in defensible positions and fortified. (In previous centuries fortified centres had been far fewer and more scattered.) However, until the late centuries BC armed conflict between individual leaders or raids by small groups remained the established pattern, rather than large-scale fighting.

A greater range of weapons was now in use, especially spears and swords, their forms changing frequently in response to technical improvements and fashion. Bronze was in abundant supply and made into tools for everyday use by itinerant smiths. Iron came into use from around 1000 BC and by 600 BC it had largely replaced bronze for tools and everyday weapons, freeing it for use in elaborate jewellery and ceremonial armour and weaponry.

Major changes occurred in burial practices and religious rites. In most areas burial, often under large mounds, was replaced by cremation, the ashes being interred in urns within flat graves (urnfields). Funerary rites became more varied in the Iron Age and many graves – particularly in wealthy areas – contained lavish goods, as in the cemetery at Hallstatt in western Austria, which profited from the trade in salt from local mines. Substantial religious monuments were no longer built, religion now focusing on natural locations such as rivers and lakes.

CELTIC EUROPE

During the 1st millennium BC much of France, Germany and the Alpine region came to be dominated by the Celtic peoples (map 4), who also settled in parts of Britain, Spain, northern Italy and Anatolia. By the 3rd century BC towns (known to the Romans as oppida) were emerging in many parts of Europe, reflecting both increased prosperity and more complex and larger-scale political organization. In the west this development was short-lived as Europe west of the Rhine progressively fell to Roman expansion. In the east and north, however, Germanic and other peoples continued the life of peasant agriculture, trade, localized industry and warfare that had characterized much of the continent for many centuries.
By 10,000 BC most of Africa was inhabited by hunter-gatherer groups (map 1). Although generally only their stone tools survive, the majority of their artefacts would have been made of perishable materials such as wood, leather and plant fibres. At Gwisho in Zambia a large find of organic objects, including wooden bows and arrows, bark containers, and leather bags and clothes, provides us with some insight into what is normally lost. Further information on the lives of African hunter-gatherers comes from their rich rock art, known in many areas of the continent but particularly in the Sahara and in southern Africa. This not only depicts aspects of everyday life, such as housing and clothing, but it also gives a picture of archaeologically intangible activities such as dancing and traditional beliefs.

With the retreat of the ice sheets around this time conditions became both warmer and wetter, creating new opportunities for hunter-gatherer communities. Rising sea levels encouraged the utilization of coastal resources, such as shellfish in southern Africa. Many groups moved between the coast and inland sites, exploiting seasonally available food resources, and people also began to hunt smaller game in the forests that were spreading into former savanna regions. In the Sahara belt, largely uninhabited during the arid glacial period, extensive areas of grassland now developed and the existing restricted bodies of water expanded into great lakes, swamps and rivers. These became favoured areas of occupation, often supporting large permanent settlements whose inhabitants derived much of their livelihood from fish, aquatic mammals (such as hippos), waterfowl and water plants, as well as locally hunted game. Similar lakeside or riverine communities developed in other parts of the continent, for example around Lake Turkana in East Africa.

**EARLY FARMING IN AFRICA**

Some communities began to manage their resources more closely: they weeded, watered and tended preferred plants, and perhaps planted them, and they herded local animals, particularly cattle but also species such as eland and giraffe.
In the Nile Valley, nut-grass tubers had been intensively exploited since glacial times, and by 11,000 BC cereals such as sorghum and millet were cultivated and African rice, also indigenous to this region, may well have been grown, although at present the earliest evidence for its cultivation is from Jenne-jeno around the 1st century BC. By around 3000 BC farming communities also began to appear in northern parts of East Africa.

**The Spread of Metalworking**

Around 500 BC metalworking began in parts of West Africa (map 3). Carthaginians and Greeks had by this time established colonies on the North African coast (pages 40–41). They were familiar with the working of bronze, iron and gold and were involved in trade across the Sahara, and this may have been the means by which knowledge of metalurgy reached sub-Saharan Africa. Sites with early evidence of coopers' working, notably Akjoujt, have also yielded objects imported from North Africa. Egypt, Nubia and Ethiopia were now working metals and may also have been a source of technological expertise. Alternatively, the working of gold and iron may have been indigenous developments: the impressive terracotta heads and figurines from Nok were produced by people well versed in smelting and using iron.

Although iron tools were very useful for forest clearance, agriculture, woodworking and other everyday activities, the spread of ironworking was at first extremely patchy. While some areas in both East and West Africa were working iron as early as the Nok culture around 500 BC, other adjacent regions did not begin to do so until the early or middle centuries of the first millennium AD (pages 80–81). In some cases, however, such as the equatorial forests of the Congo Basin, the absence of early evidence of metallurgy is likely to reflect the poor preservation of iron objects: ironworking was probably well established there by the late centuries BC.

**Early Farming in Southern Africa**

The early centuries AD saw the spread into much of the rest of Africa of ironworking, along with pottery, permanent settlements, domestic animals and agriculture (map 4). By the 2nd century the eastern settlers had reached northern Tanzania, from where they quickly spread through the coastal lowlands and inland regions of southeastern Africa, reaching Natal by the 3rd century. Depending on local conditions and their own antecedents, groups established different patterns of existence within the broad agricultural framework: those on the southeastern coast, for example, derived much of their protein from marine resources such as shellfish rather than from their few domestic animals; other groups included specialist pastoralists and broadly based mixed farmers growing cereals that included sorghum and millet, plus other plants such as cowpeas, beans, squashes and probably yams.

The interrelations of these settlers with the native hunter-gatherer groups were varied. Some hunter-gatherers in areas suitable for agriculture were totally displaced by the newcomers; others established mutually beneficial relations, adopting aspects of the intrusive culture, such as pottery or domestic animals; some groups raided the new farming communities to lift cattle, sheep or goats. The southwestern was unsuited to the cultivation of the introduced crops, but hunter-gatherers there began to herd domestic sheep.

By the late 1st millennium AD iron tools had largely replaced stone tools throughout most of Africa. In some areas – the Copperbelt in Zambia and Zaire, for example – copper was being made into ornaments such as bangles, though gold would not be worked in the southern half of the continent before the close of the millennium.

\[\text{Archaeological data and linguistic evidence combine to indicate that a number of radical innovations – including agriculture, herding, metalworking and permanent settlement – were introduced to the southern half of the continent by the spread of people from the north who spoke Bantu languages. Originating in part of southern West Africa (now eastern Nigeria and Cameroon), Bantu languages progressively spread southwest along two main routes, in the east and west. The areas these farmers penetrated were inhabited by hunter-gatherer communities, speaking Nilotic languages in the north and probably in other areas.}\]
FROM HUNTING TO FARMING: THE AMERICAS 12,000–1000 BC

Controversy surrounds the date of human colonization of the Americas (map 1). During glacial periods when sea levels fell, the Bering Strait became dry land (Beringia), allowing humans living in Siberia to move across into the northernmost part of the Americas. However, substantial ice sheets would then have prevented further overland penetration of the continent. Only subsequently, when the ice sheets melted, could further advances occur – although it is conceivable that migration into the Americas took place by sea, down the Pacific coast.

Several glacial cycles occurred following the emergence of modern humans (pages 16–17), during which, at least hypothetically, such a migration could have taken place. Nevertheless, despite (as yet unsubstantiated) claims for early dates, humans probably reached the far north of the Americas about 16,000 BC, during the most recent glacial episode, and spread south when the ice sheets retreated around 12,000 BC. Not only do the earliest incontrovertibly dated sites belong to the period 12–10,000 BC, but biological and linguistic evidence also supports an arrival at this time. In addition, the adjacent regions of Asia from which colonists must have come seem not to have been inhabited until around 18,000 BC.

The colonization of the Americas after 10,000 BC was extremely rapid, taking place within a thousand years. The first Americans were mainly big-game hunters, although occasional finds of plant material show that they had a varied diet. Their prey were mostly large herbivores: bison and mammoths in the north, giant sloths and mastodons further south, as well as horses, camels and others. By about 7000 BC many of these animals had become extinct (except the bison, which became much smaller in size). Humans probably played some part in these extinctions, although changes in climate and environment are also likely factors.

HUNTER-GATHERERS AND EARLY FARMERS

After 8000 BC bison hunting became the main subsistence base of the inhabitants of the Great Plains of North America (map 2). Hunting was generally an individual activity, but occasionally groups of hunters and their families combined in a great drive to stampede bison over a cliff or into a natural corral, so that huge numbers could be slaughtered at once. Elsewhere in North America, a great range of regional variations developed on the theme of hunting and gathering, and in many areas these ways of life survived until the appearance of European settlers in recent centuries.

The people of the Arctic regions led a harsh existence. Their inventiveness enabled them to develop equipment such as the igloo and the kayak to withstand the intense cold of winter and of the Arctic seas, and to hunt large blubber-rich sea mammals such as whales and seals. Other northern groups relied more on land mammals, notably caribou. The inhabitants of the Pacific Coast region grew prosperous on their annual catch of salmon and other marine and riverine resources. They acquired slaves, constructed spectacular wooden structures and gave magnificent feasts. In the deserts of the southwest, seasonal migration enabled people to obtain a diversity of plant, animal and aquatic foodstuffs at different times of the year, while the wooded environment of the east also provided a rich resource base.
provided a diverse range of such foods. In areas of abundance, some eastern groups were able to settle in camps for much of the year, burying their dead in large cemeteries.

These woodland folk also developed long-distance trade networks, exchanging such prized commodities as copper, marine shells and fine-quality stone for tool-making. Later, groups in the Ohio Valley and adjacent areas (the Adena and Hopewell cultures) elaborated their exchange networks and raised substantial mounds over their dead. By about 2500–2000 BC some groups in the eastern region were cultivating local plants, such as sunflowers and squashes. In the southwest similar developments were encouraged by the introduction around 1000 BC from Mesoamerica of maize, a high-yielding crop which did not reach the eastern communities until around AD 800 (pages 108–9).

DEVELOPMENTS IN MESOAMERICA

After 7000 BC hunter-gatherer bands in highland valleys of Mesoamerica supplemented the foodstuffs they obtained through seasonal migration by sowing and tending a number of local plants such as squashes and chillies (map 3). By 5000 BC they were also cultivating plants acquired from other regions of Mesoamerica. Among these was maize, at first an insignificant plant with cobs barely 3 cm (1.2 in) long. However, genetic changes progressively increased the size of the cobs, and by 2000–1500 BC maize had become the staple of Mesoamerican agriculture, supplemented by beans and other vegetables. Villages in the highlands could now depend entirely on agriculture for their plant foods and were occupied all year round. As there were no suitable herd animals for domestication, hunting remained important into colonial times; the only domestic animals eaten were dogs, ducks and turkeys (introduced from North America). Lowland regions of Mesoamerica also began to cultivate plants acquired from other regions of Mesoamerica. Among these was cotton, which became an important crop in the lowlands by 2000 BC. By this time village communities were established throughout the Andean region and had developed strategies to exploit a variety of local resources. The coast provided exceptionally rich fisheries, while inland crops were cultivated using irrigation, with cotton particularly important. The lower slopes of the Andes were also cultivated, with crops such as potatoes at higher altitudes, while the llamas and alpacas of the high pastures provided meat and wool.

Apart from residential villages, often furnished with substantial cemeteries, early South Americans also built religious centres with monumental structures. By 1200 BC the Chavin cult, centred on the great religious monuments of Chavin de Huantar and marked by characteristic art, architecture and iconography, had united peoples along much of the Peruvian coast (pages 34–35).

EARLY FARMING IN SOUTH AMERICA

Preserved organic remains from arid caves in the Andes provide evidence that plants were cultivated in South America by around 6500 BC (map 4). Along with local varieties like potatoes, these included plants (such as beans and chillies) native to the jungle lowlands to the east. It is therefore likely that South American agriculture began in the Amazon Basin, although humid conditions in this area precluded the preservation of ancient plant remains. Pottery and other equipment used to process manioc (cassava) offer indirect evidence that this important American staple food was grown in South America by 2000 BC.

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The Pacific was one of the last regions on Earth to be colonized by people. Modern humans spread into Southeast Asia and from there crossed the seas to New Guinea and Australia (which formed a single landmass at that time) by about 60,000 BC. A few of the islands adjacent to New Guinea were also settled before 30,000 BC, but expansion into the rest of the Pacific only began around 1500 BC and was not completed until AD 1000 (map 1).

The first colonization of Australia
The early inhabitants of Australia were confined initially to the coast and inland river valleys, spreading to colonize the south by 40,000 BC (map 2). They gathered a variety of wild resources and hunted the local fauna, which at that time included a number of large species such as a giant kangaroo, Procoptodon. Between 25,000 and 15,000 these huge creatures became extinct: humans may have been partly to blame, although increasing aridity was probably also responsible. By 23,000 BC ground-stone tools were being made - the earliest known in the world - and by 12,000 BC people had learnt to process the toxic but highly nutritious cycad nuts to remove their poison. The harsh desert interior of Australia was colonized by groups who adapted their lifestyle to cope with this challenging environment.

By 8000 BC further major changes had taken place. New tools were now in use, including the boomerang (invented by 8000 BC) and small, fine stone tools suited to a variety of tasks, of which wood-working was of prime importance. The dingo, a semi-wild dog, had been introduced into Australia, perhaps brought in by a new wave of immigrants from Southeast Asia. Dingoes outcompeted the native predators such as the thylacine (Tasmanian tiger), a carnivorous marsupial which became extinct.

Although they never adopted farming Australia's aborigines exercised considerable control over the wild resources at their disposal, clearing the bush by fire-setting in order to encourage new growth and attract or drive game, and replanting certain preferred plant species. New Guinea's first inhabitants were also hunters and gatherers, but by 7000 BC some communities here had begun cultivating local plants like sugar cane, yam, taro and banana, and keeping pigs (map 1). At Kuk, in the highlands, there is evidence that contacts were maintained throughout the area, with return as well as outward journeys. The Polynesians used the stars, ocean currents, winds and other natural phenomena as navigational guides, and they made ocean charts of palm sticks with the islands marked by cowrie shells.
The complex social and cultural life of Australia's Aboriginal inhabitants is reflected in painted and engraved art (which appeared almost as early as the first settlement of Australia), in burials with an array of grave goods, in a variety of ritual sites, and in the Aborigines' rich oral traditions. Links between communities based on kinship were enhanced by long-distance trade: commodities such as coastal shells were taken into the interior while roughed-out stone axes from quarries in the interior moved in the opposite direction.

The colonization of eastern Polynesia
This wave of colonization came to a standstill around 1000 BC in western Polynesia. Groups from the colonized regions spread north and east to complete the settlement of Micronesia from that time, but it was not until about 200 BC that a new surge of eastward colonization took place, establishing populations on the more scattered islands of eastern Polynesia, including the Society Islands, Tahiti and the Marquesas. These people evolved a distinctive culture which differed from that developed by groups in the areas already settled – areas that were still open to influence from Southeast Asia. By now the Polynesians had almost entirely abandoned pottery: eastern Polynesians began making distinctive new types of stone adze, shell fish-hooks and jewellery. They also built stone religious monuments.

The best known and most striking of these were the Easter Island statues. Easter Island and Hawaii were settled in a further colonizing movement by around AD 400. Nearly 2,000 kilometres (1,250 miles) from Pitcairn, its nearest neighbour, Easter Island was probably never revisited after its initial settlement. The resulting isolation allowed its people to develop a unique form of general Polynesian culture, notable for its mysterious stone heads (map 3).

New Zealand's first settlers
Between AD 800 and 1000 a final wave of Polynesian voyagers colonized New Zealand (map 4) and the Chatham Islands to the east. Here new challenges and opportunities awaited them.

New Zealand is unique in the Pacific in enjoying a temperate climate; most of the tropical plants cultivated by Polynesians elsewhere in the Pacific could not grow here, although sweet potatoes (introduced into Polynesia from South America) flourished. In compensation there were rich marine resources and a wide range of edible plants indigenous to the islands – of which one, the root of the bracket fern, became an important cultivated plant on North Island.

There was also a large population of huge flightless birds (moa), which had evolved in great diversity due to the absence of mammals and predators. Reverting to their distantly ancestral hunter-gatherer way of life, the new settlers (early Maori) hunted these birds to extinction within 500 years, aided by the dogs and rats they had introduced. The native flora also became depleted. As South Island was unsuited to agriculture its population declined, and on North Island increased reliance on horticulture went hand in hand with growing warfare between the communities, accompanied by the building of fortified settlements, trophy head-hunting and cannibalism.

The culture of the early Maori settlers in New Zealand differed from that of other Polynesians in the emphasis it placed on long-distance trade. Among the items traded were various types of stone used for making tools and weapons, including greenstone for wadrods and smelted, and materials such as obsidian (volcanic glass), argillite (white clay rock) and shells.
Agricultural communities had emerged in many parts of the world by the 4th millennium BC. In some areas high productivity supported high population densities and the emergence of cities, necessitating more complex social organization and giving rise to more elaborate public architecture. These developments encouraged trade in essential and luxury goods as well as craft and other occupational specialization. Such “civilized” communities appeared first in Mesopotamia, around 4000 BC.

**MESOPOTAMIA**

By 4500 BC the advent of irrigation agriculture had enabled the settlement of the dry southern Mesopotamian alluvium (map 1). A social world comprising groups of agrarianist kinsfolk living in hamlets, villages or towns, evolved, to be transformed around 600 years later into one of specialists living in complex and hierarchical social arrangements in an urban milieu. Religion played an important part in this process: while religious structures are recognizable in the earlier archaeological record, palaces and other large secular buildings appear only later in the 4th millennium. Religious complexes became larger and increasingly elaborate throughout the period.

A number of urban centres emerged, of which one in particular stands out - ancient Warka (map 2A), also called Uruk. The city had at least two very large religious precincts – Eanna and Kullaba. In the Eanna Precinct the earliest written records, dating from around 3100 BC, have been found: tablets of clay or gypsum inscribed with ideographic characters. These first texts were economic in nature, comprising lists and amounts of goods and payments.

**INTERNATIONAL TRADE**

The literate Sumerians provide an invaluable source of information on contemporary cultures, from whom they obtained essential raw materials such as metals, wood and minerals, and luxuries including lapis lazuli. The most distant of their direct trading partners was the Indus region, known to them as Meluhha, the source of ivory, carnelian beads and gold; closer lay Magan, a major source of copper, and Dilmun (Bahrain), long known to the Sumerians as the source of “sweet water” and “fish-eyes” (pearls) (map 3). Dilmun acted as an entrepot in this trade, but there were also Meluhhan merchants resident in some Sumerian cities. Sumer exported textiles, oil and barley to its trading partners, but the Indus people were probably most interested in receiving silver obtained by Sumer from further west. It is likely that Magan was an intermediary for trade along the Arabian coast with Africa, the source of several types of millet introduced into India at this time. The Indus people also had writing, but the surviving texts – brief inscriptions on seals and copper tablets – have yet to be deciphered, and probably contain little beyond names and titles.

By 2900 BC there were also other important urban centres in southern Mesopotamia – city-states ruled by individual kings who negotiated shifting economic and political alliances among themselves and with polities outside Mesopotamia. The wealth and power of the Early Dynastic rulers can be seen in the elaborate burials in the Royal Cemetery of Ur, some including human sacrifices as well as objects of gold, silver and lapis lazuli.

**SUMER AND AKKAD**

From the fragmented historical record of this period it is apparent that the region was becoming divided between the lands of Akkad (from Abu Salabikh to the edge of the northern Mesopotamian plains) and of Sumer (from Nippur south to Eridu). Sumer and Akkad were not political entities but regions whose people spoke two different languages while sharing a common material culture. Around 2350 BC Sargon I, a charismatic and powerful Akkadian ruler, subjugated all Sumer and Akkad, also conquering lands to the northwest as far as Turkey and the Mediterranean, and to the east as far as Susa. His was perhaps the first empire to outlast the life of its founder, but by 2200 BC it had collapsed and was followed by a period of Sumerian revival.

At the close of the 3rd millennium BC Ur, long an important Sumerian city, came to dominate the region. The Third Dynasty of Ur ruled the cities of Sumer and Akkad and east beyond the Zagros Mountains, establishing a system of governors and tax collectors that formed the skeleton for the complex bureaucracy needed to control a large population. However, this last Sumerian flowering had lasted only 120 years when Ur was sacked in 2004 BC by the Elamites.
Point to a time when a network of rivers flowed parallel to the Indus, augmenting the area available for agriculture. The area at the mouth of these rivers was important in both local and international trade.

**The Indus Region**

In the Indus region, colonized by farmers in the later 4th millennium BC, many settlements were replaced by planned towns and cities around 2600 BC (map 4). Within their overall similarity of plan there was considerable local variation, particularly in the layout of the citadel, probably reflecting heterogeneity in religious and cultural practices. For example, the citadel at Mohenjo-daro was dominated by a Great Bath, suggesting ritual bathing, important in later Indian religion (map 2B). In contrast, those of Kalibangan and Lothal had pits where sacrificial material was burnt.

Despite some regional variation, uniformity was a keynote of the Indus civilization. Throughout the Indus realms high-quality goods such as pottery, flint blades and copper objects, shell and stone beads and bangles, and steatite seals were manufactured from the best materials available, such as flint from the Rohri Hills. Although the Indus people owed much of their prosperity to the rich agricultural potential of their river valleys, a significant proportion of the population were mobile pastoralists, their flocks and herds grazing in the adjacent forests and grassy uplands; it is probable they acted as carriers in the internal trade networks that ensured the distribution of goods.

Outside the heartland of the civilization, mobile hunter-gatherers provided the means by which the Indus people obtained goods and materials (such as ivory, carnelian and gold) from other regions of the subcontinent, in exchange for cultivated grain, domestic animals and manufactured goods such as copper fish-hooks. The fishers of the Aravalli Hills also participated in this network, trading their locally mined copper.

Around 1800 BC the Indus civilization went into decline. A probable cause was the drying up of some of the rivers, but other factors may have included disease, changes in agricultural practices, and perhaps the depredations of Indo-Aryan nomads on the Indus periphery.
The first civilizations emerged in areas where high agricultural productivity was possible, supporting dense populations. In the Old World they appeared along the rivers in Mesopotamia, northern India, Egypt and northern China. Craft specialization developed, trade flourished, writing began and rulers were often given elaborate burial tombs. However, each civilization also had unique features rooted in its own cultural background and environment.

Life in Ancient Egypt evolved around the Nile, which provided a regular water supply and fertile soils and thus, by contrast with the surrounding desert regions, made agricultural production possible. Navigation on the river was easy, as boats could travel northwards with the current or sail southwards on the northerly winds. From the 5th millennium BC farming communities along the Nile gradually began to merge into a cultural, political and economic unit. This process of unification was encouraged by trading contacts and the need to control the floodwaters of the Nile. To reap the benefits of the yearly inundation of the river, communities had to work together to build dams, flood basins and irrigation channels over large areas. In around 3000 BC this co-operation resulted in the establishment of a single kingdom and the First Dynasty: according to tradition, in 3100 BC King Menes united the delta region (Lower Egypt) and the river valley (Upper Egypt) and founded a capital at Memphis.

### The Early Dynastic and Old Kingdom periods

The period of the first Egyptian dynasties was one of great cultural and economic significance, when hieroglyphic writing was developed and administrative centres established. During the succeeding period of the Old Kingdom (2686–2181 BC), Egyptian culture flourished and the great pyramids were built as spectacular royal tombs (map 1). The first was the step pyramid constructed for Pharaoh (or King) Djoser (2667–2648 BC) at Saq卡拉（over 60 metres (200 feet) high), it was the largest stone building of its time. The true pyramids, with sloping sides, were constructed at Giza, and the largest, built for Pharaoh Khufu (2589–2566 BC), reached a height of nearly 150 metres (500 feet). Eventually the rule of the Old Kingdom dynasties collapsed, possibly because of the expanding power of the provincial governors, or perhaps because scarce rainfall led to famine and unrest. Central government would be restored with new dynasties during the Middle Kingdom (2055–1650 BC) and the New Kingdom (1550–1069 BC) periods.

### The growth of Egyptian trade

In search of building materials, gold and luxury items, the pharaohs established a wide trade network. During the Old Kingdom period links were forged with many areas of West Asia, including Byblos on the Lebanese coast, predominantly in a search for timber, and expeditions were sent to mine turquoise, copper and malachite in the Sinai Desert. The Eastern Desert yielded copper and stone and gave access to the harbours on the Red Sea, from where trade with East Africa and Arabia was conducted. While these trading missions were mainly peaceful, the area to the south of the First Cataract along the Nile became a prime target for expansion. This land, called Nubia or Kush, offered large quantities of gold as well as connections with the African hinterland, which was an important source of spices, ivory and other luxury goods. During the Old Kingdom period, a mining settlement was established at Buhen – the first step in a process of southward expansion which would peak in the 15th century BC.

Arts and crafts flourished in Ancient Egypt, particularly in the service of religion and in providing for the dead. Religion also played a major role in northern China, where ancestors were given the greatest respect and were consulted by divination using oracle bones prior to important events such as hunting trips, childbirth and military campaigns.

### The rise of the Shang civilization

Around 1700 BC the Shang civilization emerged as a powerful new state in the northern plains of China. It is known from later historical sources, from magnificent archaeological remains of cities and great tombs, and from written inscriptions carved on oracle bones and cast on splendid ritual bronze vessels. Bronze-working was important to Shang culture and to many other peoples in China, and several different traditions can be recognized (map 2). However, it is the use of writing that sets the Shang civilization apart: although ideographic pictograms were used as potters’ marks as early as the 3rd millennium BC, the Shang inscriptions provide the first evidence of the development of a literate civilization in China.

During the latter half of the 2nd millennium BC the Shang dynasty conquered and controlled large parts of northern China (map 3). The first Shang king, Tang, achieved dominance by defeating 11 other peoples and then winning over 36 more by his fair rule and moral leadership. Shang rule reached its greatest extent under Wu Ding, one of Tang's successors, who was renowned for his wisdom and led a series of successful military campaigns. Wu Ding was supported in his campaigns by his consort Fu Hao, who herself led armies into battle against the hostile Fang people.
The secret of Shang military success was the use of war chariots, which were so prized that they were sometimes included in burials. Fu Hao’s sumptuous tomb is the richest known Shang burial, containing over 400 bronze treasures, 2,000 cowrie shells and more than 500 jade artefacts. Most of the other great tombs, however, were looted in antiquity.

**Royal Chinese Cities**

Walled towns or cities ruled by royal lineages were central to early Chinese states, but they were often “moved”: eight such transfers are recorded for the Shang capital before the reign of the first king (the beginning of the “dynastic period”) and a further seven for the 30 kings of the dynastic period. We know most about the last capital, Yin (near modern Anyang), which was founded by Pan Geng in about 1400 BC.

Yin was located on the marshy plains of the Huang He River, at that time a warmer and moister environment than now exists. The coast was considerably closer and the region was fertile, supporting two crops a year of rice and millet. Water buffalo and wild boar roamed the luxuriant forests which have long since disappeared. Yin sprawled over a large area in which residential compounds for the ruling elite and clusters of commoners’ dwellings were interspersed with bronze foundries and workshops producing jade and lacquer ware and pottery. At its centre lay the royal palaces and ancestor temples set atop platforms of pounded earth, and a royal cemetery where kings lay in magnificent shaft graves.

We know little about the later Shang rulers, except for the debaucheries of the last king, the tyrannical Ghou. Such were Ghou’s excesses and tortures that the Shang people welcomed his defeat at the hands of the Zhou in the Battle of Ghaoge, traditionally dated 1122 BC but probably closer to 1050 BC. The Zhou were to become China’s longest-ruling dynasty, governing the region until 256 BC (pages 48–49).

The immediate predecessors of the Shang began working in bronze—a craft reaching great heights under both the Shang and their neighbours. Cast bronze vessels, used to serve food and drink in ceremonies honouring ancestors, followed the traditional shapes previously made in pottery, often intricately decorated and featuring the face of a monster known as qilin. The discovery of many fine bronzes at Sanxingdui in Sichuan proves the existence of excellent bronze-working traditions outside the Shang area. Working in bronze probably began earlier in Southeast Asia and south China.

The Shang state was the most important of China’s early states—and the only one that was literate. From the oracle bones the Shang employed to foretell the outcome of military campaigns, we know the names of many fang (alien states) with whom they were in conflict at various times. Defeated enemies were often sacrificed to gods or ancestors. Shang kings maintained a small personal bodyguard but could raise armies of up to 5,000 men from their provinces in wartime. These were mostly foot soldiers armed with halberds, supporting an elite force of chariotry.

Many bronze vessels produced in Shang China were decorated with animal motifs. The lid of this gong (lidded jar) is in the form of an imaginary animal combining features of birds and tigers. Gongs were used during the time of Fu Hao around 1200 BC, but were soon replaced by animal-shaped jars.
The Olmec are best known for the massive carved heads and other distinctive stone sculptures found in their three successive ceremonial centres of San Lorenzo (1200–900 BC), La Venta (900–600 BC) and Tres Zapotes (600–300 BC) and at other Mesoamerican sites.

Teotihuacan influenced and probably dominated much of the extensive area with which it traded, including the Maya city of Kaminaljuyu. It is unclear to what extent this dominance was achieved and maintained by military force: although Teotihuacan art rarely shows its people as warriors, this is how they appear in the art of their powerful neighbours, the Maya and Monte Alban.

By 1200 BC much of Mesoamerica was inhabited by agricultural communities, which were linked through trade in both essential everyday commodities and exotic materials. The most prosperous area at this time was the Gulf Coast, where annual river flooding supported rich agriculture, and it was in this region that the Olmec culture emerged (map 1).

While some scholars believe that the Olmec dominated Mesoamerica, controlling the settlements in which their distinctive artefacts have been found, others see the Olmec as the religious leaders of the time, with their successive ceremonial centres acting as places of pilgrimage. Another school of thought views the Olmec as the most visible and most easily identified of a number of contemporary regional cultures that were mutually influential.

Much that is characteristic of later Mesoamerican civilization is already evident in the Olmec culture. The dangerous animals (in particular the jaguar) and the natural phenomena (such as rain) which feature prominently in Olmec art reappear in various guises in later religious art. The concern with the movements of sun, moon and stars that underlies much Mesoamerican religion is apparent in the astronomically aligned layout of the Olmec ceremonial centres, where the first temple pyramids and plazas, as well as caches of precious offerings to the gods, have been found. The characteristic colossal carved heads, which may be portraits of Olmec rulers, wear helmets for the ritual ballgame, a dangerous sport with religious significance that was part of most Mesoamerican cultures and often involved the sacrifice of members of the losing team.

Personal blood sacrifice, practised in later Mesoamerican religions, also appears to have been a feature of Olmec life, as stingray spines and other objects used to draw blood have been found at Olmec sites. These items were widely traded - as were both jade, which had great ritual importance, and obsidian (volcanic rock glass), used to make exceptionally sharp tools but also fine ritual or status objects. The widespread distribution of these materials reflects not only their religious significance throughout Mesoamerica but also their role as indicators of status in communities where social hierarchies were beginning to emerge. Prestigious Olmec pottery and figurines (including the characteristic “were-jaguar” babies) served the same purpose.

The Teotihuacan and Monte Alban Empires
By about 300 BC the Olmec had lost their pre-eminent position and other civilizations were developing in the highland zone, particularly the Teotihuacan Empire in the Basin of Mexico and the Monte Alban Empire of the Zapotec people in the Oaxaca Valley (map 2). This was the beginning of
what is known as the Classic Period, which lasted until around AD 900. Agricultural productivity now greatly increased in this region as irrigation techniques using wells and canals were developed to supplement rain-fed farming. Raised fields may also have been cultivated.

Like the Olmec, all these civilizations were heavily involved in trade. The city of Teotihuacan (map 3A), founded before 300 BC, was well placed to control widespread trading networks. It contained over 400 workshops manufacturing goods for local use and for export - objects of obsidian (400 workshops), basalt (a building stone), shell and other materials, as well as distinctive pottery.

The city of Monte Alban was founded around 500 BC. Like Teotihuacan, it was the ceremonial and political centre of its state, but in contrast it was not the centre for regional craft production. Evidence shows that initially the Monte Alban state grew by military conquest, but by AD 300 its expansion had been checked by that of the Teotihuacan Empire, although the people of Monte Alban seem to have been on friendly terms with their neighbour.

Ballcourts and depictions of sacrificial victims at Monte Alban show the continuation in the highland zone of the religious practices of Olmec times. Also continued was the use of written symbols (glyphs) to record dates and related information. Concern with the movements of heavenly bodies and the related calendar had led to the development of glyphs by the Olmec; by 500 BC the people of the Oaxaca Valley were recording dates and names on their carved stone slabs (stelae). However, the only region where a complete writing system developed in the Classic Period was the Maya lowlands (map 4).

THE EARLY MAYA CIVILIZATION

The Maya writing system was extremely complex, with many variations in the form of individual glyphs and in the way in which a word could be expressed. It was also used to record an extremely elaborate calendrical system, involving interlocking and independent cycles of time, including the 52-year repeating cycle used throughout Mesoamerica and the Maya Long Count, a cycle beginning in 3114 BC according to our present-day dating system. These depended both on a detailed knowledge of astronomical patterns and on sophisticated mathematics, including the concept of zero.

Although the Maya script is still not fully deciphered, scholars are now able to read many inscriptions on carved stelae, temple stairs and lintels and have pieced together the dynastic history of many of the Maya kingdoms. (Unlike the two highland empires, the Maya were not politically unified, although they were united culturally.) Maya inscriptions record the descent of each ruler from a founding ancestor, his performance of appropriate ritual activities on dates of significance in the astronomical religious calendar, and his victories over neighbouring rulers. Although wars of conquest did occur at this time - Uaxactun's takeover by Tikal (map 3B) in AD 378 is the prime example - the main motive for warfare was to capture high-ranking individuals to be used as sacrificial victims.

Blood sacrifice was of central importance in Maya and other Mesoamerican religions, based on the belief that human blood both nourished divine beings and opened a path through which humans could communicate with the spirit world. While personal sacrifices could be made by any member of Maya society, it was largely the responsibility of each king to ensure the well-being of his state through the provision of sacrificial victims and by letting his own blood. Members of the king's family were appointed as provincial governors of lesser centres within the kingdom, and they also acted in other official capacities including that of scribe.

The 7th century saw the demise of Teotihuacan and Monte Alban and the rise of other highland states, while in the Maya region important changes had already occurred (pages 84–85). The pattern of existence that had emerged in Olmec times continued, however, as the template for the Mesoamerican way of life up to the time of the European conquest in the 16th century.
CULTURES IN SOUTH AMERICA
1400 BC–AD 1000

Spondylus and strombus shells, widely regarded as food for the gods, featured prominently in Chavin and later Andean art. Imported from the coast of Ecuador, they were an important commodity in the exchange networks that ensured the distribution of foodstuffs and other raw materials (such as obsidian, or volcanic glass) and manufactured goods (notably pottery and textiles) between the different regions of the Andean zone during the Chavin period. Chavin de Huantar probably owed its pre-eminent position to its location at the centre of trade routes running both north–south and east–west, in some areas roads were built to facilitate trade and communications, and these networks (and the commodities they controlled) changed little in later periods.

By the late 2nd millennium BC a patchwork of inter-related farming settlements existed throughout the Andean region, from coasts and lowland valleys to high pastures. In addition to residential villages, the Andean peoples were constructing religious centres which took various forms (map 1). Those in coastal regions were characteristically built in the shape of a U, with terraced mounds laid out along three sides of a rectangular plaza, and a pyramid often stood on the central mound. Some of these temple complexes - notably Cerro Sechin, where graphic carvings decorating the platforms of the Ghavin ceremonial centres, another practice that endured down the ages - for example in the magnificent burials found in the few unlooted Moche huacas (sacred pyramids) such as that at Sipan.

THE PARACAS AND NAZCA CULTURES

The distinctive Paracas culture emerged in Chavin times, around 600 BC. Their craftsmanship survived in an extensive cemetery (map 1) containing numerous mummies of elite individuals wrapped in beautifully embroidered cotton textiles and accompanied by fine pottery, goldwork and other offerings. By around 375 BC the Paracas culture had developed into the Nazca culture (maps 2 and 4B), also renowned for its textiles and fine polychrome pottery. Some vessels were designed in the form of trophy heads, and real heads - pierced for suspension on a rope - have been recovered from Nazca cemeteries, in particular at the chief Nazca ceremonial centre of Cahuachi.

Unlike Chavin de Huantar and the ceremonial centres of other Andean civilizations, Cahuachi seems not to have functioned as a town, though it was probably a place occupied briefly by thousands of pilgrims during religious ceremonies and festivals. In its neighbourhood are the enigmatic Nazca Lines, designs on a gigantic scale which were created by removing stones to expose the light desert soil beneath and depict animals, birds and geometric shapes familiar from the Nazca pottery. Their form can only be appreciated from the air, so they are thought to have been intended for the gods to view and to have been used in the performance of religious activities.

CHAVIN DE HUANTAR

Around 850 BC, a similar U-shaped ceremonial centre was constructed in the mountains at Chavin de Huantar. Housing the shrine of an oracular fanged deity set within labyrinthine passages, Chavin de Huantar became a place of pilgrimage, the centre of a cult that was widespread in its influence, as demonstrated by the distribution of artefacts in the characteristic Chavin style. Carvings decorating the temple mounds focused on religious themes, as did designs on pottery, jewellery and other objects. Chief among these was the Chavin deity, which continued to be worshipped down the ages in various forms, such as the Staff God of Tiwanaku. Other supernatural creatures included jaguars, caymans and composite beasts; shamans were also depicted and they were believed to be able to transform themselves into exotic birds and animals.

Traded objects, such as goldwork, were included as grave goods in the elaborate burials of the Chavin elite. These burials were often placed in shaft tombs within the platforms of the Chavin ceremonial centres, another practice that endured down the ages - for example in the magnificent burials found in the few unlooted Moche huacas (sacred pyramids) such as that at Sipan.
Irrigation played an important role in South American agriculture, and water control was well developed during the Chavin period (1200–200 BC), when a series of canals was skillfully used to provide awe-inspiring sound effects in the great ceremonial centre of Chavin de Huantar. Later civilizations in the Andean region employed a variety of different techniques appropriate to local conditions. The Moche supplemented perennial and seasonal watercourses by creating a network of canals. To the south, in the Nazca region, underground aqueducts designed to prevent water loss by evaporation were probably constructed after AD 600 when the region fell to the Huari, who also built sophisticated bilateral irrigation terraces. The Tiwanaku state undertook a large-scale programme of swamp drainage and canal construction in the Pampa Koani region of Lake Titicaca to establish a complex network of fertile raised fields. Some of these irrigation systems, such as the Nazca underground aqueducts, have survived into modern times; others have recently been revived and are proving far more successful than modern methods.

THE MOCHE CULTURE

Partially contemporary with the Nazca culture, which flourished until around AD 600, was the Moche culture of c. AD 1-650, maps 2 and 4B. Their ceramics, painted with exceptionally fine calligraphy, reveal a ceremonial life focused on mountain worship, royal mortuary cults, warfare and the dismemberment of captives. The recent discovery of an unlooted pyramid (Huaca) at Sipan, containing the burials of two Moche lords, has given us a vivid picture of Moche burial practices. Accompanied by a number of sacrificed men, women and dogs, these lords were lavishly robed in garments decorated with gold and silver, copper and feathers; they were provided with rich grave goods in the same materials, along with spondylus and strombus shells. Details of these burials are familiar from decoration on the painted or moulded pottery. Moche ceramics also included some of the first (and only) portrait effigies in the Americas, all cast from moulds and often into the stirrup-handled vessels common to Peru. Although heavy in religious imagery, these ceramics are unusually narrative for South American art, leading some scholars to postulate influence from other areas such as Mesoamerica.

THE CITIES OF HUARI AND TIWANAKU

Around AD 650 the Moche culture was eclipsed by new art styles emanating from Huari, near Ayacucho in the southern highlands of Peru (map 3). More distant still lay a city of comparable complexity, Tiwanaku, near Lake Titicaca. Although both cities had emerged c. 400, the connection between them remains enigmatic. Most archaeologists believe that they were not so much dual capitals of one empire (an older theory) as antagonistic polities, one – Huari – oriented to the north, the other – Tiwanaku – to the high timberless plains known as the altiplano.

While recent political instability in the region of Huari has made it difficult to study, Tiwanaku has been intensively investigated, unveiling elaborate raised fields (map 4C). Whether the fields around Lake Titicaca were systematically organized and harvested by the Tiwanaku state continues to be controversial. Field research in the Moquegua Valley indicates late Tiwanaku expansion into a number of enclaves, with maize in particular being cultivated. Also subject to Huari influence, this valley was important as the source of many prized materials which included lapis lazuli, turquoise, obsidian (volcanic glass) and copper.
The eastern Mediterranean became extremely affluent during the Bronze Age. This prosperity was largely based on a booming international trade in which the Egyptians and later the Hittites played key roles (map 1). During the period of the Middle Kingdom (2055–1650 BC), Egypt experienced stability under a central government led by dynasties from Thebes. Dominion over Nubia, which had been lost during the political disintegration of the First Intermediate Period (2181–2055 BC), was restored, guaranteeing access to products from the African heartland. Royal missions were sent to re-establish diplomatic contacts with Syria and Palestine, a move that further encouraged trade in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Minoan and Mycenaean Civilizations

From approximately 2000 BC, the Minoan civilization flourished on the island of Crete, centred around palaces such as Knossos, Phaistos and Mallia, and the island developed its own script. Initially pictographs resembling the Hittite signary and Egyptian hieroglyphs were used, but around 1700 BC a linear script was invented, the so-called “Linear A”.

Around 1450 BC, most Minoan palaces were destroyed by fire. This was once considered to be linked to the massive volcanic eruption on the nearby island of Thera (Santorini), but the eruption is now thought to have taken place around 1628 BC. One possibility is that the destruction was due to occupation by mainland Greeks, the so-called Mycenaean, who already controlled much of southern Greece. By 1400 BC, most of Crete had been lost during the political disintegration of the First Intermediate Period (2181–2055 BC), was restored, guaranteeing access to products from the African heartland. Royal missions were sent to re-establish diplomatic contacts with Syria and Palestine, a move that further encouraged trade in the eastern Mediterranean.

While these changes were occurring in the south, in northern Mesopotamia the inhabitants of the core Assyrian cities of Ashur were creating trading networks with cities in Anatolia up to 800 kilometres (500 miles) away, where they established trading outposts to exchange Assyrian textiles and “annakum” (probably tin) for silver and gold.

Hittite Expansion and Contraction

To the north and east of Mesopotamia there were, by the mid-2nd millennium BC, numerous small Hurrian (sometimes called Mitannian) principalities, while the Hittites controlled much of Anatolia. Texts written in the wedge-shaped characters of the cuneiform script tell us there were other kingdoms in Anatolia such as Arzawa, Assuwa, Ashiya and Lulka, but their exact location is uncertain.

In 1595 BC the Hittites under King Mursili defeated Babylon. Soon afterwards, however, the Hittites were beset by internal dissension and revolts, and lost much of their extended territory until they were left controlling only central Anatolia. For about a century very little is known about events in Mesopotamia and Anatolia. In 1480 BC the Hurrian kingdoms were united by King Parrattarna as the kingdom of Mitanni, and by 1415 BC the Kassites, a people who had been slowly moving into Babylonia, had established dominance in the area. The Hittites once again controlled much of the Anatolian plateau and were heavily involved in Mediterranean trade, receiving commodities such as copper, gold and grains, as well as those under their influence or control. At the same time they were spreading southwards into the Levant, an area where the Egyptians under the New Kingdom dynasties were also expanding.
NEW KINGDOM EGYPT

Egyptian unity had once again been destroyed when the Hyksos, an Asiatic tribe, seized part of the country around 1650 BC. Their rule lasted for about 100 years until Ahmose (r. 1550–1525 BC) drove them out and established the New Kingdom (1550–1069 BC), a period of great cultural flowering (map 2). This was also the time of the greatest Egyptian expansion, predominantly geared towards securing resources from Nubia and West Asia. Thutmose I (r. 1504–1492 BC) campaigned as far as the Euphrates River, and Thutmose III (r. 1479–1425 BC) reclaimed Syria, thus extending the empire to Carchemish. He also established Egyptian control over Nubia up to the Fourth Cataract.

Egyptian domination over Palestine and Syria once again lapsed until Sety I (r. 1294–1279 BC) recovered Palestine. He initiated a period of fierce competition with the Hittites for control of the Levant, which came to a head at the Battle of Qadesh in 1275 BC. Although the Egyptians claimed victory, the Hittites probably gained the upper hand, as the area around an ancient city of Damascene came under Hittite influence.

Soon after this battle the resurgent Assyrians under King Adad-nirari I (r. 1305–1274 BC) captured the Mitannian capital of Washukanni (whose location is still unknown) and, with the collapse of the Mitanni kingdom, established themselves as a power equal to Egypt. In response the Hittites formed a pact of non-aggression with the Egyptians that led to a period of stability in the region.

THE "SEA PEOPLES"

Early in the 12th century BC large movements of peoples around the eastern Mediterranean coincided with the social and economic collapse of many of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms (map 3). A wave of destruction was wrought by tribes known collectively as the "Sea Peoples": cities on the Syrian coast and Cyprus were sacked, along with Hittite settlements and Mycenaean palaces, and the Hittite Empire and Mycenaean civilization both came to an end.

The Assyrians were not directly affected by these upheavals and continued to expand. They invaded Babylon as well as the Levant, where they took advantage of the collapse of the Hittite Empire. However, by the close of the 2nd millennium Assyrian dominance was also fading and the kingdom of Elam to the east now became the most powerful player in the region.
From approximately 1200 to 900 BC, West Asia was in an economic and political downswing. Both the archaeological and textual evidence indicates that there was no longer the vast wealth that had supported the lavish royal lifestyles and military campaigns of the Late Bronze Age. Although major cities remained occupied, the empires of the Egyptians, Hittites, Elamites and Assyrians no longer held sway over the region. However, beginning in 911 BC, Adad-nirari II (r. 911–891 BC) started to re-establish central authority in Assyria (map 1). After securing Assyria he sacked but did not conquer Babylon and subsequently conducted a successful series of campaigns in the Habur region. Expansion of the Assyrian Empire continued throughout much of the 9th century BC, and with their mighty armies the Assyrians were to dominate West Asia almost continuously for 200 years until their defeat by the Medes and Babylonians in 612 BC.

**Assyrian Expansion**

The Assyrians did not have a policy of uniform military conquest and incorporation; instead they established a pattern of conquest that entailed first receiving gifts from independent rulers, who were considered as “clients”. If the client state subsequently failed to provide “gifts” (tribute), the Assyrians treated this as an act of rebellion and conquered the state. A local ruler was then appointed, or the country was annexed and ruled by a provincial governor. This method of domination and control channelled all the tributes of clients and booty of conquered countries into the heartland of Assyria. Thus the Assyrians not only acquired an extensive empire but also great wealth, enabling their rulers to build fabulous palaces, establish several new capitals and commission works of art ranging from exquisite ivory carvings to monumental stone reliefs.

**Israel and Judah**

The Levant was one of the main areas to suffer the effects of Assyrian expansion. The Israelites had settled in Palestine, their traditional “promised land”, around 1250 BC (map 2). A little later, around 1200 BC, the Philistines occupied the adjacent area of Philistia. Increasing pressure from this and other neighbouring tribes forced the Israelites to unite under one king during the 11th century BC. The first, Saul, was defeated by the Philistines, but his successor David (r. 1006–966 BC) expanded the kingdom and chose Jerusalem as its religious and political centre. Under David and his son Solomon (r. 966–926 BC) the kingdom prospered, becoming an international power and a centre of culture and trade. Tensions between the northern and the southern tribes mounted, however, and after Solomon’s death the kingdom was divided into two parts, Israel and Judah.

**The Age of the Phoenicians**

To the north Phoenicia had become a major trading empire after the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization around 1200 BC (pages 36-37). Phoenicia consisted of autonomous city-states such as Byblos, Sidon and Tyre, which established new trade routes and from the end of the 9th century BC founded colonies in North Africa, Spain and Sardinia (map 3). Carthage was a wealthy Phoenician
trading centre and gradually established its own empire. Phoenician interest in the western Mediterranean led to clashes with Greeks in southern France and Corsica, while the Carthaginians later engaged in a power struggle with the Romans that ended with their city's destruction in 146 BC.

EGYPT AND ASSYRIA

After the central government of the Egyptian New Kingdom collapsed around 1069 BC, the country was ruled by two competing dynasties based in the Nile delta and Thebes. Nubia, parts of which had been colonized by Egypt from Old Kingdom times (pages 30–31), now became independent (map 4). A family of local lords established itself as a powerful dynasty, governing from Napata. When the rulers based in the delta threatened Thebes, the priest of the state god Amun sought the protection of the Nubian king Piy (r. 746–716 BC), granting him the title Pharaoh of Egypt. Piy conquered Thebes and went northwards to put down opposition by the delta rulers. His successor completed the conquest of Egypt, reversing centuries of Egyptian domination of Nubia. The start of the Nubian dynasty marks the beginning of the so-called Later Period (747–332 BC).

In the early 8th century BC waning Assyrian power allowed neighbouring kingdoms to prosper. The Urukians, centred in eastern Anatolia around Lake Van, greatly expanded their territory, notably to the south. They had adopted a number of ideas from the Assyrians—including the use of cuneiform writing—but they had their own distinctive culture and were skilled in working both bronze and iron. In Babylonia the Chaldeans, an aristocratic tribe, became prominent. The languishing Gulf trade revived under their auspices, and the resulting wealth and stability enabled Babylonian cultural life to continue, assuring the survival of Mesopotamian literary and scientific traditions. Assyrian power grew once again in the late 8th century BC, and after gaining control of Babylonia and the Levant the empire was soon in conflict with Egypt. Assyria itself was attacked and subdued by the Persians and the Greeks, who also went on to establish extremely powerful entities that finally clashed.

In 671 BC the Assyrians launched an attack against the Egyptians and, after initial setbacks, withdrew to leave friendly "client kings" in place. During this period, Egyptian culture flourished, with Greek Classical and Hellenistic influences becoming increasingly prominent. The Nubians, meanwhile, retreated southwards.

THE NEO-BABYLONIAN EMPIRE

In 626 BC, after 60 years of stability and growth under Assyrian co-kings, a Chaldean who took the royal name of Nabopolassar seized power in Babylonia and established what is known as the Chaldean or Neo-Babylonian Empire. Ten years of civil war between the Babylonians and the Assyrians followed, but by 616 BC Nabopolassar was strong enough to take his armies north, where he defeated the Assyrians and their Egyptian allies. In 615 BC the Medes, who originated from the area around Hamadan, sacked the Assyrian capital Ashur. In 612 BC the combined forces of the Medes and Babylonians besieged and sacked Nineveh, effectively bringing the Assyrian Empire to an end.

In 610 BC Nebuchadnezzar, the Medes' successor, became king of Babylon and established an empire that stretched from Egypt to the Euphrates. He quickly annexed Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, while his successor, Nebuchadnezzar II (r. 605–562 BC), continued his predecessor's policy of expansion. Nebuchadnezzar II was succeeded by his son, the biblical conqueror Nebuchadnezzar, who, after defeating the Babylonians, went on to conquer Egypt in 529 BC. The fall of Nineveh in 539 BC can be seen as a turning point between the millennia that saw the old empires of Egypt, the Hittites, Babylon and Assyria rise, fall and rise again, and the arrival of new players on the world stage: these were the Persians and the Greeks, who also went on to establish extremely powerful entities that finally clashed.
More than 700 years after the fall of Mycenae (pages 36–37), a new civilization flourished in Greece. The cultural and political life of Greece, and particularly of Athens, in the 5th century BC was to have a profound impact on Western civilization. In Athens the principles of democracy were established and scientific and philosophical reasoning taken to unprecedented heights. The Athenian literary tradition – exemplified by the tragedies of Sophocles and the comedies of Aristophanes – formed a central part of its legacy. Also in Athens, architecture and forms of art such as sculpture and vase painting took on the Classical styles that still influence the Western sense of aesthetics.

The Greek landscape is dominated by the sea and by mountains, which cover 80 per cent of the mainland and reach heights of over 2,000 metres (6,000 feet) (map 1). The original would have been made of bronze using the "lost-wax" technique, a method that enabled the Greeks to portray the most lifelike of figures. Where the many islands in the Aegean Sea provide secure points for navigation and promote maritime traffic, cross-country communication is hindered by the mountains, which leave many areas isolated. In these mountain pockets as grazing land. It is likely that the ancient rural landscape was lush and densely wooded, but by the 1st millennium BC: poor soil and the scarce rainfall during the summer months limited the possibilities for growing crops. Modern botanical and geological studies reveal a remarkable stability in the Greek countryside during the last 3,000 years, until the recent industrialization of agriculture. Today's farmers grow labour-intensive crops such as apricots and grapes in the valleys along the coast, cultivate cereals and olives on the less fertile mountain slopes, and use the mountain pastures as grazing land. It is likely that the ancient rural population of Greece practised a similar mixed agriculture, supplemented with marine resources.

The Greek city-states

Whereas the many islands in the Aegean Sea provide secure points for navigation and promote maritime traffic, cross-country communication is hindered by the mountains, which leave many areas isolated. In these mountain pockets independent, self-governing city-states, or poleis, developed during the 6th century BC. Their focal point was usually an urban centre positioned on a defensible rock: the acropolis (literally the "high town"). This functioned as the political, administrative and religious centre for the surrounding countryside. Some city-states expanded their influence and came to dominate; others remained on a more equal footing with neighbouring cities, with whom they acted as a federal unit in matters such as foreign policy. During the 5th century BC a sense of a Greek identity emerged, primarily based on language and religion – and expressed in the pan-Hellenic (all-Greek) festivals such as the Olympic Games and the shared oracles at Delphi and Dodona.

From around 750 BC food shortages, political unrest and trade interests prompted the Greeks to venture out and establish new city-states well away from home (map 2). These colonies retained the culture and religion of their mother cities, yet in a political sense functioned independently. The earliest colonies in Syria (Al Mina) and Italy (Ischia), founded by Eretria and Chalkeis, were primarily trading posts, but the quest for arable land probably played a key role in the colonization of Sicily and the Black Sea area, mostly by Chalkeis, Corinth and Miletus. While these trade connections and colonies were of great cultural significance, promoting an exchange between the eastern and western Mediterranean areas, they also led to major conflicts, for example with the Phoenicians (pages 38–39).

War with Persia

In the east the expansion of Persia's Achaemenid Empire (pages 42–43) led to confrontations with the Greek cities of Asia Minor (map 3). With the support of Athens and Eretria, these cities rebelled against the Persian king Darius I in 499 BC, and the rebellions were not finally suppressed until 493 BC. Darius then demanded the submission of all the mainland Greek cities, but Athens and Sparta refused. In 492 BC Darius sent out a punitive mission, which backfired
after most of the Persian fleet was lost in storms around Mount Athos. When Eretria was sacked in 490 BC Greece was divided on how to respond, but the Athenians and a small Plataean force took the initiative and defeated the Persians at Marathon that year. Infuriated, Darius's successor Xerxes prepared an even larger invasion, to which many of the Greek city-states responded by mounting their first united force, led by Sparta. The Athenian leader Themistocles interpreted the oracular pronouncement that they should rely on Athens's wooden walls to mean strengthening their navy, and he enlarged the fleet to 180 ships.

The first confrontation took place in 480 BC at Thermopylae, where the Spartan King Leonidas held out bravely but was defeated. After inflicting considerable losses on the Persian navy at Artemisium in 480 BC, the Athenians withdrew to the Bay of Salamis. They knew they could not defeat the Persians on land and so left their city to the enemy, who burned Athens to the ground. The huge Persian fleet followed the Athenian navy to Salamis but was unable to manoeuvre within the narrow straits there and was obliterated in 480 BC. The following year, at Platea, the Persian land army suffered a similar fate at the hands of the Spartans and the Greeks dealt the Persians the final blow in 479 BC at Mount Mycale, where the Persian troops had taken refuge. The small and independent Greek city-states had managed to defeat the greatest empire at that time.

ATHENS AND SPARTA

Athens gained tremendous prestige through its contributions to the victory over the Persians and, when Sparta declined, seemed the obvious leader of an anti-Persian pact. Although the main aims of this confederacy, the Delian League, were protection against the Persians and seeking compensation for the incurred losses, the Athenians soon used the alliance to build an empire. They imposed heavy tributes on their allies and punished revolts mercilessly. In 454 BC the Delian League's treasury was moved to Athens and funds were overtly channelled into the city's coffers. A grand building scheme was launched to restore the city, crowned by the construction of the Parthenon (477-438 BC) and the Erechtheum (421-406 BC). This was Athens's Golden Age, much of it masterminded by Pericles.

Sparta and other Greek cities watched the growth of Athens with suspicion. Not only did they fear Athens's military power, but they were also wary of democracy, Athens's radical contribution to political innovation. This rule of the people (women, slaves and foreigners excepted) was perceived as posing a direct threat to Sparta's ruling upper classes and, after mounting tension, war broke out in 431 BC (map 4). It was a costly conflict: Attica's countryside was sacked annually and the population, withdrawn within the city's walls, suffered famine and plague that killed a quarter of its number, including Pericles. The Peloponnesian War lasted 27 years, ending with Athens's downfall in 404 BC.

### Map 3: The Persian Wars 492–479 BC

- Movement of Persian fleet 492 BC
- Movement of Persian fleet and army 480 BC
- Major battle 479 BC
- Area of war with Persia

- Persian Empire 492 BC

- The unity displayed by Greece during the Persian Wars was short-lived. Athenian imperialist policy led to war with Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies—described by the historian Thucydides as the most appalling of all the Greek wars in losses and suffering.

### Map 4: The Peloponnesian War 431–404 BC

- Athens and Delian League members
- Persian Empire
- Area allied to Athens
- Athenian victory with date

- Sparta's victory with date

#### Notes

- The Greeks exported their political and social ideas alongside their art, and various colonies around the northern shores of the Mediterranean are still littered with temples, theatres, gymnasia and agora, or market-places. The remains of this late 5th-century temple are at Segesta in Sicily—a focal point for Greek trade. Its columns are in the simple Doric style, first of the three major orders of Classical architecture, the progressively more complex and ornate Ionic and Corinthian styles followed later.
On his succession in 359 BC Philip II was master of a tiny kingdom, yet he transformed the Macedonian army into a formidable fighting machine - increasing the numbers of aristocratic cavalry, introducing the heavy infantry phalanx armed with sarissas (long pikes), and mounting sieges of unprecedented efficiency. By his death in 336 BC Macedonia was a major power, dominating Greece and threatening the Persian Achaemenid Empire. His son Alexander, charismatic leader and military genius, inherited Philip's ambitions as well as his army, and he conquered not only the Persian Empire but also lands well beyond. However, his attempts to weld his vast conquests into a unified empire under combined Macedonian and local rulers ended with his early death in Babylon at the age of 32.

The Persian Achaemenid Empire (map 1) now encompassed the Lydian territory, including the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor which Croesus had annexed in 585 BC. In 539 BC Cyrus also conquered Babylon. He was said to have been a just ruler who allowed his subjects religious freedom and did not impose excessively harsh taxes.

The Persian satrapies
In 530 BC Cyrus was killed on campaign and was succeeded by his son Cambyses, whose greatest military feat was the annexation of Egypt in 525 BC. After Cambyses and his brother mysteriously died, Darius I (a cousin of Achaemenid descent) came to the throne in 521 BC. Rather than accepting the existing administrative structures as his predecessors had done, Darius organized the empire into 20 provinces or "satrapies", each ruled by one of his relatives. To ensure efficient government he created a road network and installed a regular system of taxation based on the gold Daric coin.

Darius added the Indus province to the empire and brought Thrace under Persian rule in 512 BC, but his attack on the Scythians in the Danube area was unsuccessful. Darius suffered another setback in 499 BC, when Cyprus Persian rule combined an empire-wide legal and administrative system with an acceptance of local customs, practices and religions. Trade prospered under the Achaemenids, facilitated by the efficient road network, a standardized system of weights and measures, and the innovative use of coinage. Sophisticated irrigation works using underground watercourses and canals increased agricultural productivity.
and the Greek city-states on the coast of Asia Minor revolted. Although Cyprus was swiftly brought back under Persian rule, the Greek rebellion persisted until 493 BC. The missions sent by Darius and his successor Xerxes to punish the mainland Greeks for their support ended in Persian defeats in 490, 480 and 479 BC (pages 46-47). The rest of the empire remained intact until it was conquered by Alexander the Great.

**MACEDONIAN EXPANSION**

When Darius invaded Thrace, Macedonia had little choice but to become a Persian vassal, and it remained a marginal state on the international political scene until Philip II ascended the Macedonian throne in 359 BC. Philip forged a professional army, unified Macedonia and, having gained control of Thessaly, expanded into Illyria and Thrace, bringing important harbours and goldmines into the empire.

His expansion (map 2) met with hostility from Athens and Thebes, whose military power had greatly diminished during the Peloponnesian War. After his victory over a combined Theban-Athenian army at Chaeronea in 338 BC, Philip was the undisputed master of Greece until his assassination in 336 BC - just as he was preparing to invade Persia. His 20-year-old son Alexander III succeeded him, and after crushing opposition to his reign in Macedonia he joined the remainder of his father's army in Persian territory. Having defeated the army of the Persian satraps at Granicus in 334 BC, Alexander faced Darius III (r. 336–330 BC) at Issus in 333 BC. On a narrow coastal plain he dealt the Persians a devastating defeat and captured Darius's family.

He then conquered Syria, Egypt and Mesopotamia before confronting Darius again in 331 BC on the plains of the Indus near Arbela. After a long battle, Darius fled and Alexander moved on to sack Persepolis in retribution for the destruction of Athens in the Persian Wars some 150 years earlier.

In the east, Alexander's self-proclaimed status as King of Asia was threatened by rebel satraps. However, in 327 BC he crushed remaining opposition in eastern Iran and Afghanistan, before invading northern India. His ambition had now shifted to expanding beyond the boundaries of the former Persian Empire, and he crossed the River Indus in 326 BC; he hoped to proceed to the River Ganges, regarded as the eastern limit of the inhabited world, but was stopped by mutiny in his tired army. Instead he subdued the tribes along the River Indus and returned to Babylon, where he died in 323 BC of fever, exhaustion or possibly poison.

Alexander's Great had forged an empire which stretched from Greece to the River Indus (map 3) and which merged Greek and Oriental cultures. Greek became the common language, and Greek gods were venerated side by side with local deities. Both Macedonians and Persians ruled as satraps, and Alexander encouraged his generals to marry Persian women, as he himself had done. He founded 70 new cities, many called Alexandria, which acted as military but also cultural centres of the new cosmopolitan society. Alexander's success was rooted in his prowess as a military leader, a role in which he displayed great personal courage, and in clever propaganda, such as the construction of a myth proclaiming his divinity - a belief which he himself seemed to share.

**ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS**

After Alexander's death a long power struggle ensued between his generals, the so-called "War of the Diadochi" (successors). The main contenders were Antigonus of Phrygia, Seleucus of Babylonia, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Antipatros, in charge of Macedonia and Greece. Macedonia, generally regarded as the seat of legitimate rule, became the centre of continuous conflict. After the murder of Alexander's son by Cassander, son of Antipatros, the various successors all proclaimed themselves kings between 306 and 303 BC (map 4).

While this marked the definite end of Alexander's empire, the war was not yet over: after renewed hostilities three kingdoms (later called the Hellenistic kingdoms) were securely established by 275 BC. The Antigonids ruled in Macedonia, the Seleucids in Syria and the Ptolemies in Egypt, but their reigns ended when the Romans captured their territories (in 148, 64 and 30 BC respectively). Meanwhile the successors of Chandragupta - who, after Alexander's death, had founded the Mauryan Empire and taken control of the Punjab region - remained in power until approximately 186 BC (pages 46-47).
THE BIRTH OF WORLD RELIGIONS
1500 BC–AD 600

By 600 AD a series of major religions had spread throughout Eurasia (map 1). Distinguished from other, more local beliefs by a focus on holy writings, or scriptures, most of them continue to flourish today.

The oldest religion is Hinduism. Its sacred writings, the Vedas, were first compiled by seers and priests, or rishis, and were based on myths, legends and hymns passed down from antiquity. Many of the beliefs and rituals of Hinduism had their origins in the sacrificial cults introduced to India by the Indo-Aryans from around 1500 BC, while others were indigenous and can be traced back to the Indus civilization (pages 28–29); indeed it derives its name from the river.

Central to Hinduism are a belief in the transmigration of souls, the worship of many deities (who eventually came to be seen as aspects of one god), the religious sanction of strict social stratification, the caste system, and the ability to assimilate rather than exclude different religious beliefs. Unlike most of the later major religions, Hinduism never really spread beyond the bounds of its home country, although it was very influential in some of the early states of Southeast Asia (pages 64–65).

THE SPREAD OF BUDDHISM

Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–483 BC), the founder of Buddhism, was born a wealthy prince in northeastern India (map 2). Renouncing worldly trappings and achieving enlightenment, or nirvana, he became known as the Buddha (the Enlightened). Gautama lived at a time of great religious ferment in India, and Buddhism was one of a number of sects that aimed to reform Hinduism. Another, more extreme, reform movement was Jainism, whose asceticism was a reaction to the rigid ritualism of Hinduism. Buddhism shared with Hinduism the belief in the cycle of rebirth, but differed in the way in which escape from the cycle could be achieved. Indeed the appearance of Buddhism stimulated a resurgence in Hinduism, which may be why Buddhism failed to take a permanent hold in India.
Buddhism was given official backing by the Mauryan Emperor Ashoka (r. 272-231 BC), and Buddhist monuments, such as the great stupa at Sanchi, were built. Over the following centuries Buddhism – with its emphasis on overcoming suffering and breaking out of the endless cycle of rebirth through discipline, meditation, good works and the vanishing of desire – spread throughout much of Asia, reaching Japan in the 6th century AD. Great Buddhist centres, based around religious communities, developed.

**CONFUCIANISM AND DAOISM**

Two philosophical traditions were dominant in China when Buddhist monks arrived there in the 4th century AD. Confucianism, named after the author of the Classics, Kongzi, or Confucius (551-479 BC), propounded a series of morals encouraging a way of life ruled by the principles of order, hierarchy and respect. Confucius worked for much of his career as an administrator in one of the Warring States (pages 48-49), and his ideas subsequently greatly influenced political philosophy in China and many other parts of East Asia.

The other tradition, Daoism, or “the Way”, called for people to find ways of being in harmony with the world. It was based on the teachings of the philosopher Lao-tze, written down in the Dao De Jing (probably in the 3rd century BC). In its combination of cosmology and the sanctification of nature, certain mountains were considered especially sacred and became the focus of worship.

**ZOROASTRIANISM AND JUDAISM**

In West Asia a new religion developed out of the ancient Indo-Iranian belief systems during the 1st millennium BC. Zarathrustra, known to the Greek world as Zoroaster, lived in Persia, probably during the 10th century BC, though some date him from 626 to 551 BC. Zoroastrianism, the religion named after him, had a major impact on the development of many other religious traditions, including Judaism and Christianity. Its scriptures, the Avesta, set out the Zoroastrian belief that life is a constant struggle between good and evil. Zoroaster rejected the pantheism of the Indo-Iranian religions and proclaimed one of the ancient deities, Ahura Mazda (the “Wise Lord”) as the one supreme god.

Zoroaster believed that the end of the world was imminent, and that only the righteous would survive the great conflagration to share in the new creation.

Following the death of Zoroaster his teachings spread throughout the Persian Achaemenid Empire of 550-330 BC (pages 42-43) until the conquests of Alexander displaced Zoroastrianism with Hellenistic beliefs. Renewed interest in Zoroastrianism developed towards the end of the Parthian Empire (238 BC-AD 224), and it was taken up as the official religion of the Sassanian Empire, where it flourished until the arrival of Islam in the 7th century.

Zoroastrianism had considerable influence on the development of Judaism (map 3), which had originated with the people of Abraham – nomad groups living in the northern Arabian Desert in the 2nd millennium BC. Jewish tradition holds that these Hebrew people spent time in slavery in pharaonic Egypt before leaving under the leadership of Moses around 1250 BC. They settled in Canaan and fought with the local inhabitants, particularly the Philistines, until peace was achieved under King David around 1000 BC.

Jewish communities were established in Egypt in the 2nd century BC, in Italy from the 1st century AD, in Spain by AD 200 and in Germany by AD 300. The teachings of Judaism form the Old Testament of the Bible, in addition, Jewish law is recorded in the Talmud, the first codification being the Mishnah, written down about AD 200.

**THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY**

Named after its founding figure, Jesus Christ (c. 4 BC-AD 29), Christianity (map 4) developed from Judaic roots. Christians believe in one God and that Jesus, born in Bethlehem, is the Son of God – the Messiah whose arrival on Earth had long been promised in the Jewish tradition. Jesus’s radical teachings and disregard for the establishment led to his death by crucifixion, an event Christians believe he overcame in the Resurrection. In the first few centuries AD, Christianity flourished in many parts of the Roman world, and Christ’s teachings (written down in the New Testament) spread by apostolic figures such as Paul of Tarsus. By 600 it had travelled from its origins in the eastern Mediterranean as far as the western shores of the Caspian Sea in the east and the British Isles in the northwest.
During the 2nd millennium BC Indo-Aryan nomads were the first of many groups from Iran or Central Asia to invade the Indian subcontinent. Initially they spread only into the Ganges Valley, but according to legend (given support by recent archaeological work), around 500 BC a group led by Prince Vijaya also gained control of Sri Lanka. In 530 BC the Persians conquered the northwest, but the area subsequently fell to Alexander the Great (pages 42–43) and the Indo-Greek kingdoms that emerged after his death dominated the region for several centuries. However, neither Persians nor Greeks ever penetrated deeper into the subcontinent, due to the strength of native dynasties.

**Kingdoms and Empires**

By 500 BC kingdoms existed throughout the Ganges region. Chief among these was Magadha, favourably located for control both of riverborne trade and of the sources of raw materials such as iron. Magadha gradually expanded at the expense of its neighbours and before 297 BC its king, Chandragupta Maurya, ruled most of north India (map 1). His grandson Ashoka (r. 272–231 BC) further extended the empire, conquering Kalinga in 261 BC, and only the extreme south retained its independence. Pillar and rock edicts mark the extent of Mauryan political authority: these proclaimed Ashoka’s ethical code of social responsibility and toleration. It was an age of peace and prosperity.

The political unity of the Mauryan Empire did not long survive Ashoka’s death in about 231 BC. Numerous independent kingdoms emerged, such as the Satavahana realms in western India, but none was strong enough to resist the waves of foreign invaders (map 2). The Sakas, arriving from Central Asia around 130 BC, gradually gained control of much of the north and west. They were succeeded by the Parthians from the Iranian Plateau and the Central Asian Kushans, who loosely united the Ganges Valley and the northwest until the mid-3rd century AD. From the 5th century AD onwards, the north was prey to attacks by the ferocious Huns (White Huns) who swept in from the east.

By the time they reached the Ganges Valley or the Deccan, the force of foreign invasions was spent, and Sri Lanka and the south were generally spared. Instead they suffered periodic attacks by native groups such as the Mauryans, Tamils and Guptas. In the 4th century AD the Guptas, who ruled a small kingdom in the Ganges region, began to expand, gaining control of adjacent regions through military conquest, diplomacy and dynastic marriages. Unlike the earlier Mauryan Empire, however, they established only indirect political authority over much of this area, local rulers usually acting under their suzerainty.

**Rural and Urban Development**

Much of the subcontinent, such as the jungle regions, was unsuited to agriculture and was inhabited by hunter-gatherers. In addition to the wild produce they collected for their own needs they obtained materials for settled farmers, such as honey, venison and lac (used for lacquer), exchanging these for cultivated foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

Throughout this period the majority of South Asians dwelt in villages. Rice was the main staple in the east and Sri Lanka, millet in the south and wheat in the north; animals, particularly cattle, were kept. By around 500 BC irrigation works such as canals, dams and tanks were being constructed to increase agricultural productivity. Rulers – particularly the Mauryas, who exercised strong centralized control over their realms – also encouraged the cultivation of wasteland, often by the forced resettlement of groups of low-caste cultivators. In Sri Lanka sophisticated hydraulic engineering developed from around 300 BC, using sluice pits and long canals. Land taxes and levies on produce provided the main income for states throughout the period, although trade also yielded considerable revenues.

Many towns and cities developed as centres of trade and industry, and they flourished even during periods of weak political control (map 3). Many, especially in the west and south, were ports for seaborne trade. They contained...
Many towns and cities were established under the Mauryas, though they developed somewhat later in the south, where irrigation agriculture had begun only around 300 BCE. Political authority went hand-in-hand with town dwelling: when the Ikshvaku broke away from the weakened Satavahana Empire in the 3rd century AD, for example, one of their first acts was to establish Vijayapuri ("city of victory", now modern Nagarjunakonda) on the banks of the Krishna River.

**Trade and Religion**

By the early centuries AD regular seaborne trade linked southern India and Sri Lanka with countries to both east and west (map 4). The Romans traded gold in exchange for gemstones, textiles and spices; to the east, Indians and Sri Lankans obtained gold, tin and spices from the kingdoms of Southeast Asia (pages 52-53). In addition, Southeast Asia acted as an entrepot between China and India. China also traded overland along the Silk Road, which skirted the deserts of Central Asia. From north India Chinese goods, particularly silks, were carried through Persia or by sea to Alexandria, Rome's principal port for trade using the Indian Ocean.

These land and sea routes also carried Indian religions to the lands of the east. In the mid-1st millennium BCE a number of new religions appeared, notably Buddhism and Jainism (pages 44-45). They rejected Brahminical Hindu orthodoxy, including the caste system, and were enthusiastically adopted by the lower castes, merchants and craftsmen. Buddhism rapidly became the dominant religion in north India, later spreading into the south. Ashoka sent a Buddhist mission to Sri Lanka, where King Devanampiya Tissa became an ardent convert, establishing a Buddhist realm which has endured until today. Simple complexes of monastic cells grew by the early centuries AD into substantial monasteries, usually richly endowed by royalty, merchants and guilds. Located on the outskirts of towns and along the great highways, they supported Buddhist monks and nuns, accommodated travellers, provided education and could raise venture capital.

Under the Guptas (c. 320-550) there was a major revival of Hinduism, which had continued in some areas and was now enhanced by features adopted from the breakaway religions, particularly bhakti (personal devotion to deities or saints). Buddhism gradually withered away in the country of its birth but remained vigorous in Sri Lanka, China, Japan, Tibet and Southeast Asia. Hinduism was also introduced to the latter region, and a patchwork of Buddhist and Hindu states developed there (pages 62-63).
In the 8th century BC, regional entities began to assert their independence from the Zhou state, fighting among themselves for dominance as well as fending off attacks from barbarian neighbours. By the late 5th century BC power was concentrated in seven principal states—Han, Wei, Zhao, Qin, Chu, Yan, and Qi. They all built enormous walls to protect their borders, fortified their cities and even their villages, and constructed roads and canals to expedite the movement of troops and supplies. As military technology and the science of warfare flourished, the organization, weaponry and ferocity of the Qin army combined to give them superiority over the other Warring States, and in 221 BC the Qin united the whole area to form the First Chinese empire.

In the period between the victory of the Zhou king Wu over the Shang in the mid-11th century BC and the downfall of the last Han emperor, Xian Di, in AD 220, China underwent a series of political, economic and philosophical transformations that were to lay the foundations for Chinese government and society until the 20th century.

**The First Chinese Dynasties**
The Zhou, possibly descended from nomads, established their royal capital at Hao in their ancestral heartland in the Wei River valley. For 250 years Zhou rulers held sway over a unified domain, their rule legitimated by the Mandate of Heaven—the divine right to rule China— which they claimed to have inherited from the Shang. Long inscriptions on fine bronze vessels record their achievements. By 770 BC, however, the empire had begun to fragment, under pressure from barbarian tribes to the northwest the Zhou capital was moved east to Luoyang. Despite the continued claim of Zhou kings to the Mandate of Heaven, real power slipped away to a multitude of regional states.

By 403 BC, seven major "Warring States" were competing for control of China (map 1). Through a series of tactical victories beginning in 280 BC, and under King Zheng from 246 BC, the state of Qin achieved supremacy by 221 BC. Zhang had reformed Qin, replacing the old kinship-based government with an efficient bureaucratic state. Proclaiming himself Shi Huang Di, "the First Emperor", he established his new capital at Xianyang. Despite an early death in 210 BC, he left a legacy that paved the way for Liu Bang, the founder of the Han dynasty four years later, to...
build the Han Empire (map 2). Liu Bang and his descendants ruled China from 206 BC to AD 220, with a brief interruption during Wang Mang’s Xin dynasty (AD 6–23).

Movements of population

By AD 2, the date of the first national census, China had a recorded population of 57 million. This huge number was often mobilized for warfare or vast public works, and in the reign of Wu Di (141–57 BC), the “Martial Emperor” who greatly expanded the territories of the empire, some two million people were resettled in colonies in the north and northwest. However, the later part of the Han dynasty saw a major movement of population southwards—a process that was precipitated by a major shift in the course of the Huang He River between AD 2 and 11 that left much of north China, traditionally the centre of power, depopulated.

The art of war in early China

These mass population movements occurred in a country unified through major developments in the art of war. Under the warlords of the Warring States, both individual gallantry and mass brutality were displayed, and armies became professional. From the 6th century BC new weapons, notably iron swords and armour, had replaced the traditional bronze halberds. Cavalry outmanoeuvred chariots on the battlefield and the new cities became targets for siege warfare. The Zhao stronghold of Jinyang was besieged for a year before the attackers turned on each other in a classic piece of Warring States treachery. From the 5th century BC the states built pounded-earth walls along their frontiers.

While earlier rulers either mounted expeditions against the nomadic “barbarian non-Chinese” or were harassed by them, the Qin and Han were aggressively expansionist. To keep the nomads out of his new empire, Shi Huang Di joined the sections of walled defences earlier states had built, thus creating the Great Wall. The Xiongnu, among the most troublesome for the early Chinese empires, and the Han emperor Wu Di’s constant search for allies against them created new links with the middle of the continent. The nomads often had to be bought off as much as driven away by force, as shown by the Chinese treasures from the tomb of the Xiongnu chief at Noin Ula. Under the Han, military expansion was backed up by a programme of colonization, and commanderies were set up in areas far-flung as modern Korea and Vietnam.

Town and country living

A truly urban civilization developed in this period, with walled cities becoming the focus of trade, as in the case of Chang’an (map 3). Many modern Chinese cities are built on foundations laid in the Zhou period, and the earliest Chinese coins, miniature bronze knives and spades come from Zhou cities. Coinage was standardized by the First Emperor and the multitude of local mints was finally brought under central control in 119 BC.

The empire depended on the production of a wide range of goods and services, and in particular stable agriculture (map 4). Agricultural productivity was increased by government reforms and the use of more efficient tools, especially new ploughs made of iron. The importance of iron was recognized through the introduction, again in 119 BC, of state monopolies over its production, along with control of the production of salt and alcohol.

Politics and the end of the Han empire

In the period of the Warring States, a political philosophy developed that recognized the uplifting nature of public life, but also viewed politics as ultimately corrupting. Clashes resonate throughout the history of the early Chinese empires between, on the one hand, the authoritarian politics of many of the rulers and, on the other, the high ideals of Confucius (551–479 BC) — perhaps the most influential of all Chinese philosophers — and his Reformist successors, which placed emphasis on virtue and fair government. Unlike their Shang predecessors, rulers were bound more by codes of human conduct than the demands of the spirits. Laws were first codified in the state of Wei under the rule of Duke Wen (r. 424–387 BC). Although much criticized, these formed the model for the Han law code. It was, however, peasant revolts inspired by messianic beliefs, often drawing on Daoism, that disrupted and weakened the Han Empire towards the end of its life. Movements such as the revolt of the Yellow Turbans in 184 AD, punished by the slaughter of over 500,000 people, left the empire open to the ambitions of powerful independent generals who divided up its territories between them.
Central Asia is a vast arid zone of steppe grasslands, looming mountains and inhospitable deserts. On its southwestern mountain fringes an agricultural way of life developed as early as the 6th millennium BC at sites like Djeitun, and some of these communities later developed into towns and cities (map 1). For example, Altyn Depe was first occupied in the 6th millennium, was enclosed by a wall in the 4th millennium, and by the 3rd millennium covered an area of nearly 30 hectares (74 acres) with craft production areas, elite compounds, fine burials and large platforms reminiscent of the great Mesopotamian ziggurats (pages 28–29). Agriculture in this region depended on a precarious irrigation system that collapsed around 2000 BC. However, later inhabitants such as the Persians (later 1st millennium BC) and Sasanians (from the 3rd century AD) devised more complex underground irrigation canals (qanats) which again brought prosperity to the region.

Up to the 5th millennium BC settlements were scattered along the rivers of Central Asia. These often consisted of partially subterranean houses and were home to small groups of hunter-gatherers who caught fish and a variety of game and collected plant foods. Later these hunter-gatherer communities began to adopt pottery and aspects of food production from the agricultural or pastoral groups with whom they came into contact (map 2).

**SETTLEMENT AND PASTORALISM**

By 4500 BC small permanent communities had appeared in favoured regions of Central Asia on the margins of Europe and West Asia, growing crops and, more particularly, herding livestock. Some of these were among the first to domesticate the horse, initially for meat. Their successors used wheeled vehicles: indeed four-wheeled wagons appeared in burials in
southern Russia in the 4th millennium BC, and by 2000 BC the chariot dominated battlefields from Mesopotamia to China. The introduction of the spoked wheel (replacing the heavy solid wheel) made these vehicles much more manoeuvrable. Horse-riding was first adopted around 2000 BC by peoples dwelling north of the Caspian Sea. By 1000 BC full nomadic pastoralism had developed, from which emerged the horse-riding warriors who were to become the scourge of the Classical world.

While the origins of Indo-European speakers are still a matter of heated debate, many scholars would now place them among the groups dwelling between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea in the 4th and 3rd millennia BC. These are archaeologically identified as the Srubnaya and Andronovo cultures and their predecessors. During the 2nd millennium BC groups speaking Indo-European languages can be identified in adjacent areas (map 4). By the beginning of the 1st millennium AD Indo-European languages were spoken in Europe as well as much of West Asia, Iran, South Asia and parts of Central Asia.

By the 1st millennium BC a fusion of nomadic and sedentary cultures gave rise to several kingdoms in south-western Central Asia, which by the mid-6th century BC were largely under Persian control. The Achaemenid kings of the Persian Empire built roads, fortified cities and developed irrigation systems, and the influence of Persian culture was felt deep into Central Asia. Persian rule came to an end with the campaigns of Alexander the Great, and Hellenistic systems of administration and culture spread throughout the region (pages 42–43). The Greco-Bactrian kings were the first to establish links across Central Asia with China.

**The Nomad Confederacies**

In the later centuries BC a series of powerful confederacies emerged among the nomad peoples. Historical accounts of these nomad societies and the threat they posed to the Classical civilizations have been left behind by Greek, Roman, Chinese and other authors, who named great tribal confederacies, including the Xiongnu and Yuechi in the east, and the Scythians, Sakas, Cimmerians and Sarmatians further west (map 4). These nomad groups buried their elite in great mounds such as those at Noin Ula, Pazyryk and Kul Oba. Horses, central to the nomadic way of life, often played a major role in burial rituals, sacrificed to accompany their owners, along with much gold and silver and lavishly decorated textiles, some of which have been marvellously preserved in the frozen conditions of the tundra. Such rich burials are described by the Greek historian Herodotus, whose accounts closely match the archaeological finds. These nomads wore highly decorated clothes and ornamented their bodies with tattoos. Hemp was not only used for textiles but was also smoked, as evidenced by remains of smoking paraphernalia. Stringed instruments also found in the tombs attest a love of music and song.

The Xiongnu formed one of the greatest of the nomad confederacies. Originating on the Mongolian plateau, they conquered and ruled the oasis cities of the Turfan Basin in the 2nd century BC. While they sometimes harried the borders of the Chinese Empire, on other occasions they enjoyed good trading relationships with China (pages 52–53), as can be seen in the presence of exquisite Chinese silks and other manufactured treasures, such as bronzes and lacquer, in the burial of a Xiongnu chief at Noin Ula. Xiongnu expansion drove other nomad groups further west, including the Yuechi, who settled on the Oxus (Amudarya) River. One branch of the Yuechi, the Xianzhu, later established an empire in northern India (pages 46–47). The Xiongnu and other nomad peoples developed a distinctive culture, marked particularly by a splendid tradition of zoomorphic art. Other shared practices included binding children's heads in infancy to produce an elongated shape. They also developed major innovations in equestrian and military equipment, such as the composite bow or the scale-armour which made Sarmatian cavalry such formidable opponents of the Romans. Similarly the Huns, mounted steppe warriors armed with powerful reflex bows, wrought havoc in 5th-century Europe and northern India (map 5).

From the 1st millennium BC substantial population movements took place in the steppe region. Groups often spilled over into adjacent settled lands, in some cases laying waste settled communities before being driven off, as with the 8th-century inroads of the Commanesians into West Asia. Sometimes the invaders settled and became incorporated into the civilization of the lands they overran—the Sakas and Kushans in South Asia, for example. China successfully resisted many nomad incursions—partly by erecting massive defences that culminated in the Great Wall—though its western provinces fell for a period to the might of the Xiongnu nomads.

The Hunns moved through Central Asia during the 4th century AD, as evidenced by finds of their typical large bronze cauldrons, bows and artificially deformed skulls. One branch entered Europe in the 5th century, briefly wreaking havoc under the charismatic leadership of Attila, while the Hepthalites (Hunas or White Huns) overran the Sasanian Empire and laid waste the cities of northern India where they established a short-lived empire.
Bronze-working cultures had developed in mainland Southeast Asia during the 3rd millennium BC, and by 500 BC the bronze objects that were produced included the famous Dong Son drums. The drums were placed in elite burials and probably had a ritual significance. Made using a "lost wax" casting technique, they were widely distributed and reached the islands of Southeast Asia, where metallurgy was also being practised. By the 2nd century BC the area was linked to both India and China by sea routes which were used by Hindu Brahmin priests and Buddhist missionaries as well as merchants. As a result, new ideas of astronomy, art, science, medicine, government and religion were spread, and Buddhist and Hindu states were established in the region. One of the greatest was Funan, reputedly founded in the 2nd century BC by the Brahmin Kaundinya and reaching its peak in the 3rd century AD. The remains of a major Funan trading city have been excavated at Oc Eo.

In the early 2nd century BC the Xiongnu nomads drove their Yuechi neighbours westwards, in the process making the Yuechi king's skull into a drinking cup. In 138 BC the Han Chinese emperor Wudi sent Zhang Qian to the Yuechi, hoping to make common cause with them against their mutual Xiongnu enemies. After enormous difficulties and numerous adventures, Zhang Qian reached the Yuechi in the Oxus Valley — and although he failed to persuade them to renew their conflict with the Xiongnu, he took back to China detailed accounts of the lands he visited and the new opportunities for trade that they offered.

Over the following century Han China established trade routes through Central Asia which, despite passing through some of the most inhospitable terrain in Eurasia, soon provided access to West and South Asia and indirectly to the Roman world (map 1). For a time the Chinese controlled this "Silk Road" through Central Asia, establishing the Western Regions Protectorate with garrisons in the caravan towns, but the area was always menaced and often controlled by barbarian groups such as the Wusun and, especially, the Xiongnu. During the first three centuries AD the western portion was ruled by the Kushans, who had established an empire in northern India (pages 46-47).

Dependent largely on the hardy Bactrian camel, the Silk Road trade took Chinese silks (a prized commodity in the Roman Empire) and other luxuries to India and thence to the markets of the West. In exchange, many Roman manufactured goods found their way to China, along with the highly valued "heavenly horses" of Ferghana, gems from India, and grapes, saffron, beans and pomegranates from Central Asia. Ideas travelled, too: by the 1st century AD Buddhism was spreading from its Indian home to the oasis towns of the Silk Road, later becoming established in China, Korea and Japan (pages 44-45).

A number of possible routes linked China and the West, their course channelled by lofty mountains and freezing deserts, but political and military factors were also important in determining which routes were in use at any time. The oasis towns along the Silk Road rose and fell in prosperity with the fluctuating importance of the various routes. The collapse of the Han Empire in the 3rd century AD, the decline of the Kushans and the break-up of the Roman Empire all had their impact on the Silk Road, though links between East and West continued — for example, taking Chinese pilgrims to visit the Buddhist holy places in India.

**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

By the 2nd century BC sea routes linking India with China via Southeast Asia were also in common use. While Indian literature makes only vague references to trade with Southeast Asia, finds of Indian beads and Western objects in the region — such as Roman coins and cut gems — and of Southeast Asian tin in south Indian sites, attest to the region's contacts with India. The seaborne trade grew in the early centuries AD, a period when urban centres and states were appearing in much of Southeast Asia (map 2). Riverborne trade linked China and mainland Southeast Asia during the 1st millennium BC, and sea traffic developed during the period of the Han Empire. In 111 BC Han armies conquered the formerly independent state of Nan Yue, establishing colonies and, from AD 40, directly administering the province. At this time the area to its south was probably home to a number of small independent chieftdoms united in opposition to Chinese territorial aggression. Chinese interest in Southeast Asian trade burgeoned after the fall of the Han in AD 220, when the Chinese elite fled south, and trade with the West along the Silk Road was largely replaced by maritime trade via Southeast Asia to India.
TRADE ACROSS THE INDIAN OCEAN

Trade links had been operating around the coasts of the Indian Ocean from the later 3rd millennium BC. Regular seaborne trade took place in the Gulf, Sumerians trading directly with the Indus civilization, along with the coastal inhabitants of Oman and Makran and the seafaring traders of Bahrain. Land or coast-hugging sea routes also brought African plants and Arabian incense to India and the lands of the Gulf (pages 28–29). Egypt was economically and politically involved with Nubia to its south along the River Nile (pages 30-31), and seaborne expeditions through the Red Sea were mounted by Egypt to bring back exotic materials from the Land of Punt, probably situated in Ethiopia.

In subsequent centuries the rise and fall of Mediterranean, western Asiatic and Indian Ocean states and cultures brought a variety of participants into this network, including Persians, Phoenicians and Greeks. By the 1st millennium BC both Arabs and Indians were familiar with, and exploiting, the monsoon winds to cross the Indian Ocean instead of laboriously following the coast. The volume of Roman traffic in the Indian Ocean greatly increased during the reign of Emperor Augustus (27 BC–AD 14), with perhaps over 100 ships setting out from the Red Sea in a single year.

A Greek sailing manual of around 60 AD, The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (Indian Ocean), has provided a wealth of information on trade in this area. Alexandria was the starting point for most east- and southbound trade: here the bulk of cargoes were assembled and shipped down the Nile as far as Koptos, where they were taken by camel to either Myos Hormos or Berenice on the Red Sea. Some expeditions travelled south as far as Rapha on the coast of East Africa, obtaining ivory, tortoise-shell and incense – a round trip of two years because of the timing of the winds.

Others made the more dangerous ocean crossing to India, where they exchanged gold, wine, manufactured goods and raw materials for gems, fine Indian cotton textiles and garments, Chinese silks, spices, aromatics and drugs. On the return journey they would stop at Kane and Muza to obtain frankincense and myrrh, reaching Alexandria within a year of departure. Arab and Indian merchants also still plied these routes. Unlike the Romans (whose trade was in low-bulk, high-value commodities, carried directly between their source and the Roman world), other Indian Ocean traders dealt in everyday commodities such as grain, foodstuffs and ordinary textiles and might trade in any port.
The classical world was the cradle of European civilization: if Greece shaped Europe's culture, Rome laid its practical foundations. Throughout Rome's mighty empire, science was applied for utilitarian ends, from underfloor heating to watermills, aqueducts and an impressive road network. Rome bequeathed to posterity its efficient administration, codified laws, widespread literacy and a universally understood language. It also adopted and spread Christianity, for which it provided the institutional base.

The city of Rome developed in the 7th and 6th centuries BC from a number of settlements spread over seven low, flat-topped hills. Ruled by kings until about 500 BC, it then became a republic governed by two annually-elected consuls and an advisory body, the Senate. Around the same time Rome defeated the tribes in the surrounding area and gradually expanded through Italy: in the Latin War (496–493 BC) it crushed a rebellion of the Latin tribes, incorporating them in a pro-Roman League, and by the 3rd century BC it had overrun the Greek-influenced civilization of the Etruscans, famous for their fine pottery.

Victory over the Samnites in 290 BC led to a confrontation with the Greek colonies in southern Italy, whose defeat in 275 BC gave Rome control of the entire Italian peninsula. To strengthen its grip on the conquered territory, colonies were founded and settled by both Roman citizens and Latin allies. Swift access to these colonies was provided by an extensive road network, created from the late 4th century BC and greatly extended during the 2nd century BC.

**Expansion Beyond Italy**

The first confrontation outside Italy was against the Carthaginians, who saw their commercial interests in Sicily threatened by Rome's expansion. During the three Punic Wars (264–241, 218–201, 149–146 BC) Rome seized territory formerly held by the Carthaginians (Sardinia, Corsica, Spain and the tip of northern Africa), but also suffered its worst defeats. In 218 BC the Carthaginian general Hannibal crossed the Alps and obliterated the Roman army at Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and at Cannae (216 BC). To withstand the Carthaginians, Rome had constructed its first fleet around 260 BC and greatly extended during the 2nd century BC.

Caesar's influence had grown to such an extent that the Senate saw its position threatened and ordered him to disband his army in 49 BC.

Caesar disobeyed and crossed the Rubicon River – in defiance of the law that forbade a general to lead his army out of the province to which he was posted – and ruled Rome as a dictator until he was assassinated in 44 BC. Caesar's adoptive son Octavian (63 BC–AD 14) officially restored the Senate's powers, nominally taking up the position of princeps (first citizen) while gradually increasing his authority. In 27 BC he was awarded the title "Augustus" ("revered one"), and this date is usually taken as the start of the imperial period.

Augustus's reign brought a period of peace and stability, the so-called Pax Romana, which would last until AD 180. His main military efforts were aimed at creating a fixed and easily defensible border for his empire (map 2). Augustus conquered the entire area up to the River Danube, which, together with the River Rhine, formed his northern border.

In the east the frontier was less well defined and was controlled more by political means, such as alliances with neighbouring kingdoms.

Augustus also annexed Egypt, Judea and Galatia and reorganized the legions left by his predecessors, keeping a firm grip on those provinces that required a military presence by awarding them the status of imperial province. The emperor himself appointed the governors for these provinces, while the Senate selected the governors for the others. Augustus also reorganized the navy: he based his two main fleets at Misenum and Ravenna to patrol the Mediterranean against pirates, while smaller fleets were stationed within the maritime provinces to guard the borders.

**Roman Trade**

Trade flourished under Augustus's rule. The military infrastructure such as sheltered harbours, lighthouses and roads greatly benefited commercial activity, and the presence of Roman soldiers in faraway provinces further encouraged long-distance trade (map 3). Gradually, however, the provinces became economically independent: they started to export their own products and eventually, during the 3rd century, began to deprive Rome of its export markets.
Unlike his acquisitive predecessor Trajan, Emperor Hadrian concentrated on reinforcing the previous Roman limes, or frontiers. He strengthened the Agri Decumates limes between the Rhine and the Danube with a wooden palisade and numerous forts and is thought to have started work on a mudbrick wall and ditch which was to become the African frontier, the fossatum Africae. He built the first stone wall to secure the British frontier—a second was later constructed by Antoninus (r. 138–161)—and also reinforced Trajan’s work on the Syrian limes, a policy later continued by Diocletian.

During the reign of Augustus, trade became Rome’s lifeline. To feed its rapidly expanding urban population, it depended on the import of corn—first from Sicily, later from Africa and Egypt—and to suit the tastes of Rome’s “nouveaux riches,” luxury goods were imported from even further afield—silk from China, hair for wigs from Germany, ivory from Africa. However, the traffic was two-way: during the 1st century AD, for example, Rome developed a lucrative business supplying the provinces with products such as wine and olive oil.
BARBARIAN INVASIONS OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
100–500

Throughout its history the Roman Empire suffered frequent small-scale raids along its European frontier, but major invasions were rare. In the early 1st century AD a defensive alliance to resist Roman aggression had been formed under the leadership of Arminius, a chieftain of the Cherusci—one of a host of minor political units that comprised the Germanic world at this time (map 1).

However, the first large-scale invasion of the Roman Empire did not occur until the 160s, when the movement of Gothic and other Germanic groups from northern Poland towards the Black Sea led to the Marcomannic War. Recent archaeological investigations have revealed the spread of the so-called Wielbark Culture south and east from northern Poland at precisely this period (map 2). Another time of turmoil followed in the mid-3rd century, associated with Goths, Herules and others in the east and Franks and Alemanni in the west. Archaeologically, the eastward moves are mirrored in the creation and spread of the Gothic-dominated Cernjachov Culture in the later 3rd century. None of this, however, amounts to a picture of constant pressure on the Roman Empire.

Relations between the empire and the peoples beyond its borders, whom the Romans regarded as uncivilized “barbarians”, were not all confined to skirmishing and warfare. Numerous individual Germans served in Roman armies, while Roman diplomatic subsidies supported favoured Germanic rulers. Some important trading routes also operated, such as the famous amber route to the Baltic (pages 38–39), and there was a steady flow of materials (timber, grain, livestock) and labour across the border.

These new sources of wealth—and in particular the struggle to control them—resulted in the social, economic and political transformation of the Germanic world. By the 4th century the many small-scale political units, which had relatively egalitarian social structures, had evolved into fewer, larger and more powerful associations that were dominated by a social elite increasingly based on inherited wealth. The main groups were the Saxons, Franks and Alemanni on the Rhine, the Burgundians and Quadi on the middle Danube, and the Goths on the lower Danube (map 2). None had the power to stand up to the empire on their own, but neither was Roman domination of them total, the Alemanni even seeking to annex Roman territory in the 350s and dictate diplomatic terms.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE HUNS
The prevailing balance of power was transformed some time around 350 by the arrival on the fringes of Europe of the Huns, a nomadic group from the steppe to the east (map 3). By 376 the Hunnic invasions had made life intolerable for many Goths and they had started to move westwards. Three groups came to Rome’s Danube frontier to seek asylum: one group was admitted by treaty, a second forced its way in, and the third, led by Athanaric, sought a new home in Transylvania. Goodwill was lacking on both sides, however, and the two admitted groups became embroiled in six years of warfare with the Roman Empire.

A huge Gothic victory won at Adrianople in 378 convinced the Roman state of the need to recognize the Goths’ right to an autonomous existence—a compromise confirmed by peace in 382. In the meantime the Goths under the leadership of Athanaric had in turn forced Sarmatians onto Roman soil. Taifali barbarians had crossed the Danube to be defeated in 377, and numerous groups of Alans had begun to move west, some being recruited into the Roman army in the early 380s. In 395 the Huns made their first direct attack on the empire, advancing from the area northeast of the Black Sea (where the majority were still based) through the Caucasus into Asia Minor.

The division of the Roman Empire into the Western and Eastern Empires in 395 (pages 54–55) was soon followed by further invasions (map 3). In 405–6 Goths under the leadership of Radagaisus invaded Italy, and while he was defeated and killed in the summer of 406, many of his followers survived to be sold into slavery or incorporated into the Roman army. At the end of 406 another large group of invaders—mainly Vandals, Alans and Sueves—crossed the Rhine. It is likely that, as with the invaders of the 370s, they were fleeing from the Huns, who by around 420 were establishing a new home in Transylvania. Despite this, the Vandals, Alans and Sueves had pillaged their way to Spain (map 3), and

The Romans regarded all peoples outside their empire as inferior, referring to them as “barbarians”. There were two main groups: first, the largely Germanic-speaking settled agriculturalists of central and eastern Europe; second, the nomadic steppe peoples belonging to various linguistic and ethnic groupings who periodically disturbed the eastern fringes of continental Europe.
The Goths, who had crossed the empire’s frontier in 376, had moved to Italy under the leadership of Alaric. Here they were reinforced by the former followers of Radagaisus to create the Visigoths. They sacked Rome in August 410, but by 420 the Romans had forced them to accept settlement in Aquitaine on compromise terms. Rome had also counterattacked in Spain, where one of the two Vandal groups and many Alans were destroyed, before the death of Emperor Honorius in 423 led to ten years of internal political strife which crippled the empire’s capacity for action. During this period the Vandals and Alans, now united under Geiseric, seized the rich lands of North Africa, while eastern Britain fell decisively under the sway of Anglo-Saxon invaders.

The losses in Britain, Aquitaine, Spain and North Africa fundamentally eroded the power of the Western Empire. Essentially, it maintained itself by taxing agricultural production, so that losses of land meant losses of revenue. Tax-raising in northern Gaul was periodically disrupted by Franks and others. By 440 the Western Empire had lost too much of its tax base to survive. It was propped up for a generation, however, through a combination of prestige (after 400 years it took time for the empire’s contemporaries to realize that it was indeed at an end), support from the Eastern Empire, and temporary cohesion fuelled by fear of the Huns, whose empire reached its peak under Attila in the 440s. The collapse of Hunnic power in the 450s, however, heralded Roman imperial collapse. New kingdoms quickly emerged around the Visigoths in southwestern Gaul and Spain, and the Burgundians in the Rhône Valley, where they had been resettled by the Romans in the 430s after being massed by the Huns. At the same time the Franks, no longer controlled by the Romans, united to create a kingdom either side of the Rhine (pages 74–75). The end of the Huns also freed more groups to take part in the share-out of land (map 4). Lombards and Gepids took territories in the middle Danube, and Theoderic the Amal united Gothic renegades from the Hunnic Empire with other Goths serving in the Eastern Roman army. This new force, the Ostrogoths, had conquered the whole of Italy by 493.
Humans already occupied much of the globe by the year 500. Over the next thousand years the spread of intensive food production enabled their numbers to continue rising and a growing area to become more densely occupied. As a result, states and empires and other complex forms of socio-economic organization developed in almost every continent. Foremost in terms of wealth, population and technological achievement was China.

A number of intensive methods of cultivation had been developed before 500. However, the medieval period witnessed the spread of such methods over an ever-expanding area, dramatically increasing outputs in parts of Africa by the 8th century, in eastern Europe by the turn of the millennium, and in some regions of North America throughout the centuries up to 1500 (map 1). Depending on the environment, different crops were involved: sorghum and millet in Africa, wheat in Europe, and maize, beans and squash amongst others in North America.

At the same time new intensive farming regimes were developed which tackled the problem of sustaining soil fertility in the face of continuous use. In medieval Europe an unprecedented level of central planning evolved, based on the manor. This made possible economies of scale in the use of expensive items (such as draught animals and iron tools) and the implementation of a new strategy for raising production while maintaining fertility – the three-year rotation system. Wheat was grown in one year, beans and other legumes to restore nitrogen to the soil were grown in the next, and the land was allowed to lie fallow in the third.

On the basis of such advances, populations often grew dramatically. In England, for example, the figure of just over one million in about 500 nearly quadrupled to over four million before the Black Death (bubonic plague) took its dreadful toll across Europe in 1347–52, while China's population under the dynasties of the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) increased from just over 50 million in the mid-8th century to over 100 million in the late 13th century.

Food production and populations did not always increase, however. Where a figure seems to have reached its optimum under a precise set of environmental conditions, a period of depletion often followed. In Mesoamerica, for example, the
“Maya Collapse” of the 9th century, when the population dropped dramatically from almost five million in the Yucatán Peninsula alone, can at least partly be attributed to degradation of the land caused by intensive agriculture coupled with a reduction in rainfall. In western Europe it is possible that the impact of the Black Death – which reduced the population by between a quarter and a half – may have been intensified because numbers had in places already passed the point of sustainability for the agriculture of the time.

THE SPREAD OF WORLD RELIGIONS

The Black Death was seen by the Christian population of Europe as God’s punishment for their sins. Christianity won an increasing number of adherents in Europe during the medieval period, while Buddhism spread to East and Southeast Asia. In India, the land of Buddhism’s birth, Hinduism revived, particularly in the south.

In the 630s the new religion of Islam emerged in the Arabian Peninsula and through military conquest rapidly took hold of the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Europe. It reached the limits of its westward expansion in 732, when a Muslim army was defeated at Poitiers in central France. However, over the following centuries the states and empires of Islam frequently inflicted defeats on Christendom. At the end of the 13th century the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria completed the recapture of the Holy Land (Palestine) from the Latin Church and in 1453 the Ottoman Turks finally succeeded in capturing Constantinople – capital of the Orthodox Church. Islam also eclipsed Zoroastrianism in southwest Asia, pushed Hinduism back in India from the 1190s, and spread into Central Asia through the conversion of the Mongols from the late 13th century.

TOWNS AND TRADE

In the ancient world much effort was devoted to building and adorning cultural and ceremonial capitals such as Babylon, Athens, Rome and Constantinople. The medieval period too saw the construction and expansion of such cities. In China, Chang’ an was adopted by the Tang dynasty as their capital and was developed to cover an area of 77 square kilometres (30 square miles), with a population of about one million in the 7th century. With Baghdad, the Muslim Abbasids founded what was to become probably the world’s largest city in the early 9th century, with an area of 90 square kilometres (35 square miles). The Muslims also oversaw the development of some of Europe’s largest cities at this time – notably Córdoba and Seville in Spain and Palermo in Sicily. It was not until the 12th century that the towns of Latin Christendom really began to grow, the larger among them – such as Paris and Cologne – building magnificent churches, town halls and palaces.

By 1500 only a tiny proportion of the world’s population lived in large cities. In Europe, for example, just three million out of an estimated total of 80 million lived in cities with over 10,000 inhabitants. The characteristic form of medieval urbanism everywhere was the modest market town, evolved as a service centre for the local agricultural economy. It was a place where surplus crops could be exchanged for other foodstuffs and goods, making it possible to grow a wider range of crops suited to local soils. It was also home to a variety of specialist craftsmen, whose various wares (tools, leather goods, ceramics, and so on) were made for sale to the rural population.

Throughout the medieval period agriculture was the occupation of the vast majority of people. From the 10th century it was made more productive in Europe partly by the introduction of the three-year rotation system and improvements in the design of the plough. However, the pattern of its cultivation must as it always had, dictated by the seasons. This 15th-century illustration of ploughing the fields and sowing the winter grain in October is taken from a Book of Hours (Les Très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry), which was produced by the Franco-Flemish Limbourg brothers. Like many medieval calendars, the book illustrates the changing occupations of the months, from sowing to harvesting.

China’s cities were among the most impressive of the medieval world. A busy street scene is depicted in this 12th-century illustration of Kaifeng, capital of the Song dynasty between 960 and 1126. Attacks from the north by the Jurchens then led to the adoption of the more southern Hangzhou as the Song capital. With its estimated population of one and a half million, Hangzhou became a symbol of a golden age in China’s history.
A States and empires continued to rise and fall in the medieval period. Many of those in Eurasia in 1200 were to be overwhelmed by the destructive conquests of the Mongols in the 13th century.

The Byzantine Emperor Justinian I (r. 527-65) attempted to recreate the Roman Empire of the 4th century, before it was divided into Eastern and Western parts. Among his conquests were Italy, where he adopted the city of Ravenna as the imperial capital and did much to adorn it. This 6th-century mosaic in the Church of San Vitale shows the Empress Theodora with her attendants.

The development of market towns was a clear sign of growing sophistication in rural economies, where specialization and exchange (developed in many parts of Asia, Europe, Mesoamerica and South America well before 500) replaced self-sufficiency as the basis of agricultural production. During the medieval period they spread across Europe and came to play an important role in the economies of both West and East Africa.

Some towns also serviced regional and long-distance trade based largely on linking contrasting ecological zones and dealing in items that were perceived as luxuries — notably, metals, clothing materials and spices. From the later 8th century the Viking merchants of Scandinavia linked the fur-producing forests of subarctic regions with the wealthy cities of the Middle East, while from the 9th century a growing trans-Saharan trade moved gold, ivory and slaves between West Africa and the Muslim north African coast. Trade in a variety of items, including metalwork, stones and cacao, continued to flourish in Mesoamerica, as did the movement of silks and spices along the highways of Central Asia until the nomadic Mongol hordes created havoc there in the 13th century.

**STATES AND EMPIRES**

Much of the new food surplus was now used to support people performing a range of specialist functions, many of which were not directly concerned with traditional forms of economic activity. The number of religious specialists grew as Christianity joined Buddhism in generating numerous monastic communities. Most specialists, however, were associated with the spread of states and empires (map 2). A class of literate bureaucrats — devising and administering laws and gathering taxes — became a feature of the majority of medieval states. Long established in parts of Asia, such people became central to the functioning of many European states from the 12th century.

Another specialist, even more widespread, was the warrior. The Chinese Song Empire was sustained by huge armies, supported by taxes raised from a dependent rural populace, while in Japan the samurai became a socially dominant military aristocracy in the first half of the 2nd millennium. The great empires of Mesoamerica and South America were similarly built around large bodies of specialist warriors. In Europe an elite knightly class developed from the late 11th century, eclipsing the more widely spread military obligations of earlier centuries. For 200 years these knights provided the backbone of the crusader armies that set out to recover and protect the Holy Land from the Muslims.

Medieval state structures took many forms. Some were extremely loose associations, such as the
merchant communities of Viking Russia. While these did support a king, his rights were very limited and he and his fellow merchant oligarchs did little more than exact relatively small amounts of tribute from largely autonomous Slav subjects.

The feudal states of western Europe, by contrast, supported an oligarchic landowning elite who exercised tight controls over their peasantry. The kings, however, again had restricted powers; it was only the development of royal bureaucracies after about 1200 that allowed them to exploit their kingdoms' taxable resources more effectively.

The vast Chinese empires were organized on yet another basis, with an oligarchy of bureaucratic families competing for power and influence through a governmental system which they entered via civil service examinations. Some Mesoamerican states, such as those of the Maya, also had literate bureaucracies, while in the 15th century even the non-literate Incas in South America used their quipus (knotted strings) for the record-keeping vital to any dominant imperial power.

The history of medieval empires and states was never confined to armies, bureaucracies and dominant elites. Nearly all displayed progress in art, music, architecture, literature and education. Elites everywhere patronized the arts and sponsored entertainments, as surviving examples from imperial China, Moorish Spain, early Renaissance Italy and many other places testify.

Sometimes these cultural spin-offs marked advances in themselves. In the 8th century, for example, the monasteries of Carolingian Europe produced a cursive form of writing that accelerated manuscript production for the remainder of the medieval period, and in early 15th-century Korea the world's first system of moveable metal type for book printing was introduced.

**BROADENING HORIZONS**

During the prehistoric period humans had become widely dispersed as they had colonized the globe. Nevertheless, many groups had maintained contacts with their neighbours, exchanging ideas and materials. The development of civilizations from the 4th millennium BC saw the establishment of direct political and trade links between geographically distant regions. Such links increased very noticeably during the medieval period, in line with advances in nautical technology.

At the turn of the millennium Viking adventurers combined the sail power and hull strength of their ships to forge the first tenuous links across the Atlantic to America. More substantial connections were developed by Muslim traders who in their dhows exploited cyclical winds and currents to expand the triangular trade that had existed since the 1st century AD between the Red Sea, East Africa and India. Beyond India the trade network extended as far east as China, from where in the early 15th century expeditions sailed to Southeast Asia and Africa. Their ships were five times the size of the Portuguese envoys in which the northwest coast of Africa was explored from 1415.

While ocean travel would produce maritime empires outside the Mediterranean only after 1500, land empires continued to ebb and flow in the medieval period, with some covering vast areas. Successive Chinese dynasties controlled states often larger than modern China. In the 7th century the power of the Western Turks ran from the borders of China to the fringes of eastern Europe, and in the 13th century the nomadic Mongols conquered a vast area of Eurasia to create the largest land empire the world has ever seen.

Political, economic and cultural ties between states all burgeoned in the medieval period, accelerating the process of making the world a "smaller" place. However, as well as generating new wealth and cultural stimulation, interaction across Eurasia brought the plague to Europe – to particularly devastating effect in the 14th century. The medieval world was a place in which empires were established and sustained by bloodshed, great art often flourished because of unequal distributions of wealth, and the triumph of Christianity and Islam came at the cost of widespread persecution.
I

The magnificent temple complex of Borobudur in central Java was built between 750 and 850 as an expression of devotion to Mahayana Buddhism. This carving adorns one of the temple walls.

The rise of Islam from the 630s cut a swathe across the Christian Mediterranean world. By way of compensation, missionary Christianity spread ever further into northern and eastern Europe, while minority Christian regions survived in Central Asia, the Middle East and northeast Africa.

Meanwhile Buddhism, marginalized in the subcontinent of its birth, extended ever further north and east, into Tibet, China, Southeast Asia, Korea and, finally, Japan. In Southeast Asia it faced in turn a challenge from Hinduism and then from Islam.

THE IMPACT OF ISLAM

Islam emerged in the 7th century as a mass movement of devout converts to the Koranic revelation (pages 68-69), men who employed warfare to help win adherents from Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and the older localized faiths. It fractured the cultural unity of the Christianized Roman Mediterranean and totally eclipsed Zoroastrianism in Persia. Islamic secular culture absorbed Classical, Zoroastrian and Hindu traditions as well as those of the Arabian Desert. However, the global expansion of the Islamic world (Dar al-Islam) brought subdivision and even schism. The Islamic sunna (code of law) was variously interpreted, often regionally, by four separate law schools. Shiite partisans of dynastic leadership split right away from the consensual Sunni tradition and developed their own conventions. By the time Islam reached the Danube in Europe, the Niger in West Africa and the Moluccas in Southeast Asia in the 15th century, it was far from cohesive.

THE CHANGING FACE OF CHRISTIANITY

Although Christian minorities held on in Egypt, the Middle East and Central Asia (map 2), “Christendom” became increasingly identified with Europe, where both the Western (Latin) and the Eastern (Greek or Orthodox) traditions compensated for their losses to Islam by vigorous and sometimes competitive missionary activity. Latin Christianity won over Germanic-speaking peoples and their central European neighbours, while large areas of the Balkans and eastern Europe were converted to Orthodoxy. After centuries of intermittent disagreement between the Latin and Greek Churches, the Great Schism of 1054 finally brought about the divide between Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

The crusades of 1095-1291 to the Holy Land were essentially counter-productive (pages 94-95). They put Muslims forever on their guard against Latin Christendom and may have added to the pressure on communities of oriental Christians to convert to Islam. Militant Latin Christendom was more successful in the Baltic region and the Iberian Peninsula, where the later medieval period saw the political reconquest of all Moorish territory. By 1500 Spain had become a launchpad for transatlantic ventures and the transmission of Christianity to the New World.

THE SPREAD OF BUDDHISM OUTSIDE INDIA

Buddhism lost its western lands to Islam and it never regained any large-scale presence in India, the subcontinent of its birth, where the mainstream Hindu tradition predominated alongside what remained of the Jain faith. Buddhist numbers were increasingly concentrated in lands to the east and north and, paradoxically, Buddhist strength was at its greatest where there was ideological power-sharing with other faiths – the case in both China and Japan (map 3).

In China the secular philosophy of Confucianism was revitalized during the Tang dynasty of the 7th to 9th centuries, retaining its classical status and control of the education system. It offered moral and intellectual guidelines for a life of public service, virtuous prosperity and happiness to members of the scholarly gentry, including the “mandarins” of the Chinese civil service. Buddhism remained – like the indigenous Chinese philosophy or “way” of the Dao (Tao) – as an alternative, culturally sanctioned code, appealing to those who could never hope to
achieve the Confucian scholarly ideal or who found its secular priorities unsatisfying.

In Japan Buddhism had been adopted from China by the 6th century. It became remarkably pervasive and was intellectually and spiritually creative, bringing literacy to the whole country – but it never ousted Kami (Shinto), a traditionalist compendium of reverence for nature, land and state which remained intrinsic to Japanese cultural identity.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND CULTURAL PARALLELS
Despite profound divergences in creed and world outlook, the major medieval faiths had organizational and cultural parallels. All had “professional” adherents who adopted a consciously devout, disciplined or even ascetic way of life. While the reclusive tradition of withdrawal to the wilderness pervaded a range of religious cultures, hermits and wandering “holy men” were never as influential as members of disciplined religious orders and brotherhoods. The Sangha (monastic order) was central to the life of the Buddhist world and included nuns; the Persian Sufi movement was vital to the spread of Islam among the ordinary people; the great Benedictine houses of western Europe preserved a cultural and political inheritance through centuries of feudal disorder – as did, in a similar political context, the great Buddhist houses of medieval Japan. However, when mendicancy appeared in the West, with the establishment in the 13th century of wealthy orders of friars, it was very different from the contemplative and ascetic mendicancy of the East.

Medieval religions offered practical services to state and society. In many countries the educated clergy were the only people able to write and therefore worked as official scribes. Churches, mosques and temples operated a broadcasting system and communications network, and pilgrims and travellers could expect hospitality from religious foundations. Members of many religious communities were adept at acquiring communal or institutional (as distinct from personal) wealth. They could operate as financiers and at the same time expand their sphere of influence; thus Hindu temples were the banks of South India and 15th-century Portuguese overseas enterprise was funded by the crusading Order of Christ.

Much of the ritual year was defined by medieval religion and, where communal prayer was an obligation, the hours of the day. The spires, domes and towers of religious architecture dominated the skylines of major cities. Yet remote regions retained old beliefs and customs: there were fringe areas in Mesopotamia where sects clung to the traditions of the temples as late as the 11th century, and the 14th-century traveller Ibn Battutah found West African Muslims, even some of those who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj), amazingly relaxed in their religious observance.

CHALLENGES TO THE ESTABLISHED RELIGIONS
Challenges to the established religions came from within rather than from residual “old beliefs”. The Buddhist world, for example, saw the development of eccentric and magical practices on the margins of the Tantric tradition, while early Islam experienced a succession of breakaway movements from the mainstream Sunni community – Kharijite, Ibadhi and a range of Shi’ite alternatives. In the Christian world many “heresies” countered established orthodoxy. Medieval religious culture was not necessarily intolerant: pilgrimage, a universal form of devotion, could be a mind-broadening experience, and different religions were sometimes capable of coexistence and even co-operation. For example, in the 13th century, at the height of the Christian reconquest of Moorish territory in Spain, Santa Maria La Blanca in Toledo functioned peaceably as the mosque on Fridays, the synagogue on Saturdays and the church on Sundays.

The last three centuries of the first millennium saw the steady development of a deep and lasting cultural divide – between an Eastern, Greek-rooted Orthodox tradition and a Western, Latin-based Catholic culture. Both last both loads and devotees to Islam in the Near East and North Africa, but resilient Christian communities continued to survive in these areas under Muslim rule.
In the 6th century Southeast Asia was a region in which warfare was endemic and the borders of political entities, known as mandalas, expanded and contracted with the power of their overlords. The influence of India was evident in the widespread practice of Hinduism and Buddhism (pages 44–45). Also evident was the influence of China, which under the Han dynasty had first begun to administer the area of Nam Viet (in what is now northern Vietnam) in 40 AD (map 1). In 679 the Chinese Tang government set up a protectorate-general in the area and the Chinese commanderies — in particular, that in Chi Ho— became important trade centres. There were, however, many rebellions, and in 938 independence from China was secured and the Dai Viet kingdom established. To the south of Nam Viet was Champa, where fishing, trade and piracy were more important economic activities than agriculture.

The Khmer Kingdoms

In about 550 the capital of the great Hindu kingdom of Funan, Vyadhapura, was conquered by King Bhavavarman of Chen-la. Regarded as the first state of the Khmers — one of the many ethnic groups in the region — Chen-la had by the 7th century expanded its power throughout much of mainland Southeast Asia. In 802 the Khmer king Jayavarman II established the Angkorean mandala, the forerunner of modern Cambodia, which was to dominate central mainland Southeast Asia until the 13th century (map 2). His new capital at Hariharalaya was on the great inland sea of Tonle Sap — the key to the floodwaters of the Mekong that were essential for the intensive rice irrigation schemes on which Angkor depended.

Thai and Burmese Kingdoms

The hold of the Khmers over central mainland Southeast Asia was to be broken by the Thais. In the middle of the 7th century the Thais had formed the kingdom of Nanzhao in southwestern China. Perhaps partly due to pressure from the Chinese, they had moved south along the river valleys into Southeast Asia, conquering the Buddhist kingdom of Pyu in the middle of the 8th century. Around 860 a Thai polity in the area of modern Thailand was founded with its capital at Sukhothai (map 2). It was the first of three Thai kingdoms to emerge on the Chao Phraya River, displacing earlier Hindu kingdoms such as Dvaravati. The invasion of southwest China by Mongol forces under Qubilai Khan in 1253–54 pushed more Thais south — probably from the region of Nanzhao — and the Thai kingdom centred at Chiangmai was founded around 1275, followed further south by Ayuthia in 1350 (map 3).

The Burmese kingdom of Pagan was established shortly after Angkor emerged in Cambodia in the 9th century (map 2). In 1044 Anawratha ascended the throne and did much to extend the realm of the Pagan kings, the greatest of whom was Kyanzittha (r. 1082–1122). These kings built one of the most elaborate and extensive Buddhist monuments in the world in their capital at Pagan, where vast temple
complexes spread 60 kilometres (35 miles) across the floodplains of the Irrawaddy River. This great building programme was to ruin the kingdom; in 1287, after a period of decline, Pagan succumbed to invasion from China.

In the 15th century a new power, Pegu, developed in lower Burma. Pegu fostered trading links with India and maritime Southeast Asia through its seaports, which included Martaban. It was also often in conflict with the inland agricultural state of Ava, which, it is supposed, was controlled by Pegu. Despite occasional support from Ming China, the rulers of Ava were constantly harassed by the Shan hill peoples, culminating in the assassination of the king in 1426, and as a result Ava eventually gave up its ambitions regarding Pegu.

THE EMPIRE OF SRIVIJAYA

Throughout the Malaysian Peninsula and much of island Southeast Asia, maritime empires flourished. The empire of Srivijaya (c. 670–1025) (map 2), with its centre near the modern port of Palembang in Sumatra, was based on control of the resources of the forests and seas of the Indonesian archipelago. The city blossomed, its wealth reflected in ceremonial centres such as those described by the 7th-century Chinese traveller I Ching, where 1,000 priests served gold and silver Buddhas with lotus-shaped bowls.

In central Java, kingdoms had developed by the 6th century in which some of the greatest monuments of the ancient world were to be constructed (map 2). The Sailendras, one of the central Javanese royal lineages, supported Mahayana Buddhism, a patronage that found its greatest expression in the magnificent temple complex of Borobudur, built between 750 and 850. As well as being devout the Sailendras were aggressive warriors, and they mounted a series of seaborne expeditions against kingdoms on the mainland: Chiao-Chih in 767, Champa in 774 and Chen-ia of Water in around 800. They kept control of Chen-ia of Water until it was taken over by the Khmer Empire. They also held sway over large areas of Sumatra. However, after 860 control over Java moved from the Sailendras to Hindu lineages, including the builders of the great Hindu complex at Prambanan.

In the 11th century a new power emerged in east Java, and control of the international trade routes began to slip away from Srivijaya. In 1025 this process was hastened when the Srivijayan capital was sacked by Chola invaders from south India. Airlangga (c. 991–1049) was one of the most important of the rulers of this east Javanese realm, which came to dominate and grow wealthy on the burgeoning international trade in spices. Following Airlangga’s death in 1049 the realm was divided in two, with Singhasari to the east and Kediri to the west. In the mid-13th century the rulers of Singhasari took over Kediri to lay the foundations of the great maritime empire of Majapahit, which controlled the region until the 15th century.

The trade routes that had facilitated the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism to Southeast Asia also encouraged the spread of Islam. It reached the northern tip of Sumatra in the 13th century; by the 15th century it had reached Malaya and Java. A number of Muslim states were created at the expense of the faltering Majapahit kingdom, including one based on Melaka, a thriving commercial port which by the end of the 15th century controlled the Strait of Malacca. In 1511 Melaka fell to the Portuguese, thus ushering in an era during which Europeans wreaked great change on the Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms and empires of Southeast Asia.
Throughout their history the Byzantines described themselves as Romans, and saw their empire as the continuation, without break, of the Roman Empire. Consequently, to give a starting date for the Byzantine Empire is a matter of debate among historians. The date of 527, when Justinian became emperor and launched a far-reaching campaign of conquest, is one of several options. Others include 330, when the Roman emperor Constantine the Great moved his capital to the city of Byzantium, naming it Constantinople, and 410, when Rome was sacked. Yet another is 476, when the Western Empire virtually ceased to exist, leaving Constantinople and the Eastern Empire as the last bastion of Christian civilization.

**FLUCTUATING BORDERS**

The history of the empire is one of constantly fluctuating borders as successive emperors campaigned, with varying degrees of success, against Persians and Arabs to the east, and Avars, Slavs, Bulgars and Russians to the north and west (map 1). Two of the most successful conquering emperors were Justinian (in power from 527 to 565) and Basil II (co-emperor from 960 and in sole authority from 985 to 1025). Justinian looked to the west to regain the old empire of Rome, and he and his general Belisarius conquered North Africa and Italy, while struggling to hold the eastern frontier. However, the resources of the empire were not sufficient to retain this ground, and during the 7th century most of these territorial gains were lost. The rise of Islam offered a new enemy with whom the empire was to be in conflict until finally succumbing in 1453 (pages 96–97). In the four centuries between the reigns of Justinian and Basil, emperors never ceased both to fight and to negotiate for territory. However, it was in the 11th century that Byzantium made its greatest gains to the west, with Basil "the Bulgar-Slayer" bringing the entire Balkan peninsula under Byzantine control after defeating the Bulgarians. Basil also forged links with the Rus and Vikings to the north, employing them as troops in his wars of conquest.

**ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE**

Totalitarian in ambition and ideology, absolute in his power to intervene directly in every aspect of both government and life itself, the emperor was the beginning and end of the political and administrative structure. Initially this was based on the Roman system of provincial government. In the 7th century, however, the traditional Roman provinces were reorganized into large units called "themes" (map 2), where the military commander also functioned as civil administrator and judge. The population of each theme provided the basis of recruitment for the army, which took the form of a peasant militia. Ordinary soldiers were given land in frontier regions and exempted from taxation in exchange for military service. By the 8th century the themes were the centres of revolts, with theme generals becoming pretenders to the imperial throne. Consequently, throughout the 8th and 9th centuries the central government worked to diminish the power of large themes, and by the 11th century the military commanders had been replaced by civil governors.

**CHURCH AND STATE**

Byzantium saw itself as the Christian empire under God, its mission to reduce the world to one empire. Church and state were inextricably linked. Ecclesiastical organization was as hierarchical as that of the state. Five patriarchates, based at Constantinople, Rome, Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch, marked out the centres of Christian worship in the Late Roman period and fought for supremacy in the Church. By the 11th century, however, the three oriental sees were no longer part of the empire, and in the ensuing centuries it was the struggle between Rome and Constantinople that affected the course of Byzantine history. Beneath the patriarchs was a system of bishops, within which the bishops derived considerable influence from their control of all ecclesiastical properties and charitable institutions. The empire also extended its influence through missionary expeditions, above all in the strategically important Balkan area (map 3).
Simply called “the City” (map 4), Constantinople was the most important city in the empire. It was the emperor’s base, and thus the centre of all civil, military and ecclesiastical administration. Its position was almost unassailable, as the Muslim armies who attempted to capture it in the 7th and 8th centuries discovered (pages 66-67). For almost 900 years it withstood all attacks by enemy forces until, in 1204, it was overrun and ransacked by the army of the Fourth Crusade.

The main trade routes were sea or river-based and the chief centres of trade were on the coast. Dominant among them was Constantinople, which not only served as the emperor’s capital but also as the heart of Christendom for many centuries.

The transformation of the small town of Byzantium into the city of Constantinople was accomplished remarkably quickly. There is evidence that by the middle of the 4th century there were 14 palaces, 14 churches, 8 aqueducts, 2 theatres and a circus, as well as homes for the inhabitants who were forced to move to the city from nearby settlements. Comparatively little now survives of Byzantine Constantinople in present-day Istanbul, but Hagia Sophia, the great church built by Justinian as a centre of worship for all Christendom, can still be seen, along with a host of lesser churches. A handful of imperial monuments exist, the most obvious of which are the 5th-century city walls in the shape of an arc almost 6 kilometres (4 miles) long.

The importance of religion in the empire is reflected in its surviving artistic achievements. Churches and monasteries, often beautifully decorated with mosaics and wall paintings, are to be found throughout the empire’s territories, along with portable works of art, such as enamels, books, metalwork and, above all, icons. The few secular buildings and objects that remain are often in Late Roman cities such as Ephesus – gradually abandoned in the 7th century – but most notably in Constantinople.
In the second quarter of the 7th century AD the map of the world was abruptly and irreversibly changed by a series of events that astonished contemporary observers. From the 630s the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula, previously accorded little attention by the “civilized” world, burst out of their homelands and attacked the fertile regions to the north in a series of campaigns that resulted in the complete destruction of the Sasanian Empire and the end of Byzantine control of the Near East. They then set about forging a new social and cultural order in the conquered territories, based on the principles of the religion they brought with them – a force which has continued to exert a profound influence over the region to the present day.

MUHAMMAD: THE “PROPHET”
In the early years of the 7th century tribal Arabian society underwent a transformation: a new communal structure emerged to replace the traditional tribal divisions that had hitherto dominated the Arabian Peninsula. This community was largely the creation of a single man, Muhammad, a trader from Mecca, the main commercial town of western Arabia. Following divine revelations in which he identified himself as the “Seal of the Prophets” (after whom no others would come), Muhammad preached a new moral system that demanded the replacement of idol worship with submission to a common code of law and the unity of Muslims (“those who submit [to God]”) against unbelievers.

Although he was persecuted by the Mecceans in the early years of his mission, Muhammad later enjoyed rapid success in nearby Medina, where he made many converts and laid down the rules governing the conduct of the community. Thereafter he sent missionaries to spread his message throughout Arabia, and shortly before his death (probably in 632) he led his triumphant army back to reclaim Mecca.

THE VICTORY OF ISLAM
Within a decade of Muhammad’s death the Muslim armies – inspired by zeal for their new faith and a desire for plunder – had inflicted defeat on both regional superpowers, the Byzantines and the Sasanians, already weakened by decades of conflict with each other. The Muslim victories at Yarmuk and Qadisiyya (in 636) opened the way to further expansion (map 1). In 642 the Muslim armies conquered Egypt, by the mid-640s Persia was theirs, and by the late 640s they had occupied Syria as far north as the border with Anatolia. The wars of conquest continued, albeit at a lesser pace, for roughly a century after the humiliation of the Byzantines and Sasanians. After overrunning the whole of the North African coastal region and taking root in much of the Iberian Peninsula, the Muslim state reached the limits of its westward expansion into Europe at the Battle of Poitiers in central France in 732. The one realistic prize which always eluded these conquerors was Constantinople: in spite of several Muslim attempts to capture it by siege, it remained the Byzantine capital until 1453.

INTERNAL CONFLICT
The euphoria generated by these successes was tempered from the start by disagreements between Muslims concerning several matters – including, most crucially, the question of who was to lead the community. The Prophet had combined both religious and political authority in his own person and this model was followed for the first three centuries by the caliphs who led the community after him. However, Muhammad had made no arrangement for the succession, and more than once in the century after his
death the Islamic world was thrown into turmoil by fiercely contested civil wars fought over this issue.

In spite of such upheavals, political power was consolidated at an early stage in the hands of the first Islamic dynasty, the Umayyads, who ruled from their capital in Damascus for nearly 100 years (661–750). Although much maligned by later Muslim writers, this caliphal dynasty succeeded in giving an Arab Muslim identity to the state. The caliph Abd al-malik b. Marwan (d. 705) decreed that Arabic (instead of Greek or Pahlavi) should be the language of administration, began a programme of religious building, and instituted a uniform Islamic coinage. Trade flourished in the region, with Syria in particular benefiting from the revenues flowing into the caliph’s coffers.

**The Abbasid Dynasty**

In the middle of the 8th century a new dynasty, the Abbasids, toppled the Umayyads, whom they accused of ruling like kings rather than caliphs – without the sanction of the community (map 2). Abbasid rule witnessed a real change in the Muslim state, with the caliphs constructing a grand new capital of Baghdad (also known as the City of Peace) in Mesopotamia (map 3). It is no coincidence that Abbasid courtly culture borrowed heavily from that of the Persian royalty, for the focus of Muslim culture now swung eastwards from Syria.

At the same time as Islam was expanding internally, Muslim eyes and minds began to be opened to a wider world, both through growing trade – in particular with the Far East – and through a burgeoning interest in ancient knowledge, primarily Greek, which was furthered by the translation into Arabic of foreign books.

Like their predecessors, however, the Abbasids failed to gain universal acceptance for their claim to be the legitimate leaders of the Muslim world. Although the caliphs continued to rule in Baghdad until they were deposed by the Mongols in the mid-13th century, they gradually lost their territories to local warlords, rulers who governed independently while still proclaiming formal subservience to the caliph. Parts of North Africa, far from the seat of caliphal power, began to fall outside caliphal control practically from the first years of Abbasid rule. By the beginning of the 10th century a rival caliphate was set up in Egypt, and Iraq and Iran were divided into petty kingdoms, many ruled by Iranian kings (map 4). In the 11th century these kingdoms were swept away by the steppe Turks who invaded the Muslim world and changed the ethnic and cultural map as decisively as the Arabs had done four centuries earlier.
THE FIRST SLAVIC STATES
400–1000

It is evident from first archaeological traces of the Slavs that in the 3rd and 4th centuries they lived in the fertile basins of the Vistula, Bug and Dniester rivers (map 1). In the early 5th century, however, the nomadic Huns conquered and drove out Germanic peoples to the west of this area (pages 56–57), allowing the Slavs to move as far as the Danube frontier of the Byzantine Empire by around 500. The subsequent victories over the Byzantines by a second nomadic people, the Avars (pages 76–79), meant that Slavic groups were able to penetrate southeastwards into the Balkans and even the Peloponnese. At the same time Slavs also moved north and west as Avars encroached on their territory.

As a result, most of central Europe as far west as the Elbe was settled by Slavs – Moravia and Bohemia had been settled by 550, and much of the Elbe region by 600. The process can be traced archaeologically in the emergence and distribution of various Slavic cultures, which are mainly distinguished by the pottery they produced.

In the 6th century the Slavs operated in numerous small and independent social units of a few thousand. Some had kings, but there were no established social hierarchies and no hereditary nobility – merely freemen and slaves. Slavs were particularly ready to adopt captured outsiders as full members of their groups, and this partly explains why they were able to Slavicize central and eastern Europe in such a relatively short period of time. They lived in small, unfortified villages, grew crops and raised animals.

However, from the 7th century, hillforts – each serving as a local centre of refuge for a small social unit – became the characteristic form of Slavic settlement, and several thousand have been found in central and eastern Europe. They subsequently merged into larger, more organized political entities, the first of which evolved in Moravia in the 9th century (map 2) but was swallowed up by Magyars moving westwards from around 900 (pages 76–77).

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

After about 500 Slavic agriculture became more productive thanks to the adoption of Roman ploughs and crop rotation. This agricultural revolution was only one element in a wider process of economic development which, archaeologically, is reflected in the wide range of specialist manufactures, not least of silver jewellery, found on Slavic sites. Much of the Slavs’ new wealth derived from contacts with economically more developed neighbours. Its greatest single source was the trade in slaves with the Muslim caliphates, conducted from the 8th century onwards and evidenced by hoards of Arab silver coins found in central Europe (map 3). Western Slavic groups and the Rus captured slaves from eastern Slavs living in the area between their respective territories. Some slaves were sold directly to Muslim (and some western) merchants in central Europe, notably in Prague, while many were shipped to the Muslim world by Scandinavian and other “middlemen”. These intermediaries bought slaves at the trading centres of the south Baltic coast (such as Elbing, Wiskau and Grobin) and subsequently transported them down the river routes of eastern Europe, particularly the Volga, which gave direct access to the Caspian Sea and Muslim Mesopotamia.

THE FORMATION OF STATES

The slave trade played an important role in generating new political structures. Traders had to organize to procure slaves, and this, together with the new silver wealth, made possible new ambitions. In the first half of the 10th century, for example, Miesco I established the first Polish state with the help of his own armoured cavalry, which his wealth enabled him to maintain. Perhaps this force was first employed to capture slaves, but it soon took on the role of establishing and maintaining territorial control with the aid of a series of hillforts. The Premyslid dynasty of Bohemia, which originated around Prague, adopted a similar strategy, and by around 900 it controlled central Bohemia through a network of three central and five frontier hillforts. Over the following century the dynasty extended its influence much further afield and in its newly acquired territories it replaced existing hillforts, which had served for local self-defence, with fortified administrative centres in order to maintain its control.

To the east, the Rus of Kiev had by about 1000 created the first Russian state, extending their control over other, originally independent trading stations such as Smolensk, Novgorod, Inveriski and Staraja Ladogla (map 4). Each of these trading groups consisted of a relatively small number of originally Scandinavian traders and a much larger number of Slavs who produced the goods, shared in the profits – and quickly absorbed the Scandinavians.
While Slavic state formation generally involved asserting aggressive dominion, this was not always the case. During the 10th century the Elbe Slavs — comprising the previously independent Abodrites, Hevellians and Sorbs — increasingly acted together to throw off the domination being exerted on them by Ottonian Saxony, which in the middle of the century had carved up their territories into a series of lordships or marches. However, the Elbe Slavs reasserted their independence in a great uprising of 983.

THE ADOPTION OF CHRISTIANITY
State formation also had a religious dimension. Franks and then Ottonians, the Papacy and Byzantium were all interested in sending missionaries to the Slavic lands, most famously in the mid-9th century when Cyril and Methodius went, with papal blessing, from Constantinople to Moravia. From the 8th century hoards of Arab silver coins were deposited in Slavic central and eastern Europe — evidence of Slavic participation in the fur and slave trades conducted in the rich lands of the Abbasid Caliphate. Slavs also traded with the Frankish Carolingian world to the west. There the brothers generated a written Slavic language to translate the Bible and Christian service materials. In the 10th century Rus, Polish and Bohemian leaders all adopted Christianity. Kiev, Gniezno and Prague, capitals of their respective states, all became archbishoprics, Kiev and Gniezno with their own episcopal networks.

Christianization allowed ambitious Slavic dynasts to sweep away not only the old Slavic gods but also the cults that were unique to each independent group and so reflected the old political order. The establishment of strong Christian churches thus contributed significantly to the process whereby the small, independent Slavic communities of the 6th century evolved into the new Slavic states of central Europe in the 9th and 10th centuries.

By the year 1000 three dominant dynasties had emerged in the Slav lands of central and eastern Europe — in Bohemia, Poland and Russia — each centred on their respective capitals of Prague, Gniezno and Kiev. While closely controlling their core areas, these new states also fought each other for control of the lands in between (Moravia, Volhynia, Silesia, Byelorussia), which repeatedly changed hands over several centuries. Dynastic unity in Poland and Russia was to collapse gradually in the 12th and 13th centuries, leading to partitions and the creation of less expansionist kingdoms. At the same time German expansion — at first demographic, then political — was to undermine the independence of the western Slav states.
The Tang dynasty established a vast empire - larger than any other Chinese empire before the conquests of the Manchus 1,000 years later. Throughout the empire Buddhism flourished, and Chinese pilgrims travelled along the trade routes of the Silk Road - firmly under Tang control between the mid-7th and mid-8th centuries - to visit stupas and shrines in India. The central administration controlled every province, using regular censuses to gather information about the available resources and population. (In 754 there were nearly 53 million people living in over 300 prefectures.) A network of canals linked the Yangtze Valley with areas to the north, supplying the huge army that defended the long imperial borders.

Following the collapse of the Han Empire in AD 220 China was divided into the three competing kingdoms of Shu, Wei and Wu. A brief period of unity was provided by the rule of the Western Jin between 265 and 316 before northern China fell under the control of non-Chinese chiefs, leaving the south in the hands of an elitist aristocracy. The country was reunited under the Sui dynasty - established in 581 - but the dynasty was short-lived. In 618, after four centuries of division and turmoil, the Tang dynasty took control (map 1).

The influence of Tang China was to be felt throughout Asia in the three centuries that followed. Its political stability and economic expansion led to the unprecedented development of links with many peoples throughout East and Central Asia, and these fostered a cultural renaissance and cosmopolitanism in China itself. Tang armies brought the trade routes of the Silk Road under Chinese control, with protectorates established as far west as Ferghana and Samarkand. In the middle of the 7th century, the Chinese Empire reached its maximum extent prior to the Manchu conquests a thousand years later. For a hundred years Tang armies were not seriously challenged, and Tang models of government were taken up by many neighbouring peoples - who in turn expanded their own spheres of influence. These included the kingdom of Nanzhao in the southwest, Bohai in the northeast, Silla in Korea and the early Japanese state centred on Heijo.

The Tang system of centralized government (map 2) was introduced by the second Tang emperor, Tai Zong (r. 626–649), and was supported by a professional bureaucracy of civil servants. The cities were linked to the countryside through a well-developed infrastructure of canals and roads. New agricultural land was opened up, especially in the south, and in the first part of the Tang period peasants owned their own land, paying for it in taxes and labour. Later on, however, as central power waned, wealthy and powerful landowners extended their area of control. Rural prosperity supported the growth of new industries, notably the production of fine pottery and luxury goods that were often inspired by fashionable foreign items.
The Korean Peninsula

In the Korean Peninsula, Tang armies assisted the kingdom of Silla (map 3), which in its campaign of expansion had crushed Paekche in 660. The defeat of Koguryo in 668 marked the beginning of the unification of Korea. To the northeast the state of Bohai was established by Tae Choyong, a general from Koguryo who refused to surrender to Silla, and in 721 a wall was built to separate the two states (map 4). Silla finally compelled the Chinese to abandon their territorial claims in Korea in 735, but all through this period maintained good relations with the Chinese. Chinese scholars, courtiers and Buddhist monks made frequent journeys to China, and Korean trading communities were established in eastern China. Many individual Koreans played important roles in the Tang Empire. In 747 a Chinese army was led to the upper ranges of the Indus by Ko Son-ji, a Korean military official.

The role of Buddhism

Not only the Chinese and Koreans, but also the Japanese, were brought together by the spread of Buddhism from India throughout East Asia. Buddhism often received official support and many of the most spectacular Buddhist monuments in Asia were built at this time, from the cave temples at Dunhuang in China to the Horyuji and Todaiji temples at Nara in Japan. The Silla capital at Kumsong (modern Kyongju), which already boasted fine monuments such as the Chomsongdae observatory, was further embellished with great Buddhist structures including the Pulguk-sa temple (c. 682). However, the relationship between this new religion and the government was not always easy: in 845 Emperor Wu Zong (r. 712-56) through the imperial concubine Yang Gemmyo following Chinese principles of city planning. The subsequent Nara period saw major political, economic and land reforms as well as campaigns against the Emishi and Ezo peoples who lived north of the boundaries of the expanding Japanese state. In 794 the capital was moved to Heian (now Kyoto), ushering in the golden age of Heian civilization during which a sophisticated courtly lifestyle developed among the elite classes. In the later part of the Heian period (794–1185) the samurai culture, which placed great value on military prowess, also evolved.

The decline of Tang power

The 9th century saw the waning of Tang influence and an ever-increasing independence in surrounding countries (map 1). In 751 Tang armies suffered two major defeats: at the Battle of Dali in the south, over 60,000 Tang soldiers perished at the hands of the troops of the kingdom of Nanzhou; in the west, Arabs took control of much of Central Asia in the Battle of the Talas River, which set the border between the Chinese and Abbasid empires.

The faltering of the Tang dynasty was symbolized by the rebellion of An Lushan, the commander of the northeastern armies, who gained great influence over Emperor Xuan Zong (r. 712–56) through the imperial concubine Yang Yuhuan. In 755 An Lushan rebelled against the emperor and led a force of over 100,000 men on the capital. Although the rebellion was eventually put down, the empire was greatly weakened and became vulnerable to external attacks. In 787 the Tibetans sacked the capital Chang'an, and in 791 defeated Chinese and Uighur forces near Beshbaliq, ending Chinese domination of Central Asia. As central control weakened and provinces became more powerful, China once again moved towards disintegration. Following more revolts, the last Tang emperor was deposed in 907.

China's relations with surrounding countries changed as these countries themselves changed. The last Japanese embassies were sent to China in 838, and in 894 the Japanese government, now dominated by the Fujiwara clan, officially banned travel to China. In the Korean Peninsula serious rebellions broke out in Silla in 889, and out of these rebellions was born the kingdom of Koryo, centred in the north, which was to control all of Korea from 936.

The long-established East Asian tradition of erecting lifesize stone or terracotta guardian figures on and around tombs reached its apogee in the three-coloured glazed statues of the Tang period.
Royal tours were a crucial element of Carolingian governmental control. As a younger man, Charlemagne averaged 29 kilometres (18 miles) a day and stayed regularly in all parts of his kingdom, thus enabling him to keep his local representatives in line. Also performing this function were teams of inspectors (missi), each usually comprising a layman and a prominent ecclesiastic. Charlemagne's grandson, Charles the Bald (r. 843-77), later evolved clearly designated areas of inspection (missatica) in the north.

The Franks were created by the reorganization of a number of Germanic groups on the northern Rhine frontier of the Roman Empire in the 3rd century AD. They comprised several subgroups, most prominently the Salians and Ripurians, which were further divided into warbands, each with their own king. The collapse of the Roman Empire after about 450 prompted further changes, with Childeric (d. 482) and his son Clovis (482-511), uniting increasing numbers of Franks under their rule. The two men belonged to a prominent Salian family — called the Merovingians after a legendary founder Merovech — but their careers turned the family into a royal dynasty for all Frankish peoples. At the same time, the newly united Franks were able to conquer more and more territory: Childeric started by taking over the Roman province of Belgica II, to which Clovis added the region around Paris (the kingdom of Aegidius and Syagrius), Alemannia and Aquitaine. Clovis's sons and grandsons further conquered Provence, Burgundy and Thuringian territory (map 1).

The Franks did not, however, evolve governmental structures of sufficient strength to hold this large new state together. The conquests had generated renewable wealth for kings to reward local landowners and hence attract their support, but when the conquests petered out kings had to buy support using their own landed resources, so that great men became wealthier at the expense of kings. By around 700 the real power had passed to a relatively small number of families in each of the regions of the kingdom: Austrasia, Neustria, Burgundy, Aquitaine and Provence (map 2).

In the 8th century the rulers of Austrasia in the north-east — called the Carolingian dynasty — reunited the whole Frankish world. Between about 695 and 805 their armies...
were on campaign for all but five years, taking advantage of an open frontier to the east. As a result, Austrasia’s rulers could offer ongoing rewards to would-be supporters and thus outbid noble rivals from the other regions. In three generations – Charles Martel (d. 741), Pippin the Short (r. 741–68) and Charlemagne (r. 768–814) – the dynasty reunited Francia and conquered Lombard Italy, Saxony, Alemannia, Thuringia, Bavaria and the Alps (map 3). On Christmas Day 800 Charlemagne was crowned emperor in Rome.

**THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT**

The Merovingians based their rule on the existing Roman structures: the cities, or civitates, and their dependent territories. However, by about 800 the civitates had ceased to exist, and in their place was a patchwork of smaller counties. It was thus much easier to create continuous territories when the kingdom was divided, as between Charlemagne’s grandsons in the Treaty of Verdun in 843.

The main governmental problem remained constant: how to exercise centralized control over a very large kingdom in an era of primitive communications. Powerful landowners were essential to a king’s rule, but they had to be prevented from becoming too independent; continual royal travel was a central part of the strategy.

Royal finance still relied on conquest. Once expansion petered out after the conquest of Saxony (805), and especially when Louis the Pious (d. 840) was succeeded by a great number of quarrelling sons, Merovingian patterns reassumed themselves. Financial resources, above all land, were transferred by rival members of the dynasty in a bid to buy supporters. By 900 Carolingian power in West Francia was confined to the Paris region, while East Francia was run by non-Carolingians from 911 (pages 92–93).

**THE CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE**

Under Charlemagne determined efforts were made to revive Classical learning. Texts were gathered and copied, and the teaching of good Latin was made a priority in royally sponsored monasteries and cathedrals with scriptoria or writing offices (map 3). This Carolingian Renaissance was generated by the work of a relatively small number of institutions, and its central thrust was religious. Carolingian monks copied Classical texts because their language and contents were considered necessary for a full understanding of the Bible. Editing variant texts of the Bible to produce one orthodox version, codifying divergent sources of church law, providing service books in good Latin: all of these were basic tasks Charlemagne wanted his scholars to undertake. Charlemagne also wished – as he proclaimed in the *Admonitio Generale* of 789 and the *Programmatic Capitulary* of 802 – to ensure higher standards of Christian religious observance and biblically guided morality in his realm. His bishops attempted to enforce this programme through a sequence of reforming councils designed to harmonize standards throughout the empire. Louis the Pious did the same with monastic practice through further councils between 817 and 819. The Papacy likewise received strong royal support, and was endowed with the lands which would form the basis of the papal state through to the 19th century.

**THE FRANKISH ECONOMY**

By around 600 the Merovingians had presided over the collapse of most of the more sophisticated elements of the Roman economy; taxation, substantial long-distance trade, towns, specialized manufacture and coins (apart from a very high-value gold coinage that was useless for everyday transactions). There were also associated declines in population and agricultural production. The 7th and 8th centuries, however, witnessed substantial recovery. New trading routes spread across the Channel and North Sea, their progress marked by the appearance of a series of trading stations or emporia (map 4). Monetary-based exchange also increased – using, from the later 7th century, a lower value silver currency. The quantity and quality of silver coins grew dramatically with the new coinage introduced by Charlemagne in the 790s – a coinage that Charles the Bald later managed to his own profit; a dense network of mints allowed him periodically to change coin types, demand that people use new coins, and charge them fees for reminting.

**CAROLINGIAN ACHIEVEMENTS**

Politically the Carolingian period ended in failure. The united western European empire could not be held together, even if Charlemagne’s resumption of an imperial title would directly inspire his Holy Roman successors (pages 90–91). In economic and cultural terms, however, the Carolingian period was deeply formative. Trade, a monetarized economy and more specialized production all began to flourish, providing the essential backdrop to the “take-off” of the western European economy which followed in the 11th century and after (pages 100–11). Carolingian scholars also set new standards in Christian belief, practice and intellectual development, with Latin Christendom growing from the seeds planted by Charlemagne.
By the mid-440s the Hunnic Empire dominated large numbers of Germanic groups in the middle Danube region and exercised a loose hold over large tracts of eastern and north-central Europe. The military success of the empire is evident from the large number of rich burials that have been found, particularly in the middle Danube region, which date from the Hunnic period. Some of these burials may have been of Huns, but many clearly belonged to the Germanic dynasts who first profited from the empire and subsequently led the independence movements which destroyed it after the death of Attila in 453.

In the 560s the Avars established themselves in the area of modern Hungary and for the next 70 years raided territories from the Rhine to Constantinople. They nearly conquered Constantinople in 626 but in doing so suffered a defeat which greatly reduced their offensive military potential. While this allowed the defection of many of their subjects, they remained a dominant power in central Europe until being defeated by Charlemagne in 796.

At the western end of the immense grasslands that run between China and Europe is the Volga and Ukrainian steppe, while further west are two regions of Europe that in soil and climate can be regarded as continuations of the steppe, the Dobrudja in modern Romania and the Great Hungarian Plain. In the 1st millennium AD the rich grazing lands of this area attracted successive waves of Asian nomads and semi-nomads who were from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and supported themselves by raising animals that were moved annually between upland summer and lowland winter pastures.

Among the most important of these westward-moving peoples were the Huns (from c. 350), whose ethnic affiliation is unknown, and the Turkic-speaking Avars (from around 560). In the latter half of the 6th century they were followed by further groups from the confederation of the so-called Western Turks (the Bulgars, Khazars and the Finno-Ugrian-speaking Magyars), and in the 9th century by independent Turkic-speaking groups, the Pechenegs and the Ogoz. As more nomads moved onto the steppe, they drove the earlier arrivals further west and towards the lands around the Mediterranean – lands whose relative wealth could be tapped through raids and more sustained military campaigns, or through the extraction of annual tributes. In 395, for example, the Huns, who at this point were settled in the Ukrainian steppe, raided both the Roman and Persian empires (pages 56–57), and by the 410s they were established on the Great Hungarian Plain, supplying mercenaries to the Roman state. In the 440s, after a sequence of highly destructive campaigns, their feared leader Attila was receiving 900 kilograms (2,000 pounds) of gold a year in tributes. The Avars later mounted a series of campaigns against the Byzantines, particularly in the 580s, and extracted a steadily increasing tribute. In the 10th century the Magyars terrorized Europe with raids from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean coast of France.

The building of empires

The steppe peoples not only raided the empires of other peoples but also built empires of their own, either on the steppe or within Europe. On the Great Hungarian Plain the Huns established a powerful and aggressive empire between about 410 and 469 (map 1). They were succeeded by the Avars, who moved west from the Ukrainian steppe in around 560 to escape the Western Turks and established an empire that was to last until 796 (map 2).

Centred around the ruling clan of the Asina, the Western Turks built a huge empire stretching from the borders of China to the Ukrainian steppe, but it had collapsed by the 630s. During the following 40 years three of its constituent parts – the Bulgars, Khazars and Magyars – established longer-lived entities in the Dobrudja, Volga and Ukrainian steppe respectively. These empires remained relatively stable for over 200 years, until in the late 9th and...
early 10th centuries the Pechenegs moved west, expelling the Magyars and undermining Khazar power (map 3). The Pechenegs themselves would later fall victim to the Seljuk Turks, a dynasty who were to emerge from the Oguz in the 11th century (pages 88–89).

All these shifting empires were based on the conquest and exploitation of subject tribes, who were usually a mixture of nomadic peoples and more settled agricultural groups. Attila’s Hunnic Empire of the 440s consisted of a dominant Hunnic core but with numerous, particularly Germanic, groups such as Goths, Gepids, Herules, Rugians, Sueves and Lombards. The Avar Empire of the later 6th century incorporated Gepids, Bulgars and numerous Slavic groups, and the Bulgar state in the Dobruja and surrounding territories also incorporated many Slavic tribes. The Khazars on the Volga steppe exercised dominion over the nomadic Magyars before they established their own empire in the Ukraine, as well as over large Slavic and later Scandinavian Rus groups to the north.

Once they had achieved some degree of dominance, peoples of the steppe tended to cease being simple nomads and profound social evolution sometimes followed. For example, when the Huns first reached the Ukrainian steppe around 375, they were led in their continual search for new pastures by a multiplicity of chiefs. By the 430s, however, one dominant dynasty, that of Attila, had emerged, suppressing all rivals. With warfare dominating their lives, the Huns were able to use the wealth of the Roman Empire to create a new, more stratified social hierarchy under a single ruler.

The Impact of the Nomads on Europe

The nature of these nomad empires explains much of their impact on Europe. Built on military dominance, they required continued military success to survive. In their campaigns they used soldiers and leaders recruited from the peoples they dominated, and their successes were to some extent shared with these peoples. A successful campaign both maintained a leader’s prestige and provided booty to be distributed – not only among the nomad core but also to selected leaders among subject groups, whose loyalty was thus maintained. The campaigns led to a substantial degree of instability in Europe, as groups escaping from the intruders sought new homes. The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century was brought about by Germanic groups escaping the Huns, and Avar pressure later led to a great migration of Slavs into central and eastern Europe and Lombards into Italy.

Warfare, however, could not be successful forever. The Europeans eventually learned how to contain the steppe peoples, for whom the logistic problems of continuous warfare increased as closer targets were conquered. Once expansion stopped, decline quickly followed. Within 16 years of Attila’s death in 453, the Huns had ceased to exist as an independent force in Europe. Without booty to distribute or prestige to inspire fear, Attila’s sons lost control of the subject peoples. Similarly, when defeat by Constantinople had curbed the power of the Avars in the 7th century, numerous Slavs and Bulgars escaped from the Avar Empire. Long-term survival was only possible for steppe peoples by adopting the lives of sedentary landowners and embracing mainstream European culture, as the Magyars did after being defeated by the Saxons at the Battle of Lechfeld in 955 (map 4).

In the 9th century the Khazars played a dominant role in trade throughout the Ukrainian steppe with both the Bulgars and Magyars. Directly or indirectly, their hegemony also extended to the Slavic and Rus groups of the neighboring forested zone to the north.

Driven into the heart of the continent by the arrival of the Pechenegs on the Ukrainian steppe around 895, the Magyars in turn terrorized central, southern and even parts of western Europe with widespread raids. Their expansion was first curbed in 936 and then halted in 955 by the newly powerful Saxon kings Henry I and his son Otto I.
The Vikings first came to the attention of other Europeans when, at the end of the 8th century, they sailed from their Scandinavian homeland to launch a series of ferocious raids on the coasts of Britain, Ireland and France. However, in the 300 years that followed they not only plundered in western Europe but also embarked on voyages of exploration, established a far-reaching network of trading routes and created new states. During these years the term "Viking" was applied only to those who undertook expeditions of plunder, but it has since come to be used more widely to refer to all the inhabitants of Norway, Denmark and Sweden at that time.

Voyages of Exploration

In the late 8th century Norwegians sailed to the Shetlands and Orkneys, drawn across the North Sea by the prevailing winds and currents. This was a shorter journey than coasting round Scandinavia and led naturally on to the northern coast of Scotland, the Hebrides, Ireland and western Britain (map 1). The Norwegians then ranged further afield and reached the Faroes in the early 9th century and Iceland, another 1,600 kilometres (1,000 miles) northwest, in the 860s and 870s. Greenland was first visited in about 900, when the Norwegian Gunnbjörn was blown off course. Settlement there began in the late 10th century, bringing further explorers, such as Eiríkr the Red, who surveyed much of the new land. According to a 12th-century saga, it was during a voyage to Greenland in 986 that Bjarni Herjólfsson was storm-driven south to reach the shores of North America. He made three landfalls, one of which is thought to coincide with the site of a permanent Norwegian settlement dating from around 1000 near L'Anse aux Meadows, on the northern tip of Newfoundland. Herjólfsson was followed by other voyagers, notably Leif Eriksson (in 1003) and his brother Thorvald (between 1005 and 1012).

Trading and raiding

Most Vikings sailed in search of profit, whether as traders or raiders. They exchanged goods at trading centres (emporia) in northern Europe and followed the river routes of western Russia - chiefly the Volga route to the Caspian - to gain access to the rich Muslim world (map 2). Between the later 8th and 10th centuries the natural resources of the north - particularly furs but also honey, wax, falcons, walrus ivory and large numbers of slaves - were exchanged for Arab silver, mostly at a great emporium in the land of the Volga Bulgars (pages 76-77). During the 9th century Norwegians and Danes also moved west, taking slaves from Ireland and Scotland via new trading settlements at Dublin and York. Commerce and plundering were linked: slaves were usually captured in raids and the trading centres became a natural target for raiders. Exploiting many of the established trading routes, Norwegians raided northern Britain from 796, and Danes quickly followed suit, moving along the Channel to attack southern England and northern France. Merchants were forced to pay protection money and many of the old emporia (especially Quentovic, Dorestad and Hamwic) were repeatedly sacked. In the 840s and 860s settlements along the western coasts of France and Spain, and along the Mediterranean coast as far as Italy, were also raided.
Alfred's newly constructed fortresses (the burhs) protected his kingdom from the second Great Army of 892-95. Many of its frustrated contingents then returned to the continent, creating chaos in Brittany and, under King Rollo, eventually being granted land to found the Duchy of Normandy at the mouth of the Seine in 911.

**CONQUEST AND SETTLEMENT**

A totally new level of activity unfolded in western Europe from the 860s with the arrival of the “Great Armies”, independent (mostly Danish) groups led by their own kings but often totalling several thousand men and now enabling Vikings to settle in previously inpenetrable areas south of Scotland. The first Great Army landed in England in 865 and within five years had subdued Northumbria, Mercia and East Anglia. The next seven years saw a series of assaults on the one surviving kingdom, Wessex, which under Alfred the Great successfully resisted and defeated the Viking Guthrum at Edington in 878. The Vikings were given territory north of the River Thames, and this was formally established as Danelaw (map 3). Dissatisfied with this arrangement, some Vikings turned to continental Europe, and for 13 years (879-92) battles raged along the rivers of northern France, even reaching Paris. Following a serious defeat on the River Dyle the remaining Vikings returned to England in 892, but this time Alfred fended them off with ease (map 4).

**THE FORMATION OF STATES**

Danelaw never constituted a unified state, and when the Vikings no longer arrived in large numbers after 900 the Wessex monarchy swallowed up their territories to create the first united kingdom of England. By contrast, King Rollo’s settlement in France eventually emerged as the independent Duchy of Normandy, and Viking trading stations in western Russia coalesced into a state in the 10th century (pages 70-71). However, the main forum of Viking state formation was Scandinavia itself. In about 800 no unified kingdoms existed there, but by around 1000 a dynasty with its capital at Jelling, led by Svein Forkbeard and his son Cnut, had established control over all of Denmark. Having suppressed their rivals they built fortresses, set up regional administrative centres, created the first native Scandinavian coinage and — because Svein and Cnut were also Christians — established a number of bishoprics (map 5).

Similar processes began in Norway in the 990s, when Olaf Tryggvasson, returning from extensive raiding in England as a rich man and a convert to Christianity, founded the Norwegian monarchy. The entity he created was far from stable, however, and Sweden also remained politically fragmented. Thus when Svein and Cnut gathered forces for the conquest of England (1003-17) they were joined not only by Danes but also by numerous independent groups from across Scandinavia. Cnut became a strong ruler of England, but his hold on Denmark and Norway was weak, and on his death in 1035 his empire disintegrated. Within 50 years the Vikings had been driven out of England by the Normans, and by the 12th century they were no longer a force to be feared outside the shores of Scandinavia.
By 1500 a number of rival states had emerged in West Africa, each governed by an elite whose wealth and power can be judged from their substantial towns, their rich burials and the fine works of craftsmanship created for them.

The various vegetation zones of West Africa supported different agricultural systems and produced different raw resources—such as gold from the savanna and forest, and salt from the desert. This diversity in turn helped stimulate the development of interregional trade.

Early West African states took a number of forms, varying in size from the vast Songhay Empire, which held in its sway many different ethnic groups, to smaller, more ethnically homogeneous Hausa city-states such as Kano (map 1). Methods of government, too, were equally varied: the great medieval empires of the savanna and semi-desert Sahel regions employed often complex bureaucracies utilizing Muslim officials and the Arabic script, while in the forested region of the south, different systems existed which attached varying importance to the role of king. Among the Igbo in the Niger delta, for example, there was no king and loyalty to the state was maintained through religious ties, ceremonies and clans.

Trade and the formation of states

Trade was intimately linked with the growth of states in West Africa, initially local and interregional in focus but later developing into long-distance trade across the Sahara. Trade flourished partly because of the existence of different environmental zones that stretched east-west across the continent and comprised the Sahara Desert, the Sahelian semi-desert, the Sudanic savanna and wooded grasslands, and finally the more heavily wooded region merging into the rainforest (map 2). The forms of agriculture practiced varied between zones: for example, the yams cultivated in the southern wooded region could not be grown in the Sahelian or Saharan zones, whereas pastoralism or animal herding was viable in the Sahel. This variation resulted in a need to exchange commodities, often carried out by merchants from the Sahel or savanna regions (map 3).

Prosperity generated through trade, coupled with the growth of settlements at important trade centers, gradually led to urbanization and the foundation of states. Recent excavations have shown that the settlement of Jenne-jeno in Mali, the earliest town yet found in West Africa, was founded in about 300 BC and had developed into a thriving town by AD 500. Although Jenne-jeno never grew into a state, it served as a center of trade where savanna commodities such as gold, iron and various foodstuffs were traded for Saharan salt and possibly—though this is less certain—for copper.

Another town founded in Mali by the 7th century was Gao, later to become the capital of the Songhay Empire. To the west, in Mauritania, the capital of the empire of Ghana also appears to have been in existence by this time, though only part of the settlement—the merchants' town of Koombo Saleh—has so far been found. While Ghana was in all probability the first of the states founded in West Africa, events were also proceeding rapidly to the east of this area on the margins of Lake Chad. The kingdom of Kanem, east of the lake, was mentioned in an Arab document in the mid-9th...
century and had certainly been in existence for some time before that. Later, apparently in the 14th century, this state shifted west of Lake Chad to Borno and became known as Kanem-Borno.

The forest regions, with their higher density of population than the savanna or Sahel regions, were a source of slaves, and states began to emerge in this area around the 12th century. Trade appears to have been linked with the growth of the Akan states in modern Ghana, an area rich in gold where trade centres such as Begho were founded perhaps as early as the 12th century. To the northeast the seven Hausa city-states, the Hausa Bakwai, were established during the 13th century. Together with a further seven related but non-Hausa states to the south, these formed a link in the 15th century between Kanem-Borno to the east and the Songhay Empire and the Akan states to the west.

The forest kingdoms also emerged comparatively early, with Benin (now famous on account of its bronze sculptures), occupied by the 13th century. Similar castings, predating those of Benin, were produced in Ife, birthplace of the Yoruba nation – a state with a well-developed tradition of forest farming, town living, crafts and government.

**CONTACTS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD**

Indirect trans-Saharan trade is known to have occurred during the 1st millennium BC, but it is unlikely that caravans travelled right across the desert until the introduction of camels towards the end of that period. Archaeological evidence indicates that trans-Saharan trade became far more important with the consolidation of Islam in North Africa from the early 9th century AD, and from this time it had a major economic and social impact on the developing states of sub-Saharan Africa.

There was a great demand in the Muslim world for West African products, particularly gold, slaves and ivory. Among the items sent south in return were manufactured goods such as cloth, glazed pottery, glass vessels, beads, paper, brass and cowrie shells (later used as currency). Transport was by camel caravans, which travelled from well to well to the Sahelian trade centres of Koumbi Saleh, Taghazaust and Gao. From there some of the goods were traded on further into West Africa – indicated, for example, by the discovery of many thousands of 9th-century coloured glass beads at the site of Igbo-Ukwu in the southern forest zone.

Through contacts with Muslim merchants, the Sahelian trade centres were exposed to Islam from the very beginnings of trans-Saharan trade with Muslim North Africa. Various local rulers of the empires of Ghana, Kanem-Borno, Mali and Songhay converted to Islam, which spread right across the region through the activities of local merchant groups such as the Mande or Wangara, who were responsible for much of the trade in gold and kola nuts from the Akan states. Hausa was also gradually Islamized but further south, in the forest states such as Ife or Benin, the traditional beliefs of animism were maintained, with religious and secular authority often intermixed.

**THE ARRIVAL OF THE PORTUGUESE**

Major events in the second half of the 15th century were to have far-reaching effects on the states, societies and trade systems of West Africa. Paramount among these was the arrival of the Portuguese on the west coast in the 1440s, followed by the establishment in 1482 of a Portuguese trading post at Elmina on the coast of modern Ghana. This meant that imported manufactured goods such as cloth could now be obtained directly from the coast and that another outlet for West African commodities was established. The slave trade across the Atlantic also began, starting with the first cargo of slaves from West Africa to the West Indies in 1518 – a momentous event with tragic consequences.

Located on the inland Niger delta, the town of Jenne-jeno owed its prosperity to its great agricultural wealth, exporting rice, cereals, dried fish and fish oil to neighbouring regions by using the Niger as a transport highway. It was the first of many such towns that emerged in West Africa, all of them trading local raw materials and produce for everyday commodities and luxuries from other regions as far away as Muslim North Africa.

Like the people of Benin, the Yoruba produced fine bronze heads and figurines. However, they are particularly renowned for their terracotta heads, such as this one of a 12th-13th century queen from Ife.
STATES AND TRADE IN EAST AFRICA
500–1500

In the 6th century East Africa was a mosaic of very different cultural groups employing a variety of subsistence strategies. Though in many areas foraging was still the primary means of providing food, agriculture and stockkeeping had already spread throughout the length of the continent. In areas such as the arid far southwest and the forests of central Africa, nomadic hunter-gatherers, being so well adapted to these environments, were still thriving in 1500 AD. However, by the 8th century more settled communities had also begun to be established, which frequently controlled resources such as copper and ivory or acted as trading settlements. Some of these settled communities later developed into kingdoms and became integrated into extensive trading networks.

In Ethiopia the Christian Axumite kingdom had begun to decline in the 7th century after losing control of its ports to the Arabs, and was finally destroyed in the 10th century. Christianity nevertheless remained strong in Ethiopia, and the focus of Christian Ethiopia (map 1) shifted south from Axum to Lalibela (then called Adafa). While the Axumite kingdom had been urban in character, the empire which replaced it was largely feudal, its rulers shifting their court when local resources had been exhausted. Rock-cut churches, created between the 10th and the 15th centuries, are the main legacy of the Christian Ethiopian Empire.

THE ISLAMIZATION OF EAST AFRICA
To the east and southeast of the Christian empire, Islamic trading settlements were established along the coast and along the trade routes leading into the interior from the major ports, of which Zeilla was perhaps the most important. As the Muslim population increased, the creation of a number of Islamic sultanates led to conflict with the Christian Ethiopian Empire. During this period the Somali slowly expanded from around the Gulf of Aden – along the coast north to Zeilla and south to Mogadishu, and into the interior – to occupy much of the Horn of Africa. By the 12th century Islamization of this area had become well advanced.

During the 9th century a series of trading settlements, united by a common religion, language and style of living, emerged along the East African coast. These Swahili-speaking Islamic communities, though African, lay on a branch of the great trade routes connecting the Red Sea, southern Arabia and India, and they adopted various aspects of the cultures with which they came in contact. By the 14th century Swahili towns and settlements had greatly expanded from the early sites of Manda and Shanga and stretched from Mogadishu south to Chiboune, with communities on the Comores and Madagascar. Towns such as Kilwa contained fine, multi-storied houses built of coral, and their inhabitants ate a diet containing rice, spices and coconut – cosmopolitan Indian Ocean tastes.

STATE FORMATION IN THE INTERIOR
Political developments also occurred in interior East Africa. In the region of the Great Lakes a series of huge earthwork enclosures was built: at Bigo over 10 kilometres (six miles) of ditches and ramparts enclosed almost 300 hectares (750 acres). It is thought that these enclosures were used for coralling cattle and that this kingdom, which later came to be known as Bunyoro, based its wealth and power on its control of cattle. Further south, control of the copper and goldfields (map 2) may have been a factor in the rise of other powerful elites. An excavated sequence of burials at Sanga illustrates the emergence of a hierarchical society by the 10th century and the development of a currency system of uniform small copper crosses. Although the main copper belt was 200 kilometres (125 miles) to the south, the society represented in the Sanga cemetery used copper to indicate wealth and status.

On the Zimbabwe Plateau, with its highland and lowland grazing areas and its gold, iron, copper and tin resources, a powerful elite emerged at the beginning of the present millennium. Its capital was located at Great Zimbabwe (map 3), a substantial complex of stone towers and enclosures surrounded by daga (mud structures), which may have had a population of some 18,000 people. Similar stone structures are found across the plateau, indicating the extent of the authority exercised by the Zimbabwe elite. Religion may have played a role in legitimizing this authority: many ritual objects have been found at Great Zimbabwe, in particular soapstone carvings and monoliths, some surmounted by birds.

EAST AFRICAN TRADE
The control and exploitation of particular resources or of trade routes played a role in the development of virtually every state and kingdom in East Africa. The area was rich in resources – in metals such as gold, copper and iron, and in exotic materials such as ivory. Whereas West Africa, with its treacherous winds and coasts, had to rely on the trans-Saharan trade routes until the end of the 15th century, East Africa was connected from an early date to the trade networks of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (pages 52–53), and beyond as far east as Java and China (map 2). At the northern end of the coast, traders may have been active from as
early as the 1st century AD, when it was found that using the favourable winds, a good dhow could make a return trip from Mombasa to Cambay during one monsoon season.

The main export from the Horn of Africa was slaves, shipped up the Red Sea and to the Arabian Peninsula. In return various manufactured goods were imported, including arms from the Arab world and ceramics from Arabia, Persia and China. Ceramics were also a major import along the length of the East African coast, where Swahili houses were built with rows of wall niches to display their collections of porcelain. Other imports included textiles, spices and sugar. Great Zimbabwe grew wealthy from the trading of copper, gold and iron ore, and the coastal trading towns controlled the export of various products – metals, ivory and slaves – from the interior, to which they transported beads.

The trading communities of the East African coast reached their height at the end of the 15th century. In 1497 a Portuguese expedition led by Vasco da Gama landed at Sofala, beginning a new chapter in the history of East Africa. Initially the Portuguese established forts at Kilwa and Sofala to safeguard their trade routes to India, but the rich coastal trade here soon became an equal attraction. The nature of these coastal settlements, and their relationship with the interior, would now alter irrevocably.
CIVILIZATIONS IN MESOAMERICA AND SOUTH AMERICA 500-1500

Mesopotamia and the Andes region of South America were home to some of the most sophisticated civilizations in ancient America— including, in the period from around 500 to 1500, the Later Maya, Toltec, Teuchítlan, Tarascan, Zapotec, Mixtec, Sican and Chimu. While some consisted of only one ethnic group, others occupied an ecologically distinct region, such as areas in the hot lowlands (tierra caliente) or cooler highlands (tierra fría). Most began in a heartland under tight dynastic control but then spread to more distant areas which were governed only indirectly, often through local rulers.

The Chimu Culture

To the west of the Andes the Chimu, a dynasty from the Moche Valley, gradually came to dominate a thin coastal strip in Peru between the 10th and 15th centuries (map 1). Iconographic clues suggest substantial continuity with the religion of the earlier Moche state (pages 34-35), although with a new twist: the capital city of Chan Chan contains ten immense enclosures thought to have served as mortuary temples for deceased Chimu emperors.

In three phases of expansion the Chimu lords extended control over and beyond the valleys once controlled by the Moche, with the same tendency of avoiding highland zones. Evidence of Chimu control in the south is patchy as local polities were incorporated by the Chimu without any substantial change to local government. By contrast, areas to the north may have been subjected to territorial conquest. Around 1350 the Chimu conquered the Lambayeque Valley, where the Sican culture with its rich burials and prosperous, irrigated settlements had succeeded the Moche. Chan Chan with its huge temples for deceased Chimu emperors.

Five valleys and by 1475, led by Emperor Manco Capac, it had reached over the Andes to the Amazonian cultural area. Great canals connecting river valleys facilitated irrigation agriculture and the growth of urban civilization in the heartland of the Chimu.

The Later Maya

In Mesoamerica the Maya went through great changes in the period between 500 and the Spanish conquest in the 16th century. Until about 900, kingdoms ruled by “holy lords” and administered by courtiers waged war and created alliances against a backdrop of a rising population— one that approached five million in the central Yucatán Peninsula alone (map 2). However, between 800 and 900 the population plummeted dramatically for a variety of reasons, some of them agricultural and meteorological (such as environmental degradation) and others political, including intensified conflict between elites.

The so-called “Maya Collapse” was more pronounced in the centre of the peninsula than elsewhere, partly due to a lower birth rate and a higher mortality rate here than elsewhere, but also because of large-scale movements of people into more peaceful zones. Thus while the reduced population of the central area settled on defended islands in lakes, some Maya groups undoubtedly moved to cities in the northwest which had only just overcome a severe water shortage by developing a new means of collecting and storing rainwater in underground estens.

At the time of the collapse, the large city of Chichen Itza lorded over a confederacy that shaped the northern peninsula (map 3). In the late 13th century the smaller city of Mayapan took over, its rule lasting until around 1450. The final years before the Spanish conquest saw power disperse into small kingdoms—a development that made the Yucatán Peninsula far more resistant to Spanish incursions than Tenochtitlan, imperial city of the Aztecs in the Valley of Mexico (pages 110-11).
The Toltecs

The emperor of the Aztecs was one of the 15th-century rulers in Mesoamerica who claimed descent from the Toltecs, a legendary people who had inhabited the semi-mythical paradise city of Tula. There is some historical evidence to support these legends, Tula having been identified with a major ruined city which was at its peak around the 10th century and was abandoned and destroyed around 1160 (map 3). Its inhabitants, the Toltecs, included groups from the Gulf coast as well as Nahuatl speakers originally from the “barbarian” lands to the north. Monumental sculptures and other artwork at Tula show the Toltecs as warriors— and practising the Mesoamerican rituals of captive sacrifice and the ballgame.

Major conflict around 980 may have led one group of Toltecs to flee to the Yucatan, where religious and perhaps dynastic elements typical of Tula appeared in Chichen Itza at this time. The Toltecs remaining at Tula then came to dominate a large area of central Mexico, playing a major role in trading networks which stretched as far north as the Pueblo area of southwestern North America (pages 108-9), the source of highly-prized turquoise. After the collapse of Tula there was probably a major dispersal of its inhabitants, introducing Toltec elements into the Valley of Mexico, Cholula and the Maya area.

The Teuchitlan, Tarascan, Zapotec and Mixtec Civilizations

Western Mexico (map 4) has often been described as the land of “enduring villages”, each with deep-shaft tombs containing sculptures of everyday life. However, recent research has shown that from 500 to 900 this hilly, dry and remote part of Mesoamerica contained not only large tombs but also a distinctive temple type known as the guachimonton: a circular configuration of mounds around a central pyramid, often with a ballcourt extending out as an alley from the central group of buildings. The concentration of such features in the Teuchitlan Valley, together with raised field agriculture (chinampas) and fortified control points along valleys leading into this area, suggest a unitary state.

By the late pre-Conquest period a local people, speaking an isolated language known as Tarascan, controlled a large area of western Mexico around Lake Patzcuaro, from where they successfully harried the Aztecs. The Tarascans were exceptional craftsmen, particularly in their working of gold and silver. Their emperor, the kasonsi, commissioned stepped platforms known as yacatas, probably the funerary monuments of his ancestors. In a dualistic pattern also common in central Mexico the kasonsi shared power with a powerful priest.

To the southeast of the Tarascan kingdom, in the Oaxaca Valley, were the Mixtecs. They had eclipsed the power of the Zapotecs, who around 700 had abandoned their great Classic centre of Monte Alban in the valley and later moved to a new base at Mitla. Here the Zapotecs constructed a fortified stronghold with fine palaces and continued to practice sacrificial rites until the arrival of the Spanish.

The Mixtecs, who were originally based in a series of small warring kingdoms in the north and west of the Oaxaca Valley, expanded their territory by warfare and dynastic marriages during the Post-Classical period (between 900 and the Spanish conquest). By 1350 they controlled the Oaxaca Valley and influenced neighbouring regions as far as Cholula. Both the Mixtecs and Zapotecs suffered at the hands of the Aztecs, but neither people was ever completely conquered; like the Tarascan Empire, both these cultures would soon be destroyed by powerful European invaders.
In contrast to the cosmopolitan and expansionist Tang dynasty, the Song dynasty was introspective and defensive. The threat from the north forced the Song to maintain a massive professional army, which by 1040 contained over 1,250,000 men. Military expenditure exploded and the production of arms and armour reached unprecedented rates. The Song also developed new methods of warfare; the first surviving formula for gunpowder dates from this period, although it had been invented under the Tang.

A painted wooden carving of Buddha from Japan's Muromachi period (1335–1573) conveys a vastly different image to the traditional Buddhist figures of the Indian subcontinent. Arriving in Japan from China by the 6th century, Buddhism was hugely influential, notably in education, but it failed to replace the indigenous religion of Shinto.

Following the fall of the Tang dynasty in 907 (pages 72–73), southern China was broken up into small “kingdoms” ruled over by warlords, while northern China was controlled by a rapid succession of “dynasties”, the Later periods of the Liang, Tang, Jin, Han and Zhou. This period of disunity, known as the Ten Kingdoms and Five Dynasties, was ended in 960 by the general Zhao Kuangyin, who brought China under the control of the Song dynasty and reigned as Emperor Taizu until 976.

The reunified Chinese Empire (map 1) was rather different in character from its Tang predecessor. It was much smaller: Central Asia had been lost, and the Liao state in the northeast was controlled by the Khitan people, the Xixia state in the northwest by the Tangut people. The Khitan and the Tangut were non-Chinese, and the north presented a constant military threat to the Song. Initially the Song emperors established the northern city of Kaifeng as their capital. However, after the loss of much of northern China to Jurchen invaders, who created the Jin state, the Song established a second capital further south in Hangzhou.

CULTURE AND ECONOMY OF THE SONG PERIOD

The Song period saw a great revival in Confucianism, regarded as the native Chinese philosophy, at the expense of Buddhism, which had been imported from India during the Tang period. The class of scholar-officials burgeoned as great emphasis was placed on civil service examination, which began during the Han period and continued under the Tang rulers, as the method of recruiting the governing elite. By the end of the era some 400,000 candidates sat exams each year, sometimes with hundreds of aspirants chasing a single post. Scholarly families fuelled a demand for the many new books of all sorts that the improvements in printing, such as woodblock printing and the use of moveable type, allowed to be produced. The Song era also witnessed new artistic forms, notably the rise of landscape painting – and indeed the Emperor Huizong (r. 1100–1126) was blamed for the loss of the north because he allowed his interests in art to distract him from government.

The population of China rose to over 100 million by 1100, with a much higher increase in the south than in the north. This demographic growth was accompanied by great economic growth and an expansion in mercantile activity, notably in waterborne trade, facilitated by the world’s first paper money. Vast new tracts of land were opened up for agriculture, and the development of an unregulated property market led to the appearance of huge estates. All across China new cities flourished, often springing out as bustling markets but with tea houses and shops soon added to attract traders and customers. In the 13th century the Italian traveller Marco Polo was to describe the later Song capital of Hangzhou as the finest and most splendid city in the world.
EVENTS IN THE NORTHEAST

The Liao state in the northeast was a union of a number of Khitan tribes – originally from the margins of the Manchurian steppe – brought together by the ruler Abaoji in the early 10th century. Their state comprised a solidly Khitan northern part and a southern part divided into 16 provinces and occupied mostly by the three million Chinese ruled over by the Khitan. From the late 10th century the Khitan repeatedly attacked the Koryo kingdom in Korea, capturing the capital Kaegyong in 1011. There were also frequent forays against the Tangut to the west.

By the 12th century a new power had emerged in the northeast – a confederation of Jurchen tribes from the mountains of eastern Manchuria. Following victory over the Liao state in 1125, the Jurchen seized north China two years later and established the Jin dynasty (map 2). The Song dynasty survived in the south until 1279, when the whole country fell to the Mongols (pages 98-99); they were, in their turn, to be replaced in 1368 by the Ming dynasty.

KOREA AND JAPAN

On the Korean Peninsula (map 3) the Koryo kingdom lasted until 1392. The later years of the dynasty were marked by repeated debilitating invasions by northern nomads and, from 1231, a series of invasions by Mongol armies. In 1232 the court was forced to flee the capital to Kanghwa Island and by 1259 the government had accepted Mongol domination. Rebellions and coups took their toll, and in 1388 General Yi Song-gye mounted a coup d’etat, ushering in the Yi dynasty that was to last from 1392 until 1910 (map 4). Hanyong, modern Seoul, replaced Kaegyong as the capital and in October 1446 Hangul, the new Korean script, was promulgated. Employing a phonetic alphabet, which can be learnt much more quickly than Chinese ideographs, this script brought literacy to the peasants and enabled the gradual appearance of a vernacular literature.

In Japan the seat of government shifted from Kyoto to Kamakura in 1185 as military overlords, or shoguns, took power from the emperor in Kyoto. The Kamakura period (1185–1335) saw the development of the militaristic samurai culture. When it ended, the Japanese rulers set their sights on conquering Korea.

Japanese incursions into Korea were met with counter-attacks by combined Ming Chinese and Korean forces, and indeed Hideyoshi died in his second attempt at conquering Korea in 1597. Power passed to Tokugawa leyasu, who established the Tokugawa Shogunate (pages 140–41) and closed the doors of Japan to the outside world.

Under the Koryo, pottery manufacture flourished. Cultural achievements included the publication of the first Korean histories, while among technical innovations was the use of movable type, leading to the world’s first casting of metal type in 1403.

In 1161 the Jin dynasty adopted Kaifeng, the old Song seat of government on the Huang He, as their capital, while the retreating Song set up a new capital further south at Hangzhou.

The 11th century in Japan is known as the era of the Warring States, or Sengoku period, during which regional warlords fought each other to win control of the country. When it ended, the Japanese rulers set their sights on conquering Korea.
At the beginning of the 11th century the Muslim world stretched from Spain in the west to the borders of Central Asia and India (map 1). Yet the political and religious unity provided for most of the Muslim world by the Abbasid Caliphate— with the notable exception of Umayyad Spain— had been lost by the 10th century. The Abbasid Empire had fragmented and the central lands of Egypt and Iraq were occupied by the Fatimids and the Buyids, both Shi'ite states that rejected the Sunni caliph's religious authority. The caliph himself now survived as no more than a powerless figurehead in Baghdad under the ignominious tutelage of a Buyid sultan. In the far west the Umayyad Caliphate was close to collapse and partition between a number of successor states— the taifa kingdoms—and the Maghreb (North Africa) was divided between several Berber dynasties. The major power in the east was the Ghaznavids, a Turkish dynasty of former slave soldiers whose only rivals were the recently converted Turkish Qarakhanids and the still largely non-Muslim Turkish nomads, especially the Oguz, on the steppe to the north. Muslim political weakness had already allowed the Byzantines to expand into Syria and Armenia, and it would soon open the way for Christian conquests in Spain and Sicily.

THE GREAT SELJUK EMPIRE

In the west the Muslim retreat was only temporarily halted by the occupation of Muslim Spain by Berber dynasties from the Maghreb—first the Almoravids (1086–1143) and later the Almohads (1150–1228). In the central and eastern lands the situation was transformed first by the conversion of the Oguz Turks to Sunni (rather than Shi'ite) Islam, and then in 1038 by the Oguz invasion of Iran, led by the Seljuk dynasty. Victory over the Ghaznavids at Manzikert in 1071 enabled the Seljuks to create a loose Sunni empire that stretched from the edge of the steppe to Anatolia and Palestine. The religious, if not political, authority of the Abbasid caliph was restored, and the next target was Shi'ite Egypt.

The so-called Great Seljuk Empire (to distinguish it from the later Anatolian state of the Seljuks of Rum) reached its zenith under Malik Shah (map 2). His death in 1092 opened a new phase of political instability and fragmentation which provided the opportunity in 1098–99 for Latin Christians from western Europe to establish the Crusader States in Syria and Palestine (pages 94–95). The Seljuks continued to rule in parts of western Iran as late as 1194, but the Seljuk era was over in Syria by 1117, and in most of eastern Iran by 1156. Only in Anatolia did an independent branch of the Seljuk dynasty flourish into the 13th century.

One beneficiary of Seljuk decline were the Abbasid caliphs, who enjoyed a new-found political independence in southern Iraq, but otherwise the central and eastern lands

During the 10th century the political unity of the Muslim world collapsed. The Abbasid caliphs, previously dominant from the Atlantic to India, were replaced by a series of regional dynasties, and the caliph in Baghdad was reduced to little more than a religious figurehead.

Under Malik Shah, the Seljuk-led warbands of the Oguz Turks reunited much of the old Abbasid Empire. His authority was based loosely on a combination of personal prestige and the ability, furnished by his military successes, to distribute material reward to more or less autonomous subordinate rulers, each with his own warrior following.

The unity fostered by the Seljuks in the 11th century was illusory. Reliant on continued military expansion to provide the rewards coveted by local leaders, it was not sustainable in the long term. Instead, in the 12th century the Muslim world fragmented into a series of regional authorities—a localization of power which made possible gains by the Byzantines, crusaders, nomads and others at the expense of particular Muslim communities.
of the Muslim world fell to Turkish dynasties. Several of these lineages, including the Zengids, the Ildegizids and the Salghurids, had their origins as atabegs, holders of delegated Seljuk authority (map 3), but there were two important exceptions – the Ayyubids and the Ghurids.

The Ayyubids were a Kurdish dynasty who began as soldiers serving the Zengids. The most famous Ayyubid, Saladin, overthrew the Fatimid Caliphate in 1171, so restoring Sunni authority in Egypt. Having expelled the Zengids from Damascus and Aleppo and retaken Jerusalem from the crusaders, he established himself as the dominant Muslim leader in the western Near East (pages 94-95).

The Ghurids were an Iranian dynasty from a tribal background in eastern Iran. They came to prominence serving the Ghaznavids and Seljuks – before, like the Ayyubids, taking over from their former masters as rulers in their own right. From the 1150s until their disastrous defeat by the nomad Qara Khitai in 1204, the Ghurids were the leading power in eastern Iran. Their conquests in India between 1192 and 1206, going beyond the earlier Ghaznavid territories based on Lahore, laid the foundation for the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi in 1211 and long-lasting Muslim rule in the subcontinent (map 4).

THE MONGOL INVASIONS

The late 12th century, the age of Saladin and the Ghurids, was a period of calm before a storm which threatened the complete destruction of Islam. From 1219 the pagan Mongols invaded and gradually conquered the area of modern-day Iran, Iraq and eastern Anatolia (pages 98-99). Baghdad was sacked in 1258, and the last generally recognized Abbasid caliph put to death. In the West, Christian armies were conquering most of what remained of Muslim Spain – and in 1217–21, and again in 1249–50, they threatened to seize Cairo and end Muslim rule in Egypt.

The Muslim world was saved partly by disunity among the Mongols. After 1242 the Mongols in the west were divided between the Golden Horde, the Ilkhanate and the Chaghatai Khanate, and they frequently fought one another as fiercely as they did their non-Mongol enemies (map 5). Islam as a religion and a culture also proved capable of converting some of its conquerors. Although the Spanish Christians proved resolute, both the Golden Horde and the Ilkhan Empire had converted to Islam by the early 14th century. Muslim survival was also due to fierce resistance – in India from the sultans of Delhi, in Syria and Palestine from the Mamluk rulers of Egypt.

THE MAMLUKS OF EGYPT

Slave soldiers or mamluks (usually Turks imported from the steppe) had been a feature of Muslim armies since the 8th century. The Egyptian mamluks serving the Ayyubids were mostly Kipchak Turks, brought as slaves from the Black Sea and taken to Egypt, where they were converted to Islam and trained to become a formidable military force. In 1250, after the French crusader invasion landed, the leaders of one of the main mamluk regiments murdered the last Ayyubid sultan in Egypt and seized power. By the beginning of the 14th century the Mamluk regime had permanently halted the Mongol advance – and expelled the crusaders from their last coveted territories on the Levantine mainland.

The spread of Islam 600-1000 pages 66-67

The Byzantine and Ottoman empires 1025-1500 pages 96-97
THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
962–1356

When the East Frankish king, Otto I, was crowned emperor by the Pope in Rome in 962, his empire comprised those lands north of the Alps which had formed the East Francia of the 843 Carolingian partition (pages 74–75) together with Lotharingia (the 843 “middle kingdom” to which Burgundy – the territories from Basel to Provence – was to be added in 1032–34), and Lombardy (map 1). This empire was passed on with relatively minor geographical alteration thereafter to his son and grandson (Otto II and Otto III) and then to his Salian, Staufen, Welf, Luxembourg and Habsburg successors.

By taking the imperial title, Otto was deliberately presenting himself as the successor of Charlemagne – restorer of the Christian empire in the west – in order to enhance his prestige. Two centuries later, when Frederick Barbarossa succeeded to the same kingship and imperial status, he reaffirmed the continuing tradition by instigating Charlemagne’s canonization and by adding the word “holy” to the name of the empire. A further two centuries later, in 1355, Charles IV of Luxembourg secured his imperial coronation in Rome, and then, in 1356, issued the Golden Bull. This came to be viewed as the basic constitutional law of the empire, defining as it did the right of seven Electors meeting at Frankfurt – the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg and the King of Bohemia – to designate the emperor-elect, also called “King of the Romans”. In this form, the Empire continued until its dissolution in 1806.

THE ITALIAN KINGSHIP

Within the Empire the sense of two component kingships was maintained: the primary northern kingship comprising Franks, Saxons, Swabians, Bavarians and Lotharingians, and the southern secondary kingship of the Lombards. The emperor-elect, chosen by German princes, travelled south across the Alps to secure recognition in northern Italy and coronation by the Pope in Rome, but there was little governmental substance to his position in Italy. Intermittently, attempts were made to change this situation. Between the mid-10th and mid-11th centuries the Liudolfing and Salian emperors spent lengthy periods south of the Alps. In the years 1158–77 the Staufen emperor Frederick Barbarossa sought to benefit from the gathering pace of economic growth and north Italian trade (pages 100–1), but failed to win a decisive victory over the Lombard League of northern town communes. His son successfully took over Sicily and southern Italy in 1194, but his grandson’s renewed attempt in 1236–50 to master Lombardy was thwarted by the alliance of communes and Papacy.

The pattern of northern intervention in Italy survived the Staufen’s loss of the Sicilian as well as the German kingship in 1254–68. However, after the expeditions of Henry of Luxembourg in 1310–13 and Ludwig of Wittelsbach in 1328, imperial jurisdiction south of the Alps was merely theoretical. In practice, government and politics evolved as an autonomous system of local regimes – and the flowering of both Italian economic enterprise and Renaissance culture developed independently of the Empire (pages 102–3).

THE NORTHERN EMPIRE

In Germany the king’s position was stronger than in Italy, yet here too the force of localism was of primary importance. Traditions of local lordship and identity were very powerfully entrenched, pre-dating the Carolingian “unification” of the region under a single kingship, and
remained the necessary framework of government. It was impossible for any single authority to exert control over so large and diverse an area and even when—in Germany as elsewhere in the 12th and 13th centuries—more bureaucratic governmental techniques were developed, they benefited local rulers rather than the emperor. These local rulers might be noble dynasts, communal associations in individual “free towns”, or more varied groupings. Among the latter the Swiss cantons, which included both Alpine rural communities and towns, were the most successful in consolidating a separate existence (map 2).

**EASTWARD EXPANSION**

Both the diversity and the extent of German society were enhanced between the 10th and 14th centuries by large-scale expansion eastwards. In the 10th century the Saxon Liudolfings gained acceptance as kings through their successful military leadership in warfare against the Slavs east of the Elbe—and above all against the Magyars who, from 900, were raiding along the Danube Valley. The victories of Henry I in the north in 933 and Otto I in the south in 955 opened the way to German movement eastwards, in a number of permutations of tribute-taking and land-settling ventures (map 3).

After the 11th century, kings and emperors had little to do with such expansion. Instead, local dynasties—such as the Babenbergs in Austria or the Wettins in Meissen—recruited the necessary human resources of peasant farmers and urban traders and provided the local structure of military and juridical organization. This movement of eastward expansion far exceeded even the expanded limits of the Empire (Reich), whose princes attended the Reichstag and engaged in the politics of elective kingship. Throughout east-central Europe, with the active encouragement of local rulers, German communities, equipped with German customary law, were induced to settle alongside Slav and Magyar populations.

From the mid-12th century some of these local rulers were connected with crusading impulses (pages 94–95). The Wendish Crusade from 1147 to 1185, waged by German princes and Danish kings, brought forcible Christianization to Holstein, Mecklenburg and Pomerania. A further series of crusades developed after 1200 in the east Baltic area of Livonia, extending into Finland by the 1240s under the impetus of Swedish conquest. Most notably, from the 1220s the Teutonic Order (an organization of soldier-monks, founded in Palestine in the 1190s, whose members were recruited from the Rhineland and other parts of the Empire) acquired independent rule in Prussia and from there waged the “Perpetual Crusade” against the pagan Lithuanians.

**THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE**

The 12th and 13th centuries also saw the creation of a network of German maritime enterprise in the Baltic, from Novgorod to Flanders and England through the North Sea. The timber, furs and grain of Scandinavia, northern Russia, and the southern hinterland of the Baltic were shipped westwards, with return cargoes of cloth and other manufactured commodities. Merchants formed associations (hanses) to protect and enhance their trade and in the 13th century this trading network developed into the Hanseatic League (map 3). The League linked the newly founded German towns (dominated by the Hanseatic merchants) on the southern Baltic coast between Lübeck and Riga, both southwards to the German hinterland and the newly exploited lands to the east, and northwards to Scandinavia. Throughout it area local rulers awarded grants of privilege in return for profit-sharing arrangements, thus contributing to German economic and cultural expansion within Europe.
The more important regional powers in France and Burgundy around 1050 included Normandy, Flanders, Anjou and Toulouse as well as the Capetian kings. Their authority was no more stable than had been that of the Carolingians. The kings of Aragon were united in 1137 with the already powerful counts of Barcelona, and they used the growing commercial wealth of the port of Barcelona to extend their control to southern France through the imposition of feudal ties.

The Christian kings in Spain strengthened their position by organizing opposition to the Muslim rulers in the south. Having held out against the Almohads and Almoravids, they overran much of the Muslim territory in the 13th century.

Between the 10th and 13th centuries much political control in France, Spain, England and other areas of western Europe was devolved to local landowning aristocracies who built castles and employed armoured knights to assert their power over the peasants. Depending on circumstances, these local magnates came more or less under the control of kings or regional lords. There was no simple pattern, but underlying changes in the economy meant that the power and influence of kings and regional lords, after declining during the 11th century, had generally grown by around 1300.

The Kingdom of France

During the 8th and early 9th centuries the French Carolingian kings had been immensely successful in harnessing the aristocracy in a common enterprise. However, by the end of the 10th century royal power and the political structure of West Francia were undergoing a fundamental transformation. One reason for this was that in about 950 the economy of western Europe had entered a phase of steady growth, marked by rising population, new settlements and an increasing volume of exchange. At the same time the Carolingian lands in West Francia had been given away or sold off in an attempt to buy support — and lacking any obvious foreign enemy either to plunder or unite against, the French kings had soon been reduced to comparative impotence. By 987, when Hugh Capet replaced the last Carolingian king, royal authority extended little beyond the small royal domain in the île de France.

The extent to which power had devolved varied from area to area, and authority by no means remained stable. In the county of Macon, for example, the counts had largely thrown off the authority of the dukes of Burgundy by 980, only to then find their own authority steadily undermined. As a result, by about 1030 the local castle-holders (castellans) and great churches were in effect independent, with their own courts exercising private justice — “banal lordship” — over a large subject population.

The Consolidation of Power

By the 12th century three factors tended to favour larger and more coherent political units. First, the growing profits arising from customs, tolls and urban expansion were more easily exploited by regional powers than by independent castellans. As trade across Europe increased, the taxation of its profits at regional level made kings and other greater lords a dominating social force. Second, the increasing use of written records and accounts gave rise to a new bureaucracy of clerks, accountants and lawyers whom only the wealthiest could afford to employ, but who in turn allowed a
much more effective exploitation of resources. Third, the spread of feudal relations enabled kings, on the basis of their growing wealth, to impose greater obligations on their castle-holding subjects.

**Spain: The Rise of Aragon**

An example of these factors being turned to good effect is the rise of the House of Aragon. In the late 11th and 12th centuries the counts of Barcelona (from 1137 also kings of Aragon) imposed feudal ties on the aristocracy of Catalonia, and went on to do the same in the kingdom of Burgundy for the turbulent aristocracy of the county of Provence (map 2). Although Count Pere II's defeat and death at the Battle of Muret in 1213 brought an end to Aragonese power north of the Pyrenees, his successors had carved out a substantial Mediterranean empire by the end of the century (map J).

Controlling and directing the reconquest of Muslim Spain was a further lever of power in the hands of Christian Spanish monarchs. During this period, the Christian kingdoms first terrorized the successor states (taifas) to the once-powerful Muslim Umayyads (pages 88–89), and then held out against the counterattack of the Berber Almoravids and Almohads before overrunning most of what was left of Muslim territory in the 13th century.

**England: A Process of Centralization**

During the 10th and early 11th centuries the Anglo-Saxon kings faced the threat of Viking conquest, and in the process forged a sophisticated and centrally controlled administrative machine. A network of shires was created, and royal mints enabled the Crown to enforce a standardized coinage and gain a considerable income through regular remintings.

By 1265 the Capetian kings directly or indirectly ruled large areas of France, and the extent of English-controlled territory had been greatly reduced. The English crown effectively controlled most of the British Isles by 1300. Its advance into Scotland came to a halt in 1314 at the Battle of Bannockburn. The Norman Conquest in 1066 paradoxically reinforced the English state, sweeping away aristocratic rivals to the crown and leaving William I and his successors with the most centralized and best administered state in western Europe.

As in Spain, royal power in England benefited from controlled expansion and the distribution of any profits arising from it. Between the 11th and 13th centuries the English kings conquered Wales (complete by 1295) and Ireland (from 1169), and threatened to do the same to Scotland until their defeat at Bannockburn in 1314 (map 4). The English kings also extended their territory in France. By the time Henry II ascended the throne in 1154 he ruled, in addition to England and Normandy (which he had inherited from his mother), territory in western France (inherited from his Plantagenet father); further territory had come with his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine (map 5). The English crown effectively controlled most of the British Isles by 1300. Its advance into Scotland came to a halt in 1314 at the Battle of Bannockburn.

**France: Capetian Dominance**

In France, luck and political skill favoured the Capetians. The death of Henry II's son Richard I in 1199 opened the way for the French king, Philip Augustus (1180–1223), to deprive Richard's brother John of French lands, including Normandy and Anjou, in a series of campaigns between 1203 and 1206. Philip's achievements, confirmed by a decisive victory in 1214, transformed the political geography of western Europe, with the Capetian kings now dominant (map 5). Paris became the uncontested political and administrative hub of the kingdom, and an intellectual centre for the whole of Latin Christendom.
The backbone of the armies of the First Crusade was provided by knights travelling as part of their lords' households. The capture of Jerusalem in July 1099 after two years' journeying - and a series of unlikely military victories - convinced survivors and contemporaries that the enterprise had been blessed by God.

Despite many appeals, the Christian rulers of the Crusader States were unable to attract sufficient military manpower to ensure the survival of their territories. Many western Europeans did settle in the East, but most regarded crusading activity as an extended penitential pilgrimage rather than the start of a new life as a colonial elite.

Over the course of 200 years a total of five major and several minor crusades set out from Christian Europe with the declared aim of either recapturing or protecting the Holy Land (Palestine) from the Muslims. The first was launched at Clermont in central France on 27 November 1095 by Pope Urban II. A vast number of people - perhaps about 100,000 - were inspired to take part in a penitential military pilgrimage to recover the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (map 1). For the Pope the expedition was a response to Byzantine appeals for help in the wake of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia, offering the opportunity to raise papal prestige through the leadership of Latin Christendom in such a spiritually beneficial enterprise. For the participants it was, perhaps above all else, an opportunity to earn salvation, their enthusiasm testifying to the degree to which Christian teaching had implanted in Western society a fear of the dreadful fate after death that awaited people who had not atoned for their sins. However, hopes of land, booty and fame were also important.

The Crusader States

By the time the expedition reached Jerusalem there were barely 14,000 crusaders. They nevertheless managed to capture the city and, over the next 40 years, establish and expand the boundaries of four states in the surrounding region: the kingdom of Jerusalem, the county of Tripoli, the principality of Antioch and the county of Edessa (map 2).

Their initial success owed a great deal to the temporary political divisions in the Muslim world. The death of the powerful Seljuk sultan Malik Shah in 1092 had plunged the sultanate into a complex civil war. Ultimately Malik Shah's son Berkyaruk prevailed, keeping control of the area of present-day Iraq and Iran, but Ridwan and Dukak, the sons of his uncle and chief opponent, Tutush (d. 1095), still ruled in Aleppo and Damascus respectively. The brothers were loath to co-operate with each other, with Kerbogha (the Seljuk governor of Mosul whom Berkyaruk sent to bring help against the crusaders), or with the Shiite Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt. The Fatimids had ruled most of Syria and Palestine through the 11th century up to the 1070s, and had themselves recaptured Jerusalem from the Seljuks only a year before the crusaders entered the city in 1099.

The Second Crusade (1146-48) failed to take Damascus, and after 1154 the situation changed significantly. In that year Mosul, Aleppo and Damascus were united under the aggressive leadership of Nur al-Din, who deliberately underpinned his authority with an ideology of holy war against the crusaders. The decline of the Shiite Fatimid Caliphate also altered the balance of power. The agricultural and commercial riches of Egypt were potentially the key to domination of the Levant. However, attempts led by King Amalric of Jerusalem between 1163 and 1169 to conquer or control Egypt merely encouraged Nur al-Din to send one of his generals, a Kurd called Saladin, to keep the crusaders out. Saladin successfully fought off the crusaders, before putting an end to the Fatimid Caliphate in 1171 (map 3).

After Nur al-Din's death in 1174, Saladin gradually dispossessed his former master's heirs, and by 1186 they had been forced to recognize his overlordship. Saladin was now able to wage war with the combined resources of Egypt and Syria, and in July 1187 he inflicted a crushing defeat on the crusaders at the Battle of Hattin, near the Sea of Galilee.
The crusaders' hold on the Holy Land was threatened by the rise of Saladin and the unification of Egypt and Syria. However, during the Third Crusade, Richard I of England came close to reversing Saladin's 1187 conquest of Jerusalem.

The Third, Fourth and Fifth Crusades

The Crusader States were saved from complete extinction by the arrival of the Third Crusade (1188-92) (map 4), political divisions among Saladin's Ayyubid heirs and then the growing Mongol threat to the world of Islam (pages 98-99) prolonged their existence. At the same time Western enthusiasm for crusading only continued to grow, and in fact Latin territories in the eastern Mediterranean reached their greatest extent in the early 13th century.

The Fourth Crusade (1198-1204) was diverted to conquer Constantinople, and its aftermath saw the creation of a series of Latin states on former Byzantine territory (map 5). The Fifth Crusade (1217-21), with contingents from Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, England and France, appeared close to success in Egypt before its final defeat in 1221. The French king Louis IX invested enormous resources on crusading in the east, but his Egyptian expedition of 1249-50 ended in disaster. The powerful Mamluk state which replaced the Ayyubids after 1250 (pages 88-89) was initially more concerned with the imminent threat from the Mongols, but as that receded the Mamluk advance proved relentless, culminating in 1291 in the fall of Acre, last of the major crusader strongholds in the Near East.

The Establishment of Military Orders

The crusading movement between 1095 and 1291 is striking evidence of the militaristic nature of Western aristocratic culture. It also reflects the importance of European sea power, especially that of Venice and Genoa, whose ships carried many of the crusaders to Palestine. During this period European maritime power grew to dominate the Mediterranean, creating a base of experience for later expansion to the Americas and the East. The failure to maintain crusader settlement in the Levant reflects the strength of Muslim opposition, but also the inadequacy of crusader manpower and resources. Even at their greatest extent in the 1140s the Crusader States amounted to little more than an embattled coastal strip.

One solution was the establishment by 1139 of the military orders of the Hospital of St John and the Knights Templar. Effectively knights living by monastic rule, both the Hospitallers and the Templars soon acquired extensive properties in the West which gave them the financial strength the settlers lacked. From the 1140s onwards many crusader lords found it necessary to hand over their more exposed strongholds to the military orders, who alone had the means to maintain and defend them.

Soon after its inception the crusading idea was transferred to other contexts. The war against the Muslims in Spain was now treated as a crusade, as was that against the pagan Slavs, Lithuanians and Balts in the north, where the Teutonic Knights — founded in the Levant in the 1190s — played a major role (pages 90-91). Also treated as crusades were expeditions to crush heresy, such as the Albigensian Crusade in southern France (1209-29) and those against the Hussites in Bohemia (1420-21, 1427, 1431), as well as those against political opponents of the Papacy. One such opponent was the Emperor Frederick II, who had actually taken part in a crusade in 1228-29, but himself became the target of a papal crusade in 1240-50.

Even after 1291 crusading remained deeply rooted in Western chivalric and popular culture through to the Reformation of the 16th century, and resistance to the Muslim Ottomans could still be seen in crusading terms in the 17th century. The Templars were suppressed in 1312 in the wake of heresy charges brought by Philip IV of France, but the Hospitallers survived (on Rhodes until 1522, on Malta until 1798), and do so still with their headquarters in Rome. In the modern Islamic world the crusading movement has come to be seen as evidence of the long and bloody past of Western Christian imperialism.
After 1025 the Byzantine Empire lacked the infrastructure and resources to maintain the boundaries that had been established under Basil II. In the east their defeat in the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 enabled the Seljuk Turks to establish themselves in Anatolia, while the Normans took over Byzantine territory in southern Italy.

Following the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, Byzantine hands were divided up. Territory in Europe came under the control of a Frankish emperor, who tried unsuccessfully to convert the populace to Catholicism, while the centre of Orthodox power shifted to Nicaea in northern Anatolia.

W hen the Byzantine warrior emperor Basil II died in 1025 he left an empire that had doubled in size during his reign and presented a serious challenge to its Muslim neighbours. Unfortunately for the Byzantines, subsequent emperors could not maintain the impetus achieved under Basil. They became embroiled in the ecclesiastical politics that provoked the "Great Schism" of 1054 – a theological split between the Orthodox and Western churches that has effectively lasted ever since. The schism invited hostility from the West at a time when Muslim power was regrouping. Norman adventurers took control of what was left of Byzantine southern Italy, just as a renewed Muslim offensive by Seljuk Turks culminated in the Battle of Manzikert (1071) – a Byzantine defeat that wiped out the eastern gains of Basil II and established the Muslim state of Iconium (Konya) in the heart of what had once been Christian Anatolia (map 1).

The Byzantine Empire

The Byzantine Comnenian dynasty (1081–1185) attempted to cope with the aftermath of the Battle of Manzikert by rebuilding diplomatic bridges with the Latin West. A request by Alexius I Comnenus for modest Western military assistance was one of the factors that promoted the crusading movement (pages 94-95). The crusades temporarily transformed the politics of the Near East by taking Muslim pressure away from Constantinople – only to bring the city under increasing Western or Frankish influence.

In the 12th century Constantinople enjoyed a brief economic boom as a major staging post for western Europeans on the road to Jerusalem. However, the empire’s finances were fundamentally weak and the Byzantines could meet their commitments only by granting commercial concessions to their erstwhile dependency, Venice. As a result the Byzantine economy became increasingly dominated by Venetian merchants in Constantinople – to the extent that from 1171 onwards Byzantine rulers attempted to cut back Venetian interests. This promoted tension and led ultimately to anti-Venetian riots in Constantinople at a time when the empire was increasingly threatened in the Balkans and Anatolia. Venice was now an enemy and took its revenge. In 1204 the old blind Venetian doge, Enrico Dandolo, successfully engineered the diversion of the Fourth Crusade away from Jerusalem and towards Constantinople. The sea walls were breached for the first time and the city was captured and systematically looted over a period of three days. This event was to mark the beginning of the Byzantine Empire’s fragmentation.

Between 1204 and 1261 Constantinople was the seat of a Frankish emperor and Latin patriarch, ruling over subordinate Frankish fiefdoms: the kingdom of Thessalonica, duchy of Athens and despotate of Achaia (map 2). Venice dominated the Greek islands and made a particularly lasting mark in and around Naxos (where there was a Venetian duchy until 1566), although it proved impossible to graft Catholicism and an alien feudalism onto rural Greek society. Greek rule survived in Western Anatolia, based at Nicaea, and also in Epirus and in Trebizond on the Black Sea.

It was the Greek Emperor of Nicaea, Michael VIII Palaeologus, who recaptured Constantinople for Orthodoxy in 1261. The restored Byzantine Empire was, however, beset by the same problems as before: it was economically hamstrung, with Venetian and Genoese trading houses in control of its international commerce. Furthermore, it was hedged in by quarrelling rivals – threatened to the north by the Balkan Slavic peoples and in Anatolia by the Turks. By the mid-14th century Greece had fallen to the Serbs (map 3), who were countered not by Byzantine forces but by advancing Muslim power. By 1354 the Ottoman Turks were in Europe. Thenceforth the Byzantine polity dwindled into a diplomatic entity based on what was effectively the city-state of Constantinople.

The Rise of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman victors were the major Turkish force to emerge from the crisis of the Mongol invasions that devastated the Muslim world in the 13th century and eliminated Seljuk power (pages 98-99). Ottoman rulers claimed descent from Osman (Uthman), the most prominent of the Muslim "ghazis" who, in the 13th century, established independent fiefdoms amid the political ruins of what had formerly been Byzantine and Seljuk Anatolia. Ottoman society and culture were profoundly Islamic, but with a distinctive ethos derived from Central Asian nomadic antecedents. Politically, the Ottoman world was opportunistic and expansionist. Osman’s son, Orhan Ghazi, was able to move his capital as far west as Bursa and marry a daughter of the Byzantine Emperor John VI Cantacuzene. This marriage epitomized the steady increase of Turkish influence in medieval Anatolia – a process which led to Byzantine culture gradually losing, or abandoning, its long struggle with Islam in the interior of Asia Minor.
The Ottoman capture of Gallipoli in 1354 presaged a serious Ottoman invasion of Europe (map 4). By 1365 Adrianople had become the Ottoman capital Edirne. Advances into Serbia, culminating in the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, put an end to Serbian expansion. At the same time the Ottomans consolidated their control of Asia Minor, and an Ottoman navy came into being, plying the waters of the Mediterranean, Aegean and Adriatic. Many of its captains were renegade Europeans. The first Ottoman siege of Constantinople itself was mounted in 1391. It was to be diverted only because of a renewed threat from the Mongols under the leadership of Timur-leng (pages 98–99).

THE DEFEAT OF CONSTANTINOPLE

It was now obvious that Byzantine Constantinople was living on borrowed time. It continued to function as a centre of scholarship and of an artistic style visible today in the remains of medieval Mistra in the Peloponnese. The Classical and Post-Classical heritage of Constantinople was still impressive, despite the ravages of 1204. However, its latter-day scholars were slipping away towards Renaissance Italy, taking their manuscripts with them. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Turks were developing their war machine. Since the 14th century Ottoman victories had been won with the aid of Balkan and other mercenaries. This recruitment of foreigners was formalized by the use of devshirme troops (recruited from Christian slaves taken into Islamic military training and educated as an elite corps).

Constantinople, as a Christian bastion, continued to receive the political sympathy of western Europe, although this was bedevilled by a mutual suspicion which the token reunion of the Greek and Latin churches in 1439 could not dispel. The Greeks feared papal aggrandisement and they had long seen unruly Western mercenaries and ambitious Italian merchants as more threatening than the Ottoman Turks. It was from the East, however, that the final blow was to fall when, in 1451, the Ottomans, under Mehmet II, laid siege to Constantinople. Powerfully armed with artillery, some of which was of Western manufacture, the Ottomans broke through the walls of the city on 29 May 1453 - the last day of the Roman Empire and the first day of a mature Ottoman Empire that would continue to expand until well into the 17th century.
THE MONGOL EMPIRE
1206–1405

The largest land empire ever created, the Mongol Empire was founded by Temujin, who united the Mongolian and Turkish-speaking tribes roughly in the area known today as Mongolia. In 1206 he was acclaimed ruler by a council of tribal leaders and given the title of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, usually translated loosely as "universal ruler". The following year he embarked on a series of raids into northern China, which were soon to turn into a full-scale campaign of conquest that was only completed by his successors over 70 years later (map 1).

Meanwhile, Mongol forces were expanding westwards along the steppe as far as the kingdom of the Muslim Khwarazm-shah (pages 88-89). Chinggis Khan decided to redirect the bulk of his army against the Islamic world, and in a campaign lasting from 1219 to 1223 he conquered most

This may have been because of the news of the death of the Great Khan Ogodei, but also perhaps due to a lack of sufficient pasture lands in this area.

1 THE MONGOL CONQUESTS 1207–79

- Territory controlled by Mongols 1227
- Campaigns under Chinggis Khan with dates
- Territory controlled by Mongols 1260
- Later Mongol campaigns with dates

- The Mongols did not follow up the total victories they secured in 1241 at Liegnitz (in Poland) and Pest (in Hungary), and soon withdrew to the south Russian steppe.

2 MONGOL CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN EUROPE

- Mongol victory
- Mongol invasion

- The empire created by Chinggis Khan between 1206 and his death in 1227 stretched from China to Persia (Iran). However, it did not survive as a united empire beyond 1260 when it split into a number of khanates whose rulers went on to conquer further territories - most notably China in 1279.
of the kingdom of the Khuwaarizm-shah. Great destruction was wrought on the cities of Bukhara and Samarqand and in the area south of the Oxus. A rudimentary Mongol administrative apparatus was set up in Iran, which grew into the bureaucracy that ruled the country into the 14th century.

There were several reasons for Chinggis Khan's success in establishing a widespread tribal empire which long outlived him. He built a large army of top-quality soldiers - the traditional horse-archers of the Eurasian steppe, experts in the tactics of concerted mass assault, whom he infused with iron discipline. An effective military leader himself, he had the foresight and talent to cultivate a cadre of extremely capable and loyal generals. He introduced several changes that laid the groundwork for a long-term Mongol administration - the adoption of an alphabet for the Mongolian language, the basic tenets of a financial system, and a system of law known as the Yasa. Finally, he propagated an imperialist ideology, premised on the assumption that the Mongols had a heaven-given "mandate" to conquer the world. All those who resisted this mandate were rebels against the heavenly order and could be dealt with accordingly.

Chinggis Khan died in 1227, on campaigned in China. He was followed as Great Khan by his second son, Ogodei (r. 1229-41), under whose rule the empire continued to expand. In China the Jin Empire was eliminated in 1234, and war began with the southern Song. In the Middle East all of Iran and the Caucasus were subjugated in the 1230s, and most of Anatolia followed in 1243. The most impressive campaigns, however, were those in Russia and then eastern Europe, where total victories were secured in April 1241 at Liegnitz (Legnica) and Pest (Budapest) (map 2).

The Successor Khanates

In the aftermath of the death of the fourth Great Khan - Mongke, a grandson of Chinggis Khan - the Mongol Empire effectively split up into a number of successor states. In China and the Mongolian heartland, Kubilai (Kublai) - a brother of Mongke (d. 1294) - established the Yuan dynasty, and had conquered all of China by 1279. This conquest was accompanied by much destruction, particularly in the north, but not all aspects of Mongol rule were negative. Trade appears to have flourished and the country was unified for the first time in centuries. From West Asia there was an influx of cultural influences in such areas as medicine, mathematics and astronomy. Mongol rule lasted in China until a series of popular uprisings in the 1360s, from which emerged the first Ming emperor - at which point large numbers of Mongols left China for the steppe.

In Central Asia the Khanate of Chaghatai - Chinggis Khan's third son - gradually ceded under his descendants, while further to the west the so-called Golden Horde, ruled by the descendants of Jochi, Chinggis's fourth son, evolved. Around 1260 there arose in Iran an additional Mongol state known as the Ilkhanate, from the title Ilkhan ("subject ruler") by which the rulers were known. This state was founded by Hulegu, the brother of Mongke and Kubilai, who conquered Baghdad in 1258 and brought to an end the Abbasid Caliphate which had existed for over 500 years. Hulegu's troops were stopped at Ayn Jalut in northern Palestine in 1260 by the Mamluks of Egypt (pages 88-89), and the border between the two states was stabilized along the Euphrates - though the war between them, at times intense, lasted until 1320. The Ilkhans, along with their subjects, converted to Islam around the beginning of the 14th century, leading to large-scale patronage of Islamic institutions. In Iran, as in the steppe to the north, the Mongols appear to have been absorbed by a larger nomadic Turkish population, whose size greatly increased during the period of Mongol domination.

The late 14th century the Turkified and Muslim descendants of the Mongol tribesmen in Transoxania gathered around Timur-leng (Tamerlane), who created an empire stretching from Central Asia to western Iran (map 4). The empire did not survive his death in 1405 as he had failed to set up an efficient administration and made no serious provision for his succession.

The Legacy of the Mongol Empire

Looking at the history of the Mongol Empire as a whole - and without belittling the destructive effects of their conquests - one clear beneficial outcome can be seen: for the first time in history, most of Asia was under one rule, enabling the transfer of merchandise, ideas and other cultural elements. This legacy was to continue long after the demise of the united Mongol state in 1260.
During the central part of the Middle Ages, Europe moved decisively away from locally self-sufficient, "closed" economies. Trade was no longer limited to transporting relatively small quantities of high-value luxury items destined for consumption by a rich and privileged elite, but came instead to encompass a wide range of agricultural and manufactured goods.

Between about 950 and 1300 the European economy was transformed (map 1). The motors of economic growth were a growing population, a developing market structure, increasing regional and subregional specialization and growing monetarization, based partly on the discovery of major new silver mines and partly on the development of commercial instruments (such as bills of exchange and letters of credit) that allowed monetary transactions to extend beyond the immediate availability of coin.

**RURAL AND URBAN GROWTH**

The clearest evidence that the European population increased comes from the growing number of settlements of all types throughout the continent. Many mark the opening up of previously uncultivated land for agriculture: place-names and archaeology tell a story of forests cut back, marshes drained and former pasture lands brought under the plough (map 2). New markets also appeared and old towns expanded, with urban growth evidenced by new parishes, larger circuits of walls and new suburbs (map 3).

In France, Germany, Italy and England local secular and ecclesiastical lords played decisive roles in the creation of a hierarchy of new market towns. Founding a market town not only opened the prospect of a new source of revenue; it also made it possible for the lord either to take payments in kind and sell them on the market for cash, or to demand the payment of rents and dues in coin, which peasant producers could now obtain by entering the market themselves.

Markets encouraged specialization at all levels, and urban craftsmen produced a growing volume of goods for the market, confident that they could obtain food and clothing from the same source. Similarly, farmers aimed less at self-sufficiency and more at the production of cash crops such as grain, grapes or wool.

Regions and sub-regions also started to specialize. By the beginning of the 12th century Flanders had become a cloth economy, its towns dependent on wool from England, grain and wine from the Ile de France and the Rhineland, and on access to customers. Indeed the cloth industry had made Flanders the richest, most densely populated and urbanized region of northern Europe. By the 13th century areas of specialist production included the wine trade in Gascony; grain in Sicily; southern Italy and eastern Europe; salt in the Bay of Biscay; the Alps, the west of England, Saxony and Languedoc; timber and fish in Scandinavia and the Baltic; fur in Russia; iron in Sweden, Westphalia and the Basque country; metalworking in the Rhineland; and cheese in eastern England, Holland and southern Poland (map 1).

**MEDITERRANEAN COMMERCE**

Italian merchants reached Flanders as early as the beginning of the 12th century, but at this date links between northern Europe and the Mediterranean were still fairly limited and it is more realistic to think in terms of European economies rather than an integrated whole. While the wealth and developing urban culture that characterized southern France, Catalonia and above all northern Italy was based partly on the same pattern of population growth and rural development occurring in Europe north of the Alps, the southern economies also benefited from access to the flourishing commercial world of the Mediterranean (map 4).

The documents of the Cairo Geniza, an extraordinary Jewish archive amassed from the 11th century onwards, vividly illustrate the growing involvement of Latin merchants, especially Italians, in Mediterranean commerce. From the mid-11th century their activities were increasingly backed by force, and during the 12th century Muslim, Jewish and Greek shipping and much of their trade were all more intensive agricultural regimes formed the backbone of economic expansion in Europe, providing sufficient surpluses in basic foodstuffs to feed the growing number of specialist producers offering their goods in exchange for the food produced by the peasantry. The development of the Chartres region, with its pattern of forest clearance and the subjugation of the landscape, is typical.
but driven from the Mediterranean Sea. When the Spanish
Muslim scholar Ibn Jubayr went on a pilgrimage to Mecca
in 1183-85 he travelled entirely on Genoese ships, apart
from the small coaster which took him across the Strait of
Gibraltar and the boat in which he crossed the Red Sea.

Between the 11th and 13th centuries a number of
important developments took place in the Mediterranean
region: Pisa and Genoa took over Corsica and Sardinia in
1015; the Normans conquered southern Italy and Sicily
(secure by 1070), and Malta in 1091; the Crusader States
were established in Syria and Palestine after 1099 (pages
94-95); Cyprus was conquered in 1191 by Richard I of
England (who then gave the island to Guy of Lusignan,
titular King of Jerusalem); a Venetian empire was created in
the Aegean after 1204; and the Balearics, Valencia and
Murcia were recaaptured from the Muslims by 1243 (map 4).
As a result the Latin states had complete control of the
Mediterranean trunk routes by the mid-13th century.
Trading networks were established that would continue to
flourish for centuries to come.

Part of what passed along these routes was a trade in
foodstuffs, bulk raw materials and textiles. Italian, French
and Spanish merchants not only took European goods to
North Africa, Egypt and the Byzantine world, but also
played an increasingly dominant role in the internal trade of
these societies. Profits from this involvement brought
enough Islamic gold to Italy to enable Genoa and Florence
during the second
12th century to strike a regular gold
coinage for the first time in Latin Europe since the 8th
century. However, the big profits of Mediterranean trade
were to be made in the luxuries for which the West was
offering a rapidly expanding market - the spices, silks
dyestuffs and perfumes of the East - and here the balance
was heavily in favour of Muslim sellers. To buy on the
Egyptian markets, Latin merchants needed large supplies of
coin and bullion.

4 MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE 12TH AND 13TH CENTURIES

THE ROLE OF SILVER

A crucial development was the opening up from the 1160s
of new European silver mines, of which the most important
were in Germany. Interregional trade in northern Europe
brought large quantities of German silver into the hands of
Flemish, French, Rhenish and English merchants who then
paid silver to southern merchants, mostly Italians, in
exchange for goods from the East.

The linchpin of the new trans-Alpine economy was the
Champagne fairs, held at Troyes, Bar-sur-Aube, Lagny
and Provins, where the powerful counts of Champagne could
secure the coinage for the first time in Latin Europe since the 8th
century. However, the big profits of Mediterranean trade
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4 MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE 12TH AND 13TH CENTURIES

- Northern Europe: Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck
- Central Europe: Nuremberg, Augsburg, Munich
- Southern Europe: Genoa, Pisa, Venice
- Western Asia: Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo
- Eastern Asia: Shanghai, Canton, Macau

The era of the crusades was also one of
growing Mediterranean commerce. European traders took some textiles and
foodstuffs east, but above all they carried
silver coins with which to purchase the
valuable dyes and spices that came from
India and the Far East.

- Expansion in sectors of the European
economy not geared to food production is
strikingly demonstrated in the phenomenon
of urban growth. Towns and cities provided
manufacturing centres and markets for
long-distance trade, either interregional or international. They also serviced their
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local agricultural economies, providing the
markets and goods that made possible local
specialisation and exchange.
In the 14th century all the towns in the two urban clusters that had developed in northern Italy and northern France and Flanders were to some degree self-governing, although only Venice asserted absolute freedom from outside authority.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire at the end of the 4th century, towns in Europe had tended to decrease in size, complexity and autonomy, particularly within Latin Christendom. In 1000 Europe’s five largest towns – Constantinople, Córdoba, Seville, Palermo and Kiev – were outside this area. However, by 1500 the pattern of urban development in Europe had undergone great changes: Constantinople was still one of the five largest towns, but the other four were now Paris, Milan, Venice and Naples. At this time around 70 per cent of the estimated 80 million inhabitants of Europe lived in the countryside, with a further 20 per cent in small market towns. Just three million people lived in the hundred or so towns of at least 10,000 inhabitants, but they represented a social, economic, cultural and political force of far greater importance than their number might suggest.

During the Middle Ages urban enterprise came to set the pace of social and cultural development in western Europe. By 1300, under the impulses of the new international economy of trade, finance and industry, two main clusters of towns had developed: one in northern Italy, the other in northern France and Flanders, with London and Cologne in close proximity (map 1).

THE ITALIAN COMMUNES

Between 1050 and 1150 Italian towns from the Alps as far south as Rome were controlled by communal regimes made up of local men of property and high status. The communes achieved power partly by violent assertion but also by the formation of “peace associations”, which had the declared aim of bringing peace and order to a locality. Once in charge, the communes directed their energies towards mastering the immediately surrounding territory (contado) – vital for maintaining food supplies and communications. In the later 12th and 13th centuries their local control was repeatedly challenged by the Staufen emperors, rulers of the Holy Roman Empire (pages 90-91).

The communes ultimately emerged victorious, but the strain of warfare, together with increasing social tensions generated by large-scale immigration from the countryside, frequently fuelled recurrent factional conflicts. This resulted in the subversion of communal government and the seizure of power by partisan cliques under so-called signori, such as the Visconti in Milan (dukes from 1395) or the Este family in Modena and Ferrara (dukes from 1452) (map 2).

TOWNS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

In northwest Europe the forms of town government varied. Here too, from around 1100, communes were set up by local revolt, or by local lords granting jurisdictional privilege. Paris and London, however, developed as royal residences and capitals of kingdoms, while the towns of the Low Countries, although prone to turbulence, remained within the framework of territorial principalities. The county of Flanders was divided into four territorial-jurisdictional sectors known as the “Four Members”, three of which were dominated by the towns of Ghent, Bruges and Ypres. Much of the business of government was transacted not by the count’s officials, but in the regular meetings of representatives of the Four Members.

By the 1460s, 36 per cent of the population of Flanders were town dwellers, half of them resident in the three big
From the early 14th century only a few communes in Italy escaped princely control— notably Venice, intermittently Genoa and Lucca, and Florence before the Medici coup of 1434. Much of their internal organization was provided in occupational guilds which exercised protective control of local vested interests.

towns, half in the 49 smaller towns (map 3). This demographic pattern was even more pronounced in Holland, where 45 per cent lived in towns but no single town exceeded 16,000 inhabitants.

**The Growth of Urban Autonomy in Germany**

By the 15th century urban development in Germany—although gathering force later than in some other regions—had produced some 35 communes with over 2,000 inhabitants and around 3,000 with some sort of recognized town status. About 50 of these were free cities under no princely jurisdiction. Unlike the Italian communes, some of which controlled whole regions, the German communities were more tightly focused on their urban centres; even Metz, one of the largest, held jurisdiction over only 250 surrounding villages. Also unlike their Italian counterparts, they rarely engaged in warfare. Even after trade guilds had occasionally asserted themselves forcefully in the 14th and 15th centuries, the towns remained under the control of a small number of noble families—42 in Nuremberg, for example, and 76 in Frankfurt in around 1500.

By this date the German towns were enjoying a golden age of economic growth and cultural vitality—a vitality that had been a feature of European urban society since the 12th century. Among its achievements had been the Gothic architectural style of church building, secular buildings of equivalent scale, such as the town halls of Florence and Bruges; the spread of printing presses from the Rhineland to over 200 towns throughout Latin Christendom between 1450 and 1500; the “civic humanism” of post-communal Italy; and the “scholastic humanism” fostered by the foundation of some 80 universities—five by 1200, a further 14 by 1300, 26 in the 14th century, and 35 in the 15th century (pages 134-35).

**The Early Renaissance**

The great town halls of communal Italy were built mainly between 1260 and 1330—around the lifetime of the civic-minded vernacular poet Dante (1265-1321), and of his fellow Florentine, Giotto (1266-1337), whose painting came to be seen as marking the beginning of a new sense of space and form. Over the following century Florence continued to loom especially large in the visual arts, with architecture and sculpture as well as painting coming to express a “classical” ideal inspired by the Graeco-Roman past. Florence also produced writers such as Boccaccio (1313-75), whose vernacular poems and prose rapidly influenced French and English writing, and Petrarch (1304-74), whose humanist Latin writings became formative in the education of the elite throughout Latin Christendom in the course of the 15th century.

The transmission of style, however, was not all one way. The “new art” of the painters and musicians of the towns of the Low Countries was much in demand in 15th-century Italy, and in 1500 artists and writers were, literally, citizens of a world of Renaissance culture. The career of the artist Dürer (1471-1528) moved between his native Nuremberg, Venice and Antwerp, while the humanist writer Erasmus (1469-1536) travelled constantly between Gouda, Deventer, Paris, London, Bologna, Rome, Leuven, Freiburg and Basel. Their achievement, in their own lifetimes, of Europe-wide fame beyond the span of their personal travels was itself an early product of the general spread of three urban inventions: the woodcut, the engraving and the printed book.

By 1500 some 34 per cent of the population of the Low Countries lived in towns—an urban density equalled only in parts of northern Italy. Despite the proliferation of local interests by the occupational guilds, there was considerable economic and cultural exchange between towns—so much so that Antwerp had become the leading commercial and cultural centre of western Europe.
The merchants' "Silk Roads", which doubled as military routes for invaders and mercenaries, and lined up with the savannahs of the Indian Ocean and the Black and Mediterranean seas, were also highways for infection with the plague. Medieval international travel was slow and companionable: wayfarers carried huge quantities of supplies; they utilized ports, campsites, caravanserais and storehouses that were infested with black rats whose fleas carried the plague. They also dealt extensively in the bales of cloth which so often harboured flea-borne infection.

Part of the response of western European culture to the plague was to personify death via various visual media. The danse macabre entered court entertainment, and artists and sculptors experimented with the grisly themes of the cadaver and the skull. This 15th-century fresco from the Italian School, entitled The Triumph of Death, is a direct descendant of the genre spawned by the terrifying disease a century earlier.

In the 14th century the "Old World" may have lost between a quarter and half of its population as a result of pandemic plague. The infective agent or plague bacillus was, and is, endemic to the ecology of certain remote areas of Asia. At times environmental factors or simple mutation can promote a dramatic rise in the numbers of the rodent fleas which are the plague's usual carriers. Facilities for transport and travel can then promote widespread person-to-person infection and turn an isolated outbreak of bubonic plague into an epidemic and ultimately a pandemic - without the intervention of rat or flea.

The "Black Death" of the 14th-century was not the first visitation of plague to the Middle East or to Europe. The Byzantine historian Procopius gave a chillingly precise account of the symptoms and progress of the disease as it struck the Persian and Byzantine empires in the 540s. This plague reached Britain in 546 and Ireland in 552, and its aftershocks extended late into the 7th century.

THE BLACK DEATH INVADES EUROPE

The medieval pandemics of the 6th and 14th centuries were the unpredicted side-effects of expanding horizons and increasing contact between East and West (map 1). The second scourge of the plague reached East Asia in the early 1330s and West Asia less than a decade later.

This time it may well have hit an already debilitated population. A run of rainy years and poor harvests in much of mid-1340s Europe had lowered resistance and led to the widespread consumption of suspect food supplies. Typically the plague was at its most virulent in congested urban areas, and dedicated professionals such as doctors and priests suffered disproportionately. Yet there were always survivors - as many as a quarter of sufferers may have lived through an attack of plague to become invested with an awe-inspiring immunity - and there were regions, even towns, that went largely unscathed (map 2).

While much plague history is anecdotal and local, such details can be just as telling as the massive mortality estimates. Pestilence halted work on the cathedral of Siena in Italy, and the building is still truncated today. The population of the Oxfordshire village of Tusmore in England was wiped out in 1348 and never restored. There were dramatic local responses to stress, such as episodes of penitential flagellation and vicious outbursts of scapegoating as vulnerable groups in society, notably the Jews, were targeted as...
the bringers of death. Such incidents were not, of course, unknown outside the plague years.

**Effects of the Black Death**

The questions whether or to what extent the 14th century pandemic changed the course of world history can only be the subject of conjecture. In China, which suffered the first and perhaps the most serious wave of devastation, demographic collapse may have fostered the consensus that the ruling Mongol or Yuan dynasty had lost the "mandate of heaven". The Yuan were ousted in 1368 in favour of an indigenous Chinese dynasty, the Ming. In the West, the loss of manpower to pestilence may have left a declining Constantinople too weak to prevent Ottoman incursions into Europe; from 1354 there were Ottoman victories in the Balkans which reached a peak at Kosovo (1389) and established a lasting Muslim government in the midst of Orthodox Christendom. West Asia certainly saw a dramatic reduction in the population of its big Islamic cities and a reversion to nomadism outside them. Perhaps the effects of the plague facilitated a last Mongol invasion by the armies of Timur-leng (1369-1405), who briefly redrew the political map from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean (pages 98-99).

However, no western European states or societies collapsed in the wake of the plague. Great cities like Venice experienced short-lived administrative dislocation and then recovered. Social tensions were exacerbated as surviving craftsmen, labourers and servants now had the advantage of scarcity and might resist the demands of lords, masters or officialdom. There was an increase in the Mediterranean slave trade as one solution to the labour shortage.

There was also a demographic shift. Thousands of settlements in agricultural western Europe were abandoned in the two centuries that followed the population peak of the early 14th century. Very few of these "lost villages" were specifically eliminated by the plague or its accompanying panic, but in the aftermath of the plague, survivors from the fens and moorlands of the agricultural margins could move (with the encouragement of landowners who needed their labour) into the best of the farming land.

The "time of pestilence" was also a time of resilience. Survivors dutifully buried their dead and coped with the paperwork of mortality, probate and the ricocheting finances of societies which had lost, on average, a third of their taxpayers. The 14th century had none of the universal expectation of population growth and longevity which characterizes the modern era. Life expectancy was less than half that of today and even those who survived the plague years had a very limited chance of reaching 70. Eyewitness accounts of the plague years describe a society whose preachers used *memento mori* ("remember you must die") as a watchword and regularly portrayed earthly existence as a vale of tears. The plague, which served to underline this concept, was easily incorporated into Christian theological debate; it is also likely to have reinforced Islamic fatalism and possibly the cyclical view of history and society set out in the writings of the philosopher Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406).

Meanwhile, mainstream Western culture took refuge in the incorporation of mortality into art and personified death as a figure in popular stories and morality plays. Modern communicators still draw on this plague-time imagery of mortality to convey an apocalyptic warning.
The period 1350–1500 was one of major transition in the history of Europe. Constant warfare reshaped the boundaries of kingdoms and other political entities (map 1), while the loss of over a third of the population as a result of the Black Death of 1347–52 (pages 104–5) generated economic, social and political change. It was also a period of crisis in the Church, as papal schism let loose challenges to the old order of Latin Christendom.

Western and Central Europe

From 1337 much of western Europe became the arena for a struggle between the Valois princes and the Plantagenet kings of England for the succession to the Capetian kingship of France. The resulting Hundred Years War (map 2) gave rise to a network of alliances linking the Valois to Scotland and Castile, the Plantagenets to Portugal, and both at different times to the Wittelsbach and Luxembourg dynasties of the Holy Roman Empire. Such links helped to sustain Scotland’s independence from England. They also stimulated the emergence of a more powerful Burgundy which brought together the territorial principalities of the Low Countries – first, in the 1360s, as a Valois satellite, then as a Plantagenet ally (1419–35 and 1468–77), and finally as a Habsburg inheritance.

The Hundred Years War network of alliances figured significantly in the warfare in the Iberian Peninsula which resulted in the establishment of the Trastámara dynasty in Castile in 1369 and the Aragón dynasty in Portugal in 1385. A century later, between 1474 and 1479, two autonomous monarchies emerged whose expansionist ambitions found expression, in the case of Portugal, in maritime expeditions along the coast of Africa, and, in the case of Castile and Aragón, in the conquest of Muslim Granada (1480–92). Italy developed as an essentially self-contained political complex, with Milan, Venice and Florence expanding into regional territorial states by the mid-15th century. In the south, the Trastámara Alfonso V of Aragón added the kingdom of Naples to his existing possession of Sicily in 1442, after conflict with a Valois claimant. This was followed half a century later by a renewed Valois-Trastámara struggle in the post-1494 wars which turned Italy into the battleground of Europe (pages 146–47). In the meantime, Naples along with Milan, Venice, and Florence and the Papacy sought intermittently after 1455 to function as a league to secure “the concert of Italy” from outside intervention.

Germany and the Holy Roman Empire (pages 99–101), which were far less affected by large-scale warfare than other areas, came to function as a network of princely and urban local regimes, with relatively few moments of widespread disruption after the 1340s. The institution of elective kingship proved largely cohesive and peaceful, and the imperial title passed in virtually hereditary succession from the House of Luxembourg to the Habsburgs in 1438.

Eastern and Northern Europe

In east central Europe the position of the Luxembourgs and Habsburgs in Bohemia (from 1310) and Hungary (from 1387) was intermittently challenged by the rise of the Lithuanian Jagiellon dynasty. To their rule of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth the Jagiellon dynasty added the kingship of Bohemia (1471–1526) and Hungary (1440–44 and 1490–1526). In the Baltic, attempts to unite the three kingships of Denmark, Norway and Sweden were briefly successful with the creation in 1397 of the Union of Kalmar. Nonetheless, from 1448 the Oldenburg dynasty maintained its control in Denmark and most of the western Norse world from Norway to Iceland. Flanking Latin Christendom, the Muslim Ottoman Empire (pages 96–97) and the Orthodox Christian Russian Empire (pages 148–49) emerged.

Religious Developments

In 1309 the French Pope Clement V had taken up residence in Avignon. The monarchical style of the Papacy had reached its peak in 1378, shortly after its return to Rome, a disputed papal election caused the Church to split and two rival popes – based in Avignon and Rome – to operate simultaneously (map 3). This remained the situation until 1417, when the General Council at Constance (1414–18) secured the election of Pope Martin V. At the same time parts of Europe were less marked by dissent from established theological doctrine and by anti-clerical criticism. In England the Lollards, influenced by John Wycliffe, made no effective headway. However, in Bohemia the Hussite movement, launched by John Hus,
developed into a revolutionary challenge to the established order. In 1415 Hus was burned at the stake for heresy, an event that provoked the Hussite Wars against the Holy Roman Emperor. The Hussites achieved dramatic military victories in the 1420s, but their theological and political impact was contained after peace was agreed in 1434–36.

A great challenge to the Papacy came from the Conciliar movement. This developed into a constitutional struggle between reformist clergy seeking to use the church councils (such as that at Constance) to reduce the authority of the Pope, and the bid by the Papacy to reassert the pre-1378 order of church government. The Conciliarists eventually had to acknowledge defeat in 1449, the preference of lay rulers for a monarchical papal ideology proving decisive.

THE EFFECTS OF THE BLACK DEATH

The dramatic fall in population during the Black Death led to severe disruption of agricultural and industrial production and trade (map 4). It also led to smaller and more professional armies, although there was an increase in the incidence of warfare, which in turn induced social tension and revolts (among them the Jacquerie Revolt in northern France in 1358, the Peasants' Revolt in England in 1381, and a wave of urban revolts in northwest Europe, the Baltic region and Italy around 1375–85). The levy of war taxation, often the trigger of such unrest, was of fundamental importance in the development of representative institutions, which in the form of parliaments or “Estates” became the vehicle for a heightened sense of the political community throughout Europe.

The initial cause of the Great Schism was a disputed papal election in 1378. It lasted for almost 40 years (1378–1417) because lay political groups exploited the situation, rapidly aligning themselves behind the rival claimants to papal office. Thus Valois France and its allies in Scotland and Castile recognized the Pope resident (from 1379) in Avignon, while England and Portugal as well as most parts of the Holy Roman Empire and northern and eastern Europe recognized the Pope resident in Rome.

Between about 1370 and 1500 the rural world was marked by depressed grain prices, partly off set by increasing diversification from arable into pasture farming and horticulture. With the contraction of the labour force, wages rose and sustained the demand for a wide range of manufactured and other commodities, both staples and luxuries. The result was a more buoyant economy in the towns and the fostering of technological innovation in, for example, silk weaving, printing and metallurgical processes.
North America in the 6th century was home to many different cultural traditions. Farming communities, growing native or introduced crops, were established in some parts of the south. Elsewhere, richly diverse ways of life were based on natural resources.

**THE SOUTHWEST**

Between 200 and 900 settled communities developed in the American southwest (map 1), growing crops (especially maize, squash and beans) introduced from Mesoamerica. These communities also began to make pottery to supplement their traditional basket containers. Semi-subterranean houses were constructed. Plazas, mounds and ballcourts reminiscent of those of Mesoamerica appeared in the Hohokam area by 600, at settlements such as Snaketown; these public spaces were probably the focus of ceremonial and ritual activities. Smaller villages clustered around the main centres, which are thought to have been the homes of chiefs controlling the networks of irrigation canals that made two annual crops possible in this arid region.

Irrigation was also vitally important to the Anasazi and Mogollon peoples in the similarly arid areas to the north and east of Hohokam. Around 700 in the Anasazi area and 1000 among the Mogollon, villages of semi-subterranean houses gave way to villages built above ground but containing a subterranean ceremonial structure (kiva). These developed into larger and more elaborate complexes of adjoining rooms, called pueblos by the Spanish in the 16th century. Among the best known is Pueblo Bonito (map 2). Here a massive plaza containing two large kivas was surrounded by a semi-circular, five-storey, tiered complex of some 200 rooms and smaller kivas, housing up to 1,200 people.

Further north the pueblos of the Mesa Verde region had developed along different architectural lines. At first situated on plateaus, by 1150 most were constructed on natural or artificial platforms on the face of canyon cliffs, such as Cliff Palace. These cliff-side villages, many dominated by watchtowers, were probably designed for defence and reflect deteriorating environmental conditions at the time.

A major shift in trade patterns took place around the 14th century, when it appears that the Mogollon village of Casas Grandes was taken over by Mexican pochtecas (merchants). It grew into a town and became a trade and craft production centre, surrounded by a network of roads and forts, directly controlling the turquoise sources. Mexican architecture now appeared and sophisticated irrigation systems were constructed.

In other areas favourable climatic and environmental conditions had promoted the spread of farming into marginal regions in preceding centuries, but by the later 13th century conditions were deteriorating. There was widespread drought and many sites were abandoned, their inhabitants moving into more fertile areas, particularly along the banks of rivers. In the 1450s Apache and Navajo hunters began to make raids on the fringes of the area, and in 1528 a Spanish expedition signalled future domination by Europeans.

**THE SOUTHEAST**

By about 400 the extensive exchange networks of the Hopewell people (pages 24–25) were in decline and funerary mound building was going out of fashion in all but the southern regions of the southeast. However, by 800 the introduction of maize, later supplemented by beans, allowed an increased reliance on agriculture, and concentrated settlement on the easily cultivated river floodplains (map 3). As before, communities were linked by a long-distance trade network. Many were autonomous small chiefdoms but in some areas a hierarchically developed, with subordinate chiefdoms answerable to a centralized authority operating from a major centre. The largest town in this emerging mosaic of Mississippian chiefdoms was Cahokia, a powerful and prosperous centre c. 1050–1250, which housed perhaps 30,000 people in dwellings clustered around the palisaded centre with its plaza and huge mounds.

**OTHER NATIVE AMERICANS**

From 800, horticulture based on beans, squash and maize spread through the mid- and northeast (map 4). Although hunting continued to be important, the increased reliance on agriculture encouraged settlement in semi-permanent villages. By the time the Europeans arrived in North America in the 16th century, the northeast was a patchwork of nations settled in small territories, constantly at war but also trading with one another. Later some settled their differences, uniting into the Iroquois Confederacy which became involved in the wars between rival European powers in the region.

The Great Plains had been home for thousands of years to small groups of buffalo (bison) hunters and small-scale horticulturalists. The introduction of the bow and arrow may have increased hunting efficiency and, possibly for this reason, several peoples moved onto the Great Plains from the surrounding areas. After about 900, colonists from the Mississippian cultures brought maize cultivation to the Missouri region of the Great Plains. The stockades and mounds surrounding their settlements, along with evidence of massacres and scalplings, indicate that these groups were constantly at war.

Further west, in the Great Basin, hunter-gatherer groups continued their long-standing nomadic way of life (map 5) until it was destroyed by white settlers. Under influence from...
Mississippian towns were the ceremonial centres for their surrounding communities, participating at this time in the religious tradition known as the "Southern Cult". Symbolic artefacts characteristic of this cult - such as copper pendants, seashells and figurines bearing distinctive designs (including snakes, hands and weeping faces) - were found at centres throughout the Mississippian cult area. Mounds in the heart of these centres were crowned by temples and sometimes the houses of the elite.

The Anasazi of the southwest, the Fremont - a number of culturally-related groups who practised horticulture and made distinctive figurines and other artefacts - flourished from around 500 until the late 13th century, when they were wiped out by droughts. Around 1450 Apache and Navajo from the far northwest reached the area and, after contact with the Spanish, took up horse-breeding and hunting on the western Great Plains.

In the far north, Inuit communities spread northwards and eastwards through the Arctic. This was made possible by a number of innovations that improved adaptation to life in extreme cold: igloos, snowshoes, snow goggles, dog sledges, kayaks and the larger umiaks, as well as harpoons capable of killing sea mammals as large as whales. During the warmer temperatures of the period from around 900 to 1300, the Inuit colonized Greenland, where they came into contact and sometimes conflict with the Vikings, who established a toehold there and on Newfoundland between 982 and 1400 (pages 78-79).

Outside the southwest and southeast many different cultures flourished, depending to a varied extent on hunting, fishing, gathering and agriculture. The arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century brought horses to North America; rapidly adopted by the Plains peoples, these animals revolutionized hunting techniques, enabling efficient slaughter of buffalo and easy long-distance movement. Many peoples soon abandoned agriculture in favour of a way of life based on horseback hunting.
The short-lived Inca Empire in the Andes and Aztec Empire in Mesoamerica were the last to dominate the two principal areas of urbanized culture which had developed over a period of 3,000 years before the arrival of the Spanish. Both mobilized labour for state projects and extracted valuable materials and objects from their subjects, but while the Aztecs undertook most of their building and manufacturing projects in the imperial core – particularly in their capital city, Tenochtitlan, under present-day Mexico City – the Incas had broader control over their subjects and directed projects in distant territories. In Tenochtitlan the Aztecs created a remarkable assembly of large, finely carved stone sculptures in a mere 70-year period before the fall of their empire to the Spanish in 1521, but little can now be seen of these. In comparison, distinctive Inca architecture, ceramics and other remains have been found throughout their empire, the largest in pre-Spanish America.

The Inca Empire

Unlike the inhabitants of Mesoamerica, who recorded history in manuscripts with hieroglyphic dates and pictographic representations of rulers and their activities, the ancient Andeans used knotted strings (quipus) for record-keeping. The reconstruction of the history of the Inca Empire is therefore problematic. Inca conquests of local neighbours around the capital of Cuzco probably date from the 14th century (pages 84–85), and the period of greatest expansion began around 1440 under Pachacuti, who rebuilt the imperial capital, and his successor Tupac Yupanqui. At its height the empire covered a 4,200-kilometre (2,600-mile) strip along western South America, encompassing coastal and highland valleys from Quito in modern Ecuador to southern Chile (map 1).

The Incas were great builders, and the extent of their empire is still visible in an advanced road system of highland and lowland routes along which armies and caravans of llamas moved. At intervals there were settlements or way-stations built of distinctive Inca stonework, such as the well-studied site of Huanuco Pampa. These architectural complexes included accommodation for local artisans and labourers working for the state, feasting halls and ceremonial plazas for the worshipping of the local elite, facilities for storage, and lodgings for imperial representatives. All aspects of production, from the acquisition of materials to the manufacture and distribution of finished items, were controlled by the state.

The Inca capital of Cuzco

Cuzco was the political, cultural and ritual focal point of the empire. It was surrounded by settlements of Inca commoners and members of the elite and their retainers, relocated from sometimes distant areas of the empire. Cuzco proper (map 2) was relatively small, containing only the residences of the living ruler and royal clans reputedly descended from previous kings (some fictitious), plus the temples, plazas, platforms and halls for imperial ritual. Palaces and temples consisted of rows of simple adobe or stone rooms with platforms and halls for imperial ritual. Palaces and temples consisted of rows of simple adobe or stone rooms with gabled straw roofs; where they differed from homes of commoners was in the quality of workmanship and materials, such as finely worked ashlar masonry, gold and silver sheets attached to walls, and elaborately dyed and plaited thatch.

The Aztecs

Because the Aztecs kept written records, we have a better idea of their imperial history. The empire was founded in 1431, after the Aztec war of independence from the Tepanecs who had previously dominated the Valley of Mexico. It was formed by an alliance of three cities – Texcoco, Tlacopan and Tenochtitlan – the last of which quickly became the dominant city.

All Tenochca Aztec rulers were warriors, but the two responsible for the greatest expansions were Motecuhzoma, or Montezuma I (r. 1440–69), who also reorganized Aztec society and rebuilt the imperial capital, and Ahuitzotl (r. 1466–1502), who extended the empire to the border of
modern Guatemala. Early expansion by Montezuma I and two other kings consolidated the highlands on all sides of the capital, while later thrusts by Ahuitzotl and Montezuma II (r. 1502-19) went into tropical coastal areas and temperate highlands to the south and east. The west and north were blocked by the enemy Tarascan Empire and by culturally less complex groups to whom the Aztecs applied the derogatory term “Ghichimecs”. At the time of the Spanish arrival in 1519, Aztec armies were reportedly poised to invade the northern Maya kingdoms on the Yucatán Peninsula from the port of Xicalango.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AZTEC EMPIRE

The Aztec Empire extended from the Pacific to the Gulf coast, but imperial provinces were bordered by blocks of unconquered territories, keeping the people of Mesoamerica in a constant state of warfare. The region had well-developed market and long-distance trading systems centuries before the rise of the Aztecs, who tried to control these where they could; however, many networks continued to operate independently. The Aztecs did not put their energies into administrative structures, and their empire lacked the monumental road system of the Incas’ polity. However, Aztec artisans were accomplished stone carvers, as evidenced by surviving temples at mountain sites like Malinalco to the southwest of the capital.

After conquest of a province, numerous captives of war were brought to the capital for sacrifice. As in Peru, captured deity images were put in Aztec temples, sacred mountain sites were appropriated for ceremonies and temples, and tribute was demanded. However, conquered groups were not relocated; instead, loyal subjects from Tenochtitlan and nearby areas were sent to strategically located colonies, while members of the foreign elite and traders spent time in the cities of the imperial centre.

At its height Tenochtitlan, which occupied an island in the shallow lake that dominated the Valley of Mexico, had a population of perhaps 200,000, four times that of its nearest rival. According to contemporary descriptions, it had a huge central precinct in which four great causeways met. The precinct contained many temples and was immediately surrounded by the palaces of rulers and the elite. Beyond were the neighbourhoods of commoners, where enclosed compounds and house gardens were organized in a grid of streets and canals.

Texcoco and Tlacopan on the east and west shores, along with numerous other towns as old as or older than Tenochtitlan, remained uneasy allies and potential enemies of the capital. Thus when the Spanish arrived in 1519 they found thousands of Indian allies both in the valley and throughout the empire ready to revolt against the Aztecs.

The Aztec Empire covered much of what is now central Mexico, with one separate province adjacent to distant Maya territory. There were substantial unconquered areas next to and surrounded by imperial provinces. The empire’s capital, Tenochtitlan, and its two uneasy allies – Texcoco and Tlacopan – were just three of some 50 cities with surrounding territories and satellite towns in the lake zone of the Valley of Mexico.

Manuscripts of the Spanish colonial period have made it possible to reconstruct the Aztec Empire’s structure. Among them is the Codex Mendoza, which includes pictures of the pre-Conquest tributes that were demanded from individual provinces – among them warriors’ clothing, bags of feathers and dried chillies.
Before 1500 there was a gradual overall increase in the world’s population and economy, although epidemics and widespread famine sometimes caused a temporary decline. Then in the space of 300 years the population more than doubled, from 425 to 900 million, and the world economy expanded rapidly as Europe embarked on a process of exploration, colonization and domination of intercontinental commerce.

Porcelain was amongst the Chinese products for which there was a great demand in Europe. Another was silk. The export of both products from China ensured that trade with the West continued to flourish throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, although Chinese merchants did not themselves venture outside Asia.

Despite periods of vigorous territorial and economic expansion, the great land empires failed to participate in the commercial revolution led by the countries of northern Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. In 1700 they still covered vast areas, but in the following century the three Muslim empires – the Mughal, Safavid and Ottoman – declined as the commercial and military power of the Europeans expanded.

The Europeans’ exploration and discovery of the world began in earnest in the second half of the 15th century when the desire to find a sea route to the East led to a series of Portuguese voyages down the west coast of Africa. The Cape of Good Hope was finally reached in 1488, just four years before Christopher Columbus set sail across the Atlantic, on behalf of Spain, in search of a westward route to China. His discovery of the West Indies was quickly followed by Spanish expeditions to the American mainland and the creation of Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Caribbean and South America. New trade routes across the Atlantic and Indian oceans were pioneered by the Spanish and Portuguese, to be taken over in the 17th century by the Dutch, English and French.

Africa was both a survivor and a victim of this transoceanic transport revolution. The economies of its states – and the extensive trade network linking the north, east and west of the continent – were little affected by contact with the Europeans. However, from 1450 over 12 million Africans were forced to embark on a journey across the Atlantic as slaves destined to work in the plantations and gold and silver mines of Europe’s colonies in the Americas and the Caribbean.

European Trade with Asia

The Europeans were to have a greater effect on the economies of Asia. In South and Southeast Asia the Portuguese combined plunder with trade, and by the 1560s they were importing about half the spices reaching Europe from the East. With overland Eurasian trade becoming increasingly hazardous – and also costly as local rulers extorted high protection costs – merchants from other European nations sought to establish themselves in the
oceanic Asian trade. In 1600 and 1602 the English and Dutch East India Companies were created, and within a few years the Dutch company had weakened Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean. However, local politics and rivalries between Hindu and Muslim entrepreneurs and courtier-traders continued to influence the patterns of European commerce and imperialism.

In the first half of the 17th century a struggle between Crown and Parliament in England, and a war of liberation in the Netherlands (from which the independent Dutch Republic emerged), placed merchant capitalists in both countries in more powerful positions. By the 1650s they were the leading economies of Europe. A century later trade outside Europe accounted for 20 to 25 per cent of the Dutch Republic’s total trade, while the figure for England was as high as 50 per cent.

THE EMPIRES OF ASIA
The rapid growth of northern European trade was not closely related to technological achievement: in the 17th century Europe imported Asian manufactured goods rather than vice versa, and per capita productivity in India and China was probably greater than in Europe. However, the technological superiority of India and China was not matched by an urge towards overseas expansion and conquest. Under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) Chinese voyages of exploration in the early 15th century had reached as far as the east coast of Africa. Yet while these voyages helped to consolidate China’s sphere of influence in Asia, they did not lead to the creation of a far-reaching overseas trading network. Instead, trade with the rest of Asia and with Europe continued to flourish with the aid of overland routes, short-distance sea routes and foreign merchants, resulting in an outflow of ceramics and silk, and an inflow of silver.

China relied on intensive agriculture to support its ever-growing population, but in the 16th century it was stricken by harvest failures, droughts and famine, which in turn led to frequent rebellions. Insufficient resources were devoted to defence, and in 1644 the Ming dynasty gave way to Manchu conquerors from the north. Under the Manchus, China became preoccupied with defending its own borders, which by 1760 had expanded to encompass a greater area than ever before (map I).

In India the Mughal Empire – established in 1526 by Muslim warrior descendants of the Mongols – was centred on cities in the country’s heartland. Its rulers financed their administration, and the architectural achievements for which they are renowned, by taxing local agriculture and commerce. However, they had little interest in overseas trade beyond the existing involvement of the artisanal industries in the Muslim trading networks that stretched from Arabia to Indonesia. The Portuguese, who were intent on seizing control of these networks, used their ships’ guns to overcome opposition and established trading posts around the coast. They were followed by Dutch, English and French merchants.

The Mughal Empire was just one of three powerful Muslim empires in the 16th century. Another was that of the Ottoman Turks, who after their capture of Constantinople in 1453 had embarked on a process of territorial expansion in Africa, Asia and Europe. This was to continue until 1683 when their last major expedition was driven back from Vienna, the Austrian Habsburg capital.

Among the other great powers with which the Ottomans came into conflict in the 16th century was the third representative of the political and cultural achievements of Islam at this time – the Safavid Empire (1501–1736) in Iran. Despite a resounding Ottoman victory in 1514, it was not until 1639 that the border between the two empires – the present-day frontier between Iran and Iraq – was firmly established.
The Europeans’ “discovery” of the world gave an enormous stimulus to cartography and the improvement of optical instruments. It also heralded a new capacity for observation of the natural world which eventually surpassed even that of the Chinese. The sophisticated depiction of spatial relationships which evolved in art is exemplified in The Artist’s Studio (c. 1660) by the Dutch painter Jan Vermeer.

THE MAJOR LAND EMPIRES OF EUROPE

The conflict with the Safavids temporarily diverted Ottoman attention away from Europe, where the power with which it most frequently came into direct confrontation in the 16th and 17th centuries was the Habsburg Empire. In the 1520s this empire was little more than the largest conglomeration of territories and rights in Europe – among them Spain, Austria, Hungary and the former lands of the Duchy of Burgundy – since the 9th century. It was not welded into a more coherent empire until the Thirty Years War of 1618–48, from which time the Habsburgs began the reconquest of Hungarian territory lost to the Ottomans and thus became the major dynastic power of central Europe.

To the northeast of the Habsburg Empire lay Poland – a kingdom which through much of the 17th and 18th centuries was in conflict with Russia. Under Muscovy’s Grand Duke Ivan III (r. 1462–1505), Russia began a process of exploration and expansion on land comparable with that undertaken overseas by the western European maritime powers. By the end of the 18th century its empire stretched from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, and formed a world economy in miniature.

COLONIZATION OF THE AMERICAS

Following the European discovery of the Americas – and the highly valued commodities to be found there – world demand for gold and silver ensured the gradual integration of the New World into the emerging European world economy. The Spanish conquest of Central and South America from the end of the 15th century was accompanied by the decimation of the native Indian population – not as a deliberate act of genocide but mainly as a result of diseases imported from Europe and a regime of forced labour. The estimated pre-conquest population of about 57 million was reduced to less than six million by the late 16th century. A similar fate awaited the smaller North American population when European colonists began to arrive in the 17th century. In order to replace native forced labour, slavery was introduced by the Spanish conquistadores and their successors. Between 1500 and 1650 about 500,000 African slaves were imported by the Spanish and Portuguese. Far greater numbers were subsequently imported when the slave system was extended to the Dutch, English and French colonies.

In the short term the Europeans’ discovery of the New World drained resources away from Spain and Portugal, who pursued their expansionist strategies through conquest. Expansion in the Americas did not become profitable for the European powers until the later 17th century, when a thriving colonial economy began to develop, based on the plantation crops of sugar in the West Indies; tobacco, rice and indigo in the central and southern mainland colonies; and family farms,
At the beginning of the 16th century European trading routes did not reach beyond West Africa. By the end of the 18th century they crossed the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, inextricably linking Europe, Asia and the Americas in the growing exchange of raw materials, foodstuffs, manufactured goods and silver.

handicraft production and intra-colonial trade in New England and the other northern colonies. Profits from trade with the colonies at first went principally to the Dutch Republic, followed closely by England and then France.

EUROPEAN DOMINATION OF TRADE

The domination of the evolving global economy by Europe, rather than by China or the Islamic powers, was due to a number of convergent forces, including the development of maritime enterprise and, later, of scientific and technological innovations. The division of the Church during the 16th-century Reformation, between Catholic and Protestant believers, encouraged international rivalry and emigration to the New World. However, above all else, it was the existence of a competitive state system in Europe, and the willingness and capacity of European governments to mobilize military and naval power in support of trade, which secured European hegemony. By the mid-18th century the octopus-like grip of the European trade routes formed an interlocking whole, in which American bullion paid for Asian luxuries and for the supplies of timber and other naval stores from the Baltic countries that were essential for further commercial expansion (maps 2 and 3).

The growing European appetite for colonial and Asian goods — including tea, sugar, tobacco, spices, and silks — as well as luxury items produced within Europe, was to play a significant role in the industrialization of western Europe, and of Britain in particular. The spread of consumerism and the desire for market-bought products encouraged rural households to specialize in both food production and various types of cottage industry in order to enhance their purchasing power — with the result that an early “industrious revolution” operating at the level of the household economy took place.

At the same time the commercial revolution provided new overseas markets for manufactured goods, especially in North America after around 1750, as well as essential raw materials such as dyestuffs, raw cotton and silk, and iron ore. The struggle to protect overseas markets and colonial sources of supply stimulated war industries such as shipbuilding, armaments and metal-smelting, all of which saw major technological improvements in the 18th century. The expansion of the Europe-centred world economy thus paved the way for the Industrial Revolution which was to take place first in Britain, and then in Europe and the United States, with enormous repercussions for the world in the 19th century.
Most civilizations knew something of the world outside their own territorial boundaries before Europeans discovered the existence of the Americas in the 1490s. The Greeks had circumnavigated Britain as early as 310 BC, by the 1st century AD Rome had established links with China, while the Chinese themselves had explored Central Asia, reaching the Euphrates by AD 360. However, the insularity of the Chinese court in the late 15th century (pages 138-39) – leading to the destruction of most of the official records of Zheng He’s pioneering voyages of 1405–33 in the Pacific and Indian oceans – undermined any sustained contact with the wider world. The discoveries by European explorers were new and momentous in the sense that expanding geographical horizons were matched by new mental horizons.

The geographical discoveries of the late 15th century were neither isolated nor accidental historical events. Rather, they were part of a European expansionist phase, and were to some degree a response to the disruption of Eurasian commerce brought about by plague, the closure of the Silk Road and the caravan routes during the 1360s, and the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. The need to find a direct route to the Far East, principally for trading silks and spices, provided a powerful impetus to exploration.

The Portuguese led the way with a series of expeditions from 1415 to explore the west coast of Africa (pages 80–81). In 1445 the westernmost tip of the continent was rounded, and by 1460 they had travelled 3,200 kilometres (2,000 miles) south as far as Sierra Leone, bringing back spices, gold and slaves. By 1474 the equator had been crossed, and in 1488 Bartholomew Dias reached the Cape of Good Hope (map 1) – an important step towards the establishment of a sea route to India, which was achieved by Vasco da Gama in 1497–98. After Dias’s voyage, mapmakers were able to show the sea encompassing southern Africa, but the globe was still envisaged as a much smaller – and younger – planet than is actually the case, and was thought to be dominated by the Eurasian landmass.
When Christopher Columbus set sail across the Atlantic in 1492 he was guided by the assumption that the American continents were islands off the coast of China. This belief was quickly discredited when the Spanish searched in a westerly direction. Although they were unsuccessful in reaching their immediate goal, the result was the discovery of the West Indies and the Venezuelan coast by Sebastian Cabot, under commission from the English crown, discovered 640 kilometers (400 miles) of coastline from Newfoundland to Cape Breton, and by 1509 his son Sebastian had travelled as far south as Cape Cod.

In 1510 the English knew more about North America than any other European country did, but during the next half century the French moved into the lead. In 1524 Verrazano, in the service of France, sailed along the coast from Cape Fear to Newfoundland, thereby proving that the earlier discoveries of Columbus and Cabot were part of a single landsmass. The first steps in exploring North America’s interior were taken ten years later by Jacques Cartier, who travelled along the St Lawrence River as far as Montreal. It was not until the 1570s and 1580s that the English returned to the area, with the voyages of Frobisher and Davis, in search of a northwest passage via Newfoundland (map 1). The years 1577–80 also saw an important breakthrough in English efforts when Francis Drake circumnavigated the world in the search for a new transpacific route.

The northern maritime countries were fortunate to inherit the more sophisticated seamanship and navigational skills of the Portuguese and Spanish. The art of celestial navigation, using the quadrant and astrolabe, was improved by the Portuguese during the 1480s, when manuscript copies of the first navigational manual, the Regimento, the first navigational manual, the Regimento, became available prior to its publication in 1509. Sebastian Cabot, an expert cartographer, helped to spread knowledge of Spanish navigational techniques in England. Although ships gradually increased in size during the 16th century, improvements in ship design were not, of themselves, sufficient to stimulate the long-distance exploration which took place during this period. The Dutch introduced top masts and stays, as well as the fluytschip (a flat-bottomed cargo carrier), and these advances certainly facilitated commercial exploitation and colonization of a type that was markedly different from the plundering of the conquistadores and the privateering expeditions of Drake. However, the idea of European settlement in the Americas in order to exploit fully the land’s natural resources was surprisingly slow to win acceptance and, when it did, was invariably difficult to sustain.

The Spanish and the New World

While Portuguese explorers searched for a passage to the East by a southeasterly route, the Spanish searched in a westerly and southwesterly direction. Although they were unsuccessful in reaching their immediate goal, the result was the discovery of the West Indies and the Venezuelan coast by Christopher Columbus between 1492 and 1502. Columbus, as his Spanish patrons realized, had greatly underestimated the distances involved in reaching Asia by a southwesterly route, but he nevertheless pressed on. The New World was Spain’s unexpected prize, confirmed in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, and first described by the explorer and writer Amerigo Vespucci in travel accounts published from 1507. By the 1520s the Old World recognized the Americas as an enormous “new” continent between Europe and Asia.

Spanish exploitation of the Caribbean islands began with the settlement of Hispaniola in 1493, followed by that of Cuba and Puerto Rico. These islands provided a base for the exploration of Central America, and the failure of the Spanish to find a sea route to Asia encouraged further colonisation and plunder. Mainland settlement began in 1509–10 on the isthmus of Panama. Hernan Cortes, the first of the conquistadores, established Spanish control over the Aztec Empire in Mexico in 1521, and in South America Francisco Pizarro subdued the empire of the Incas in Peru and Bolivia during the 1520s and early 1530s (pages 120–21). The conquest of Mexico and Peru provided new opportunities for transpacific exploration (map 2), and in 1527 Saevedra travelled across the Pacific from the coast of Mexico to the Moluccas. A viable return route, from the Philippines to Acapulco, was first navigated by Urdaneta in 1565 and was followed thereafter by Spanish galleons. In 1567 Mendana and Sarmiento led an expedition in search of a great southern continent and found the Solomon Islands. Mendana attempted to return there to establish a Christian colony in 1595, accompanied by the Portuguese navigator Quiros. They were unable to find the Solomons but instead stumbled on the Marquesas and Santa Cruz islands. However, it was not until the more scientific voyages of the 18th century that the full extent of the Pacific, from Alaska to New Zealand and the east coast of Australia, was to be explored.

The English, French and Dutch in North America

For much of the 16th century the Spanish and Portuguese attempted to exclude northern Europeans from their expanding colonial empires and the new sea routes across the southern hemisphere. As a result, the opening up of the north Atlantic world was mainly an English, French and Dutch enterprise, although it was more than a by-product of the quest for a northwestern route to the East. The first initiatives were probably undertaken as early as the 1420s by Bristol merchants involved in trade with Iceland. These traders were certainly exploring the coast of Newfoundland in 1481, some time before John Cabot made his historic voyage of 1497. Cabot, under commission from the English crown, discovered 640 kilometers (400 miles) of coastline from Newfoundland to Cape Breton, and by 1509 his son Sebastian had travelled as far south as Cape Cod.

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The Portuguese seaborne empire was based on a series of forts linking together trading entrepôts from the coast of Africa to South and Southeast Asia, and on to China and Japan. This system secured Portuguese trade with the East for nearly a century. The empire was governed from Goa, on the west coast of India, which had been captured for Portugal by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1510. Although the Portuguese were to lose most of their eastern possessions to the Dutch in the 17th century, they managed to hold on to Goa, surviving Dutch blockades of the city in 1603 and 1639.

Although European explorers had ventured into Asia in the 1st century AD, significant European contact with the continent only began on 27 May 1498 when the Portuguese fleet of Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut on the west coast of India. Da Gama had rounded the Cape of Good Hope in search of the valuable spices and silks which had long reached Europe only via expensive overland routes. Over the next hundred years a Portuguese "seaborne empire" spread around the coasts of the Indian Ocean, moving ever further east and developing a chain of forts linking Ormuz, Goa, Cochin, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Melaka and Ternate (map 1). Japan was reached in 1542 and a settlement established in China, at Macau, in 1555.

**PORTUGUESE TRADING EMPIRE**

The motives of the Portuguese were both economic and religious. In the pursuit of wealth, they attempted to establish a monopoly over the spice trade to Europe and to force entry into an already extensive trading network within Asia. Previously, this commerce had been conducted by indigenous merchants along free-trade principles, but the Portuguese coerced local merchants into paying them licence fees and seized the most lucrative trade routes for themselves. In the service of God, they promoted Christianity. In some cases, the two objectives dovetailed neatly: in Japan, between 1542 and 1639, they made more than 100,000 converts while running a valuable silk trade from Macau and advising the rising power of the Tokugawa shogunate on military tactics.

Yet Portuguese influence in the East was to prove short-lived. In part, it suffered from problems at home. Rivalry with Spain was intense and after the crowns of the two Iberian countries were united in 1580 internecine strife became bitter. A further problem was caused by the rivalry of Asian empires, whose temporary weaknesses had been exploited by the Portuguese. In Japan, for example, once the Tokugawa (pages 140-41) had achieved victory in the civil wars, they expelled the Iberians and in 1639 outlawed Christianity as a danger to the stability of their new state.

**DUTCH TRADE IN ASIA**

For the most part, however, Portuguese influence was eclipsed by the rise of another European power. The Dutch had long been involved in war against Spain (pages 152-53) and took the unification of its throne with that of Portugal as a signal to penetrate Asian waters and attack the Portuguese Empire. Following the establishment of their East India Company in 1602, the Dutch progressively displaced the Portuguese in Asian trade and developed their own trading empire further east (map 2). They also expanded Asian trade with Europe, Africa and the Americas, bringing Chinese porcelain into Western markets and Indian cotton textiles to the slave coasts of Africa and plantations of the New World.

The success of the Dutch was based on superior mercantile and maritime skills, which enabled them to enforce trade monopolies with greater ruthlessness. It also owed something to religion since, as Protestants, they were less interested in making converts than their Catholic rivals and were thus perceived as less of a threat by the indigenous societies. Following the expulsion of the Iberians from Japan, for example, the Tokugawa invited the Dutch to conduct Japan's external trade at Nagasaki.

Dutch maritime influence grew during the 17th century and remained strong east of Ceylon throughout the 18th century. However, it too faced eventual eclipse. One reason for this was that the Dutch were drawn into the politics of the hinterlands behind their port settlements and spent scarce resources on local wars at great cost to their trade. However, the principal reason for their demise was the belated entry into Asian trade of the much stronger European states of England and France.

**THE ENGLISH AND THE FRENCH IN INDIA**

English merchants had initially tried to break into the spice trade of the Indonesian archipelago but after the Massacre of Ambolna in 1623, when Dutch forces had destroyed their principal trading settlement, they were effectively excluded. Instead they concentrated on India, where the
The Europeans were drawn towards Asia by the lure of exotic consumer goods — tea, spices and silk — and by high-quality manufactures such as porcelain and printed cotton textiles (chintzes). Authority of the Mughal Empire (pages 144-45) constrained the Dutch from gaining too tight a control and offered opportunities for competitive trade (map 3). India was originally regarded as of limited mercantile importance because its spices were thought to be of lower quality than those found elsewhere. Yet this judgement was subsequently proved to be mistaken; India also possessed an enormous cotton textile industry, the significance of which became increasingly apparent as the 17th century advanced (pages 194-95). Cotton textiles were already established in the vast network of Asian trade, so the English gained secondary access to markets from the Gulf to the China seas. There was also a growing demand in Europe for Indian textiles, and from the 1650s onwards the cloth trade became the main source of European profits in Asia. This, in turn, caught the attention of the French, whose first Asian settlement was established in India in 1664, and the two newcomers steadily reduced the Dutch presence around the shores of India. The English also used India as a staging post for ventures further east, forging a broad triangular trade with China, from which tea, raw silk and porcelain were exported to the West in return for Indian silver and opium.

From the second quarter of the 18th century trade relations between England, France and India began to change. Many European states put up tariff barriers against Indian textile imports in order to protect their own domestic industries. This increased the importance to the English of trade with China and, in turn, placed greater emphasis on their ability to gain access to Indian silver and opium. In addition the Mughal Empire, which had previously confined European activities to the coasts, began to break up. Its successor states were soon at war with one another, making demands for finance and armaments which the Europeans found too lucrative to ignore. From the 1740s England and France also began a series of wars against each other which were to last — with brief interruptions — for the rest of the century, and end in the domination by “British India” of a vast area of the world from Arabia to the China seas.
Crucial to the first phase of Spanish colonization were the four voyages in which Columbus discovered the principal Caribbean islands and explored major sections of the mainland coast. These were followed by further naval expeditions mounted from Spain—involving many of Columbus's former companions. The travels of Narvaez, de Vaca, de Soto and Coronado were not considered successful since they brought neither wealth nor property to the Spanish crown. Information they provided, however, resulted in a new understanding of the main contours of the southern part of North America, which was reflected in contemporary maps of the area.

Columbus discovered America in the name of Spain in 1492, but this famous voyage was merely the initial step in the Spanish colonization of a large part of the continent, a process that took place in three stages. THE CARIBBEAN AND THE GULF OF MEXICO

Until 1518, the Spanish undertook the exploration and settlement of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico (map 1). However, Spanish attempts to exploit their new territories by establishing trading posts in the Caribbean were unsuccessful, because the simple agrarian societies of the islands could not sustain a trading economy. Instead, the Spanish established colonies of exploitation in Hispaniola, Cuba and Puerto Rico, using forced Indian labour in agriculture and gold-mining. From 1510, however, the economy was undermined by the collapse of the indigenous workforce, caused by Spanish mistreatment and by the spread of European diseases to which the islanders had little natural resistance.

THE AZTEC AND INCA EMPIRES

Spanish interest therefore turned to the great civilizations of the mainland (pages 110-11) which, in the second and most important phase of Spanish colonization, were reconnoitred and eventually conquered in a two-pronged exploration from the islands (map 2). In 1519 Hernán Cortés was sent by the governor of Cuba on a commercial and exploring expedition to the Yucatan Peninsula. Once ashore, Cortés repudiated the governor's mandate and henceforth acted on his own initiative, acknowledging only the authority of the King of Spain. His small army of military adventurers or conquistadores, having founded the town of Veracruz and symbolically scuttled its own boats, marched to Tlaxcala (map 3). Here they overcame initial resistance to form an alliance with the Tlaxcalans, themselves resentful of Aztec overlordship.

Cortés and his Tlaxcalan allies entered the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan, in 1519; but early in 1520 Cortés was forced to return to the coast to meet and win over to his side a hostile Spanish army dispatched from Cuba under Narvaez. Unfortunately the greed of the Spanish left behind in Tenochtitlan had alienated the Aztecs and, on Cortés' return, the Spanish were driven from the city in a series of events which led to the death of the Aztec emperor Montezuma. Cortés' army retreated to Tlaxcala, and in 1521 they and their Tlaxcalan allies launched a successful campaign against Tenochtitlan. This victory brought under Spanish control the millions of central Mexicans who had formerly been Aztec tributaries.

Meanwhile, from Hispaniola, the Spanish had organized colonies in Darien and on the Pacific coast of the Panama isthmus, first crossed by Balboa in 1513. Panama was used as a base for expeditions into Nicaragua and beyond and,
Atahualpa, the Inca ruler, was captured by Francisco Pizarro after being enticed to a meeting in the main square of Cajamarca. His unarmed retinue was quickly overcome and slaughtered by the Spanish artillery.

Pizarro's conquest of the empire of the Incas was the first stage of the Spanish colonization of South America. Rumours of gold inspired three separate expeditions in six years into the mountains of what is now Colombia. More importantly, for a series of exploratory voyages in the late 1520s along the Peruvian coast, organized by Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Amalgrò (map 4). Between 1531 and 1533 Pizarro's small army conquered the Inca imperial cities of Cajamarca and Cuzco, put to death the Emperor Atahualpa and replaced him with a puppet ruler, the Emperor Manco. Victory in Peru, however, was not as clear-cut as that in Mexico: the Incas rebelled under Manco and brutal civil wars broke out, both between the conquistadores themselves and later between the colonists and royal officials sent to govern them. Amalgrò and all five Pizarro brothers were killed in these wars, and Peru was not brought under Spain's control until around 1560.

**Further into the mainland**

Mexico and Peru provided the resources for the third and final stage of Spanish territorial gains between the mid-1520s and mid-1540s. Alvarado's and Cortes' expeditions from Mexico began the process by which the Yucatan and the Yucatan were brought under Spanish control, while a number of other campaigns extended Spanish authority into northern Mexico. However, the protracted wanderings of the Narvaez, de Vaca, de Soto and Coronado bands in the southern United States were epic failures, establishing the northern limits of Spanish colonization. The expeditions of Amalgrò, Valdivia and Bernaldez from Peru extended Spanish rule into Chile in the south and Ecuador and Colombia in the north, where the conquistadores encountered independent expeditions, such as Quiroa's, pushing down from the Caribbean coast. South America also had its share of heroic failures, such as Orellana's descent of the Amazon (map 4).

The Spanish also tentatively explored the Plata region in naval expeditions mounted from Spain, the most notable of which was Sebastian Cabot's exploration of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers in 1526–30. From the mid-1540s the surge of conquests waned. By this time Spain had conquered the Americas nearly as far as it was ever going to, although many areas were not intensively colonized until the 18th century.

The relentless courage, determination and energy which had been displayed by the Spanish conquistadores in acquiring land, wealth and subject populations in the Americas are probably without parallel in the history of European imperialism. However, the ferocious cruelty with which they treated the native populations is hard to square with their lofty claims that they were driven not just by the desire to get rich but also by the ideals of bringing Christianity and civilization to the American Indians. In practice they recognized no authority but their own, and their reckless disregard for their own lives was exceeded only by their callous indifference to the welfare of the peoples they conquered.
Silver mining, which was concentrated in Mexico and based on the forced labour of American Indian workers, accounted for over 90 per cent of Spanish-American exports between 1550 and 1640. In the Spanish Caribbean colonies of Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico, however, African slave labour was used to work the sugar and coffee plantations.

The peoples conquered by the Spanish and Portuguese in the Americas embraced a very wide range of cultures. Within the Inca and Aztec empires there were urban and agricultural communities in which small-scale farmers produced ample surpluses for the noble and religious classes (pages 110-11). In other regions there were less stratified, semi-sedentary and nomadic societies in which people produced little beyond their own consumption needs. At the time of the Conquest it is probable that the indigenous population of Spanish America amounted to some 40–50 million, 60 per cent of which was found in Mexico and Peru, while Portuguese Brazil had a population of 2.5 million (pie chart 1). What is certain is that until around 1650 all American Indian societies suffered massive population losses – reducing the original totals by 90 per cent. These losses, once thought to be caused by Spanish brutality, are now largely attributed to the Indians’ lack of resistance to European and African diseases. While the Indian population declined, the European, African and mixed populations rose sharply as a result of migration from Spain and the slave trade (pie chart 2). In the 18th century there was very rapid population growth among all racial groups, particularly the mixed and African populations.

The Spanish Empire

The economic development of the Spanish Empire was concentrated in areas that had once been part of the Inca and Aztec empires in central Peru and central Mexico (maps 1 and 2). Here the Spanish introduced a system known as the encomienda, under which groups of American Indians were allotted to a Spanish overlord, or encomendero, to whom they supplied labour and tribute and from whom, supposedly, they received protection. In practice, the encomienda system was highly exploitative and this, combined with the decline in the Indian population, led to its replacement by the repartimiento in Mexico and the mita in Peru. These were state-regulated labour systems under which the Indian communities were required to supply labour to private employers (and also to the state in Mexico) in three main activities: mining, agriculture and textiles. The mining of silver and mercury, which grew rapidly between 1550 and 1640, was of key importance: silver alone provided Spanish America with 90 per cent of its exports. The Spanish crown claimed sovereignty over all American territory to the west of the line laid down at the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, while Portuguese Brazil had a population of 2.5 million (pie chart 1). What is certain is that until around 1650 all American Indian societies suffered massive population losses – reducing the original totals by 90 per cent. These losses, once thought to be caused by Spanish brutality, are now largely attributed to the Indians’ lack of resistance to European and African diseases. While the Indian population declined, the European, African and mixed populations rose sharply as a result of migration from Spain and the slave trade (pie chart 2). In the 18th century there was very rapid population growth among all racial groups, particularly the mixed and African populations.

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sector also expanded as the Spanish set about producing commodities previously unknown to the Indians, principally wheat, cattle, sheep, wine and sugar. The production of wool and cotton textiles was concentrated in Mexico. Economic development outside Mexico and Peru was slow or even non-existent, and here the Spanish continued to use the encomienda system to appropriate the small surpluses of foodstuffs and cash crops, such as cochineal, which the depleted Indian populations could produce.

In the middle decades of the 17th century the decline in the number of Indians and in the international price of silver caused an economic recession in Spanish America. However, recovery began around 1670 and in the 18th century there was rapid economic growth. In Mexico and Peru this was based on the revival of the silver export industry and the expansion of agriculture and textile manufacturing. These activities used mainly wage labour.

However, the reluctance of Indians to work outside their communities led to the practice whereby Spanish employers advanced wages and credit to Indians and used the resulting debts, which the labourers could not repay, to bring them into the workforce. In the peripheral areas, expansion was driven by goldmining in Ecuador and Colombia and by the plantation production of sugar, coffee and indigo in Mexico, the Central American isthmus, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador – all activities which depended on imported slave labour and external markets. These areas were integrated into the mainstream economy in the 18th century.

THE PORTUGUESE IN BRAZIL

In Brazil, which was developed much more slowly than Spanish America, the Portuguese began by bartering tools and trinkets for Indian-supplied dyewoods. However, the indigenous market for manufactures was soon saturated, and from c. 1550 the colonists turned to sugar production, the basis of the New World’s first great plantation system.

The sugar industry depended entirely upon foreign markets and dominated Brazil’s economic and social development until 1700. The early sugar plantations were worked by Indian labourers, most of them enslaved. However, their productivity was low because they came from cultures with little experience of settled agriculture, and their numbers were drastically reduced by exposure to European diseases, particularly during the 1550s and 1560s. Consequently, by the early 17th century the colonists had substituted imported African slaves. From around 1670 the sugar industry was checked by competition from English and French Caribbean producers, and thenceforth the main impetus to Brazilian economic growth came from the opening up of gold and diamond mines in the interior regions of Minas Gerais and Goias, which were also worked by imported slaves (map 2).

SPANISH AUTHORITY IN THE COLONIES

The economic and social development of the Spanish colonies did not take place in a political vacuum. In the early colonial period the Spanish crown had little authority in America. The colonists observed the legal forms, as when they founded new towns, but in effect they ruled themselves. They largely ignored their chief critics, the friars, who came to the Americas to christianize the Indians in the “spiritual conquest”, and most of whom deplored the Spanish mistreatment of the indigenous population.

The Spanish crown, fearful that the conquistadores – the adventurers who had conquered Mexico, Central and South America – would form an autonomous and hereditary aristocracy, began from around 1580 to impose its authority on its American acquisitions. The government’s main concern was to curb the colonists’ virtually unlimited powers over the Indians, so it whittled away the quantities of tribute and labour extracted by the encomienda and transferred numerous encomiendas from private to Crown jurisdiction. Furthermore, a royal bureaucracy was created to absorb the powers formerly held by the conquistadores. Spanish America was divided into viceroyalties (map 3), each subdivided into a small number of audiencias – substantial areas administered by a legal council and a larger number of corregimientos – rural districts with urban centres governed by corregidores.

From around 1640 Spain’s authority in the Americas weakened as important royal powers over the colonists were commuted in exchange for fiscal payments, and as the practice of selling official posts to American-born Spaniards became widespread. These posts were used to benefit their holders, and their extended family networks, rather than to enhance royal authority. Weak government led to a stagnation in Spain’s revenues from the New World and a decline in the empire’s capacity to defend itself. The consequences of these developments became all too apparent in the Seven Years War (1756–63), when Britain inflicted crushing defeats on the Spanish in North America (pages 124–25). This experience stimulated the “Bourbon Reforms”, a programme of economic and political reorganization through which the Spanish crown attempted the bureaucratic reconquest of its American empire.
Following the discovery of the New World by European explorers at the end of the 15th century and beginning of the 16th, Spain and Portugal had laid claim to all of the Americas. However, this Iberian monopoly was not accepted by the other European powers and in the second half of the 16th century it was pierced by hundreds of voyages dispatched from northern Europe. Ships were sent to trade or pillage and even, in a few instances, to found colonies, although none of the latter survived. From these beginnings Britain, France and Holland founded empires in America and the Caribbean in the 17th century. British colonies were set up in two main waves: from 1607 to 1634, when settlements were established in Virginia, Maryland, New England and the eastern Caribbean; and from 1655 to 1680, when Jamaica was seized from the Spanish, the Carolinas and Pennsylvania were founded and New York was taken from the Dutch (map 1).

Unlike the white population of the British mainland colonies, the population of French Canada grew slowly because its economy was based on furs and fish, which required much less labour than agriculture. In the British mainland colonies the slave population increased rapidly, but in the Caribbean harsh treatment and tropical disease prevented its natural growth and encouraged the slave trade with Africa.
In the early 17th century the French established fishing and fur-trading colonies in Canada at New France and Acadia (Nova Scotia) and settler colonies in the Caribbean and the western portion of Hispaniola (map 2). The Dutch established trading factories – as on Curaçao – rather than colonies, but they founded one major colony, Dutch Guiana, taken from the British in 1665 (pages 122–23).

THE NORTHERN COLONIES
Outside the southeast and southwest regions, the indigenous people of North America (pages 108–9) lived mainly in semi-sedentary or nomadic societies, and the North American colonists never seriously attempted to live from their labour as the Spanish colonists did in parts of South America. Some Native Americans were enslaved – as in South Carolina – but the main contacts between Europeans and Native Americans were through the fur trade, where furs were supplied by native trappers, and through warfare. In general the Native Americans responded to the arrival and settlement of the Europeans with competition and resistance, moving west, leaving depopulated regions to be settled by migrants from Europe. These migrants were mostly people seeking economic betterment or freedom from religious persecution. Taking advantage of the region’s rich natural resources, they created prosperous farming communities specializing in the production of grain, livestock and timber, and benefiting from the relatively disease-free environment of the region.

THE PLANTATION COLONIES
Conditions in the plantation colonies of the southern mainland and the Caribbean were very different. Here disease was rife, discouraging free migration and killing many of those who did take the risks of settlement – mainly white indentured servants who had little choice over their destinations and provided several years of unpaid labour in exchange for their passage and a plot of land at the end of their service. Some 200,000 of these servants migrated to British plantation colonies, fewer to the French Caribbean, and they were employed in the production of tobacco and other plantation staples for export to Europe. From around 1650, however, there was a fundamental change in the labour system of the plantation colonies. The shift from tobacco to sugar caused an explosive increase in the demand for labour which could not be met by Britain and France. This led to the use of imported African slaves, first in the Caribbean and then, from 1680, in Virginia and Maryland (pages 126–27).

CONTINUED EXPANSION
In the 18th century the populations of all the British mainland colonies had fast natural rates of growth (graphs). In the northern colonies this pushed agricultural settlement into the interior. In the southern colonies the coastal regions intensified the slave-plantation production of tobacco, to which was added rice and indigo in South Carolina and Georgia. Settlement also spread into the southern “back-countries” – temperate mixed farming zones – whose economic and social development was akin to that of the northern colonies. The French mainland colonies in Canada and Louisiana achieved a massive territorial expansion to 1763, but their demographic and economic development was very slow. In the Caribbean, both the British and French slave-plantation economies grew rapidly.

COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
Neither Britain nor France exercised much political influence over their colonies until the 1660s, when France established an authoritarian system with military governors and powerful colonial officials accountable to the king. Britain also created royal bureaucracies but their power was shared with elected legislative assemblies. Both governments subjected imperial trade to strict mercantilist controls, requiring the colonies to trade exclusively with their mother countries. The benefits reaped by Britain and France were enormous because colonial trade was the fastest growing sector of international commerce in the period.
Slave Economies of the Western Hemisphere 1500–1880

Five major European empires were established in the Americas between the 16th and 19th centuries (map 1). In the economies of four of these empires – the Portuguese, Dutch, British and French – African slavery was the most important form of labour. In the fifth – the Spanish – African slaves played a significant and, in the 18th century, an increasing role. This occurred alongside the exploitation of the indigenous population. Slavery was an important element of European imperialism in the Americas because of the scarcity of labour in relation to the region’s abundant natural resources. Exploitation of the indigenous population was a strategy used in Spanish Mexico and Peru, where the sedentary and economically advanced American Indian societies provided labour and tribute payments to the Spanish as they had to their former Aztec and Inca overlords. However, the semi-sedentary and nomadic Native American peoples who occupied much of Spanish North America and overwhelmingly predominated in the other empires, could not satisfy the white colonists’ demands for labour and commodities.

Attempts to enslave these peoples proved unsuccessful in the long run, partly because they exhibited fearful mortality rates in captivity and partly because colonial governments generally opposed such enslavement.

A second source of labour was the large number of European migrants to the more temperate zones, such as the mainland of British America; but white migrants preferred to become independent farmers rather than wage labourers. The shortage of such labour was even more acute in the tropical colonies, where the hot and humid climate and the constant threat of disease discouraged free migration. From settling.

The colonists therefore turned to a third source of labour: slaves from Africa. Since the late 15th century African slaves had been used on plantations on European-colonized Atlantic islands such as Madeira and São Tomé. They proved to have two great advantages for the European colonists. First, they and their offspring, who were treated as chattels, could be coerced into almost any form of work; second, their supply was infinitely more elastic than the availability of labour from indigenous or European sources.

The Growth of the Slave Economies

The first major slave economies were created in the Spanish and Portuguese empires, which imported about 500,000 slaves between around 1500 and 1650. The Portuguese concentrated their slaves in the sugar plantations of coastal Brazil, while the Spanish used theirs in a number of regional economies, the most important of which were the sugar and wine estates of the semi-tropical coastal lowlands of Peru and Mexico and the silver mines of northern Mexico.

The period between 1650 and 1810 saw a massive expansion of slavery in all the major European empires in the Americas (map 2). The Portuguese expanded their sugar plantation system in Brazil and, after 1700, imported hundreds of thousands of slaves to work the diamond and gold mines in the interior of the country in the Minas Gerais and Goias regions. The vast majority of the Spanish-owned slaves were employed not in Mexico and Peru but on the sugar and cocoa plantations of Cuba and Venezuela and in the gold-mines of Colombia. These formerly peripheral regions of the Spanish Empire became increasingly important, entering the mainstream of the Spanish-American economy in the 18th century. The British, Dutch and French poured slaves into their Caribbean and Guyanese colonies, where they produced sugar, coffee and other plantation staples. On the northern mainland the British and French colonists imported smaller numbers of slaves into the tobacco-producing colonies of Virginia and Maryland, the rice and indigo economies of South Carolina and Georgia and the sugar colony of Louisiana.

The Demographics of Slavery

The conditions of life for slaves in the Americas, and in particular their relative ability to produce new generations of slaves, were determined by the labour requirements of the plantation crops that they cultivated and the disease environments in which they lived. Most were employed on large-scale sugar and coffee plantations in the tropical and semi-tropical zones, where their masters underfed and overworked them, and where they were ravaged by diseases such as dysentery and yellow fever. These slave populations experienced high mortality and low fertility rates, which meant that the expansion of labour forces depended on a swelling stream of human imports from Africa, from where over six million slaves were imported between c. 1650 and c. 1800 (map 1). The extent of the natural decline of slave populations can be gauged from the example of the British Caribbean colonies, which imported some 1.5 million slaves during this period, but by 1800 had an African-Caribbean population of just over 500,000. Natural increase was experienced by only a small number
of the slave populations — for example, those in the tobacco colonies of Virginia and Maryland — who benefited from adequate food supplies, an environment less conducive to disease than was to be found in the tropical colonies, and a less demanding labour regime.

ABOLITION AND THE SLAVE TRADE
The period from 1810 to 1880 represented the final era of slavery in the Americas. Although a number of countries abolished their transatlantic slave trades (Britain in 1807 and the United States in 1810, for example), American slavery continued to expand. The plantations of Brazil and of the Spanish and French colonies in the Caribbean imported nearly two million slaves between 1810 and 1860. In Cuba the slave population more than doubled in these years, while in the same period the slave population of the southern United States, mainly engaged in cotton production, increased by natural means from 0.9 to 3.7 million.

The abolition of the institution of slavery, as opposed to that of the slave trade, was a long process which extended from the 1820s up to the 1880s. The number of slave revolts increased in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (map 2), but with the exception of the revolt in 1791 in French St Domingue (which was to become the independent state of Haiti in 1804), none succeeded in achieving local abolition. Instead, the end of slavery was brought about partly by the economic decline of the slave economies but largely by political events — in particular, war and revolution. Several of the newly independent Spanish-American republics outlawed slavery between 1824 and 1829; slavery in the British West Indies was abolished by a reforming British government in 1834; and in the United States slavery was ended in 1865 by the victory of the Union states over the Confederate states in the American Civil War.
A
fter more than a century of economic growth, 1620
saw the beginning of a period of economic crisis and
stagnation in many parts of Europe. The economic
decline of Spain and Italy was accompanied by the migra-
tion of skilled labour and capital to the north. English and
Dutch merchants broke into Mediterranean trade during the
Eleven Years Truce with Spain, from 1609 to 1621 (pages
156–57). The Dutch retained and expanded their share of
Baltic commerce to achieve a near-monopoly of the region’s
trade by 1650, while English trade with the Baltic grew
significantly from the 1670s. This coincided with the rise of
Amsterdam and London as important world trading centres
(pages 132–33), and with a permanent shift in Europe’s
economic centre of gravity from the Mediterranean to the
North Sea/Baltic zone—a shift reflected in population trends
(graph 1 and map 1).

The rise of Holland
The 17th century, often described as Holland’s “golden age”,
was also the period of England’s “apprenticeship” to the
Dutch Republic. In the wake of the Dutch revolt against
Spain in 1572 and also after the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes by the French crown in 1685 (pages 154–55), Protestant
refugees were welcomed in the towns of southern
England and the northern Netherlands. Bringing with them
their expertise in new industries and industrial processes,
including brewing, papermaking, the manufacture of glass
and ceramics, and silk weaving, they made a significant
impact on the English economy. In an increasingly scientific
age, the Dutch capacity for visualization was highly valued,
showing itself in a range of skills associated with the “art of
describing”: mapmaking, engraving, drawing, painting and
the making of scientific instruments. Dutch engineers were
active in promoting drainage and embankment works in
countries throughout Europe (map 2).

By the early 18th century an international division of
labour was emerging, shaped as much by government policy
as by market forces. In France and England especially, new
forms of economic nationalism had emerged during the
1660s and 1670s, embodied in policies designed to promote
overseas and colonial trade, and industrial diversification,
at the expense of competitors. Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-
French rivalry was sharpened by the imposition of
protectionist import duties and restrictions on the export of
raw materials, and above all by the English Navigation Acts
of 1651 and 1660 which sought to wrest the colonial carry-
ing trade from the Dutch. By the early 1670s the Dutch
economic miracle was over, and English merchants would
soon displace the Dutch as the dynamic force behind
European and world trade (graph 2).

Anglo-Dutch competition
Anglo-Dutch competition was evident in many fields,
including the North Sea herring fisheries, woollen textile
manufacture, textile dyeing and finishing, and by the 18th
century, sugar refining, tobacco processing and linen
bleaching. These activities all involved processing and as
such were fields in which the Dutch excelled by virtue of
their success in controlling the markets for finished
products. English industry, on the other hand, was more
deeply embedded in the domestic manufacturing economy,
and relied on the labour of rural households.

Trade rivalry and industrial competition created an
international climate in which warfare became endemic,
from the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1652, 1665–67 and 1672–74,
to the intermittent Anglo-French struggles of 1689–1815.
Military expenditure by the British state multiplied fivefold
between the 1690s and the Napoleonic Wars, and provided
a huge stimulus to the industrial and construction sectors.
Shipbuilding, the metallurgical and arms industries, civil
engineering and the building and supply of naval dockyards
stimulated employment, investment and innovation through
increased public spending.

As the Scottish political economist Adam Smith real-
ized, the Anglo-French wars of the 18th century represented
a struggle for economic supremacy as much as for political
power in Europe, India and North America. France was a
late starter in the race for colonial trade and territory, but
made remarkable progress during the middle decades of the
18th century, especially in the West Indies (graph 2).
Nevertheless, British domination of the Atlantic economy
was secure by the end of the Seven Years War (1756–63).
On the eve of the American War of Independence (1775–83)
British imports from the West Indies and the American
mainland colonies far exceeded those from either the North
Sea or Mediterranean zones, and the lion’s share of British
manufactured exports went across the Atlantic.
In the last resort, however, the European economies were dependent on their natural resources and the legacy of political history. This was especially true in the case of agricultural and primary production, and the extent to which nations and regions were able to commercialize these sectors. Whereas the Dutch chose to develop a compact and specialized agricultural sector and to depend on large-scale food imports, the English chose agricultural self-sufficiency, protectionism, and, after 1689, the manipulation of food prices in the interests of producers by means of subsidized exports. French peasant agriculture, on the other hand, constrained by labour-intensive farming methods and a host of geographical, political and institutional limitations, was strongly resistant to commercialization. Above all, it was on the basis of plentiful energy sources that Britain was able to surge forward towards industrialization. The availability of coal released British producers from dependence on organic materials such as timber and charcoal at a time when Dutch peat supplies were becoming exhausted. In short, the Dutch Republic faced the limitations of a city-state underpinned by merchant capital - just as Britain was emerging as a strong nation-state, with a developing industrial base.
THE RISE OF EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL EMPIRES 1600–1800

The geographical discoveries by Europeans in the late 15th and early 16th centuries gave Europe access to many new sources of wealth: land, precious metals and new products such as coffee and tobacco. However, in the rush to exploit all these, the rivalry between the European states produced a world divided into commercial empires. In the short term the discoveries probably acted as a drain on European commercial and financial resources, particularly those of Spain and Portugal. The profits from the silver mines of Spanish America and the Portuguese spice trade were substantial for those directly involved, but while the outflow of precious metals from the Americas may have quickened economic activity in Europe, it also intensified the inflationary pressures that were already present.

Overall, the growth of transoceanic trade (map 1) made little impact on the European economy before the 1550s, and it has been suggested that it was not until the late 17th century that commercial and industrial profits from European trade with Asia and the Americas became visible and significant, initiating a commercial revolution. By this time the benefits resulting from Iberian overseas trade and investment had become more widely diffused across Europe, accruing principally to the Dutch Republic, followed closely by England and, later, France.

NEW COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Whereas Spain and Portugal relied on the formation of government agencies to promote colonial and commercial enterprise, the newer colonial states adapted existing forms of corporate organization to serve new purposes. In this respect, the English and Dutch East India Companies (formed in 1600 and 1602 respectively) can be seen as fore-runners of the modern multinational corporations. Owned by shareholders, managed by boards of directors and employing accountants and other salaried workers, these independent companies wielded great political power at home and abroad. Their efficiency and the impact of their monopoly powers have been questioned, but they undoubtedly played an important role in the expansion and integration of the global economy.

Trade in the Far East was enmeshed with politics and diplomacy, and required powerful trading bodies to act on behalf of states. However, this was not the case in the colonies of North America and the Caribbean where, with the exception of the Dutch West India Company (1621–1791), trade was conducted mainly by private, unincorporated merchants. Such merchants operated through social networks that were formed on the basis of religious, family and other personal ties. Before 1700 the bulk of
transatlantic commerce was conducted by British merchants operating through colonial agents, but local merchants increased their share of trade from the early years of the 18th century, especially in the northern colonies. Although institutionalized monopoly powers were not necessary for the development of trade with North America, the English Navigation Act of 1651 (prohibiting imports to England from outside Europe unless carried in English ships) effectively established a national monopoly which played an important role in undermining Dutch competition during the following century.

As the world economy expanded the Americas, Europe and the Far East became inextricably linked through trade, shipping and bullion flows. Silver bullion from the mines of Central and South America enabled the northern European economies to buy goods from Asia and the Baltic (map 2). Imports from the Baltic region, such as timber for ship-building, iron ore and naval stores, contributed to the further expansion of long-distance trade, while the flow of Asian imports - silk, calico, spices and drugs - brought consumer goods to Europe and North America. It was not until the second half of the 18th century that the amount of silver bullion exported to Asia fell sharply, compensated for by rising exports of British manufactured goods.

**THE STIMULUS TO COMMERCIAL EXPANSION**

A major stimulus behind the commercial revolution of the 17th century was an increase in consumer demand. In spite of demographic stagnation in Europe, towns and cities continued to expand (pages 132–33), and as they did so new patterns of consumption and social behaviour evolved. Contributing to the diversification of consumption habits was the arrival of new and exotic commodities such as spices, tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, tropical fruit, dyestuffs and Asian textiles. Such commodities resulted in, for example, the development of coffee houses, more fashionable clothing and household furnishings, and new domestic rituals such as tea-drinking. Maize and potatoes helped to feed Europe's growing population in the 18th century, without competing with home-produced foodstuffs. New industries such as sugar refining, tobacco processing, cotton manufacture and textile printing developed as a result of long-distance trade and colonial development.

However, despite the benefits of trade with Asia and the Americas, economic growth in Europe depended mainly on trade within Europe itself, and on improvements in domestic agriculture and manufacturing. Long-distance trade was expensive, not always profitable, and did not contribute a great deal to capital formation within those countries which were at the core of the world economy. Competition between the European states - and the consequent need to defend, administer and control colonial territories - involved increased public expenditure and more complex government administration. Furthermore, the growing European demand for imported products resulted in balance of payments problems for the countries involved, to which there were two obvious solutions: to increase the volume of re-exported goods, and to provide shipping services. In this sense, the commercial revolution generated its own momentum.

**GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN COMMERCE**

The countries that gained most from this economic expansion were nation-states such as France and England, which were capable of developing the machinery of strong central government alongside aggressive mercantilist policies. Mercantilism aimed to increase employment through the encouragement of overseas trade, especially the import of essential raw materials, while protecting home industry by the imposition of high import duties. In comparison with the English and French variants, Dutch mercantilism remained weak and incidental, particularly in the colonial field. The decentralized federal structure of the United Provinces, together with the deeply entrenched interests of its merchants overseas, inhibited the kind of aggressive unity that was partly behind the increasing power of its larger neighbours - France and England.

Silver from the mines of Central and South America reached Europe via Spain and Portugal, where it entered the arteries of world trade. The Dutch, who were the dominant commercial power in Europe, operated as Europe's bankers in circulating coin and bullion, using it to purchase goods from three principal areas: the Baltic, the Middle East and East Asia.
**EUROPEAN URBANIZATION**

1500–1800

The process of urbanization in Europe involved three overlapping phases. In the first phase, which occurred around 1550, a few large cities—one notably London, Paris and Amsterdam—expanded rapidly, while in the third phase there was an increase in the size and number of smaller cities and a relative leveling off in the growth of larger cities. In the 16th century the most urbanized regions in Europe—defined by the percentage of the total population resident in towns and cities—were in the northern and southern Netherlands, and Italy. From the early 17th century, however, urban growth subsided in the last two regions while cities in the northern Netherlands expanded rapidly, in common with those of England and Scotland. By comparison, only moderate urbanization took place in France.

During the early 16th century a European-centred world economy was emerging, characterized not only by the rise of transoceanic trade but also by new and distinctive patterns of urban growth in Europe itself. Between 1500 and 1800 the towns and cities of Europe came to form a single urban system, involving the integration of regional trading networks and the commercialization of predominantly rural economies.

In 1500 the most urbanized regions in Europe were Italy and the Netherlands, but from the early 17th century the potential for urban growth began to move steadily northwards, with the northern Netherlands becoming the most urbanized area while rates of urban growth in Italy and the southern Netherlands subsided (maps 1–4). The Dutch Republic (the northern Netherlands) approached a ceiling in the mid-17th century because in the preceding century there had been no increase in the number of smaller centres from which cities could develop. England, by contrast, contained hundreds of market towns and industrial villages capable of expansion. By the early 19th century the rate of urban growth in Britain had reached that attained by the Dutch a century earlier, but at a much higher level of population. Between 1680 and 1820 the population of England and Wales grew by 133 per cent, while that of the Dutch Republic increased by only 8 per cent. In both countries, however, a single dominating commercial centre had emerged by 1700.

**The growth of London and Amsterdam**

London's meteoric growth (map 5) overshadowed that of all its rivals, including Paris (graph). In 1600 about 5 per cent of the English population lived in London; by 1700 this proportion had reached 10 per cent, much higher than in other European capital cities apart from Amsterdam, which contained 8 per cent of the Dutch population. Paris, by comparison, contained only 2.5 per cent of the French people. The exceptional position of London may account for the rapid development of the English economy in the late 17th and 18th centuries, at a time when London was absorbing half the natural increase of the entire population. This rapid expansion led to problems of overcrowding and insanitary conditions, bringing disease and high death rates. It was therefore only through substantial migration from the countryside that London and other large cities could continue to grow. A more healthy environment for Londoners only began to evolve with the replacement of timber by brick as a building material, and the introduction of building regulations after the Great Fire of London in 1666. In Amsterdam, efforts to create a more carefully planned city intensified after 1613, when construction of the spacious outer girdle of canals began.
In the period 1750–1850 the majority of large cities grew at much the same rate as the population as a whole, while smaller centres experienced a much higher rate of growth. The notable exception to this rule was London, whose meteoric growth continued unabated.

The population of London expanded from about 120,000 in 1550 to 575,000 by 1700. This latter figure represented 10 per cent of the English population, a uniquely high proportion in comparison with other European capital cities at the time.

New Urban Centres
As population levels rose in Europe after 1750 a new pattern of urban growth began to unfold. Expansion was no longer confined to the larger cities; indeed, it was the growth of small cities and the emergence of new urban centres which lay behind an overall increase in the pace of urbanization. There are two possible explanations for this, both arising from the overall growth in population. First, there was an increased demand for food, which in turn stimulated the rural sector and the expansion of regional marketing and administrative centres. Second, the clustering of rural producers in and around industrial villages during the preceding century had created the basis for several new manufacturing centres that were now able to emerge in response to growing markets.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1500–1770

From the mid-16th century botanical gardens were established in many university towns, and in the following century academies of science added a new dimension to the range of institutions which promoted learning. The most important of these were the Roman Accademia dei Lincei (1603), the Accademi del Cimento in Florence (1657), the Royal Society of London (1660) and the Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris (1665).

Between the early 16th and mid-18th centuries there was a remarkable growth both in the understanding of the natural world and in the capacity to exploit it. In 1500 the study of mathematics was well established in major universities across Europe (map 1) and by the end of the 16th century it was a central discipline in both Protestant and Catholic centres of learning. The idea that the world should be represented geometrically formed a central strand of the Renaissance and was especially influential in the development of perspective representation by Italian painters and architects. The research of a number of people—including Nicolaus Copernicus (in Kraków), Johannes Kepler (in Tübingen and Prague), Galileo Galilei (in Padua and Florence) and Isaac Newton (in Cambridge)—suggested that God’s Creation had been made according to a mathematical blueprint. England was briefly predominant in the field of natural philosophy following the publication of Newton’s *Principia Mathematica* in 1687, but in the 18th century cities as far apart as Basel, St Petersburg, and Paris became centres of European scientific creativity.

CENTRES OF LEARNING

The works of Aristotle formed the basis of the university curriculum until the end of the 17th century, when Cartesian and then Newtonian doctrines began to take hold in most of Europe. A number of factors were involved in bringing about this shift: new discoveries, as well as a more critical attitude to ancient texts, progressively weakened the credibility of Aristotelian styles of explanation, while the development of print and paper production meant that information was available to unprecedentedly large numbers of people, particularly the new urban elites. Moreover, with the exception of Newton’s research at Cambridge, innovation in the exact sciences ceased to be university-based after the late 16th century. Instead, the princely courts in Germany and Italy became the major centres of creative work, while the Roman Accademia dei Lincei at the start of the 17th century was the first of a number of academies, both metropolitan and provincial, which promoted learning in natural philosophy and astronomy (map 1). Little of note could have been achieved without networks
of correspondence which connected individuals in all the major European cities, the most significant being those organized in the 17th century by Marin Mersenne, Samuel Hartlib and Henry Oldenburg. Many of these letters were printed in philosophical journals – the Journal des Savants and the Philosophical Transactions – which were established in the 1660s.

**The Development of Botany**

From the late 15th century European voyages to the Americas, Africa and Asia provided novel galvanized by information and samples pouring in from places outside Europe. From the Americas came maize, potatoes, runner beans, pineapples and sunflowers, and by 1585 peppers from South America were being cultivated in Italy, Castile and Moravia. New drug plants included guaiacum, Chinese root and sarsaparilla. Botany was practiced at universities with strengths in medicine, and botanical gardens were set up to cultivate rare and exotic plants (map 1). Books such as Leonard Fuchs's *De Historia Stirpium*, published in 1542, pioneered naturalistic depictions of plants, and the number of plants recorded in such books expanded from less than a thousand in 1500 to the 6,000 recorded in Caspar Bauhin's *Pinax* of 1623.

**Scientific Instruments**

Throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries systematic observation and the use of experimentation and the microscope accelerated the development of botanical and zoological knowledge across Europe. At the same time the development of the telescope revolutionized the study of astronomy, with major new astronomical discoveries made by scholars in London, Danzig, The Hague and Rome.

Research into the existence and nature of a vacuum linked developments in natural philosophy to those in technology. A vacuum was impossible in the Aristotelian system, but in the 1640s experimenters in France argued that the space at the top of a tube inverted in a bowl of mercury was void of matter. At about the same time Otto von Guericke of Magdeburg began trials with the evacuation of air from a copper surrounding. His ideas were taken up by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke in Oxford, who constructed an air-pump with a glass receiver in 1659. The Dutchman Christiaan Huygens supervised the construction of a pump at the Académie Royale in Paris in 1665, and a number of instrument makers sold different sorts of pumps in Paris in the 1670s. London, Paris, Leipzig and Leiden all became particularly influential centres of pump construction in the 18th century, while London alone became the most important general site of instrument manufacture (map 2).

**Industrial Technology**

There were also momentous developments in the area of industrial technology. As pits were dug deeper and deeper to extract coal and minerals such as tin and lead, steam engines emerged as a response to the need to rid mines of water. At the start of the 17th century a number of people considered the possibility of using steam to raise water, either for clearing mines or for producing fountains and cascades for aristocratic gardens. It is no coincidence that a pioneer of air-pump design, Denis Papin, also worked on atmospheric steam engines. Having worked on air-pumps with Boyle and Huygens in the 1670s, he wrote an article in 1690 describing how steam could raise a piston which would then be allowed to fall due to atmospheric pressure.

Papin's article may well have influenced Thomas Savery, who produced the first workable apparatus for raising water by fire at the end of the 1690s. Savery was the latest in a line of engine constructors based around London, and although his machine was practical in limited situations, it was of no help in deep mines and suffered repeatedly from boiler explosions.

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It was the Englishman Thomas Newcomen's piston-driven atmospheric engine which would transform industry in the period before James Watt's innovations revolutionized the design of steam engines towards the end of the 18th century. Newcomen's first working engine was installed in Staffordshire in 1712 (map 2). The design of Newcomen's engine was a closely guarded secret, and for the first 15 years no machine outside Britain was made to work without the support and maintenance of a British engineer. The success of the Newtonian system and the domination enjoyed by the British in the art of engine design throughout the 18th century are indicative of the geographical shift in innovative science and technology which had drifted northwards from Italy at the end of the 16th century.
In the northern third of tropical Africa, Islam slowly percolated along the ever-changing dust tracks of the Sahara, up the cataracts of the Nile and down the sailing routes of the Red Sea to bring new spiritual energy, theological ideas, commercial codes of practice, jurisprudence, the Arabic alphabet and mosque-based scholarship to the towns of Africa. Perambulating scholars settled in Timbuktu and Kano, where local holy men synthesized their own customs with those of Mediterranean Islam. Islamic art and architecture spread too – as seen in the great minarets of the Niger Valley, regularly coated in river clay, and the palaces of the Swahili east coast, which were built of carved coral.

The three centuries after 1500 were marked by an increase in interaction between Africa's peoples and those of the outside world, though this increase should not be exaggerated. On the east coast there was no radical change in the pattern of cultural and commercial exchange that had existed since the time of the Roman Empire, but Indians and Europeans encouraged the further exploitation of East Africa's copper mines, mangrove forests, elephant herds, gold deposits and shore-line fisheries (map 1). Foreigners also exploited opportunities to recruit voluntary, and more especially involuntary, migrant labour to serve as ships' crews and pearl divers, as household slaves and concubines, or as field hands in the coconut groves and date plantations of the Middle East.

The central interior of Africa was only indirectly affected by the globalization of Africa's external relations before 1800. Local merchants and kingdoms fought over salt quarries, iron mines and fishing lakes. Africa's ongoing agricultural revolution took a new leap forward when traditional grains such as millet and sorghum were supplemented by the slow diffusion of tropical grains from the Americas such as flour maize and flint maize, while the traditional crops of root yam and vegetable banana were augmented by new carbohydrates processed from cassava.
In western Africa, Christianity was the vehicle for religious change and adaptation. In the Kongo kingdom, one faction seized power in 1506 with the help of foreign priests who subsequently built chapels and schools, created a small bureaucracy and archive, and developed powerful Christian rituals to match local ones. A hundred years later the Papacy sent Capuchin friars to Kongo and the surrounding principalities to spread the new religion into the provincial and rural areas. Rustic traditionalists proved more resistant to religious change than ambitious townsfolk, however. Christianity created factionalism, discord, and eventually a civil war.

**Trade and Colonization**

The impact of European merchants on the Atlantic seaboard of Africa was older, and initially more pervasive, than that of Christianity. Much merchant activity was carried on at open beaches off which 200-tonne sailing vessels anchored; on lagoons where canoes plied, carrying merchandise and slaves; and in creeks where timber vessels that were no longer seaworthy were permanently anchored as floating storehouses. On the Gold Coast (map 2) the pattern of trade was different, with around 40 gold-trading fortresses being built by European trading nations. Among the greatest of these castle-warehouses was Cape Coast Castle, the headquarters of the English. Its installations were matched by the fortifications and slave-trading houses of the French on the island of Goree and, in the south, the Portuguese fortress at Luanda, which was to become Africa’s largest slave-exporting harbour on the Atlantic Ocean.

During the 16th and 17th centuries three attempts at colonization of parts of Africa were made by foreigners. The Ottomans spread through North Africa during the early 16th century, capturing cities from Cairo to Algiers and creating an empire which only began to break up when Napoleon attacked Egypt in 1798. The next great colonizing episode was the Portuguese attempt to gain and retain commercial dominance on both the western and eastern flanks of Africa after 1570. Unlike the Ottomans, the Portuguese were unable to conquer significant parts of the mainland, though they attempted to do so in both Morocco and Ethiopia. They did, however, create Creole communities on the islands and in a few fortress towns, notably along the Zambezi River. The part of Africa most vulnerable to foreign attack proved to be Angola, where Portuguese merchants became conquistadores in the Spanish-American style. The third episode of early colonization was carried out by the Dutch, who between 1637 and 1652 captured three strategic points – the gold-trading castle of Elmina, the slave harbour of Luanda and the prospective military base at Cape Town. Although the Portuguese were able to recover Luanda in 1648 and resume their conquest of Angola, the Dutch influence there proved pervasive. At Cape Town the creolized Dutch remained a distinctive segment of the population after the British captured the city in 1806.

The African response to the European opening of the Atlantic to long-distance shipping was to build their markets, their cities and their royal capitals away from the coast and beyond the range of direct foreign interference. In Angola, where European armies penetrated 300 kilometres (200 miles) inland, the greatest of the African trading empires built the royal compounds of Lunda beyond the reach of the conquistadores. In Asante, by contrast, the resistance to invasion was so effective that a royal city with permanent palaces could be safely established at a strategic crossroads little more than 150 kilometres (100 miles) from the coast. The Asante Empire was able to absorb several older kingdoms which had been brokers between the coast and the interior. The empire of Oyo partially eclipsed the ancient trading city of Benin and absorbed the powerful shrine city of Ife; a fresh new trading state was created in Dahomey and attracted Latin American and European merchants anxious to buy prisoners of war in exchange for firearms and gunpowder as well as textiles and luxuries.

**Consequences of the Slave Trade**

The period 1500–1800 saw an enormous increase in the scale of the American, Mediterranean and Asian purchase of slaves. In some areas, such as Angola, the consequence was a demographic haemorrhage as thousands of people were sold abroad each year, thereby undermining the capacity of communities to renew themselves. In Guinea the slave trade caused such acute social malaise that small communities became dominated by secret societies which manipulated a rising fear of witchcraft. In the Niger Basin whole communities were devastated by raids which caused death, famine and disease on a spiralling scale. In contrast to this, some successful broker kingdoms built up their agrarian economies with new crops and preserved their population by refusing to sell young women captives abroad.

In the long term, however, the effects of the slave trade were to entrench violence as a way of life and create a damaging intellectual climate which presumed that white people were superior to black people. The decolonizing of the minds of both the perpetrators and the victims of the slave trade was to be a slow process, further delayed by the colonial interlude which affected Africa during the first half of the 20th century.
A China during the Ming period was open to foreign trade, doing business with its neighbours in every direction. Its exports were predominately manufactured goods, including silk cloth, ceramics, paper and bronze coins, but they also included some raw materials (such as silk). This pattern changed in the 18th century when China responded to international demand and began to supply large quantities of silk, tea and porcelain to the West. Having only small deposits of precious metals, it relied largely on imported silver and gold to support its increasingly sophisticated market economy.

In 1368 the Mongols, who had ruled China since 1271, were ousted by a peasants' revolt, the leader of which crowned himself Emperor Taizu and founded the Ming dynasty. The Ming period (1368–1644) marked a renaissance in China's cultural, political and economic strength. Administrative systems for running the empire dating from 221 BC were resumed, the imperial examinations for applicants to the civil service were reinstated, and there was a national census and land registration for the purposes of taxation. The Spiritual School (xinxue), based on the tradition of the Ideologist School of Confucianism (lixue) was established, supporting the need for social order according to the "Will of Heaven". It was to remain popular throughout the Ming and subsequent Qing period.

**Developments in Agriculture**

An agricultural system based on small freeholds was rebuilt, and initially attempts were made by Emperor Taizu to control the tax burden on the poorer farmers. During the second half of the Ming period, however, ownership of land became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. This led to the introduction of dual ownership, under which a freeholder could offer land for permanent lease. Sharecropping – a system by which a proportion of the crops produced by the leaseholder is handed over in rent – was also common.

There were significant technological improvements in Chinese agriculture. From the second half of the 16th century new crops were adopted from the outside world, including the potato and sweet potato, maize, sugar beet, tomato, kidney bean, mango, papaya, acajou, pineapple, chilli and tobacco; several improved species, such as the American peanut and cotton, were also introduced. This resulted in an agricultural revolution, with an increase in the use of marginal land and, as a consequence, in agricultural production. China's landscape and the Chinese diet were both dramatically altered. The publication of the Complete Treatise on Agricultural Administration in around 1625 also had a major impact. Its author, Xu Guangqi, was the de facto Prime Minister, and he enthusiastically promoted the new crops and Western technology for water control. As a result, the Chinese economy was able to survive the increasingly frequent natural disasters of the second half of the Ming period.

**Trade and Expansion of Influence**

Ming China was active in domestic and foreign trade. Trading guilds were well established in commercial centres and long-distance trade in staple products flourished (map 2). China was essentially open to foreign trade, as is evident from the outflow of ceramics and silk, and the inflow of silver that enabled China to adopt its first silver standard. A large number of Chinese settled in Southeast Asia, along the maritime trading routes. In addition, European Christian missionaries in China introduced Western technology. Some, such as Matteo Ricci, in the
16th century, were appointed to high positions in the Imperial Court.

Chinese influence was extended by the state-sponsored voyages of the early 15th century, led by Admiral Zheng He. The admiral and his fleet crossed the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, visiting among other places Sumatra, Calicut, Zafar and Mogadishu (map 2). The armada — consisting of 27,800 mariners on 200 ships — was well equipped with charts and compasses, and its captains were knowledgeable about meteorological and hydrological conditions. Its voyages, which represent the most spectacular episode in Chinese maritime history, helped to consolidate China's sphere of influence in Asia.

Western powers presented little threat during the Ming period. In 1622-24 the imperial navy twice defeated invading Dutch fleets: off China's south coast, at Macau and Amoy, and off the Pescadore Islands near Taiwan. Only Japanese pirates generally caused concern on the coasts. The real danger to the empire came from the Tatar and Manchu invasions on the northern and northwestern frontiers, and in 1449 Emperor Zhu Qizhen was captured while fighting the invaders. Between 1368 and 1620, 18 major construction projects were carried out to overhaul the 6,700 kilometres (4,200 miles) of the Great Wall (map 3).

**The Decline of the Ming Dynasty**

The military strength of the empire gradually faded, and internal rebellions broke out every year from 1522. There was a decline in the efficiency of the Ming government, partly due to interference in the process of government by court eunuchs, but also because rampant tax evasion threw the government into financial difficulties. In response, around 1573 a "one-whip method" of taxation was introduced, intended to lower administrative costs by reducing the number of different taxes levied, and to spread the tax burden more fairly. This reform was short-lived, however, and financial and socio-economic crises were to haunt the Ming dynasty until its downfall.

The Ming dynasty ended in 1644 with the suicide of Emperor Zhu Yiujian following the fall of Beijing to rebels. Officials of the Ming government enlisted the aid of the Manchu — a hitherto nomadic people from beyond the Great Wall who had adopted the Chinese culture — to help them drive the rebels from Beijing. However, once in control of the capital the Manchus refused to leave, and the rule of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911) began. (A Ming exile government survived in Taiwan until 1683 in the form of a city state with a large fleet and an extensive trading network in East and Southeast Asia.)

**Early Manchu Qing Rule**

The legitimacy of the Manchu Qing dynasty was always in question, and perhaps as a consequence it made few innovations; its language, state machinery, legal framework and economic policies were all inherited from the Ming. The early Qing can, however, be credited with maintaining a long internal peace and with expanding the Chinese empire to its greatest extent ever, by joining the Manchu territory in Manchuria and Siberia to China, consolidating military control over the part of Turkestan known as the "New Territory", and developing a political link with Tibet (map 3). As a result, the population of the Chinese Empire reportedly tripled from around 143 million in 1740 to over 423 million in 1846. From 1800 onwards, however, the Qing dynasty was increasingly under threat from internal uprisings — caused by famine and a corrupt government — and from aggressive Western powers.

* Under the Manchu dynasty the Chinese Empire, already extensive, trebled in size. However, with the exception of Manchuria, the territory gained was neither highly populated nor particularly fertile. Although the vassal states of Korea and Annam provided the empire with only a small income, they did form buffer zones against potential invaders.

* Zheng He's fleets, which numbered 200 ships, sailed on a series of voyages across the Indian Ocean as far as Arabia and the east coast of Africa, and throughout the islands of Southeast Asia. The ships returned laden with goods and exotic plants, as well as prisoners of war (including the King of Ceylon). Zheng's fleets used force on three occasions: in Sumatra in 1404, in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1410, and in Sumatra in 1413, mainly against Chinese pirates.
In 1603, after many decades of civil war, Japan came under a new structure of military government headed by the Tokugawa family. The emperor, resident in Kyoto, no longer had any real political power, although the Tokugawa administration, called the Shogunate or Bakufu, ruled in his name. It discharged some of the functions of a national government but was a degree of decentralization persisted, with the country divided into domains, each ruled by a semi-autonomous daimyo (lord). Former enemies of the regime became tozama (outside) lords, while those deemed friendly were denoted fudai and were given important government posts. Fudai domains, along with those of collateral branches of the Tokugawa family (shimpan), were concentrated in the centre of the country (map 1). The shogunate had no power to tax within any of the domains, or, in general, to intervene in the political control of these private fiefdoms. Its only income came from lands directly owned by the Tokugawa and related (collateral) families, including, for example, the Ii and Matsudaira.

In an attempt to ensure their continued dominance, the Tokugawa implemented controls over individual lords and the population in general. Contacts with countries outside Japan were restricted to a minimum, giving rise to a period of national seclusion, or “isolation”. All daimyo had to visit the shogunal capital, Edo, regularly, and leave their families there as hostages. They were compelled to engage in public works to restrict their finances, and public disorder within domains could incur heavy penalties. A strict hereditary caste system headed by the ruling samurai (warrior) caste, followed in descending order by farmers, artisans and merchants, was enforced. The economy was based on rice, with the size and wealth of the various domains measured in terms of the rice crop. The daimyo paid their warrior retainers stipends measured in rice, and the warrior caste as a whole marketed any surplus not required for consumption to purchase other necessities and luxuries.

**Urbanization and Economic Growth**

Although the influence of the Tokugawa over the daimyo progressively weakened, the ruling structure remained broadly unchanged until the fall of the shogunate in 1867. However, the very success of the regime in achieving political and social stability stimulated changes which were ultimately to contribute to its downfall. Removal of the likelihood that output would be plundered or destroyed encouraged both farmers and artisans to increase production, while peace made the transport of raw materials and finished products easier (map 2). By the end of the Tokugawa period a growing proportion of the population resided in towns of over 5,000 people, and in some areas this proportion reached over 30 per cent (map 3). The need for the ruling caste to transform their rice income into cash boosted the rise of powerful merchant families, many based in the city of Osaka. These merchant houses accumulated great wealth, despite their low social status, and a growing proportion of the population engaged in educational and cultural pursuits.

Agricultural output increased with the aid of improved techniques and land reclamation, and the majority of peasants ceased to be simple subsistence rice producers, becoming involved, along with artisans, in the supply of handicrafts and other goods. The population, after growing in the first half of the Tokugawa period, stabilized. The latter years saw the rise of manufacturing activities outside the towns, the development of local specialties and the emergence of what has been termed “proto-industrialization”. It is generally agreed that these economic developments were a significant factor in supporting Japan’s subsequent process of industrialization.

**Social Change and Unrest**

The scale of economic growth and change in the 17th and 18th centuries put pressure on the old system, with the authorities becoming powerless to control the expanding commercial interests and networks. Social status and wealth no longer went hand in hand, and the daimyo and their followers found themselves in debt to rich merchants who were nominally at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The distinctions between castes became blurred as individuals ceased to confine themselves to their prescribed occupations; the samurai, in particular, now had little reason to demonstrate their military role, instead becoming bureaucrats, scholars and, increasingly, anything that would make ends meet. New economic structures, such as landlordism,
Peasant uprisings peaked in the 1830s—an era of famine—when unrest not only involved greater numbers than ever before but also spread to embrace whole regions. Rioting occurred both in towns and in the countryside, culminating in a major uprising in Osaka in 1837.

Transport routes used by the ruling class were increasingly supplemented, both on land and by sea, by routes for the transport of goods around the country. These routes were also used by the common people, and this was a contributory factor in the increasing mobility of the population in the later years of the Tokugawa regime.

The shogunate policy of bringing members of the samurai warrior class into the capital of each domain, and the concentration of daimyō families and retainers in Edo and other towns, stimulated a substantial increase in urbanization, which in turn promoted conspicuous consumption.

The ultimate failure of the ruling class in many areas—particularly those controlled by the shogunate and its closest followers—coincided adequately with the effects of all these pressures fundamentally weakened the system, rendering it vulnerable to political and military opposition from within, and Western threats from without. When, after 1853, Western countries managed to breach Japan’s seclusionist policy, their presence further weakened the integrity of an already shaky system, and contributed to growing internal conflicts. In 1867 these resulted in the downfall of the Tokugawa and the establishment by its enemies of a new regime, nominally headed by the emperor, the following year.
The Ottoman and Safavid states represented twin peaks of Islamic political and cultural achievement, and each handed down a powerful and complex legacy to the modern Islamic world. From the mid-15th century to 1683 the Ottoman Empire was also one of the most successful and militarily effective states of all time. Its sultan, whom Western contemporaries called “The Grand Signior”, was regarded with immense respect throughout Christendom. Ottoman power was based on gunnery, the maintenance of a navy and an effective system of military recruitment and training. Originally, the Ottoman Janissary regiments were maintained by the devshirme – the “gathering” of child slave recruits from the margins of the empire, who eventually were able to leave military service as free Muslims. However, by the 17th century local, Muslim-born recruits were beginning to dominate the army.

The Ottoman state displayed a high level of religious tolerance for the substantial proportion of the empire’s subjects who were not Ottoman Turks or even Muslims. Members of minority communities became senior Ottoman commanders and administrators; indeed, the Orthodox Greek community was probably richer and more numerous than that of the ruling Ottoman Turks.

The Ottoman economy was based on an agricultural society which supported a system of military and religious fiefdoms. A vital adjunct to this peasant world was provided by the empire’s most notable and outward-looking communities – the Greeks, Armenians, Syrians and Sephardi Jews who dominated many of the empire’s cities and towns.

Territorial expansion was intrinsic to Ottoman power (map 1). As late as the 17th century there was no sign that policy-makers in Constantinople believed that Ottoman territorial authority had reached saturation point or achieved natural frontiers. Yet this was, in effect, the case. The Ottoman threat to Italy faded and Vienna – the “Red Apple of the West” in Ottoman military folklore – remained a prize that eluded the sultans. The defeat of the last great Ottoman expedition to Vienna in 1683 marked the beginning of the empire’s long decline.

The Safavid State
The Safavids made their mark by nurturing the culture that defines modern Iran. The founder of the Safavid dynasty was Shah Ismail I (r. 1501–24), who re-established a central government amid the political chaos into which Persia had fallen in the aftermath of the age of Timur-ling. Ismail’s partisans were the Qizilbash – red-capped Turcoman devotees of the Safawi religious brotherhood. The shah welded the Qizilbash into a political force by
linking his and their ambitions to the establishment of “Twelver Shiism” as the religion of the Persian state. In the wider Islamic world, this nostalgic Shi'ite tradition was increasingly a marginal or sectarian faith, regarded by the Sunni majority as heretical. In Safavid Persia, Shi'ism became the defining national creed, providing the Safavids with an ideological focus. Unfortunately, it also exacerbated enmities between Persia and its Sunni Muslim neighbours and rivals, the Ottomans to the west and the Uzbek raiders from Transoxania (map 2).

Safavid shahs – most notably Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) – were deliberate propagandists of Shi'ite culture. They were patrons of representational art, usually in miniature, and undertook a magnificent building programme of religious architecture, palaces and public works. The greatest splendours survive in Abbas I’s capital, Esfahan.

**THE FORGING OF A FRONTIER**

The Ottoman Turks inherited from their Byzantine predecessors a determination to keep the Black Sea dependent on Constantinople, free from control by Central Asian rulers. When Shah Ismail and his Qizilbash forces began to infiltrate eastern Anatolia from Tabriz in the early 16th century, they provoked a massive Ottoman military response. The armies of Sultan Selim the Grim were in the forefront of contemporary military capacity, and the Ottoman artillery gained a dramatic victory over the lightly-armed Persians at Chaldiran in 1514. The Battle of Chaldiran appears to have shifted the centre of gravity of the Persian Empire to the east, but it was not a final encounter. It led to more than 120 years of intermittent Ottoman–Safavid conflict over land occupied by Azeris, Kurds and Mesopotamian Arabs (map 2). (By diverting Ottoman attention from the Balkans, this conflict relieved western Europe of some of the military pressure to which it had been exposed since the Ottoman elimination of the Byzantine Empire in 1453.) The standard pattern in this long conflict was one of an Ottoman offensive countered by Persian “scorched earth” and guerrilla tactics. Shah Abbas I was briefly able to set the Safavid forces on the offensive and reconstitute most of the empire once ruled by his predecessor Ismail, but the eventual settlement, enshrined in the lasting Peace of Zuhab in 1639, favoured the Ottomans. The frontier had no logic in terms of language, ethnicity or culture. It divided rather than defined communities, splitting Sunni from Sunni and Shi’ite from Shi’ite, but it formed the basis for the frontier between the Ottoman and Persian empires and survived as the Iraq–Iran border. The Safavid Empire continued until the invasion of its lands by the Ghilzai Afghans in 1722 heralded the demise of the dynasty in 1736.

**THE WORLD OF MERCHANTS AND CARAVANS**

The Ottoman and Safavid states governed lands that had been in contact with a wider world since antiquity. The empires were crossed by commercial and pilgrimage routes and contained gateways by land and sea which linked the Mediterranean and Levantine worlds to the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia and China (map 3).

Many Ottoman and Safavid traders were also Muslim pilgrims undertaking journeys to Mecca. However, a good proportion of the traders and migrants from the Islamic empires were not Muslims but members of Christian and Jewish minority groups operating in partnership with Europeans, many of whom were based in Constantinople, Smyrna, Aleppo and Alexandria – the empire’s “windows to the West”. Safavid contacts with the Western world were tenuous and bedevilled by the difficulties of the Persian terrain, but during the 16th century European adventurers did make their way to Esfahan and back. At the same time, the powers of western Europe began to establish their own sea routes to the East (pages 118–19), thus threatening to wrest control of Eurasian trade from the Safavids. However, although in 1515 the Portuguese captured Ormuz, a Gulf market for horses and spices, they lost it again to the Safavids in 1622. Thereafter, the old trade in spices and silk – and a new trade in tea – continued to be serviced by caravan routes into the 18th century.
A On the death of Babur in 1530 the Mughal Empire was little more than an area in northern India under military occupation. During the reign of Akbar, between 1556 and 1605, it was much expanded and became a centrally governed state.

V The artisan industries of India—especially those manufacturing cotton textiles—were at first stimulated by the arrival of the Europeans in the 16th century. As a result, India became the workshop of the world known to Europeans.

The Mughal Empire was founded in 1526 by Babur, Sultan of Kabul. Babur was of Turkic origin and traced his ancestry back to Timur-leng (Tamerlane) and to Chinggis Khan, the Mongol Emperor of China. His advance from Kabul was at the expense of Afghan warlords who themselves had spread into the plains of India, conquering the Sultanate of Delhi and establishing the Lodi dynasty. Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi at the Battle of Panipat in 1526 and then, until his death in 1530, progressively extended his sway across the Ganges Valley as far east as the borders of Bengal (map 1).

CONSOLIDATION UNDER AKBAR
Babur’s successor, Humayan (r. 1530–56), faced a resurgence of Afghan power and, between 1540 and 1555, was driven into exile while the empire was ruled by Sher Shah and his sons. In 1555 Humayan retook Delhi to restore the Timurid monarchy, and when he died the following year the succession passed to his son Akbar (r. 1556–1605). Having driven the Mughals’ enemies from Delhi, Akbar used his long reign both to expand the empire and, even more significantly, to consolidate and transform it, converting a rulership founded on warrior nomadism into one based on centralized government.

The state which Akbar constructed had a number of key features. At the top he built a “service” nobility of mansabdars who provided administration across the empire. Many mansabdars were immigrants from elsewhere in the Islamic world, whose loyalty was owed exclusively to the emperor himself. Beneath them, Akbar incorporated the Hindu Rajput chieftains who ruled over lower castes and commoners. These chieftains possessed local power bases which were notionally independent of Mughal authority, but their status and security were enhanced by membership of an imperial aristocracy. To facilitate their incorporation, Akbar—who was fascinated by all religions—also promoted a cultural style which crossed strict religious boundaries. Beneath the mansabdar-Rajput elite, the empire rested on the labour of millions of peasants and artisans from whom large revenues were extracted.

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Akbar’s successors Jahangir (r. 1605-27) and Shah Jahan (r. 1627-58) continued these imperial structures – which made Mughal rulership one of the wonders of the time. Mughal splendour and power were comparable only to those of the Ottoman and Chinese empires (pages 138-39 and 142-43). They were based on the mobilization of great wealth through a system of cash-taxation, which itself was made possible by the high productivity and commercial development of the economy. India’s fertile river valleys yielded substantial agricultural surpluses, which in turn supported extensive artisan industries (map 2). From at least the 10th century these industries had been drawn into trading networks stretching from Arabia to Indonesia. At the end of the 15th century Asian trade had also begun to attract European interest (pages 118-19). First the Portuguese, then the Dutch, French and English, reached India by sea and developed trading links (map 3). They brought with them huge quantities of gold and silver taken from the Americas, further stimulating the Indian economy. However, the European presence also spelled danger – although its character did not become fully apparent until the 18th century. At that point, and most notably after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), Mughal power went into precipitate decline (map 4). The empire was unable to respond to invasions from abroad or to rebellions at home. Even the mansabdari elite turned against it, as governors (or naudas) declared themselves independent and sought to establish their own kingdoms. Although the emperorship retained a symbolic significance throughout the rest of the century (and was not formally abolished until 1857), the real substance of Mughal power was weakening even by 1730. Yet there may have been other causes of Mughal decline, which point to the growing influence of a wider world. Rapid commercial expansion in the 17th century, when an ever-growing number of trading posts was established, both altered the political geography of India and changed the social balance between military and economic power. Commerce was based on overseas trade and most enriched the maritime provinces. It also strengthened the position of mercantile groups and the gentry classes. The Mughal Empire, founded by warrior descendants of the “Mongol Horde” and centred on cities in India’s heartland, was singularly ill-equipped to manage such developments.

Aurangzeb attempted to establish Mughal power in southern India. However, in doing so he came up against foes – in particular, the Marathas – whom he could do little to contain. The Marathas introduced new forms of warfare, based on guerrilla tactics, which defied Mughal armed might. Also, as chieftains risen from the peasantry – rather than imposed on top of it – Maratha leaders spawned the kinds of insurrections which had made the Rajputs susceptible to imperial influence. From the 1680s Maratha armies broke through the Mughal cordon meant to contain them, and ravaged far and wide. The Europeans, who had established trading posts around the coast, were mere observers of events at this time.
Maps of 16th-century Europe are often deceptive in that they appear to suggest that the western countries - France, Spain and England - and the eastern countries - Poland and Russia - were consolidated and centralized, while sandwiched between them many tiny entities were grouped together to form the Holy Roman Empire (map 1). In fact, all the European states were highly decentralized and regionalized in 1500. France (map 2) actually saw an increase in devolution during the 16th century as many provinces escaped central control in the French Wars of Religion (1562–98).

Spain consisted largely of a union of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, with Castile itself made up of a number of component kingdoms. In 1512 Ferdinand of Aragon added to this by annexing the kingdom of Navarre, though not the portion of it north of the Pyrenees. Stability in Spain rested on the willingness of the government (centred at Madrid from the 1560s) not to touch the immunities and privileges of these kingdoms, another of which was added to the Spanish Habsburg realm in 1580 when King Philip II of Spain also became King of Portugal.

Poland was divided up into counties and governorships dominated by the nobility, and was formally made up of two realms, the kingdom of Poland and the vast Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Agreements reached between 1569 and 1572 turned the kingdom into an elective monarchy in which the power of the king was limited by a diet made up of senators and delegates.

The Russian Empire came into being as a multi-ethnic empire only after the coronation of Ivan IV in 1547. It was created through the conquest of the Tatar khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in the 1550s and expansion across the Urals into Siberia from the 1580s (pages 148–49). Though often ruled brutally, it hardly consisted of a centralized realm and, indeed, for a decade of Ivan’s reign (1564–74) it was deliberately divided by the tsar into a personal domain, in which his word was law, and the rest of the country, in which the boyars (nobles) ruled.

The Holy Roman Empire

By the 16th century the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire was, in reality, confined to the territory north of the Alps. The Italian section continued formally as part of the Empire, with its rulers nominally invested as Imperial Vassals, but as time went on this had less and less meaning. The Swiss Confederation gained exemption from imperial duties in 1499 and was formally released from imperial jurisdiction in 1648. In 1500 and 1512 the rest of the Empire was organized in Imperial Circles for purposes of raising taxes and administering justice. The Netherlands was formed as the Burgundian Circle, the northern provinces of which were formally recognized as independent of the Empire in 1648.

As a result of the Lutheran Reformation (pages 154–55), many of the ecclesiastical territories were secularized after 1520. The basic constitution of the Empire (the Golden
France was composed of provinces, some of which were under centralized control (pays d'élection) while others raised local taxes through regional assemblies (pays d'états). Law differed widely between regions, the main distinction being between the Roman-based law of the south and the customary law of the north.

Bull of 1356, which defined the princes who had the right to elect the Emperor, was modified by the Treaty of Augsburg of 1555 to accommodate these changes, granting princes and cities the right to be Lutheran and recognizing the secularization of church property up to 1552.

EUROPEAN DYNASTIES

Most European states were to some extent dynastic—they were regarded as a family inheritance. The collection of lands under the rule of the King of Spain in the second half of the century (Portugal, Castile, Navarre, Catalonia, Naples and Sicily) was the product of dynastic inheritance under the Habsburg Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor from 1519 to 1558 (pages 152–53). In the British Isles, King Henry VIII of England claimed the throne of Ireland in 1541, and in 1603 King James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne, thus uniting all three kingdoms under one monarch.

In central Europe at the beginning of the 16th century, one branch of the Jagiellon dynasty of Poland ruled over Poland–Lithuania while another ruled over Bohemia and Hungary. Hungary, one of the largest kingdoms of the late Middle Ages, was a union of Hungary itself (with power devolved to powerful regional magnates), Croatia and parts of Bosnia. After King Lajos II of Hungary was overwhelmed by the Ottomans at the Battle of Mohacs in 1526 (pages 142–43), much of his inheritance passed to the Habsburgs through his sister's marriage to Ferdinand I, the brother of Emperor Charles V. From the 1540s the borderland between this eastern Habsburg territory and the Ottoman Empire was marked by a number of territories: Hungarian Transylvania (Erdely), Moldavia and Wallachia were ruled by local princes as tributaries of the sultan, whose direct rule extended to Buda and the central region of Hungary. In the north the Union of Kalmar of 1397, which had brought together Denmark, Norway and Sweden–Finland under the same monarchy, was broken in 1523 with the secession of Sweden–Finland under Gustav I Vasa (pages 150–51).

DYNASTIC WARS

The ruling dynasties of Europe were all closely related to each other, though this did not prevent the fighting of wars. Often described as “Wars of Magnificence”, these were pursued for glory and the vindication of dynastic title, and were considered more admirable than “common wars” fought for the annexation of territory or other forms of gain. An example of this occurred in Italy (map 3) where the House of France and the Spanish House of Aragon—whose rights were inherited by the Habsburg Charles V—both laid claim to Naples in the south and to Lombardy and the duchy of Milan in the north. In the latter, the richest part of Italy, the struggle was more than one of inheritance. Francis I of France gained control of Milan in 1500, but it in 1512 and reconquered it in 1515, but Charles V had to oppose this if his power in Italy were not to crumble. War began in 1521 (the French evacuated Milan in 1522), and lasted intermittently in the peninsula until the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. Signed by representatives of Henry II of France and Philip II of Spain, this treaty had the effect of liquidating French ambitions in Italy while maintaining French acquisitions in Lorraine—Metz, Toul and Verdun (map 2). This established a new international order which was to survive with modifications until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
The expansion of Russian rule into Europe and Asia was a process of exploration and discovery comparable with the contemporaneous exploration of the oceanic world by western European peoples. It was, however, also the creation of a highly autocratic land empire. In the mid-15th century the Russian state of Muscovy was just one of many small principalities in northern Europe which paid tribute to the Tatars; by the end of the 18th century it was at the heart of an empire that stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait.

The process of expansion began after Muscovy had freed itself from Tatar domination in the 1450s. Grand Duke Ivan III (r. 1462–1505) and later his son, Vasili III (r. 1505–33) set about extending his territory by annexing neighbouring regions (map 1). Ivan IV became the next grand duke in 1533 at the age of three, and during his minority the boyars (nobles) vied with each other for control of the state. No further territorial expansion took place until after he was formally crowned as the first “tsar” (emperor) in 1547. However, in 1552 a successful campaign was launched against the Tatar stronghold of Kazan, and this was followed by the seizure of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea in 1556. Russian territory now extended the entire length of the Volga, bisecting Tatar domains and dominating the peoples of the northern Caucasus and eastern Caspian.

**Expansion into Asia**

In the east the foundation in 1560 of a fortified post at Perm on the River Kama brought the Muscovites to within easy reach of the Urals, where trading in furs promised to be a great source of wealth. From 1578 the Stroganovs, a family of merchants who had been granted a vast tract of unexplored land by the tsar, took the lead in exploration and settlement beyond the Urals. Their allies in this process were the Cossacks, descendants of peasants who had fled from worsening economic conditions in Russia to become fighting guards of the frontier. The Khanate of Sibir was conquered in 1581, and the colonists founded ostrogs – fortified trading posts – along the Irysh and Ob rivers, controlling the lower reaches of both by 1592 (map 2).

Expansion continued to be rapid in the 17th century. The Lena River was reached in 1632, the Indigirka in 1639 and the Kolyma in 1644. The explorer Dzhenevich reached the Bering Strait in 1648 and Khabarov got to the Amur River in 1649. The Khamchatska Peninsula was entered by Russian explorers in 1679. These territorial advances took place largely at the expense of the indigenous, often nomadic, peoples who were powerless in the face of Russian imperialism. Any resistance was effectively suppressed by punitive expeditions from the ostrogs.

**Russian ambitions in the west**

In the west, Russian ambitions were more circumscribed. In 1558, in an attempt to take land around the Baltic, Ivan IV became embroiled in a devastating war of 25 years which ruined both Livonia and Estonia and left the Russian armies prostrate. By the end of his reign all Ivan's western conquests
had been lost. His death in 1584 unleashed a generation of instability culminating in the "Time of Troubles", a period of political and social upheaval and foreign occupation that was not settled until a national revolt led to the installation of a new dynasty, the Romanovs, in 1613.

At this time Russia's main western enemy was Poland, which took advantage of Russia's internal problems to take back Smolensk and Chernigov in 1618. Another threat was the growing power of Sweden (pages 150-51), which acquired Ingria and Carelia from Russia in 1617. Russia, however, was able to take advantage of the Swedish invasion of Poland in the 1650s to conclude a treaty with the Ukrainian Cossacks and detach them from Poland. Between 1667 and 1689 Russia also regained Smolensk and Chernigov from Poland.

**PETER THE GREAT**

By the beginning of Peter the Great's reign (1689-1725), Russia had tripled its territory in a century. In Siberia, consolidation was now the order of the day, but in the west, Russia faced the military power of Sweden under Charles XII. As a consequence, the Great Northern War broke out in 1700. Sweden was defeated by Russia in the Battle of Pritawa in 1709 (pages 150-51), and the outcome, formalized in 1721, was the acquisition from Sweden of Estonia and Livonia, and the return to Russia of Ingria and Carelia.

The coastal fortresses of Vyborg, Reval and Riga had fallen into Russian hands, and Peter had been able to found the new Baltic port of St Petersburg in 1703 (map 3).

Acquiring a port on the Baltic was one element of Peter's ambitious plans to overhaul the state and "Europeanize" Russia. So, too, was the construction of a navy and the acquisition of a port on the Black Sea. He achieved the latter when he captured Azov in 1696, but he lost it again in 1711 during the Great Northern War. It was not regained until the reign of Anna in 1739. Thereafter, the conquest of the land surrounding the Sea of Azov (Kuban, Crimea and Taurida) had to wait until the 1780s, during the reign of Catherine II (1762-96).

**WESTERNIZATION AND THE ECONOMY**

In order to compete with other western powers, Russia needed to industrialize. A few ironworks had been set up by foreigners in the 1630s in the Tula and Moscow regions, but Russia remained an overwhelmingly peasant society and lagged far behind western Europe. Peter the Great operated an essentially mercantilist policy, patronizing certain commercial interests in order to encourage export trade. As a result there was rapid growth of both mining and the arms industry (map 3), but this "forced industrialization", impressive as it seemed at the time, had little impact on the living standards of the peasants.

> During the reign of Peter the Great the number of industrial plants increased from about 20 to around 200. Many of these produced armaments, while others were mining and metallurgical plants in the Urals. However, conditions for the vast majority of Russian people—represented by both landlords and the state—continued to deteriorate, leading to massive peasant rebellions which periodically convulsed Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries.
At the beginning of the 16th century the Baltic region was still dominated by power blocks which had been in place for over a hundred years. In Scandinavia the Union of Kalmar, dating from 1397, joined together Denmark, Norway and Sweden-Finland in a loosely governed monarchy centred at Copenhagen. All round the southern Baltic the alliance of free Hanseatic cities, such as Danzig and Lübeck, controlled trade. In the east, the Order of the Teutonic Knights still ruled over a region that included East Prussia, Estonia, Livonia and Courland (map 1). The largest country was Poland-Lithuania, created in 1386 when the ruler of the vast Grand Duchy of Lithuania came to the Polish throne.

Economically, it was already in the process of becoming a major supplier of raw materials to the increasingly urban capitalist society of north-western Europe. Poland was becoming a major supplier of grain, while furs and hemp from Novgorod and Muscovy, and timber and ores from Sweden, were already major elements in European trade and production. Consequently control of the ports, tolls and waterways to western Europe was an increasingly important factor in the politics of the Baltic region.

A NEW ORDER IN THE BALTIC

In 1521 a Swedish nobleman, Gustav Vasa, led a successful revolution in Stockholm against the Danish king, thus ending the Kalmar Union. Gustav Vasa became king in 1523, beginning a new period of Swedish independence and nationhood. The civil wars which followed in Denmark and Sweden re-established the power of the aristocracy and limited that of the monarchy.

In the 1520s the Reformation (pages 154–55) hastened the disintegration of the lands of the Teutonic Order, while in Estonia, Livonia and Courland the Order became fragmented, leading eventually to civil war in 1556–57. The Livonian lands now became a prime object of competition between Poland, Muscovy (Russia), Sweden and Denmark. During the resulting war, the emergence of Sweden as a real power in the Baltic region was confirmed when the Hanseatic port of Reval placed itself under Swedish protection in 1560 (map 1). Thereafter, the maintenance of this foothold in Estonia became a major determinant of Swedish policy – though Denmark, the most powerful state in the region, opposed Swedish pretensions. In 1582 a treaty between Poland and Russia left most of Livonia in Polish hands, and in 1595 Sweden made good its hold on Estonia by signing the Treaty of Tesnino with Russia.

At the beginning of the 17th century Denmark was still the leading Baltic power, with control of the Sound – the only deep-water access to the Baltic. As a result of a war with Sweden in 1611–13, it succeeded in expelling the Swedes from their only port on the North Sea (Ålborg) and gaining trading access to Livonia. However, military intervention in northern Germany in 1625–29 was a disastrous failure and a severe blow to Danish power.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SWEDEN

From 1603 Poland and Sweden fought for control of the great Baltic trading centres such as Riga, Dorpat and Reval. King Gustav II Adolf (r.1611–32) of Sweden succeeded in capturing Riga in 1621 and the whole of Livonia by 1625, and the following year he occupied most of the ports along the Prussian coast. The war was only ended by the Truce of Altmark in 1629, allowing Sweden to continue to milk the revenues of the Prussian ports.

By 1630 Sweden was a force to be reckoned with in European politics. Having modernized his armies, King Gustav II Adolf went to war in Germany to counter the threat to Sweden’s security posed by the Habsburgs (pages 152–53). With his epic march through Germany in 1630–32, Sweden temporarily became the military arbiter of Europe and, despite setbacks in 1634–36, emerged in 1648 as one of the victors of the Thirty Years War (map 2). Sweden’s growing ascendency over Denmark was recognized in 1645 by the Treaty of Brömsebro, which gave
Sweden. Jamtland and Härjedalen as well as a 20-year lease on Halland and freedom of passage through the Sound. Denmark also conceded Bremen and Verden, confirmed in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which also transferred western Pomerania to Sweden. These treaties, however, did not entirely settle the issue of predominance. Sweden still needed to assure its control of the Prussian ports, and in 1655 King Charles X mounted an invasion of Poland that led to its virtual collapse. He then moved against the Danes and in 1658 forced them to abandon their provinces on the Swedish mainland – Bohuslän, Halland, Skåne and Blekinge – as well as Trondheim in Norway (returned in 1660).

The year 1660 marks in some ways the summit of Swedish imperial power based on a military system, both at land and sea, that made Sweden the envy of Europe. There were, however, a number of factors that threatened to weaken Sweden. The population was only a little over a million, and the constitution was liable to sudden fluctuations between limited and absolute monarchy. The possessions in northern Germany were extremely vulnerable and often lost during wars, only to be retained by diplomatic manoeuvres.

The culmination of this was the Great Northern War of 1700–21 and the Battle of Pòltava in 1709 between Charles XII and Peter I of Russia. The Treaty of Nystadt in 1721 marked the end of Sweden’s hegemony over the Baltic, with the loss of Livonia and Estonia to Russia as well as part of western Pomerania to Prussia.

The disintegration of Poland

To the south, Swedish military adventurism was a key factor, along with Russian ambitions (pages 148–49), in the disintegration of the Polish state (map 4). Poland never recovered from the Swedish occupation of 1655–58, and in 1667 it lost the eastern Ukraine and Smolensk to Russia. Thereafter, Poland became increasingly a plaything of surrounding powers. It was a major theatre of the Great Northern War of 1700–21, and by 1717 Peter the Great of Russia had turned it into a Russian protectorate. When a faction of the Polish nobility began to challenge this from the 1760s, the protectorate ceased to serve a useful purpose and Poland was divided up between Russia, Prussia and Austria in a series of partitions from 1772 to 1795 (map 5).

A Swedish military power was based on a national standing army established after 1544 by Gustav I. This was supplemented by mercenaries when a larger force was needed for foreign conquest. In the early 17th century the army was further reformed by Gustav II Adolf, paving the way for Swedish success in the Thirty Years War (1618–48) and beyond.

After a brief period as a Russian protectorate, Poland was carved up in the course of three partitions in 1773, 1793 and 1795 between Russia, Austria and Prussia.
THE HABSBURG EMPIRE
1490–1700

In 1490 the Habsburg dynasty was just one of a number of ancient dynasties — among them the Valois of France, the Trastamaras of Castile and Aragon and the Jagiellons of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary — that were in the process of creating major princely states. Remarkably, by the 1520s the Habsburgs had accumulated under Emperor Charles V the largest conglomeration of territories and rights since the age of Charlemagne in the 9th century (map 1). The military and diplomatic system needed to rule and defend them in the emperor’s name was formidable by the standards of the age. Yet in some ways it is a misnomer to talk about a Habsburg “empire” at this time, for Charles ruled his many territories largely through rights of inheritance and they all maintained their separate constitutions.

The extent of Habsburg territories

Charles was the grandson of Maximilian I of the House of Habsburg, which had ruled over domains centred on Austria since the 13th century. Holy Roman Emperor from 1493 to 1519, Maximilian gained control, through marriage, of what was left of the territories of the extremely wealthy Valois dukes of Burgundy. In 1506 Charles inherited these territories from his father, Philip the Handsome, and in the course of his reign he made a number of additions (map 2). In 1516 he inherited through his mother, Juana, daughter of Isabella of Castile (d.1504) and Ferdinand of Aragon, Spanish territories that included Majorca, Sicily and Naples. Milan was added to his territories in Italy through conquest in 1522. An alliance was formed with the Genoese Republic in 1528; the defeat of French expeditions to Milan and Naples (1528–29) and the overthrow of the French-backed Florentine Republic in 1530 sealed Habsburg predominance in Italy. Thereafter, French challenges — the occupation of Piedmont in 1536–59 and invasions in 1544 and 1556–57 — proved transitory.

In 1519 Charles was elected Holy Roman Emperor, a role which brought formal prestige as the first prince of Christendom but little more. The King of France, in any case, regarded himself as the equivalent of the emperor in his own kingdom and recognized no superior. Charles ruled more directly as Archduke of the Netherlands and of Austria. Control of the eastern Habsburg lands centred on Vienna was devolved to his brother Ferdinand, who was elected heir to the imperial throne in 1531. Charles’s hopes of maintaining his prerogatives as emperor were undermined by the determination of several German princes to defy him over the ban placed on Martin Luther, who had provoked the first serious challenge to the Catholic Church at the Imperial Diet at Worms in 1521 (pages 154–55).

In both the Mediterranean and central Europe Charles directly confronted the power of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had occupied Rhodes in 1522 and went on to defeat the Hungarian army in 1526. The Austrian territories
were therefore in the front line, and Vienna withstood a major siege in 1529 and a threat of one in 1532. The Ottoman threat was only held at bay by the combined dynastic and imperial power of the Habsburgs. In the western Mediterranean Charles sought, through the conquest of Tunis in 1535 and the disastrous expedition against Algiers in 1541, to build on the foot-holds already acquired in coastal North Africa.

**Division of the empire**

As Charles's deputy in Germany, Ferdinand I had consolidated the Habsburg family's position as central European dynasts. When King Louis II of Hungary was killed at Mohacs in 1526 (pages 142-3), Ferdinand was elected to the Bohemian and Hungarian thrones by the magnates, who saw him as the best guarantor of their safety against the Ottoman Turks. However, Ferdinand was opposed by one Hungarian magnate – Jan Zapolya of Transylvania, who was backed by the Turks – and all that he could salvage of Hungary were the territories of “Royal Hungary” (the west of modern Hungary and modern Slovakia). By the late 16th century these territories were elective monarchies, with large and powerful Protestant nobilities, whose independence Ferdinand II (King of Bohemia from 1617 and of Hungary from 1618, and Holy Roman Emperor 1619–37) became determined to crush, while at the same time reversing the decline in imperial power within Germany.

As a result of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) the Habsburg territories in central Europe were welded into a much more coherent dynastic empire, though the opposition of the princes of the empire had undermined ambitions in Germany by 1635. With the weakening of the Ottoman Turks in the 17th century, the dynasty was able to begin the piecemeal reconquest of Hungary (map 3). Largely complete by the end of the century, this established the Habsburgs as the major dynastic power of central Europe.

**The Spanish Empire**

In the west the Spanish branch of the dynasty descended from Philip II (r. 1556–98) continued the trend which was clear from the middle of Charles V’s reign, the development of a Spanish empire that was dependent on the wealth arising from the Castilian conquest of the New World and on the deployment of military power and diplomatic alliances in Europe. Power was transmitted along a series of military routes leading from Spain to the Low Countries known collectively as the “Spanish Road” (map 1), and was challenged in the late 16th century by rebels in the Low Countries and by England. Ultimately, Spain proved resilient in the face of massive setbacks such as the rebellions in Portugal and Catalonia in 1640 and the defeats in the Low Countries by France at Lens in 1643 and Rocroi in 1648 (pages 158–59). Nevertheless, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 forced the recognition of the independence of the United Provinces, and the Peace of the Pyrenees with France in 1659 registered a serious shift in the balance of power towards France. For the rest of the 17th century, Spain and its dependencies were constantly on the defensive. They were certainly not in a position to aid the Austrian Habsburgs, who had to contend with the last great advance of the Ottomans (map 3). This reached its most western limit in 1683 but would continue to pose a threat well into the following century.

**Europe 1350–1500**

- Pages 106–7

**The Habsburg Empire: Expansion and Decline 1700–1918**

- Pages 174–75
Protestantism took a number of forms across Europe. In Germany and Scandinavia local secular rulers promoted the establishment of new churches, mostly along Lutheran lines. In the Netherlands, Calvinism became politically predominant during the latter 16th century, while in England the Anglican Church under Elizabeth I was Calvinist with an episcopal government. Further east, Calvinism was adopted in Transylvania (in Hungary) — and in Poland so many nobles became Protestant that special provisions for their toleration had to be agreed in 1569-71.

The Reformation is commonly associated with an outraged response to the corruption of the Church in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. In fact, the corruption of the Church had come under attack before. What was new at this time was the emergence of a powerful force of religious revivalism which swept across Europe and sought an increased role for the laity in religious life.

The Impact of Lutheranism
The Protestant Reformation is traditionally dated from 31 October 1517 when Martin Luther's Ninety-Five Theses against indulgences (documents sold by the Church which were widely thought to remit the punishments of purgatory) were posted on the door of the castle church at Wittenburg in Saxony. Luther's Theses provoked a hostile reaction from the upper hierarchy of the Church. Moreover, the circulation of printed copies of the Theses and other writings meant that they received the attention of a wider public than might otherwise have been the case. His attack on financial abuses within the Church, and his emphasis on the spiritual nature of Christianity and the teachings of the gospel, found support among a broad range of the laity.

Before 1517 reform of the Church had been seen as a legitimate objective; now Luther's call for "reformation" was regarded as a fundamental threat to both the Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Luther was excommunicated in 1521 after denying the primacy of the Pope, and later that year he was placed under an imperial ban.
A number of German princes broke with Rome and adopted Lutheranism, gaining stronger political control over the Church in their own territories as a result. This was met with fierce opposition from Charles V at the Augsburg Reichstag in 1530, and in response a League of Protestant estates – including Hesse, Saxony, Wurttemberg, the Palatinate and several imperial cities – was formed at Schmalkalden, thus splitting the Empire into two warring camps. It was not until 1555 that Charles V was finally forced to concede the Peace of Augsburg, granting full rights to the secular estates of the Empire to adopt Lutheran reform.

**Radical Reformation**

The reform movement spread rapidly (map 1) but for many it was the ideas of local reformers that mattered most. By the end of the 1520s a split between the Lutheran Reformation and the radical (or Reformed) churches was clear. Thomas Müntzer encouraged a more radical view that was to culminate in the “Kingdom of Zion” of the Anabaptists at Mühlstedt, which radical Zwingli had a reformation which differed from Lutheranism over, among other things, the sacrament of Communion.

Protestantism in Switzerland received a blow with the death of Zwingli in battle in 1531, but it was ultimately revived by Calvin, a humanist and lawyer born in northern France. Calvin, who controlled the Genevan church by 1541 (map 2), gave the French-speaking world a coherent and incisive doctrine as well as an effective organization. He proved to be the most significant influence on the emergence of the Reform movement in France from the 1540s onwards, when he sent out a network of preachers to the main French cities. By 1557 an underground church was in existence and in 1559 it declared itself openly.

**The Counter Reformation**

In Spain and Italy, where Spanish power posed a significant block to Protestantism, the internal reform of the Catholic Church was pushed forward by the foundation of many new religious orders devoted to charitable and evangelical work in the lay world, as well as by the militant Society of Jesus (Jesuits) founded by Ignatius Loyola in 1534. Within the Catholic Church as a whole, the establishment of the means to resist Protestantism was a priority. The three sessions of the General Council of Trent held between 1545 and 1563 restated theological doctrine in a way which precluded reunion with Protestants, and a series of decrees aimed at reforming the clergy and church organization was issued. Although the pronouncements of the Council of Trent were not immediately translated into action, the Council signalled that the Catholic Church was to become an evangelical movement, seeking to win converts both among heretics in Europe and the “pagans” of the overseas world. Crucial in this process was the growing identification between the Catholic Church and absolute monarchs, who had the power, through patronage, to win back disaffected nobles to the Roman Catholic faith.

In France, although the Jesuits were at first not allowed to preach, the result of the course of the French Wars of Religion (1562–98) which rendered life precarious for Protestants north of the Loire, especially after the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in August 1572, was largely a result of the course of the French Wars of Religion (1562–98) which rendered life precarious for Protestants north of the Loire, especially after the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in August 1572.
REVOLUTION AND STABILITY IN EUROPE 1600–1785

In the 17th century the major states of Europe were embroiled in the long conflict in central Europe known as the Thirty Years War (pages 158–59), which combined dynastic and strategic conflict with religious struggles, the latter breaking out both within and between states. The growth of armies and of military technology in this period (pages 158–59) could only be achieved through an increase in taxation that was so large as to challenge the basis on which states had been governed since the late 15th century.

Rebellion and civil war
When Spain intervened in Germany on behalf of the Austrian Habsburg emperor in 1619, and then renewed its conflict with the Dutch in 1621, it became committed to massive military expenditure which devastated its finances. In Castile, which had undergone a loss of population since the 1590s, the monarchy found the burden increasingly difficult to bear. Unable to solve the problem by concluding a peace, the government restructured the tax system so that the hitherto privileged regions of Portugal, Aragon, Catalonia and Naples bore a greater share of the tax burden. This caused a national uprising in Portugal in 1640, followed by rebellions in Catalonia (1640–53) and in Naples (1647–8) (map 1). All this nearly brought down the Spanish state.

In France – governed by Cardinal Richelieu from 1624 – the steadily increasing tax burden was accompanied by an increase in royal tax officials at the expense of the local machinery of voting taxes through representative assemblies. In addition to the massive increases in direct taxes from 1635 (when France formally entered the war against Spain and the Habsburgs) and the spread of a whole range of indirect revenues such as those on salt (the gabelle), the direct costs of billeting and supplying the army were borne by the civil population with increasing reluctance. From around 1630 numerous local revolts broke out, often supported by regional notables resentful at the infringements of their privileges by the Crown. In 1636–37 the Crown faced a large-scale rebellion in the southwest which brought together under the name of Croquants many peasant communities outraged by tax increases. In lower Normandy in 1639 the Nu-Pieds rebelled against the extension of the full salt tax regime to that area.

Cardinal Mazarin succeeded Richelieu as Chief Minister in 1643 and continued the same policies of high taxes and prolonged war against Spain, even after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. By then the Crown faced not only a discontented peasantry but also opposition from within the royal bureaucracy over the suspension of salaries, and a nobility unhappy with the exercise of power by the Chief Minister. The result was a confused period of civil war known as the Fronde, which paralysed French policy until 1653.

Crisis across Europe
In Britain the attempts of Charles I to impose his religious policies on the Scots exposed the weakness at the core of the Stuart monarchy. Charles attempted to govern and raise revenues without Parliament throughout the 1630s, but he was confronted by a tax-payers’ revolt and by the fact that he could not raise an army without some form of parliamentary grant. The summoning of Parliament in 1640 triggered a sequence of events that imposed shackles on the king’s powers and then provoked him to try a military solution. The resulting civil war (1642–48) led to the king’s execution and the proclamation of a republic in 1649. Opposition in Ireland and Scotland was crushed in 1649–50 by the New Model Army under Oliver Cromwell. In 1653 the republic was replaced by a military dictatorship, with Cromwell as “Lord Protector”.

During the same period, in the United Provinces of the Netherlands (formed in 1579 after the Protestant Prince William I of Orange led a revolt against Spanish Catholic rule), an attempt to impose quasi-royal rule under William II of Orange collapsed and the Orangist Party was purged from positions of power by the oligarchic States Party. There were also struggles for power in Sweden, and in the 1620s and 1630s large-scale peasant revolts broke out in the Alpine territories of the Austrian Habsburgs. Further east, Cossack rebellions flared up in the Polish Commonwealth in the 1640s and 1650s and in Russia in the 1670s.

Not surprisingly, some contemporaries saw a pattern in all this. The English preacher Jeremiah Whittaker declared in 1643 that “there are days of shaking and this shaking is universal”. Some modern historians have discerned a systematic “general crisis” in which the political upheavals of the mid-17th century were a symptom of profound economic transformation. In contrast, the trend throughout Europe after 1660 was towards political stability.

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1 Wars and revolts in Europe 1618–1680

Areas affected by:

- War
- Population revolt
- Political revolt
- Centralized population revolt
- Centralized political revolt
Peasant revolts continued in France until the 1670s. However, despite the continuation of severe economic problems and the massive growth of armed forces to enable the annexation of territory (map 2), these revolts did not seriously threaten the state. After Mazarin’s death in 1661 Louis XIV assumed personal rule, which deflected the discontent of the nobility and assuaged the conflicts between government, officialdom and the courts. Thereafter he ruled as absolute monarch with the aid of a centralized bureaucratic government—a pattern which was to continue until 1789. Without any significant opposition, Louis was able to impose religious uniformity in 1685.

The doctrine of “absolute power”, though not new, became the keynote for many rulers eager to imitate the splendours of Louis’ court at Versailles. In east-central Europe the Hohenzollerns—rulers of Brandenburg and Prussia—gradually increased their power after the Elector Frederick William I came to an agreement with the nobility, under which his military powers were extended in return for the reinforcement of their controls over their tenantry. By the middle of the 18th century the power of the Prussian state (map 3) equalled that of the Habsburgs in Vienna, who were themselves building an empire in the Danubian region (pages 152–53).

**CONCERT OF EUROPE**

Elsewhere in Europe the defeat of the monarchy led to the emergence of oligarchic parliamentary systems—Britain from 1689, the United Provinces from 1702, Sweden from 1721. In Spain, the regime of the Bourbon dynasty, confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, imposed a centralized government on the French model. Thus, although major wars continued to be endemic and commercial rivalry both in Europe and overseas was fierce, governments were far more securely anchored than in the earlier 17th century. Religious uniformity, while still formally insisted on, was in practice no longer so vital. A Europe in which one or other dynastic state (Spain in the 16th century, France in the 17th century) threatened to dominate the rest had been replaced by a “concert of Europe” of roughly balanced powers that was to last until the revolutionary period in the 1790s.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WARFARE IN EUROPE
1450–1750

THE RISING COST OF WAGING WAR IN THE 16TH CENTURY

Between the 15th and 18th centuries European warfare was massively transformed in scale and complexity. It has been argued that the transformation amounted to a "military revolution" led by the Swedes and the Dutch in the decades around 1600. However, this view underestimates the role of France and Spain, and the process of military change is now seen as one that was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

ARMIES AND THE STATE

The driving force behind military change was the development of a highly competitive state structure, both regionally (as in 15th-century Italy) and across Europe. Countries which had not invested in major military reorganization by the 17th century - such as Poland - were seriously disadvantaged, but in those countries where military expenditure was high the impact was felt at all levels of society. Governments needed to be able to mobilize resources for war on a large scale, and this led to many western European states becoming "machines built for the battlefield", their essential purpose being to raise, provision and deploy armies in the pursuit of their ruler's strategic objectives. In going to war, European rulers in the 16th and 17th centuries were primarily concerned with safeguarding the interests of their dynasties, as in the case of the Italian and Habsburg-Valois Wars in the 1520s to 1550s (pages 146-47, 152-53), although at times religious and commercial concerns also played a role. In addition there were several civil wars involving a degree of ideological or religious dispute, such as the English Civil War (1642–48).

ARTILLERY AND SIEGE WARFARE

Changes in warfare were made possible by a number of crucial technical innovations. First, the growing sophistication of artillery in the 15th century altered the terms of war in favour of attack. In mid-15th-century France, more effective, smaller-calibre bronze cannons replaced the existing, unreliable wrought-iron version. One of the most widely noted features of Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494 was his deployment of the formidable French royal artillery. Bronze, however, was expensive, and the next important development was the manufacture of reliable cast-iron guns in England during the 1540s. Cast-iron guns were three or four times cheaper than their bronze equivalents, and the traditional cannon foundries of Europe were unable to compete until the next century.

The earliest cannons were huge and unwieldy, best suited for sieges. The major powers - Italy, France and Spain - therefore embarked on highly expensive programmes of refortification to render fortresses and cities impregnable to artillery bombardment. By the late 16th century, high and relatively thin walls and towers had given way to earthen constructions consisting of ditches and ramparts which were to dominate the landscape of many...
use of firearms, most notably among the German reiters. Commanders now sought to organize infantry and cavalry more effectively. However, it was still difficult to manoeuvre large groups of men on the battlefield, especially since the main battles consisted of vast squares of infantrymen. The necessity of increasing the rate of fire of handguns led to the development by the Dutch armies in the 1590s of “volley fire”, in which the infantry was laid out in long lines, firing rank after rank. The development of the “countermarch” – a combination of volley fire, advancing ranks and cavalry charging with their swords drawn – gave the Swedish king Gustav Adolf’s armies the crucial edge in the 1630s, for example in the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 (map 2).

All these changes meant that battles took place over larger areas and involved greater numbers of soldiers. In 1525, at Pavia, the French king’s army of 28,000 men was defeated by a Habsburg army of 20,000; at Breitenfeld Gustav Adolf had 41,000 against 31,000 Habsburg troops; in 1709, at Malplaquet, a French army of 76,000 faced an Allied army of 105,000. While the maximum number sustainable for a whole campaign in the mid-16th century seems to have been about 50,000, by 1700 the number was around 200,000 and by 1710 France, for example, could sustain a total military establishment of 310,000 men. 

European cities until they were dismantled in the 19th century. This rendered warfare much more static, with campaigns centring on great siege operations; some of the major battles of the period – Pavia (1525), St-Quentin (1557), Nördlingen (1634), Rocroi (1643) and Vienna (1683) – were linked to such sieges (map 1). As a consequence of these developments in siege warfare, wars of rapid movement of the kind embarked upon by the English in 14th-century France became unthinkable.

**Changes on the Battlefield**

Artillery had its place on the battlefield, but because of difficulties in using it tactically, it was slow to gain dominance. A further agent for change was the application of a diversity of armaments, formations and tactics: heavily armed cavalry gradually gave way to massed ranks of pikemen and, from the early 16th century onwards, archers began to be replaced by infantry armed with handguns. At Ravenna (1512), Marignano (1515) and Bicocca (1522), field artillery and handguns inflicted severe casualties on pike squares. To combat this, large mixed infantry formations were used, armed partly with pikes and partly with muskets.

Despite these developments, the heavy cavalry did not disappear; in fact cavalry in general was overhauled to make use of firearms, most notably among the German reiters. Commanders now sought to organize infantry and cavalry more effectively. However, it was still difficult to manoeuvre large groups of men on the battlefield, especially since the main battles consisted of vast squares of infantrymen. The necessity of increasing the rate of fire of handguns led to the development by the Dutch armies in the 1590s of “volley fire”, in which the infantry was laid out in long lines, firing rank after rank. The development of the “countermarch” – a combination of volley fire, advancing ranks and cavalry charging with their swords drawn – gave the Swedish king Gustav Adolf’s armies the crucial edge in the 1630s, for example in the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631 (map 2).

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During the 16th century foreign mercenaries frequently outnumbered national subjects in the armies of the kings of France and Spain. Gradually the Italians, who had been the great soldiers of fortune in the 15th century, were supplanted first by the Swiss and then by Germans from the Rhineland and Westphalia. English mercenaries served in the Netherlands in the later 16th century, and Scots were particularly active in Germany during the Thirty Years War.
Between 1770 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 a succession of revolutions, industrial as well as political, brought widespread material progress and social change. These developments were international in character although their global impact was unevenly distributed. They had a common origin in the unparalleled expansion of European influence—economic, political, demographic and cultural—throughout the world.

In this period most of the Americas, Africa and Australasia, together with much of Asia, became dominated either by European states, or by peoples of European culture and descent. This process, which slowly but surely transformed the character of global civilization and forged the modern world, was based largely on Europe's economic and technological ascendency. By the mid-18th century European commercial primacy was already established, but its lead in manufacturing was apparent only in some areas, such as armaments, ships and books, and it lagged behind Asia in a few fields, such as porcelain and textile manufacture.

In the later 18th and early 19th centuries there was a new wave of economic growth and development, first in Britain and then in northwest Europe. This involved the concentration and mechanization of manufacturing in factories, and the use of coal to generate steam power—changes which, while not entirely replacing domestic production or more traditional energy sources, revolutionized production, initially of textiles and iron and subsequently of other industries. Later known as the “Industrial Revolution”, the changes led to such a rapid increase in manufacturing that by the middle of the 19th century Britain was described as “the workshop of the world”. 

**THE SPREAD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION**

During the 19th century, industrialization spread first to northwestern Europe and the eastern states of the United States, and then further afield. This led to an enormous increase in world trade (which trebled between 1870 and 1914) and in mass manufacturing. By 1900 both the United States and Germany surpassed Britain in some areas of production, such as that of iron and steel. Despite this, Britain remained the leading international trader and investor, with London the centre of the world capital market and of the international gold standard. Britain was also the most urbanized society in the world, with only a tiny minority of its population directly working in agriculture.

Elsewhere, the majority of the population—even in developed countries such as the United States and France—still lived and worked in rural areas, much as their forebears had done. Global trade,
industrialization and urbanization were still relatively undeveloped in 1914, yet Western innovations had already transformed many aspects of life throughout the world. Steam power provided energy not only for factories but also for railways and ocean-going ships, which, along with the telegraph and later the telephone, dramatically reduced the time and cost of long-distance transport and communications.

**POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS**

In the political sphere the American Revolution of 1775–83, which ended British rule over the Thirteen Colonies, was followed by the French Revolution, which began in 1789 and signalled a new era in the “Old World”. Tom Paine, an influential transatlantic radical wrote in 1791: “It is an age of Revolutions in which everything may be looked for.” His optimism was premature, however, for the French Revolution failed in both its Jacobin and Napoleonic forms and was followed, after 1815, by a period of reaction in Europe, led by the autocratic rulers of Russia, Austria and Prussia.

This did not, however, prevent the growth of Liberalism in Europe, which led to revolutions in France and Belgium in 1830 and to reforms in other countries such as Britain. In 1848 there were further revolutions in France and Germany which, although not entirely successful, led to the democratization of political institutions in western Europe. By the early 20th century all European states, including Russia, had representative assemblies, most of which were elected by a wide adult male suffrage. Women were still generally excluded from the franchise, but this restriction was being challenged and undermined by campaigners in Europe and North America. In the United States and the British dominions most white men and some women could vote, but not the non-European ethnic groups.

In most of the world non-democratic forms of government prevailed (map 1). In both the Middle and the Far East, dynastic rulers with autocratic powers flourished until the second decade of the 20th century. In the Asian, African and Caribbean colonies of the European powers, the native inhabitants were generally not allowed any direct voice in government. Even in Europe, democracy developed under the cloak of a much older and more absolutist political tradition: hereditary monarchy. France was the only major European power to become a republic before 1917. Bismarck - the dominant political figure in late 19th-century Europe - remained Chancellor of Germany only as long as he retained the support of the kaiser. The importance of hereditary dynasties in the European state system was illustrated when the murder of the Austrian archduke, Franz Ferdinand, at Sarajevo in 1914 precipitated the First World War.
Military conflicts within Europe in this period were caused largely by the territorial ambitions of the French, the Russians and the Prussians. Smaller conflicts arose as Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Italy and, at the very end of the period, the Balkan states fought off colonial rule and established their independence.

The American Civil War was the bloodiest conflict in American history. The unsuccessful attempt by the outnumbered Confederates to storm the Unionists during the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863 is generally considered to be the turning point of the war.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 generated not only hundreds of thousands of casualties but also the Paris Commune, in which socialists briefly seized power. The late 19th century saw the emergence of new ideologies of egalitarianism and class conflict – Marxism, syndicalism and anarchism – which rejected liberal democracy and favoured “direct action” such as industrial strikes and assassination.

Europe was a divided continent long before the First World War (1914-18) exacerbated its problems. This was apparent even on other continents, where many wars in the late 18th and 19th centuries were fought between European powers (map 3). France and Spain, for example, helped the American colonists gain their independence from Britain, and Britain captured many French, Spanish and Dutch colonies during its struggle with Napoleon.

**Resistance to Imperial Rule**

The period 1770-1914 has been described as the “Age of European Imperialism” because it was characterized by a rapid expansion in European influence over the rest of the world. However, at no time between 1770 and 1914 was most of the world under direct European control. In the Americas European colonial rule was confined to the periphery, while in the Middle East and Asia important indigenous states survived despite the expansion of European influence. The extensive Manchu Qing Empire remained largely intact until the second decade of the 20th century.

Japan acquired a maritime empire and rapidly developed its manufactures and foreign trade with the help of Western technology. Other Asian rulers, such as the shahs of Persia and the kings of Siam, kept their independence by playing off European rivals against each other. Even in India – regarded by the British as the most valuable part of their empire – control of about half the subcontinent was shared with native maharajahs. In Africa most of the interior remained beyond direct European control until the late 19th century. Furthermore, some native African states inflicted defeat on European armies – as the Zulus did at Isandhlwana in 1879, the Mahdists at Khartoum in 1885 and the Ethiopians at Adowa in 1896.

Most European colonies were of minor economic importance to their mother countries, although there were some notable exceptions. Few colonies outside North America attracted large numbers of European settlers, except Australia, where the initial settlements were established with the aid of transported convicts. Very few Europeans settled in equatorial Africa or Asia, and even India attracted only a few thousand long-term British residents.

**Changes in Population**

In the 19th century the distribution of the world’s population changed considerably. Although Asia remained far more populous than any other continent, the population of Europe increased rapidly, while that of North America exploded – largely as a result of European migration. The
expansion of the European empires in Africa and Asia facilitated both Asian and European migration, while the African slave trade continued to Brazil and Cuba until the late 19th century.

The great majority of people who left Europe - more than 30 million over the period - migrated to the United States. Americans, although they often retained some aspects of their European heritage, were proud that they had left the restrictions and conflicts of the “Old World” for the opportunities and advantages of the “New World” and supported the isolationist policy of the US government. The combination of a low tax burden with rapid westward expansion and industrialization gave the majority of white Americans a very high standard of living. By the late 19th century the United States was the richest nation in the world, although its military power and international status were still relatively undeveloped.

CROSS-CULTURAL INFLUENCES
The worldwide success of the European peoples encouraged them to believe in their own superiority, but it also exposed them to other cultures which subtly altered their own civilization. Japanese art, for example, inspired French and Dutch painters and British designers, while Hinduism prompted the fashionable cult of theosophy. In North America, popular music was influenced by African-American blues and jazz.

In Latin America Roman Catholicism became the main religion of the native peoples, but was obliged to make compromises with local practices and beliefs. Outside the Americas, European Christianity had little success in converting other ethnic and religious groups. Islam, for example, remained dominant in the Middle East and much of South and Southeast Asia, while Hinduism remained the religion of the majority in India. The Chinese and the Japanese largely remained loyal to their traditional religions, despite much missionary activity by the Christian churches, which was often prompted by deep divisions between the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches.

Throughout the period the vast majority of the world’s ethnic groups remained attached to their own indigenous traditions and had little knowledge of other languages or cultures. Even in 1914 European influence on the world was still limited and undeveloped in many respects. The largest European transcontinental empires - those of Britain and France - did not reach their apogee until after the First World War, and European cultural influence only reached its zenith in the later 20th century, by which time it had been subsumed in a wider “Westernization” of the world.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1775–83

The American Revolution or War of Independence gave birth to a new nation, the United States of America. It involved two simultaneous struggles: a military conflict with Britain, which was largely resolved by 1781, and a political conflict within America itself over whether to demand complete independence from Britain and, if so, how the resulting new nation should be structured.

Prior to the outbreak of war in 1775, the territory that became the United States comprised thirteen separate British colonies, each with its own distinct burgeoning culture, institutions and economy (map 1). Before 1763 the colonists, with their own colonial legislatures, had enjoyed a large measure of self-government, except in overseas trade, and had rarely objected to their membership of the British Empire. Changes to British policy after 1763 gradually destroyed this arrangement and created a sense of common grievance among the colonies.

CAUSES FOR GRIEVANCE

The spoils of the Seven Years War (1756–63) greatly enlarged the territory of British North America and established British dominance over the continent (map 2). In order to police this vast area and to reduce substantial wartime debt, the British government took steps to manage its North American empire more effectively. Customs officers were ordered to enforce long-standing laws regulating colonial shipping (Navigation Acts, 1650–96), and a series of measures was passed by the British parliament which for the first time taxed the colonists directly (Sugar Act, 1764; Quartering Acts, 1765; Bamp Act, 1765). Having no representation in the British parliament, the colonists viewed these measures as a deliberate attempt to bypass the colonial assemblies, and they responded by boycotting British goods. Although most of these taxes were repealed in 1770, Committees of Correspondence were organized throughout the Thirteen Colonies to publicize American grievances.

In response to the Tea Act of 1773, a symbolic “tea party” was held when protestors dumped incoming tea into Boston harbour rather than pay another “unjust” tax. The situation worsened when the boundaries of the now-British colony of Quebec were extended to the territory north of the Ohio River (Quebec Act, 1774). Feeling the need to enforce its authority, Britain passed the Coercive Acts of 1774 (the “Intolerable Acts”), which closed Boston harbour and imposed a form of martial law. Meeting in Philadelphia in 1774, the First Continental Congress asserted the right and imposed a form of martial law. Meeting in Philadelphia in 1774, the First Continental Congress asserted the right to "no taxation without representation" and, although still hoping that an amicable settlement could be reached with Britain, denounced these new British laws as violations of American rights. When Britain made it clear that the colonies must either submit to its rule or be crushed (the Restraining Act, 1775), the movement for full American independence began. War broke out when British troops clashed with the colonial militia at Lexington and Concord in April 1775.

At the start of the war, the American cause seemed precarious. The colonists were deeply divided about what they were fighting for and faced the full might of the British Empire. Britain had the greatest navy and the best-equipped army in the world, although the small size of the British army in the American colonies – composed of regular soldiers, American loyalists, Hessian mercenaries and Native American tribes, especially the Six Nations and the Cherokee – is evidence that Britain did not initially take the American threat seriously. The Americans, however, with militiamen and volunteers, had more than enough manpower to defend themselves, and in most battles they outnumbered British troops. Much of the fighting, especially in the south, took the form of guerrilla warfare, at which American militiamen, aided by the civilian population, were much more adept than the British regular troops. They had the advantage of fighting on their own territory and, unlike the British, had easy access to supplies. By the war’s end America had also won the support of Britain’s enemies – France, Spain and Holland.
The Declaration of Independence

On 4 July 1776 the Second Continental Congress adopted Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. This document furnished the moral and philosophical justification for the rebellion, arguing that governments are formed in order to secure the “self-evident” truth of the right of each individual to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” and that their power is derived from the consent of those they govern. Grounded in the notion that “all men are created equal”, the Declaration asserted the colonists’ independence from Britain and effectively cut all ties with the mother country.

Phases in the Fighting

The fighting took place in three distinct phases. The first phase (1775–76) was mainly located in New England but culminated in the American failure to capture Quebec in December 1775, thus enabling the British to retain Canada. The middle phase (1776–79) was fought mainly in the mid-Atlantic region. The American victory at Saratoga (October 1777) proved to be a major turning point in the war as it galvanized France into entering the war on America’s side, contributing badly needed financial aid and its powerful navy and troops. The final phase took place in the south and west (1778–81). Naval warfare now assumed greater importance, with French/American and British ships fighting for control of the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. Spain declared war against Britain in June 1779, followed by Holland in 1780. In September 1781 the French fleet drove the British navy from Chesapeake Bay, preparing the way for the British surrender at Yorktown (October 1781), the last major battle of the war.

Occasional fighting continued for over a year, but a new British cabinet decided to open peace negotiations. The Treaty of Paris (September 1783) recognized the new republic and established generous boundaries from the Atlantic Coast to the Mississippi, and from the Great Lakes and Canada to the 31st parallel in the south. The Revolution was not accepted by all Americans (about one-third remained loyal to Britain), and up to 100,000 colonists fled the country to form the core of English-speaking Canada (pages 188–89). The ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence were enshrined in the American Constitution of 1789, which legally established the federal republic and was subsequently used as an inspiration for other liberation movements, most notably in France.
The French Revolution of 1789 represented a major turning point in the history of continental Europe, for it marked the beginning of the demise of absolutist monarchies and their replacement by nation states in which the middle classes held political power. It arose partly from attempts by King Louis XVI to overcome a mounting financial crisis by summoning the Estates-General, a body of elected representatives which had not met since 1614. He thus aroused hopes of reform among the Third Estate (the bourgeoisie or middle classes) - hopes that could only be fulfilled by an attack on the judicial and financial privileges of the First and Second Estates (the aristocracy and clergy). While the king prevaricated, the First and Second Estates refused to surrender any of their privileges, and on 17 June 1789 the Third Estate proclaimed itself a National Assembly.

Riots had broken out in many parts of France early in 1789 (map 1) in response to a disastrous harvest in 1788 that had reduced many peasants and industrial workers to starvation. When the people of Paris stormed the Bastille prison - symbol of royal absolutism - on 4 July 1789, an enormous wave of popular unrest swept the country, and in what was known as the “Great Fear” the property of the aristocracy was looted or seized. The National Assembly reacted by abolishing the tax privileges of the aristocracy and clergy and promulgating the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen”, in which the main principles of bourgeois democracy - liberty, equality, property rights and freedom of speech - were enunciated. Other reforms followed, including the replacement of the provinces of France by a centralized state divided into 84 departments.

Powerless to stop these changes, the king tried, unsuccessfully, to flee the country in June 1791, thus provoking anti-royalist attacks. Tension between the moderates and anti-royalists grew as French royalist armies, backed by Austria and Prussia, gathered on France’s borders. In April 1792 war was declared on Austria, and in September the Prussians invaded northeastern France, but were repulsed at Valmy (map 1). A new National Convention, elected by universal male suffrage, declared France a republic.

**The Terror**

Louis XVI was put on trial and executed in January 1793. Anti-revolutionary uprisings, the presence on French soil of enemy armies and continuing economic problems, led to a sense of national emergency. The Assembly appointed a Committee of Public Safety, dominated by the extremist Jacobins and led by Robespierre. A reign of terror began, with the aim of imposing revolutionary principles by force, and more than 40,000 people (70 per cent of them from the peasantry or labouring classes) were executed as “enemies of the Revolution”.

In order to combat the foreign threat, the Committee of Public Safety introduced conscription. During 1794 the French proved successful against the invading forces of the First Coalition (map 3), and victory at Fleurus in June left them in control of the Austrian Netherlands. In July the moderate faction ousted Robespierre, who went to the guillotine. Executive power was then vested in a Directory of five members, and a five-year period of moderation set in.

**The Rise of Napoleon**

The Directory made peace with Prussia, the Netherlands and Spain, but launched an offensive against Austria in Italy, headed by a young general, Napoleon Bonaparte (map 2). He was brilliantly successful during 1796, forcing Austria out of the war, but then led an unsuccessful expedition to Egypt to try and cut Britain’s communications with its Indian empire. Meanwhile, the Directory had become profoundly unpopular with all sections of the population, and was overthrown by Napoleon on his return to France in October 1799. In 1800, following the first-ever plebiscite, from which he gained overwhelming support, he was confirmed as First Consul of France – a position that gave him supreme authority. He proceeded to introduce a number of
measures to create a centralized administrative structure, including the founding of the Bank of France in 1800. Between 1801 and 1804 a body of laws was created, known as the Napoléon Code, which embodied many of the fundamental principles of the French Revolution and was subsequently imposed in countries conquered by Napoléon's armies. In 1801 he signed a concordat with the Pope, thus helping to ensure that he received the Pope's approval when he declared himself emperor in 1804.

Military Campaigns
By the end of 1800 France had once again defeated Austrian forces in northern Italy and by February 1801 it had made peace with all its opponents except Britain. The following year it signed the Treaty of Amiens with Britain, but the resulting period of peace was not to last long, and in 1805 Austria, Russia and Sweden joined Britain to form the Third Coalition (map 3). In October the French fleet was completely destroyed by the British in the Battle of Trafalgar, but by the end of the year Napoléon's armies had inflicted heavy defeats on the Austrians and Russians at Ulm and Austerlitz respectively. They then moved on through the German states, defeating the Prussians in October 1806. Following his defeat of the Russians at Friedland in June 1807, Napoléon persuaded the tsar to join forces with France to defeat Britain, which once again was isolated as Napoléon's sole effective opponent.

War Against the Fifth Coalition
In 1808 Charles IV of Spain was forced to abdicate in favour of Napoléon's brother Joseph. The Spanish revolted and the British sent a supporting army to the Iberian Peninsula (map 2). Elsewhere in Europe the economic hardships resulting from the French military presence tended to make Napoléon's rule unpopular with his subject nations. The imposition of the Napoléon Code in countries annexed by France, while potentially beneficial to the citizens of Europe, still represented an unwelcome domination by the French. It also caused disquiet among Napoléon's allies, the Russians, who in 1810 broke with France, eventually joining Britain and Portugal in the Fifth Coalition.

In 1812 Napoléon attempted his most ambitious annexation of territory yet, launching an invasion of Russia. Although he reached Moscow in September, he found it deserted and, with insufficient supplies to feed his army, he was forced to retreat. In Spain the British and Portuguese armies finally overcame the French, chasing them back onto French soil. At the same time the Prussians, Austrians and other subject states seized the opportunity to rebel against French rule. The Fifth Coalition armies took Paris in March 1814. Napoléon abdicated and was exiled to the island of Elba, and Louis XVIII ascended the French throne.

A year later, while the Coalition members were negotiating the reshaping of Europe at the Congress of Vienna, Napoleon escaped and raised an army as he marched north through France. Following defeat at Waterloo in 1815, he was sent into permanent exile on St Helena. The final battle occurred following his escape, when a revived French army was defeated at Waterloo, in Belgium, on 18 June 1815. From 1793 onwards the rulers of the European states formed various alliances in an attempt to counter the threat from France. Britain was a common member, with other countries joining when it became expedient to do so. Russia also joined all five coalitions, although from 1807 to 1810 it was allied to France. Spain, a member of the First Coalition, became a French ally and then puppet state from 1796 until the Spanish people rose up in protest in 1808 and precipitated the Peninsular War.
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN BRITAIN
1750–1850

I
n the late 18th and early 19th centuries Britain became the world's leading industrial nation in a process of economic growth and change that is regarded as the world's first industrial revolution. In some respects, however, the process was of an evolutionary nature, with change occurring at different speeds in different sectors of the economy. There were a number of reasons why the process of industrialization first occurred in Britain rather than any other country in Europe. In 1750 Britain had a well-developed and specialized economy, substantial overseas trade and an average per capita national income that was one of the highest in Europe. Domestic textile industries, iron smelting and the manufacturing of iron goods were well-established (map 1). The country was also fortunate in its natural resources, among them fertile land on which a productive agricultural sector had been able to develop. Early enclosure of fields (bar chart 1), together with crop improvements and livestock breeding, meant that British agriculture could feed a rapidly increasing urban workforce. Supplies of coal – fundamental to the nature of Britain's industrialization – were widespread and plentiful, and the development of a national market in coal was facilitated by coastal trade. Navigable rivers provided internal transport, while faster-flowing rivers supplied water power for industry and corn-milling.

The British government also played a very important role in establishing the conditions under which industry could thrive. Britain was free from the internal customs barriers and river tolls which stifled trade in Europe, while laws protected the textile and iron industries from foreign competition. Private property rights and a stable currency stimulated economic development, as did the stability provided by a strong state in which warfare, taxation and the public debt were managed by sophisticated bureaucracies. Shipping and trade were protected by Britain's naval supremacy, which also helped to secure trading privileges and build up a worldwide colonial empire obliged to conduct trade using British ships.

Rapid economic progress was further encouraged by Britain's success in war, in particular the war of 1793–1815 against France (pages 166–67), during which Britain remained free from invasion and escaped the economic dislocation engendered by war on the continent of Europe. The war created a demand for armaments, ships and uniforms, which in turn stimulated Britain's shipbuilding, iron-smelting, engineering and textile industries.

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY

In 1750 a variety of textiles – silk, linen, fustian (a mixture of linen and cotton) and, in particular, wool – had long been produced in Britain. The West Riding of Yorkshire, the West Country and East Anglia were centres of the woollen industry, while the fustian industry had developed in Lancashire (map 1). The skilled workforce employed in both industries was largely home-based and organized by merchants who thus built up capital and entrepreneurial skills. Such skills were used to great effect in the second half of the 18th century, when the cotton industry developed rapidly. Technological change allowed Lancashire to produce and sell cotton cloth more cheaply than India, where production depended on low-paid labour. Inventions such as Arkwright's water frame and Watt's steam-powered rotative engine transformed cotton spinning in the last decade of the 18th century into a factory-based, urban industry. This led to an unprecedented rise in productivity and production. Lancashire became the centre of the world's cotton manufacturing industry (map 2) and exported cotton cloth throughout the world. The woollen industry continued to be of importance, especially in the West Riding of Yorkshire, where mechanization was introduced and British wool was supplemented by merino wool imported from Australia.

IRON, COAL AND TRANSPORT

Innovation in iron production in the 18th century facilitated smelting, and later refining, using coke instead of charcoal. Steam power, fuelled by plentiful coal supplies, began to replace man, horse and water power, encouraging the development of the factory system and rapid urbanization near coalfields. These developments were self-sustaining, for while steam engines increased the demand for coal and iron, better steam-driven pumps and rotary winding equipment facilitated deeper coalmines.

Transport developed in response to the economic changes. Canals were constructed to carry heavy and bulky goods, and roads were improved by turnpike trusts, opening up the national market for goods. The combination of colliery waggonways and the steam engine led to the piecemeal development of a rail network from 1825 onwards which by 1850 linked the major urban centres. It also encouraged further industrialization by generating a huge fresh demand for coal, iron, steel, engineering and investment (map 3).

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The economic and social effects of industrialization were complex and wide-ranging. Between 1750 and 1850 the population of England almost trebled. By 1850 more than half the population lived in towns or cities, compared with only 25 per cent in 1800 (bar chart 2). Eleven per cent lived in London, which remained the largest manufacturing centre, and more than 60 towns and cities had over 20,000 inhabitants. Such a process of rapid urbanization was unprecedented and unplanned. Crowded and insanitary living conditions meant that urban death rates were considerably higher than those in rural areas. At the same time, the development of the factory system generated issues of discipline, as some workers resented capitalist control of work processes and the replacement of traditional skills by machines. There were outbreaks of machine
breaking, especially in times of trade depression. Moral debates were prompted by the employment of women and children as cheap labour.

Even as late as 1850, however, when British manufactured goods were traded all over the world, many areas of Britain remained rural. In some regions industries had actually declined, among them wool production in the West Country and iron manufacture around Ironbridge (maps 1 and 2). The vast majority of the industrial working population was employed in retailing and warehousing, workshops and small enterprises rather than in factories. Capital and technology had become less involved with agriculture and more involved with industry, especially manufacturing, and with trade and construction related to industry. Yet agriculture was still the largest single occupation and most of Britain's food was still home-produced.

By 1850 Britain was no longer the only country to have undergone an industrial revolution. Similar changes had begun to occur in continental Europe (pages 170–71), sometimes with the aid of British machinery, entrepreneurial and financial skills. British industrial workers had also taken their skills to the Continent. In the second half of the century a considerable number were to emigrate to the United States, where the process of industrialization (pages 186–87) was eventually to lead to Britain losing its position as the world's greatest industrial power.
The industrialization of Europe started in the 1830s, some decades after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the late 18th century. Much debate has centred on whether British industrialization "spilled over" into Europe (and if so, to what extent), or whether European countries accumulated their own technological and manufacturing knowledge. There is no question that there were substantial flows of skilled labour, entrepreneurs, capital and technology from Britain, and later from France and Germany, to the less industrialized parts of Europe. However, although the basic model of industrialization remained British, each country developed its own national characteristics. Substitutes were found for the particular resources that Britain possessed, but which other countries lacked, more organized banking systems supplied finance to accelerate growth, and more aware governments supplied the ideologies and incentives to motivate growth. As a result, industrialization in the countries of continental Europe was more state-driven and more revolutionary in character than in Britain. The culmination of this model was the abrupt industrialization of the USSR under the Soviet system from 1917 onwards.

**Regional development**

In the first half of the 19th century many of Europe's modern nation-states were yet to come into existence. Germany and Italy were still fragmented into small political entities, while at the other extreme lay dynastic empires that spanned several nationalities, such as the Habsburg Austrian Empire, the tsarist Russian Empire (which included much of the Balkans). The process of industrialization often took place in the context of shifting political allegiances and the forging of national identities. Political alliances and wars, such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, introduced border changes that were often somewhat haphazard in economic terms. On the other hand, some of the German states used economic unification - initially in the form of a customs union (Zollverein) in 1834 - as a step towards political union in 1871 (pages 176–77). Industry in its early stages was predominantly confined to a number of rather circumscribed regions. Some, such as the region just west of Kraków and a large area of northern Europe, cut across national boundaries (map 1). The existence of coal and iron was the most important criterion for determining the speed at which regions developed, but locally available resources were also important, especially the supply of skills in textile regions. Some of the emerging industrial regions subsequently faded, such as the areas around Le Havre, Leipzig and Dresden, while some new ones emerged, such as that bordering the Ruhr in Germany. In general, industrialization can be said to have come to
regions rather than to nations. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, much industrial activity in Europe is dominated by regional “clusters” of activity, rather than by a general spread of industrialization to all corners.

**Development of Industry**

The pattern of European industrialization (starting in northwest Europe and moving northwards, southwards and eastwards) tends to support the idea that it was based on that of Britain. It is certainly beyond doubt that the technological advances developed in Britain, for example in textile machinery and steam engines, did not need to be reinvented. However, the technology often needed to be modified to suit local conditions. For example, the type of steam engine most popular in Britain (developed by James Watt) consumed too much coal for its use to be worthwhile in regions where coal was more expensive than in Britain. As a result, water-wheels and the more efficient water turbines were often used to power machinery in France and Italy. Similarly, in the textile industry it was found that machinery developed for the manufacture of woollen and cotton cloth in Britain was not as suitable for the finer textiles of France and Spain.

The scattering of industrial areas encouraged the growth of railway systems, to facilitate the delivery of raw materials to manufacturers and the distribution of manufactured goods to customers. The first track was laid in northern Europe in the 1840s, and the network had reached all corners of Europe by 1870 (map 1). In countries such as Spain and Italy the railway was envisaged as the catalyst that would set in motion the process of industrialization, but in these countries, which were among the last to industrialize, the building of railway lines had little appreciable effect. In general, railways were successful at connecting already industrializing areas, rather than fostering the growth of new areas.

**The Speed and Impact of Industrialization**

The impact of new industries and new technologies can be gauged from the levels of industrialization achieved, measured in terms of the volume of industrial production per person (maps 2 and 3). In 1830 the figure for Britain was more than twice as high as in any other European nation except Belgium, and even as late as 1913 Britain remained ahead, although it was rapidly being caught by Switzerland, Belgium and, of course, Germany, whose steel production had by this time outstripped that of Britain (pages 216–17). Indeed, while Britain had a 13.6 per cent share of the world industrial output in 1813, Germany, with its much larger population, had 14.8 per cent, and was thus second only to the United States in terms of its industrial might.

The most obvious effect of industrialization was on economic growth and on the living standards of the populations of the industrialized countries. While industrialization had developed first in countries whose societies were relatively egalitarian, such as Belgium and France, it often had the effect of widening social inequalities for some years. The national income per head, the most common indicator of overall prosperity and growth, rose throughout Europe (graph), but its steepest increase was in northern Europe, where industrialization took its strongest hold. So, despite the squalor and misery of industrial regions and cities, it seems that industrializing nations as a whole, and certain sectors in particular, enjoyed long-term economic benefits.

![Graph: Relative growth in GNP per capita across Europe 1830–1910](image)

![Graph: The speed and impact of industrialization](image)

**Britain**, with its head start, steamed ahead of the rest of Europe in terms of industrial output per capita in the first half of the 19th century, but Belgium, with readily available sources of coal and iron ore, also experienced an increase in output of more than 100 per cent. Elsewhere in northern Europe, and in Switzerland, industrialization made considerable headway, although the intense industrialization of northern France and Germany is not reflected in the per capita figures of these countries, since the majority of the population was still engaged in agricultural production.

![Graph: Countries underwent their main periods of industrialization at different times. Belgium experienced a spurt early on and then again at the turn of the century, while others, in particular the Scandinavian countries, were relatively late developers. Germany also started comparatively slowly but increased the volume of its industrial production per person by 240 per cent between 1880 and 1913.](image)
The Congress of Vienna resulted in several major boundary changes. France had its borders returned to those of 1792, Poland was divided once again and 39 German-speaking states were organized into the German Confederation, dominated by Prussia, which was given half of Saxony. Austria lost its possessions in northwest Europe to the Dutch in the newly created United Netherlands, but was given much of northern Italy by way of compensation.

During the 1820s and early 1830s rebellions broke out across Europe, with liberals calling for an end to absolute monarchy in Spain and Portugal and in the Italian peninsula. The Greeks, with the help of the French, British and Russians, drove the Ottomans from Morea. The Russians also intervened to crush rebellion in Poland in 1830, having defeated their own Decembrist Revolution in 1825. The French brought about a degree of constitutional reform following the replacement of Charles X by Louis Philippe in 1830, and Belgium achieved independence from the United Netherlands the same year.

Following their initial victory over Napoleon in 1814, the major European powers met at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) to decide on the future political map of Europe. The Congress was dominated by three principles: territorial compensation for the victors, the restoration and affirmation of the ruling royal dynasties, and the achievement of a balance of power between the major European states. As a result of their deliberations the German Confederation was formed, replacing the Holy Roman Empire (map 1). Elsewhere, national boundaries were redrawn, often with little regard to ethnic groupings, thus planting the seeds of nationalist tensions.

There was a shared conviction that the spread of republican and revolutionary movements must be prevented. In September 1815 Russia, Austria and Prussia formed a "Holy Alliance", agreeing to guarantee all existing boundaries and governments and to uphold the principles of Christianity throughout Europe. The alliance was subsequently joined by the other major European powers – with the exception of Britain, the Pope and, not surprisingly, the Ottoman sultan – and over the next 40 years there were several occasions when the autocratic rulers of Europe took military action to suppress uprisings in states other than their own.

**REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH**

In 1820 there was an explosion of revolutionary activity in Spain. Following the defeat of Napoleon, a liberal constitution had been introduced in 1812, but this had been annulled by King Ferdinand VII on his return from exile in 1815. In 1820 his authority was challenged by an army revolt, supported by riots across Spain (map 2), with the result that the liberal constitution was re-established.

**REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN EUROPE 1815–49**
Insurrections in Naples, Piedmont and Portugal in the summer of 1820 also attempted to introduce constitutional forms of government, and initially met with some success. However, Tsar Alexander I of Russia persuaded the Austrians and Prussians to support him in threatening military intervention, and in March 1821 Austria sent an army to crush the revolts in Piedmont and Naples. In December 1825 Russia faced revolutionary action on its own soil when a group of military officers tried unsuccessfully to prevent the accession to the tsardom of Nicholas I, preferring his more liberal-minded brother. The following year the continuing instability in Portugal prompted the British to intervene, in this instance with the intention of aiding the preservation of its constitutional government.

In Greece a revolution broke out in 1821 with the aim of shaking off Ottoman rule and uniting the whole of the ancient Hellenic state under a liberal constitution. The Ottomans enlisted support from the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Ali, whose troops seized a large area of the country by 1826, when Russia, France and Britain intervened to defeat the Muslim forces. However, the London Protocol of 1830, which proclaimed Greek independence, fell far short of the aspirations of the revolutionaries in that it only established a Greek monarchy in southern Greece, under the joint protection of the European powers (map 3).

UNREST IN THE NORTH
By 1830 revolutionary passions were rising in France. King Charles X dissolved an unco-operative Chamber of Deputies and called an election, but when an equally anti-royal Chamber resulted, he called fresh elections with a restricted electorate. Demonstrations in Paris during July forced him to abdicate in favour of Louis Philippe, whose right to call elections was removed. His reign, known as the “July Monarchy”, saw insurrections as industrial workers and members of the lower middle class, influenced by socialist and utopian ideas, demanded an increased share of political power, including the vote.

Nationalist resentment at decisions taken at the Congress of Vienna led to insurrection in both Belgium and Poland in the 1830s. In Belgium, which had been given to the United Netherlands in 1815, riots broke out in 1830 and independence was declared in October. In the kingdom of Poland, an area around Warsaw that had been given to the Russian tsar, a revolt by Polish nationalists resulted in a brief period of independence before the Russians crushed the movement in 1831, and subsequently attempted to destroy Polish identity in a campaign of “Russification”.

Britain also experienced a degree of social unrest. A mass protest in Manchester in 1819 was crushed and 11 people were killed by troops in what became known as the “Peterloo Massacre”. Inequalities in the electoral system provoked a strong movement for reform, which resulted in the Great Reform Bill of 1832. This expanded the electorate by 50 per cent and ensured representation from the newly developed industrial centres. Further calls were made by the Chartists for universal suffrage, with petitions presented to Parliament in 1838 and again in 1848.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848
By 1848 many of the European countries were suffering from an economic crisis; the failure of the potato and grain crops in 1845–46 was reflected in the price of food. There was political discontent at different social levels: peasants demanded total abolition of the feudal system, industrial workers sought improvements in their working conditions, and middle-class professionals wanted increased political rights. In Italy and Germany there were growing movements for unification and independence (pages 176–77). Revolutionary agitation began in Paris in February 1848, forcing the abdication of Louis Philippe and the establishment of the Second Republic. It then spread across central Europe (map 3). The Habsburg Empire faced with demands for a separate Hungarian government, as well as demonstrations on the streets of Vienna, initially gave in to the demands of the Hungarian nationalists and granted them a separate constitution. This, however, was annulled some months later, leading to a declaration of independence by Hungary. The Austrian response was to quell the revolt in 1849 with the help of Russian forces (pages 174–75).

Discontent in Austria spilled over into the southern states of the German Confederation, and liberals in Berlin demanded a more constitutional government. As a result, the first National Parliament of the German Confederation was summoned in May 1848.

FROM REVOLUTION TO REACTION
In June 1848 struggles between the moderate and the radical republicans culminated in three days of rioting on the streets of Paris. In crushing the rioters the more conservative factions gained control, a trend that was repeated in Prussia, where royal power was reaffirmed. The second half of 1848 was marked by waves of reaction that spread from one city to another. The restoration of Austrian control over Hungary was achieved partly by playing off against each other the different ethnic groups within the empire. However, despite the suppression of the 1848 revolutions, most of the reforms they had proposed were carried out in the second half of the century, and at least some of the nationalist movements were successful.
During the 18th century the Habsburg Empire took every opportunity to expand its territory at the expense of its neighbours. As a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Habsburgs gained territory in the Netherlands and Italy. They fared less well in the east, however, where territory taken from the Ottoman Empire in 1718 was regained by the Ottomans in 1739.

During her 40-year reign Empress Maria Theresa centralized control of the Habsburg territories through improved administrative systems, and won popular support with her social reforms.

The Spanish Habsburg dynasty ended in 1700 with the death of Charles II. King Louis XIV of France supported the claim to the Spanish throne of Philip, Duke of Anjou, who was his infant grandson and the great-nephew of Charles. The British and Dutch, fearing French domination, supported the claim of the Austrian Archduke Charles, and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) ensued (map 1). The outcome, formalized in the Peace of Utrecht (1713/14), was a compromise under which Philip attained the Spanish throne on condition that he renounced any claim to France, and the Austrians gained control of territory in Italy and the Netherlands.

During the 18th century the Austrian Habsburgs were the major dynastic power in central Europe. They were threatened, however, when on the death of Charles VI of Austria in 1740 other crowned heads of Europe refused to recognize his daughter Maria Theresa as his successor. In the resulting War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), Bavaria, France, Spain, Sardinia, Prussia and Saxony joined forces against Austria, the Netherlands and Britain in an unsuccessful attempt to oust Maria Theresa.

REFORM OF THE MONARCHY
During her long reign (1740–80) Maria Theresa embarked on transforming the diverse Habsburg dominions into a centralized nation state, and initiated many progressive reforms in the spheres of education, law and the Church. Her minister, Haywitz, put the Habsburg finances on a more stable footing, and these reforms reduced the rivalry between ethnic Germans and Czechs. When Joseph II succeeded his mother in 1780, he was able to build on her centralizing policies, and although his most radical reform – that of the tax system – was abolished by his successor, Leopold II, before it was given a chance to work, Joseph is generally considered to have been a strong and enlightened monarch.

In the years immediately after the French Revolution of 1789, and during the period of Napoleon’s leadership, the Habsburg Empire became involved in a succession of wars against France (pages 166–67), as a result of which it temporarily lost much of Austria, as well as territories in northern Italy and along the Adriatic. Under the peace settlement negotiated at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Habsburgs renounced their claim to the Netherlands in exchange for areas in northern Italy (map 2).

Austria was by this time largely under the control of Foreign Minister Metternich, who used his influence to persuade the other major European powers to assist Austria in crushing revolts in Spain, Naples and Piedmont. His own methods involved the limited use of secret police and the partial censorship of universities and freemasons.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848–49
The years 1848 and 1849 saw a succession of largely unsuccessful uprisings against the absolutist rule of the Habsburg monarchy (pages 172–73). Although reforms of the legal and administrative systems (known as the “April Laws”) were set to take effect in Hungary later that year, they did not apply to the rest of the Habsburg territories.

The unrest started in Vienna in March 1848 (as a result of which Metternich was dismissed) and spread to Prague, Venice and Milan. A Constituent Assembly was summoned to revise the constitution, but its only lasting action was to abolish serfdom. By the autumn the unrest had reached Hungary as a number of ethnic groups within the empire (map 3) made bids for greater national rights and freedoms. In December the ineffectual Ferdinand I abdicated in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph. Not feeling bound by the April Laws, Francis Joseph annulled the Hungarian constitution, causing the Hungarian leader Louis Kossuth to declare a republic. With the help of the Russians (who
feared the spread of revolutionary fervour), and the Serbs, Croats and Romanians (who all feared Hungarian domination), the Austrian army succeeded in crushing the revolt in 1849 (map 4).

From 1849 onwards an even more strongly centralized system of government was established. Trade and commerce were encouraged by fiscal reforms, and the railway network expanded. Coupled with peasant emancipation – for which landowners had been partially compensated by the government – these measures led to a trebling of the national debt over ten years. Higher taxes and a national loan raised from wealthier citizens led to discontent among the Hungarian nobles, who wished to see the restoration of the April Laws. In 1859 war in the Italian provinces forced the Austrians to cede Lombardy (map 2).

Crisis and Change
Several factors combined in the 1860s to create a period of crisis for the Habsburg Empire. It was becoming clear that Prussia, under Bismarck, presented an increasing threat, but Austria was unable to keep pace with military developments because of the insistence of the international banks that it balance its budget. Unrest in Hungary was presenting a threat to the monarchy, and also making it difficult to collect taxes and recruit for the army. A centralized government was unacceptable to the Hungarian nobility, but provincial government would be unworkable because of ethnic conflict. Austria was forced to reach a constitutional settlement with Hungary in 1867, forming the Dual Monarchy of Austria–Hungary. Although Francis Joseph was crowned head of both, and there were joint ministries for finance, foreign policy and military affairs, each nation had an independent constitution and legislature.

Encouraged by the constitutional change of 1867, many of the ethnic groups within the Dual Monarchy became increasingly vocal in their demands for the right to promote their language and culture, if not for outright autonomy. In Hungary, although other languages were not actually repressed, a knowledge of Hungarian was necessary for anyone with middle-class aspirations. Croatia was granted partial autonomy within Hungary in 1878, but continued to be dominated by its larger partner. There were also demands for greater autonomy from the Czechs in Austria, which were resisted by the German-speaking majority.

The Rise of Serb Nationalism
Bosnia, predominantly inhabited by impoverished peasants, was administered by the Austro-Hungarian Empire under terms agreed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It was annexed in 1908 in order to protect Habsburg trade routes to and from the Dalmatian coast. The resulting incorporation of a large number of Serbs into the empire was actively opposed by Serbian nationalists and was to contribute to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Following the defeat of the Austro-Hungarians in the war, the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919) broke up the empire, granting autonomy to its constituent nations and reducing Austria and Hungary to less than a quarter of their former area.

Throughout the 19th century the ethnic minorities within the Habsburg, and subsequently the Austro-Hungarian, Empire did not generally seek independence. Instead they sought to gain greater local autonomy within a reformed monarchy.
THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY AND OF GERMANY 1815–71

Among the most important developments in 19th-century Europe was the unification of Italy and Germany as nation-states—a process that fundamentally altered the balance of power in the continent. Although nationalist feeling had been stimulated by the French Revolution of 1789, and was originally associated with liberal ideas, unification was actually the result of diplomatic, war and the efforts of conservative elites rather than of popular action. German unification was promoted by Prussia, the most powerful German state, in order to protect its own domestic political stability; in Italy, Piedmont played this role for similar reasons.

Attempts to Unify Italy

The Napoleonic Wars (pages 166–67) had a dramatic effect on Italy. Napoleon redrew boundaries and introduced French political and legal ideas. At the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 the major European powers attempted to reverse these changes by restoring deposed leaders, including members of the Habsburg dynasty, and giving conservative Austria effective control of Lombardy and Venetia in northern Italy (map 1). These developments were a major setback for Italian nationalists, who sought to remove foreign interference and unite Italy. The movement for national unification, or Risorgimento, continued to grow, despite the suppression of revolts in the 1820s and early 1830s (pages 172–73). A major figure in this movement was the idealist Giuseppe Mazzini, who hoped the people would overthrow their existing rulers, both Italian and foreign.

In 1848 a wave of revolutionary fervour swept the cities of Europe— including those in Italy, where the rebels attempted to dispense with Austrian domination and to persuade local rulers to introduce constitutions. King Charles Albert of the kingdom of Sardinia hoped to defuse the revolutions by expelling the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia, but military defeats at Custozza and Novara forced him to abdicate in 1849 in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel II. In Rome, Venetian and Florentine republics were briefly established, but France intervened to restore Pope Pius IX to power and the Austrians reconquered Lombardy and restored the conservative rulers of central Italy.

The Rise of Piedmont

Moderate nationalists concluded that the best hope for Italian unification lay with Piedmont, which was economically advanced and had introduced a relatively liberal constitution. The Piedmontese prime minister, Count Camillo di Cavour, had already decided that foreign help would be needed to remove Austrian influence and achieve unification, and reached a secret agreement with Napoleon III of France at Plombières in 1858. Accordingly, when Cavour embarked on a war with Austria in 1859 France supported him; Austria was defeated and forced to cede Lombardy to Piedmont (map 2).

Piedmont's subsequent role in uniting Italy was partly a response to the actions of Giuseppe Garibaldi, one of the radicals who had created the Roman Republic in 1848. In 1860 Garibaldi led an expedition of republican “Red Shirts” (also known as Garibaldi’s Thousand) through the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, whose conservative ruler he defeated (map 2). Piedmont, anxious to preserve its constitutional monarchy, sent a force to annex the Papal States. Garibaldi then transferred the territory he had conquered to the Piedmontese king, who became head of the unified kingdom of Italy proclaimed in 1861. The remaining territories of Venetia and the Patrimony of St Peter were annexed during the subsequent ten years.
The German Confederation

Before the Napoleonic Wars Germany consisted of over 300 states, loosely bound in the Holy Roman Empire. In 1806 Napoleon dissolved the empire, replacing it with a new Confederation of the Rhine comprising states in southern and western Germany, but excluding Austria and Prussia. The Confederation became a French satellite; its constitution was modelled on that of France and it adopted the Napoleonic legal code. It was dissolved after the defeat of the French at the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 (pages 166–68).

The German Confederation, created as a result of the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, included 39 states, the largest and most powerful being Austria and Prussia (map 3). A Diet (parliament), presided over by Austria, was established at Frankfurt, but plans to create a federal army and achieve constitutional harmony among the states failed.

As in other parts of Europe, 1848 saw a wave of revolutionary activity in Germany (pages 172–73). Following unrest in Berlin, the Prussian king, Frederick William IV, introduced constitutional reforms and seemed sympathetic towards German unification. Middle-class German nationalists established a parliament at Frankfurt which drew up a constitution for a future German Empire. However, they were divided over whether to pursue a "Greater Germany", to include Catholic Austria, or a smaller grouping, dominated by Protestant Prussia. The parliament fell apart in July 1849 and by the end of the year the old order had been restored in both Germany and the Austrian Empire.

Although Austria and Prussia tried to co-operate during the 1850s, Prussia was already outstripping Austria in economic terms (pages 170–71). In 1834 Prussia had established a Customs Union (Zollverein) that bound the economies of the north German states closely, while excluding Austria (map 4). Industrialization made Prussia the richest German state, and increased its military power relative to that of Austria.

When Bismarck engineered a war with Austria in 1866 (Seven Weeks War), most German states supported Austria, Prussia, however, enjoyed advantages in military technology and defeated Austria quickly, signalling the end of the German Confederation and making German unification under Prussian leadership more likely.

In 1867 Bismarck secured the creation of a North German Confederation (map 4). Each member state retained some autonomy, but the Prussian king, William I, became the Confederation's president, responsible for defence and foreign policy. Although the south German states were apprehensive about Prussian domination, Bismarck used their fear of the territorial ambitions of Napoleon III of France to persuade them to ally with Prussia. Bismarck needed to neutralize France if he was to achieve German unification on his terms, and he therefore provoked a war over the succession to the Spanish throne. In the resulting Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) France was decisively defeated, losing the largely German-speaking areas of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia.

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The Expansion of Prussia

The leading role in German unification was played by Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian Chancellor between 1862 and 1871. Bismarck, who had come to see Austrian and Prussian interests as incompatible, sought to secure Prussian influence over northern and central Germany, and to weaken Austria's position. He hoped that success in foreign affairs would enable him to control Prussia's liberals. In 1864 Austria and Prussia jointly ousted Denmark from control of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, but the two powers increasingly competed for control of the German Confederation. When Bismarck engineered a war with Austria in 1866 (Seven Weeks War), most German states supported Austria. Prussia, however, enjoyed advantages in military technology and defeated Austria quickly, signalling the end of the German Confederation and making German unification under Prussian leadership more likely.

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The German Confederation was established following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. It comprised 39 German-speaking states, by far the largest of which was Prussia, and included states under the control of the Habsburg Empire.
THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
1683–1923

The decline of the Ottoman Empire is often said to date from the massive defeat of the Ottomans outside Vienna in 1683, but despite the territorial losses resulting from the subsequent Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the 18th-century Ottoman state remained the biggest political entity in Europe and western Asia (map 1). Although the effectiveness of the empire’s prestige troops, the Janissaries, was weakened by increasing internal unrest, Ottoman forces were able to hold Serbia. They also got the better of their old Renaissance opponent, Venice, by recovering the Morea in 1718 (map 2).

During the 18th century the major European states became more of a threat to the Ottomans. There were large-scale Russian encroachments around the Black Sea in the latter part of the century, and in 1798 a French army under Napoleon Bonaparte made a devastating, if shortlived, surprise attack on Egypt, the empire’s richest Muslim province. It was clear that the weaponry and the military capacity of the European states were moving ahead of those of their Islamic counterparts. At the same time, Europe’s ideological conflicts reverberated among the Ottoman Empire’s Christian subjects, encouraging bids for separatism and liberty which usually had Russian backing. Whole communities in the Caucasus switched their allegiance from the Ottoman (and Persian) states to the Russian Empire, and disaffection spread among the prosperous and previously co-operative Greeks of the empire’s heartlands. In 1821 the western Greeks struck out for independence, and by 1832 they had won a mini-state (map 1).

THE SLIDE INTO DEPENDENCY

The Ottoman state responded to its losses with a programme of expensive remilitarization, as well as political and economic reform and development, funded precariously from what were now seriously reduced revenues. The strategy for survival was to replace the empire’s traditional patchwork of cultural and religious communities with a new model Ottoman society in which there was one legal system, one citizen status and one tax rating for all. This was progressive, liberal 19th-century policy, but it attacked vested interests in the provinces and among the Muslim clergy.

The reform movement engendered a limited revival of international confidence in the Ottomans. During the Crimean War of 1853–56, British and French armies fought to defend Ottoman interests against Russian military escalation in exchange for an Ottoman commitment to equality of status for its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. This was a deal the Ottoman state was unable to honour; twenty years after the Crimean campaign, the Ottoman authorities were still employing ill-disciplined troops to contain unruly Balkan Christians, provoking an international outcry and eventually the resumption of full-scale war with Russia. Under the agreement reached at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the region’s political map was redrawn (maps 1 and 3). "Turkey in Europe" became a much-reduced presence.

The British took control of Egypt in 1882, and the Middle Eastern territories were lost as a result of an Arab uprising during the First World War.

**Map:**
- The Ottoman Empire reached its furthest extent in the mid-17th century, but when its troops failed to take Vienna in 1683, European powers took advantage of their disarray and seized territory in central Europe. The subsequent disintegration of the empire took place over the next 240 years.
- Between 1699 and 1739 the Ottomans lost large areas in the Balkans, although they regained the Morea from Venice in 1718, and Serbia and Wallachia from the Austrian Habsburgs in 1739.
- The British took control of Egypt in 1882, and the Middle Eastern territories were lost as a result of an Arab uprising during the First World War.

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**1. The decline of the Ottoman Empire 1683–1923**

- Event: 1683–70 (Defeat of the Ottomans)
- Event: 1807–20 (Ottoman independence)
- Event: 1821–24 (Ottoman independence)
- Event: 1878 (Congress of Berlin)
- Event: 1881 (British occupation of Egypt)
- Event: 1885 (Ottoman special)
Following Russia's defeat of the Ottomans in 1878, the Treaty of Berlin awarded an area of the Caucasus to Russia. This land was returned in 1921 by Bolshevik Russia to those fighting for the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

The Rise of the "Young Turks"

The new sultan, Abdul Hamid II, swiftly shelved the constitution he had adopted as the price of survival in 1876. He ruled in the tradition of the Ottoman dynasty - as a despot. His empire had two faces: a westward-facing and cosmopolitan Constantinople, run by European-educated officials who might also be slave-owners, governing a society that faced east. The empire's political geography was now predominantly Middle Eastern, and Abdul Hamid was keen to exploit his status as caliph (senior ruler in the Islamic world) which gave Ottoman agents access to Muslim communities worldwide, including those living under the British Raj.

Pan-Islamic policies met widespread, if covert, criticism from those within the Ottoman elite who would have preferred a state with a nationalist Turkish identity to one with a more diffuse Ottoman or Islamic facade. The empire's fault lines were exposed by a new political force: the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a successful, originally conspiratorial, pressure group dominated by Turkish nationalist army officers, commonly nicknamed the "Young Turks". The CUP was committed to the retention of "Turkey in Europe" and relatively dismissive of the empire's Middle Eastern provinces and peoples. In 1908 they forced the sultan to renew the long-suspended constitution of 1876, and the following year deposed him in favour of his more pliant brother. The CUP set out with democratic ideals but found that these were incompatible with the empire's ethnic divisions. Showpiece general elections served chiefly to demonstrate the voting power of the minorities, particularly the Arabs. CUP administration survived only by becoming increasingly dictatorial, particularly when it faced a new round of territorial losses. It was in an attempt to remedy this situation that the leader of the CUP, Enver Pasha, with German military assistance, took the Ottoman Empire to war in 1914.

Between 1914 and 1916 the empire survived a series of Allied invasions (pages 218-19). Casualties were immense and the loyalty of the empire's minority populations was suspect, with thousands of Christian Armenians massacred for their pro-Russian sympathies. Apathy and disaffection among the empire's Arab Muslims was even more dangerous. In 1916 the Hashemi "sharif", governor of Mecca, raised a desert army which, allied with the British, successfully detached all remaining Arab provinces from Turkish control.

The Birth of the New Turkey

Post-war schemes for dismembering the empire and reducing the Ottoman sultanate to puppet status were built into the Treaty of Sevres (1920), which the sultan's administration in Constantinople meekly accepted, thereby losing any last shred of credibility. An alternative Turkish nationalist government was set up at Ankara, led by Mustafa Kemal, later named "Atatiirk" (Father of the Turks). By 1922 a Turkish nationalist army attacked the Greek forces and drove them from Anatolia in disarray. The other European powers, recognizing the overwhelming Turkish support for Kemal, withdrew, and the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923.

As President of Turkey (1923-38), Mustafa Kemal ("Atatiirk") initiated a series of reforms that created a modern secular state from the remains of the Ottoman Empire.
Between 1795 and 1914 Russia sought to expand its territory in all possible directions but met with resistance from Austria, Britain and France when it threatened their interests in the Balkans in the 1850s. Expansion to the south and east was intermittent up until the 1880s, when it was halted by British power and by internal financial difficulties. To the east, the Russian Empire extended even onto the continent of North America, as far as northern California, until Alaska was sold to the Americans for $7.2 million in 1867. To the southeast, Russia continued to exert its influence in Manchuria and Mongolia in the early years of the 20th century, despite its defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905.

During the 19th century Russia continued a process of territorial expansion that had begun in the 1460s but which was now largely confined to Asia. Victory over Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815 brought the acquisition of the western part of Poland ("Congress Poland") and confirmation of earlier gains in Finland in 1809 and Bessarabia in 1812 (map 1). However, this marked the end of expansion to the west and in fact Romania soon cut its ties with Russia and in 1883 made an alliance with Germany and Austria. In the southwest the Transcaucasian territories were acquired between 1801 and 1830 and the route to them finally secured by the conquest of Chechnia—completed in 1859—and Circassia in 1864.

In Central Asia, Russia seized large areas, often moving in where there was a political vacuum it could fill and perhaps resources it could exploit (although it failed to actually exploit them until the 1920s). The conquests began in the 1820s and accelerated from 1853 onwards. In 1885, however, Russian troops clashed with Afghan forces at Pendjeh and came up against another imperialist power, Britain, which sent a stern warning that Afghanistan was not for the taking.

In the mid-19th century Russia also turned its attention to the eastern end of Asia, acquiring the regions north and south of the Amur River. This enabled it to establish Vladivostok—the vital warm-water port that gave year-round maritime access to the Far East. The Trans-Siberian Railway—built between 1891 and 1904—linked Vladivostok to Moscow, and brought the potential for trade with the Far East. It tempted Russian policymakers to take over Manchuria in order to provide a more direct route to the coast, despite warnings from economic pressure groups that they should be concentrating on expanding internal markets in Siberia. The dream of eastern expansion reached both its apogee and its catastrophe in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for Russia. The limits of the empire were thus finally set.

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Economic Development

The economic development of the Russian Empire (map 2) was continuous throughout the 19th century and into the 20th century, but four periods can be distinguished. First there was slow and steady growth from 1800 to 1885, interrupted by setbacks in the 1860s when the iron industry in the Urals was adversely affected by the emancipation of the serfs. (Many who had been forced to work in the mines fled from the region on being freed.) Then, from 1885 to 1900, there was rapid government-induced growth, with a one-sided emphasis on railway building and heavy industry. Economic stagnation, prolonged by the effects of the revolution of 1905–7 (map 3), constituted the third period. The final period, from 1908 to 1914, was a time of renewed economic growth on a broader front.

It was during this last period that the big rush to emigrate to Siberia began, stimulated by the government itself, with the intention of solving the problem of land shortage in European Russia that had contributed greatly to the rural disturbances of 1905–7. Emigration to Siberia increased rapidly (graph) and the population of Siberia rose from 5.7 million in 1897 to 8.2 million in 1910. Settlement was concentrated along the Trans-Siberian Railway, which provided a link back to the west for a developing capitalist agriculture and the gold, copper and coal mines.

The 1905 Revolution

Russia's economy expanded in the 1890s with little attention to infrastructure and a complete refusal to link economic with political changes. This created tremendous tensions in the Russian social fabric, which were exacerbated by the government's repressive measures and its attempts at a gigantic foreign-policy diversion. "What we need to stem the revolutionary tide," said the reactionary, anti-Semitic Minister of the Interior Plehve in 1903, "is a small, victorious war." However, the result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 was precisely the opposite: the "revolutionary tide" nearly swept away the whole tsarist system. Only the loyalty of parts of the imperial army at the decisive moment, in December 1905, saved the situation for Nicholas II.

The revolution of 1905 (or, more accurately, 1905–7) started under liberal slogans, and indeed the demand for representative popular government on the Western model was a common denominator throughout. It developed, however, into something much more threatening than a mere change of political regime. The workers who went on strike in 1905 set up councils, or "soviets", in every major city of the Russian Empire (map 3). These institutions acted as local organs of power, initially side by side with the old authorities, and in some cases led armed revolts that aimed at the complete overthrow of the imperial government. They were to resurface in 1917, with a decisive impact on Russian and world history.

The revolution of 1905 was not simply an urban movement of Russian workers and intellectuals. Agriculture had been neglected by the state in its drive for industrialization, and since the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 it had experienced either stagnation or a slight improvement, interrupted by the dreadful famine of 1891. It is hardly surprising that the peasants lost patience. The peasant revolts of 1905–7 were the first large-scale risings since the 18th century, and they forced the government into an abrupt change of policy (the Stolypin Reforms of 1906–10). This was, however, ultimately ineffectual, since the government carefully side-stepped the peasants' major grievance: the issue of gentry landholding. The peasant movement would revive with a vengeance in 1917 (pages 222–23).

The non-Russian nationalities also revolted in 1905, demanding autonomy or independence, depending on their level of social and national maturity. These demands would also resurface in 1917, leading to the complete disintegration of the Russian Empire, although the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922 delayed the establishment of independent national states on the territory of the former Russian Empire for nearly 70 years.
Throughout the 19th century American pioneers moved inexorably westwards across the Appalachian Mountains in search of good farmland and new opportunities. Either through diplomacy, conquest or purchase, millions of acres of new territory came under United States control to form the transcontinental nation that we recognize today. This enormous landmass was swiftly occupied by settlers, and in these new areas gained large populations they were admitted to the Union as states.

In 1873 the new nation extended from the Atlantic coast westwards as far as the Mississippi River (map 1). Its territory was subsequently enlarged in two great expansionist movements. Firstly, with great astuteness, Thomas Jefferson bought a great swath of the Midwest from France in 1803 for a mere $15 million. The “Louisiana Purchase”, as it was known, instantly doubled the size of the United States. West Florida was annexed in 1813, while under the Adams–Onis Treaty of 1819, Spain ceded all of East Florida to the United States and gave up its claim to territory north of the 42nd parallel in the Pacific northwest.

The second wave of expansion involved the acquisition of Texas, Oregon and California. In 1835 American settlers in Texas staged a successful revolt against Mexican rule, winning the Battle of San Jacinto in 1836, and the Republic of Texas was born. The Mexican War (1846–48) betwen the United States and its weaker southern neighbour resulted in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), which gave the United States not only California but a huge region in the southwest (map 1).

The United States expanded westwards to the Pacific by a series of financial deals, negotiated settlements and forcible annexations. As each new territory was brought under the control of the new government formed, it became eligible for admission to the Union as a state and entitled to representation in Congress.

For many years, Britain had contested America's claims to the Oregon Country. Its Hudson's Bay Company controlled the region but, in the face of growing American immigration in the west of the region, Britain surrendered most of the area south of the 49th parallel to the United States in the Oregon Treaty of 1846 (map 2). With the Gadsden Purchase in 1853, the United States owned all the territory of its present states except for Alaska (purchased from Russia in 1867) and Hawaii (annexed in 1898).

**Explorers of the West**

At the beginning of the 19th century part of the impetus to venture west came from the desire to increase trade – not only with the Native Americans but also with Asia. Reports from the expedition of Lewis and Clark (1804–6) (map 3) provided valuable information about the natural wealth of the West. Zebulon Pike (1804–7) explored the sources of the Mississippi and visited Colorado and New Mexico, while Stephen H. Long (1817–23) investigated lands north of the Red and Arkansas rivers. As well as these government agents, traders and fur trappers, such as Jedediah Smith, travelled extensively between the Missouri and the Pacific coast. It was they who opened the Santa Fe Trail between New Mexico and Missouri in 1821, while “mountain men”, hunting in the Rockies in the 1820s, spread word of the riches to be found there.

**Westward Migration**

The American people flowed west in several distinct migration waves (map 2). The War of 1812 against Britain led to many people overcoming their fear of opposition from Native Americans and travelling westwards to find new agricultural land. Thousands of newcomers established small farms in what was known as the “Old Northwest” (now part of the Midwest). Most of the first settlers were southerners who had been displaced by the growth of the plantation system with its slave labour force. By 1830 their settlements filled southern Indiana and Illinois and were overrunning Missouri. In the following decade newcomers from the northeast settled around the Great Lakes, and by 1840 almost all the Old Northwest had been carved into states. Many pioneers had also moved into the newly acquired territory of Florida and into the land bordering the Gulf of Mexico. Most settlers here came from the southeast, looking for fields where they could grow cotton. Small farmers had been followed by large-scale planters, who brought slaves to the region – the majority from the eastern states. Once settlers had occupied the entire area, pioneers began to push beyond the Mississippi.

Many Americans believed in “manifest destiny”, the idea that America was destined by God and by history to expand its boundaries over the whole of North America. After 1843, each spring, eager adventurers gathered at Independence, Missouri to organize wagon trains to travel the overland Oregon Trail across the Great Plains (map 3). This early trickle of settlement was hugely accelerated by the discovery of gold in California in 1849. When gold fever swept the nation, more than 100,000 “Forty-Niners” poured into California. Although relatively few found gold, many stayed on as farmers and shopkeepers.

Utah was settled not by profit-seeking adventurers but by Mormons searching for an isolated site where they could freely worship without persecution. The journey of the Mormons to the shores of Great Salt Lake in 1847 was one of the best-organized migrations in history.

Much of the West remained unsettled even after the frontier reached the Pacific Ocean. During the Civil War (1861–65) pioneers settled in the region between the Rocky
Mountains and the Sierra Nevada, and after the war ranchers and farmers occupied the Great Plains west of the Mississippi. Cattle ranching on the open ranges involved driving herds over long distances along recognized trails (map 3), from the pasture lands to the railroad and on to market. However, the “cattle kingdom” was short-lived. The pastures became exhausted, and the Homestead Act of 1862 encouraged farmers to move from the east onto free or low-cost land. The settlers enclosed the pasture lands, barring the roving cattle herds. This settlement was greatly facilitated by the new east–west railroads (pages 186–87).

The Native Americans
As the pioneers moved westwards they ruthlessly took over land from Native Americans and fighting often broke out (map 4). The US government sent in support for the settlers and federal troops won most encounters of the so-called Indian Wars (1861–68, 1875–90). Settlement of the West largely brought an end to the traditional way of life of the Native Americans. Farmers occupied and fenced in much of the land, and white settlers moving west slaughtered buffalo herds on which many Native Americans depended for their survival. At the same time, the federal government pushed more and more Native Americans onto reservations.

In the short period of one century, the United States expanded from being an infant rural nation confined to the Atlantic coast to a transcontinental powerhouse, with a large rural and industrial population. This territorial expansion occurred at a phenomenal speed and settlement proceeded rapidly, despite formidable physical and human obstacles. Having established its own internal empire from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the USA was now in a position to challenge European supremacy on the world stage.
The American Civil War was fought between the Northern states (the Union), who wished to maintain the United States of America as one nation, and the Southern states (the Confederacy), who had seceded to form their own nation. The causes of the war included the long-standing disagreements over slavery and its expansion into the new territories, as well as conflicts over economic disparities between North and South and the division of power between the federal government and individual states.

Although slavery had been a marginal issue in the founding of the Republic, abolitionists began to attack this Southern institution in the early 19th century. Following the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which forbade slavery in the Louisiana Purchase (pages 182-83) north of 36° 30', many thought that slavery would gradually die out as the tobacco industry declined. After 1830, however, the opening up of virgin lands in the Deep South to the cotton economy (map 1), coupled with the ever-increasing demand of European textile mills for raw cotton, suddenly enhanced the value of slave labour.

The Sectional Divide

American politics began to divide according to sectional interests, focusing on the status of slavery in the new western territories. The Compromise of 1850 forbade slavery in California (map 2), while the Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 opened up these two territories to slavery—leading to much violence in Kansas. Against this background, the Republican Party was formed to prevent further expansion of slavery, although in the controversial Dred Scott decision in 1857 the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not exclude slavery from the territories.

The issue of slavery came to the forefront during the presidential election of 1860. The Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, was hostile to slavery and opposed its extension to new territories, although he had pledged not to interfere with it where it already existed. Following his election as President in 1860, however, South Carolina immediately seceded from the Union, a decision followed by Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. These seven states formed the independent Confederate States of America early in 1861 and they would be joined by four more (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas) once war was declared.

The Outbreak of War

War broke out on 12 April 1861 when Southern forces opened fire on federal-owned Fort Sumter. Arguing that secession was illegal and that the Union must be preserved, Lincoln took this as a declaration of war. Given the South’s dependence on European imports, the strategy of the North was to starve the South into submission by encirclement and blockade (map 3).

The Confederacy won some early victories in 1861–62, successfully repelling Union attempts to capture their capital at Richmond, Virginia. The Union was forced (in particular by the defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861) to disband its militia in favour of a new army of 500,000 volunteers. As the war progressed, however, both sides were forced to introduce conscription to raise troops. While the Union cause seemed imperilled in the east, in the southwest Union forces were successful in their attempt to seize control of the Mississippi, culminating in the capture of New Orleans, the largest city and most important port in the Confederacy. The Confederate attempt to invade Maryland in September 1862 was thwarted at the Battle of Antietam. This encouraged President Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January 1863, which freed all slaves in the Confederacy. Although it did not apply to Union states in which slavery was still permitted (map 2), it nevertheless gave the conflict a new moral purpose: to preserve the Union and abolish slavery. Freedom for the slaves took place gradually as the Union armies moved southwards, and the Proclamation helped break down the opposition to recruitment of African-American soldiers. By the war’s end, 186,000 of them had served in Union armies, albeit in segregated regiments under the command of white officers and at vastly reduced levels of pay.

As the war progressed, the Union’s greater manpower and superior economic and industrial resources began to prevail. The Union victory at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in July 1863 proved to be the major turning point. The Confederacy was never strong enough again to undertake another major offensive. The next day the Confederate garrison of Vicksburg, Louisiana, which had been besieged by the Unionists since mid-May, surrendered. Not only had the Confederacy suffered huge and irreplaceable losses in the east, but it was also now split in two, with Union troops controlling the Mississippi. The second half of 1863 saw further decisive battles in the west in the Tennessee campaign, with the Confederate forces being driven back into Georgia.
In 1864 the Union implemented two simultaneous campaigns. The first, centred on Virginia, saw some of the fiercest fighting of the war (map inset), with no real victory for either side, although this war of attrition gradually depleted the human and material resources of the Confederates. In the second Union campaign Atlanta was captured, followed by General Sherman’s “scorched earth” march through Georgia to Savannah and then north through the Carolinas, which caused much devastation and famine in its wake. Wilmington, the Confederates last remaining seaport, was effectively closed down at the beginning of 1865 as a result of the Union naval blockade of Southern ports. At the outset of the war, the Confederacy had believed that the demand from Britain and France for cotton would force them to enter the war on its behalf. As the war progressed, however, the two countries decided not to risk intervention for a losing cause.

The Confederate General Robert E. Lee was forced to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond, and surrender to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House on 9 April 1865, effectively ending the war. By the end of May, the last Confederate forces had laid down their arms.

**THE FIRST MODERN WAR**

In many ways the Civil War was the first “modern” war. It was fought by mass citizen volunteer and conscript armies, rather than by professional soldiers. Railroads played a crucial role in the movement of troops and raw materials, while telegraphs were used for military communication as well as for virtually immediate Press reporting. The war also saw the first use of rudimentary iron-clad battleships, machine-guns, trench systems and dugouts.

The Civil War was fought at the cost of enormous loss of life (pie charts), but it had the ultimate effect of preserving the United States of America as one nation by settling the dispute over the division of power between the federal government and individual states in favour of the former. It also effectively ended the institution of slavery, although it did little to resolve the problem of race relations, which reached a climax a century later (pages 240–41). Furthermore, as the final decades of the 19th century were to reveal, the Civil War brought many economic benefits to the North, under whose leadership the United States had developed, by the end of the century, into the world’s greatest industrial power.
During the course of the 19th century the United States was transformed from a simple agrarian republic into a modern industrial nation. This process of industrialization occurred in two main phases. In the first, from 1800 to the Civil War (1861-65), developments in transportation and manufacturing, and an increase in population, resulted in a capitalist commercial economy. In the second phase a dramatic acceleration in the rate of change after 1865 led to the creation of the modern American industrial superpower.

Early industrialization
Changes in transportation provided the main catalyst for industrialization: improved national communication created larger markets and greatly facilitated the movement of goods, services and people. The earliest manifestation of this development was the laying down of hard-surfaced roads, known as turnpikes, mainly in New England and the mid-Atlantic states. During the “Turnpike Era” (1790-1820) more than 3,200 kilometres (2,000 miles) of road were constructed, the earliest being the Lancaster Pike (1794) between Philadelphia and Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The most famous turnpike, the government-financed National Road, had crossed the Appalachian Mountains from Maryland to Virginia by 1818 and reached Illinois by 1838. These roads provided an early stimulus to economic development and westward expansion.

The turnpikes were followed by advances in river and lake transportation. The first of the commercially successful steamboats started operating on the Hudson River in 1807, but these ships became more widely used further west, travelling up and down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers and

The industries of the United States benefited from rich natural resources, particularly coal and metal ores, which were transported to the industrial regions along a network of railroads, navigable rivers and canals. Industrial conflict occurred from the 1870s onwards as workers demanded a share of the country’s increased wealth.
their tributaries. The steamboats stimulated the agricultural economies of the Midwest and the south by providing quick access to markets for their produce at greatly reduced prices, and enabled manufacturers in the east to send their finished goods westwards.

The first half of the 19th century also witnessed wide-scale building of canals. In 1816 there were only 160 kilometres (100 miles) of canal, by 1840 this figure had risen to 5,321 kilometres (3,326 miles) (map 1). The Erie Canal was completed in 1825, connecting Albany, New York to Buffalo on Lake Erie, thereby giving New York City direct access to the growing markets of Ohio and the Midwest via the Great Lakes, and to the Mississippi via the Ohio River.

The first railroad was opened between Baltimore (which funded the project) and Ohio in 1830. Other cities followed Baltimore's example, and, with the markets of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois in mind, 5,324 kilometres (3,328 miles) of track had been laid by 1840—a figure which trebled over the next ten years. In the 1860s federal land grants encouraged railroad building to link together all parts of the nation and enable the quick and inexpensive movement of goods and people over great distances (map 1).

The introduction of the telegraph in 1837 further enhanced the speed of communication. By 1861 there were 80,000 kilometres (50,000 miles) of telegraph cable in the United States, connecting New York on the Atlantic with San Francisco on the Pacific coast.

DEVELOPMENTS IN MANUFACTURING
Alongside developments in transportation, the early 19th century also saw the transition from craftwork in homes and in small shops to larger-scale manufacturing with machines. Domestic US manufacturing began to flourish when imports were scarce during the War of 1812 against Britain. The textile industry spearheaded these developments, with Francis Lowell founding, in 1813, the first mill in North America that combined all the operations of converting raw cotton into finished cloth under one roof: a “factory” system based on machine technology. These early forms of manufacturing were concentrated in the east and mainly processed the products of American farms and forests.

A primary factor in the industrial growth of the United States was an abundance of raw materials (map 2). In addition, the country benefited from a large and expanding labour force, which also provided a vast domestic market for industrial goods. By 1860 its population had reached 31.5 million, exceeding that of Britain.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
In 1860 American industry was still largely undeveloped. Most industrial operations were small in scale, hand-crafting remained widespread, and there was insufficient capital for business expansion. This situation changed fundamentally after the Civil War (pages 184–85), with the rapid development of new technologies and production processes. Machines replaced hand-crafting as the main means of manufacturing, and US productive capacity increased at a rapid and unprecedented rate. Industrial growth was chiefly centred on the north, while the south largely remained an agricultural region.

More than 25 million immigrants entered the United States between 1870 and 1916 (bar chart). Mass immigration, coupled with natural growth, caused the population to more than double between 1870 and 1910 to reach 92 million. In the new industrialized nation great cities and an urban culture flourished (map 3).

In the late 19th century mass industrialization was stimulated by a surge in technological innovation and improved factory production methods, enabling goods to be produced faster, in greater quantity and thus more cheaply than ever before. The typewriter was introduced in 1867, followed by the cash register and the adding machine. Electricity was first used as a power source in the 1870s, while international telegraph cables and the invention of the telephone assisted communication in the latter part of the century.

By 1900 the population of the United States had reached 76 million, half of whom lived in the large cities that had grown in the northern industrial region.

The pattern of migration to the United States was influenced partly by political and economic developments in Europe. Before the 1890s most immigrants came from northern and western Europe, in particular from Ireland following the Potato Famine in the 1840s, and from Germany. By 1910 the majority of migrants were from central and eastern Europe, Russia and Italy.
Since the 17th century French-speaking Canadians had largely settled along the St Lawrence River. However, in the 1770s and 1780s American Loyalists, escaping from the newly formed United States, migrated to the southwestern part of the old province of Quebec and to the British colony of Nova Scotia, necessitating the creation of another colony, New Brunswick.

In 1792 Alexander Mackenzie led an expedition from Lake Athabasca to find an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. The explorers braved the rapids of the Peace and Fraser rivers before emerging on the west coast of North America at Bella Coola the following year.

Expansion west into the prairies and along the west coast during the 19th century was preceded by journeys of exploration, which were often undertaken by fur traders. The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in 1885 provided a huge boost to trade across Canada, and numerous settlements developed along its route.

During the 18th century territorial rivalry between the French and British in North America gradually increased, coming to a head in the Seven Years War of 1756-63. Although the British initially suffered defeats, their troops rapidly gained the upper hand after the appointment of General Wolfe in 1757 and by 1760 they had effectively defeated the French. France surrendered Canada to Britain in the Treaty of Paris in 1763, and Britain found itself in the unprecedented situation of having a colony with a large white population of approximately 6,500, who were non-English-speaking and Roman Catholic. The British parliament passed the Quebec Act in 1774, which greatly enlarged the territory of Quebec (pages 164-65), guaranteed freedom of religion to French Canadians (at a time when Roman Catholic subjects in Britain were effectively excluded from political participation), and recognized the validity of French civil law. These measures succeeded in securing the loyalty of the Canadians at a time of increasing discontent in the British colonies elsewhere in America. During the American Revolution (1775-83) (pages 164-65) attempts by the Thirteen Colonies first to secure Canadian support, and then to invade the region, failed.

The creation of the United States of America had significant repercussions for Canada. It not only defined the Canadian-American border (with Britain giving up all land south of the Great Lakes) but also fundamentally altered the composition of Canada’s population. Between 40,000 and 60,000 Americans who remained loyal to the British crown flooded into Canada during and after the war, creating the basis for Canada’s English-speaking population (map 1).

The Constitutional Act of 1791
The loss of the Thirteen Colonies encouraged Britain to tighten its rule over its remaining North American possessions. Acknowledging the bicultural nature of the Canadian population and the loyalists' desire for some form of representative government, the Constitutional Act of 1791 divided Quebec into two self-ruling parts - English-speaking Upper Canada (now Ontario) and French-speaking, largely Catholic, Lower Canada (now Quebec) - dominated by a British governor and an appointed legislative council. There were also significant English-speaking pockets in Lower Canada, most notably the dominant merchant class in Montreal and farmers in the eastern townships. Canadian independence was further secured when repeated American invasions were repelled in the War of 1812.

Westward Expansion
Canada’s survival as an independent country ultimately depended on population growth and economic development. In the east, internal communications were improved in the first half of the 19th century through the construction of roads and canals. Canada’s western Pacific regions had been opened up in the last decades of the 18th century by explorers such as Alexander Mackenzie (map 2), Simon Fraser and David Thompson, with fur traders and the British Hudson’s Bay Company (which also controlled vast tracts in the northeast of the country) following swiftly behind. In the central region, south of Lake Winnipeg, settlement was encouraged by the Scottish philanthropist Lord Selkirk, who set up the Red River colony for Scottish
immigrants in 1812. Two British colonies were founded on the Pacific coast: Vancouver Island (1849) and British Columbia (1858), which united in 1866.

**From Union to Confederation**

Canadian discontent with oligarchic rule led to two short rebellions in both Upper and Lower Canada in 1837 and 1838, forcing Britain to reassess how best to keep Canada within the empire and how to unite the French and English Canadians. The resulting Act of Union of 1840 combined Upper and Lower Canada into the new Province of Canada, and by 1848 Canadians had gained a degree of self-government. Under this system, however, both Canada West and Canada East (formerly Upper and Lower Canada respectively) had equal representation in the province’s legislative assembly. This did little to ensure national unity and encouraged political stalemate; further problems arose after 1850, when the population of Canada West exceeded that of Canada East, with the former unsuccessfully demanding representation by population.

During the 1850s and 1860s calls grew to dissolve this inequitable union and to replace it with some form of federal government by which each part of Canada could control its own affairs while a central government protected national defence and common interests. Constitutional change was also spurred on by external events. Britain increasingly wanted Canadians to shoulder the burden of their own defence, while Canada felt increasingly threatened by fears of an anti-British American invasion during the American Civil War (1861–65) and by the reality of raids across its borders in the 1860s by Fenians (Irish Americans demanding Irish independence from Britain). After conferences in Charlottetown and Québec (1864), the British North America Act was signed by Queen Victoria in 1867.

This act created the largely self-governing federation of Dominion of Canada under the British crown, with a constitution based on the British parliamentary system. It initially comprised only four provinces (map 3), with a population of 3.5 million people, only 100,000 of whom lived west of the Great Lakes. The driving ambition of the “Fathers of the Confederation” was to unite all of the remaining British colonies in North America in order to achieve the economic and social development necessary for a viable nation, especially in the face of ongoing American expansionism.

In 1870 the government vastly extended Canadian territory by purchasing Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company (map 3), while the company retained its trading station and forts, it gave up its monopoly of the area which had long been difficult to enforce. The province of Manitoba was created in the same year, following the Red River Rebellion by settlers of mixed French and Native American ancestry, led by Louis Riel. In 1871 British Columbia joined as Canada’s sixth province after the promise of a transcontinental railroad (completed in 1885) linking it to eastern Canada (map 2). Similar financial incentives enabled Prince Edward Island to become the seventh province in 1873, although Newfoundland remained a proud self-governing colony until 1949.

Realizing that population growth was necessary for national survival, the Canadian government actively promoted immigration from the British Isles and the United States and, towards the end of the century, from central and eastern Europe; this once more changed the cultural and ethnic mix of Canada’s population. The new settlers moved primarily to unoccupied lands on the prairies (map 2), which enabled the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan to be created in 1905. In 1912 the remaining parts of the former Hudson’s Bay Company lands were added to Québec, Ontario and Manitoba.

**Tensions between the British and French**

The position of French Canadians as a cultural minority within the Confederation led to ongoing tension, exacerbated by Canada’s decision to send volunteer troops to fight for the British Empire in the Boer War (1899–1902). The situation reached crisis point when, in 1917, the Canadian parliament introduced conscription. Ironically, the fact that 55,000 Canadians lost their lives fighting for the empire in the First World War led ultimately to the transformation of Canada into a fully independent sovereign nation under the Statute of Westminster in 1931.
In 1800 (map 1) few people, either in Europe or the Americas, could have anticipated that 25 years later all of Spain’s mainland American colonies would be independent republics. Several colonial rebellions had occurred during the late 18th century, but they had all been defeated, and should not be interpreted as antecedents of independence. The most significant of these uprisings, in Peru, was interesting for what it revealed about the fundamental allegiances of Spanish American creoles (those of Spanish descent, born in the colonies). In 1780 a Creole revolt against Spanish tax increases was superseded by an anti-Spanish rebellion among the American Indians, led by Tupac Amaru. The small minority of creoles hastily jettisoned their own protest in favour of helping the colonial authorities to suppress this revivalist Inca movement – at the cost of 100,000 lives, most of them Indian.

CREOLE ALLEGIANCE

The creoles’ fear of the African, Indian and mixed-race peoples, who made up approximately 80 per cent of Spanish America’s population in the late 18th century, meant that many of them looked to Spain to defend their dominant social and economic position. This rationale was strengthened after a slave revolt in the French Caribbean colony of Saint Domingue in 1791 led to the founding, in 1804, of Haiti, the first African-Caribbean republic in the Americas. Most creoles calculated that their interests ultimately depended on Spain, despite an expanding list of grievances against the mother country. It was not until Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, and installed Joseph Bonaparte in place of the Bourbon King Ferdinand, that some creoles began to reconsider their options. They were presented with three main choices: to support Joseph Bonaparte; to declare allegiance to the provisional Spanish Republic; or to declare allegiance to the French Revolution, which had just overthrown the Bourbon monarchy. The latter two were more acceptable to the creoles, since they offered a chance to resolve the injustices that had built up against Spain over the years. The first two were both unsatisfactory, since they would have left the creoles in a subordinate position, either as a member of the French Empire or as a dependent of the Restoration Bourbons. The creoles’ fear of the African, Indian and mixed-race peoples, who made up approximately 80 per cent of Spanish America’s population in the late 18th century, meant that many of them looked to Spain to defend their dominant social and economic position. This rationale was strengthened after a slave revolt in the French Caribbean colony of Saint Domingue in 1791 led to the founding, in 1804, of Haiti, the first African-Caribbean republic in the Americas. Most creoles calculated that their interests ultimately depended on Spain, despite an expanding list of grievances against the mother country. It was not until Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, and installed Joseph Bonaparte in place of the Bourbon King Ferdinand, that some creoles began to reconsider their options. They were presented with three main choices: to support Joseph Bonaparte; to declare allegiance to the provisional Spanish Republic; or to declare allegiance to the French Revolution, which had just overthrown the Bourbon monarchy. The latter two were more acceptable to the creoles, since they offered a chance to resolve the injustices that had built up against Spain over the years. The first two were both unsatisfactory, since they would have left the creoles in a subordinate position, either as a member of the French Empire or as a dependent of the Restoration Bourbons. The creoles’ fear of the African, Indian and mixed-race peoples, who made up approximately 80 per cent of Spanish America’s population in the late 18th century, meant that many of them looked to Spain to defend their dominant social and economic position. This rationale was strengthened after a slave revolt in the French Caribbean colony of Saint Domingue in 1791 led to the founding, in 1804, of Haiti, the first African-Caribbean republic in the Americas. Most creoles calculated that their interests ultimately depended on Spain, despite an expanding list of grievances against the mother country. It was not until Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, and installed Joseph Bonaparte in place of the Bourbon King Ferdinand, that some creoles began to reconsider their options. They were presented with three main choices: to support Joseph Bonaparte; to declare allegiance to the provisional Spanish Republic; or to declare allegiance to the French Revolution, which had just overthrown the Bourbon monarchy. The latter two were more acceptable to the creoles, since they offered a chance to resolve the injustices that had built up against Spain over the years. The first two were both unsatisfactory, since they would have left the creoles in a subordinate position, either as a member of the French Empire or as a dependent of the Restoration Bourbons.
authorities that rapidly developed in resistance to French rule in the name of Ferdinand; or to establish autonomous ruling authorities. It was the third option that was adopted by most creoles, even though they took care to emphasize that this was a temporary measure until Ferdinand regained the Spanish throne.

Creoles were, however, dissatisfied with Spanish rule on two main counts: commercial monopoly and political exclusion, both of which stemmed from attempts in the second half of the 18th century by the Bourbon kings to extract more revenue from the colonies. Spain’s commercial monopoly had been tightened up, and Spanish Americans were unable to exploit legally what they perceived as lucrative trading opportunities in the British and US markets. Taxes had been increased and collection vigilantly enforced. A new system of colonial administration had been introduced that interfered with well-established informal mechanisms for allocating power and resources within Spanish American societies. Bourbon absolutism aimed to strengthen the position of peninsulares (Spaniards born in Spain) at the expense of Spanish Americans. By the end of the 18th century, creoles accounted for a far smaller proportion of the upper levels of the colonial bureaucracy than in 1750.

INDEPENDENCE FROM SPAIN

During the first two decades of the 19th century there was a gradually developing sense among elite creoles in Spanish America that their interests might best be served by self-government. This redefinition of their position was enhanced by an incipient sense of national identity that had been developing within creole communities throughout the 18th century - an idea of being distinct not only from Spaniards but also from each other. The political ideas of the French Enlightenment, although probably less influential in the development of independence movements than was once thought, were certainly of importance to some of their leaders, notably the Venezuelan, Simon Bolivar.

During the 1810s, as Spain oscillated between reformist liberalism and absolutism, Spanish Americans first declared, and then fought for, their independence (map 2). Nevertheless, the battles between revolutionaries and royals remained fairly evenly balanced until events in Spain during 1820–21 provided the final catalyst to the creation of a political consensus among creoles that was needed to secure independence. Once it had become clear that Spanish liberalism, which returned to power in 1821, was bent on restoring the pre-1808 relationship between Spain and the American colonies, commitment to independence became widespread throughout Spanish America - with the exception of Peru, where memories of the Tupac Amaru rebellion remained vivid. Peru was eventually liberated in 1824 by Bolivar’s troops, after the retreat of the Spanish had been initiated by an invasion from the south led by the Argentine Jose de San Martin. By 1826 the last royalist troops had been expelled from South America, and Spain’s empire in the Americas was reduced to Puerto Rico and Cuba (map 3).

INDEPENDENCE FROM PORTUGAL

Brazil’s independence was partly the result of colonial grievances, although less severe than those felt by Spanish Americans. However, in overall terms, it was even more attributable to events in Europe than was the decolonization of Spanish America. The Portuguese monarchy implemented milder versions of the Bourbon reforms in the late 18th century, but in general the local elite played a far greater role in governing Brazil than their counterparts in Spain’s colonies. The main event which triggered an increasing awareness of Brazil’s distinct identity was the Portuguese Prince Regent’s establishment of his court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, after he had fled from Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal. This represented a shift in political power from Portugal to Brazil which was to prove irreversible. When the French were ousted from Portugal in 1814, the Prince Regent chose to stay in Brazil, which was raised to the status of a kingdom equal to that of Portugal. As King John, landowners presented his bowing to British pressure to end the slave trade, while merchants were unhappy about increasing British penetration of the Brazilian market, but these issues were causes of disaffection rather than rebellion. It was attempts by the Portuguese government in 1821 to return Brazil to its pre-1808 colonial status that was the main cause of its declaration of independence in 1822 under Pedro I - the region’s only constitutional monarchy. Brazil was unique in that it won its independence largely without the damaging consequences of civil war and economic collapse that occurred elsewhere in the region. In Spanish America mineral production plummeted to less than a quarter of its level before its independence struggles, industrial output declined by two-thirds, and agriculture by half. Socially, independence brought relatively little change. The corporate institutions of Spanish colonialism remained intact, the Church remained strong, and militarism was strengthened. Creoles simply took over the property abandoned by fleeing Spaniards and established themselves as a new oligarchy, which regarded the masses with at least as much disdain as their Spanish predecessors had done.
In the years following independence most countries became involved in wars over their boundaries. Argentina lost the Falkland Islands to the British in 1833, but secured Patagonia in 1881. Both Peru and Bolivia lost out to Chile in the War of the Pacific in 1879, surrendering territory rich in nitrates and, in Bolivia's case, an outlet to the sea.

The newly independent republics of Spanish America faced formidable challenges of reconstruction in the years following their wars of independence. The first problem was territorial consolidation. Their boundaries were roughly based on colonial administrative divisions, but none was clearly defined, and nearly all Spanish-American countries went to war to defend territory at some point during the 19th century (map 1). The only nation on the continent that consistently expanded its territory at the expense of its neighbours was Brazil.

**Foreign intervention**

Foreign powers were active in the region throughout this period, and acted as a significant constraint on the ability of the new states to consolidate their sovereignty. Spain was too weak to do much beyond defending its remaining colonial possessions, but it fought two wars over Cuban independence (1868-78 and 1895-98) before US military intervention in 1898 led to the Spanish-American War and the secession of Cuba and Puerto Rico to the United States. Following a three-year military occupation Cuba was declared an independent republic, albeit with a clause in its constitution (the "Platt Amendment") stipulating the right of the USA to intervene in its internal affairs.

Mexico, which achieved independence in 1821 following a civil war, subsequently lost large amounts of territory to the USA. It was briefly ruled by the Austro-Hungarian, Maximilian von Habsburg, as emperor (1864-67), supported by French troops. Britain had colonies in Guiana and British Honduras, and consolidated its commercial and financial dominance throughout most of the region, especially in Brazil and Argentina.

**Economic developments**

Throughout the 19th century Latin American economies remained dependent on the export of raw materials (maps 1, 2 and 3), continuing patterns of production established in colonial times. Although there has been considerable debate about the wisdom of this policy, in practice they had little choice. The colonial powers had left behind a tenuous basis for the creation of self-sufficient economies, and the independent states simply did not have the resources necessary for such development. Attempts were made to encourage industrialization in Mexico, Colombia and Brazil in the 1830s and 1840s, but they all succumbed to competition from European imports.

The export of primary products brought considerable wealth to Latin America, especially once the development of steamships and railways in the 1860s had modernized transportation. In the last quarter of the 19th century Latin American economies were able to benefit from the overall expansion in the world economy fuelled by European and US demands for raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods (pages 208-9). At the time it made economic sense for Latin America to exploit its comparative advantage in the world market as a supplier of raw materials. Although this strategy later proved to be flawed, it did result in rapid economic growth and a wave of prosperity among Latin American elites in what became known as "la belle époque" of Latin American development (c. 1880-1914).

On the eve of the First World War, the region was producing 18 per cent of the world's cereals, 38 per cent of its sugar and 62 per cent of its coffee, cocoa and tea.
ELITIST POLITICS

Politics in 19th-century Latin America was entirely an elite affair, with electoral contests typically involving at most ten per cent of the population and dominated by rivalry between liberals and conservatives. Most of the republics had adopted liberal constitutions based on that of the United States, but these were to prove an inadequate blueprint for the authoritarian reality of Latin American politics.

The major challenge in most countries was to consolidate central state authority over remote and often rebellious areas. Until well into the 1850s local leaders, known as caudillos, raised armies to fight for their interests, holding sway over their followers by a combination of charisma, blandishment and brutality. In these circumstances, many liberal statesmen found themselves obliged to pursue distinctly illiberal policies. As the century wore on, Latin American liberalism, which came to power in most Latin American countries during the 1850s and 1860s, took on an increasingly conservative cast. One distinctive legacy of liberalism was an appreciable reduction in the wealth of the Catholic Church, particularly in Mexico, although liberals did not succeed in diminishing the religious devotion of the majority of the populations.

SOCIAL CHANGES

Conditions barely improved for the Latin American masses. Indeed, American Indians had good reason to feel that their plight had been less onerous under colonial rule, when they had at least enjoyed a degree of protection from the Spanish crown against encroachments on their communal lands. The attempts of liberal governments to turn Indian peasants into smallholders by forcibly redistributing their lands left most Indians worse off, particularly those in Mexico.

Slavery was abolished in Central America as early as 1824 (map J), and in the Spanish South American republics during the 1850s (map I), but it continued in Portuguese-dominated Brazil, where a weak emperor was reluctant to antagonize the powerful plantation owners. Brazil did not pass legislation to end the trade in slaves until 1850 and it took until 1868 – the year before Brazil declared itself a republic – for slavery itself to be abolished. Even in conditions of allegedly “free” labour, however, the lack of alternative work meant that many former slaves had little choice but to join a floating rural proletariat, subject to seasonal work in exchange for pitiful wages.

During the middle part of the 19th century the populations of most Latin American countries more than doubled (bar chart), and by the end of the century Latin America’s integration into the world economy was beginning to bring about changes in the socio-economic structure which independence had not. Urbanization, industrialization and their consequences continued from the 1880s onwards. The late 19th century saw the emergence of a middle class based on professionals and state bureaucrats. Trade unions among the working classes – most of which were organized by European immigrants to Argentina or Brazil – first became active during this period, and public education programmes were initiated in the larger countries. It was not until after the First World War, however, that the political consequences of all these socio-economic changes were to manifest themselves.
An English East India Company fleet first reached India in 1608 and, over the course of the next century, the Company developed its trade steadily around the coasts of the subcontinent. It quickly established trading posts, known as "factories", starting at Surat in 1619 and followed by Madras in 1634, Bombay in 1674 and Calcutta in 1690.

Although originally entering the "Indies" trade in pursuit of spices, the Company made most of its fortune from cotton textiles, whose manufacture was highly developed in India. However, until the second quarter of the 18th century, there was little to suggest that the British presence in India heralded an empire. Europeans in general were economically outweighed by indigenous trading and banking groups and were politically subordinate to the great Mughal Empire (pages 144-45).

The turning point, which was to lead to British supremacy in India, came only in the mid-18th century when the Mughal Empire began to break up into warring regional states, whose needs for funds and armaments provided opportunities for the Europeans to exploit. Another factor was the growing importance of the English East India Company's lucrative trade eastwards towards China, which enhanced its importance in the Indian economy, especially in Bengal.

BRITISH-FRENCH RIVALRY
Conflicts between the European powers started to spill over into Asia, with the French and British beginning a struggle for supremacy that was not finally resolved until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. In southern India from 1746 the British and French backed rival claimants to the Nawabi of Arcot. In the course of their conflict Robert Clive, who rose from a clerkship to command the English East India Company's armies and govern Bengal, introduced new techniques of warfare borrowed from Europe. These not only prevailed against the French but opened up new possibilities of power in the Indian subcontinent.

In 1756 Siraj-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Bengal, reacted to the growing pretensions of the British by sacking their "factory" at Calcutta and consigning some of their officers to the infamous "Black Hole". Clive's forces moved north in response and defeated Siraj-ud-Daula's army at Plassey in 1757 (map 1). This created an opportunity for the conversion of the Company's economic influence in Bengal into political power; the defeat of the residual armies of the Mughal emperor at Buxar in 1764 completed this process.

However, it was to take another 50 years for the British to extend their dominion beyond Bengal, and a further 100 years for the limits of their territorial expansion to be established. First, they faced rivalry from other expanding Indian states which had also adopted the new styles of warfare, most notably Tipu Sultan's Mysore (defeated in 1799) and the Maratha Confederacy (defeated in 1818). It was not until the annexation of Punjab in 1849 that the last threat to the Company's hegemony was extinguished (map 2). Even after this, the process of acquisition was continued: smaller states that had once been "subsidiary" allies were gobbled up and Baluchistan and Burma were brought under British control, in 1876 and 1886 respectively, as a means of securing unstable borders (map 3).

Nor was political stability within the empire in India achieved with any greater ease. Most notably, in 1857 the "Great Mutiny" of Indian soldiers in the Bengal army saw the British lose control of the central Ganges Valley and face rebellion in the heartland of their empire.

EFFECTS OF BRITISH RULE
The carrying forward of the imperial project in the face of so many problems was a reflection of the importance attached to India by the British. In the course of the 19th century it became "the jewel in the crown" of the British Empire, to which it was formally annexed in 1858 when the English East India Company was dissolved. Although there was little "white" settlement and most of its economy

THE BRITISH IN INDIA
1608–1920
The rapid growth of India's railway network was an important factor in the transition from subsistence farming to commercial agriculture. As it became easier to transport produce from the countryside to the ports so the demands of the British market for specific products came to be reflected in the crops grown. During the American Civil War (1861-65), for example, when the supply of raw American cotton to the Lancashire cotton mills dried up, many Indian farmers switched to cotton production. When the war ended and the mills reverted to American cotton, the Indian market collapsed, leaving farmers unable to return to food production.

and key social institutions remained in indigenous hands, India was manipulated to yield singular advantages to Britain. Its most significant role was to supply a large army which was extensively used for imperial defence around the world. In addition, India became a captive market for the products of Britain's industrial revolution, a major exporter of agricultural commodities and an important area for the investment of British capital, especially in the rapidly expanding railway network (map 4).

What effects British rule had on India remains a controversial question. The agricultural economy grew, with expanding foreign trade and British capital providing the rudiments of a modern transport infrastructure. However, the once-great textile industry declined and few other industries rose to take its place. Ambiguity also marked British social policy. A strong imperative, especially from the 1840s onwards, was to "civilize" India along Western lines, introducing "scientific" education, a competitive market economy and Christian ethics. However, a conservative view held by some in the British administration in India warned against disturbing "native" custom. After the Mutiny, such conservative counsels won out and were reinforced by a deepening British racism, which denied equal rights to Indian subjects of the British monarch.

The reactions of Indian society to British rule were extremely mixed. Some groups mounted a ferocious defence of their traditional rights, but others responded positively to what they regarded as modernizing trends, especially taking up Western education. For such groups, the racism of the late-Victorian British and their turning away from earlier liberal ideals proved disappointing and frustrating. An Indian National Congress had been formed in 1885 to advance the cause of Indians within the empire. However, by the early 1900s it had already begun to reject the politics of loyalism and to express more fundamental objections. As the shadow of the First World War fell across the Indian landscape, the British Empire, which had succeeded in bringing India into the 19th century, was fast losing its claims to lead it through the 20th. In 1920-22, shortly after the war, Mahatma Gandhi launched the first of the mass civil disobedience campaigns which signalled the beginning of the end of British rule in India.
The outbreak of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Europe in April 1792 marked the beginning of a more intense European imperial involvement with Southeast Asia—an involvement which reached its peak between 1870 and 1914. By then nearly the whole of Southeast Asia was under European rule, the major exception being Chakri-ruled Siam (modern Thailand).

**British, Dutch and Spanish colonialism**

Britain's emergence as the leading commercial and seaborne power in the region was confirmed after 1795 when its naval forces, operating from Madras and Penang in the Strait of Malacca, captured Dutch East India Company possessions throughout the Indonesian archipelago. By 1815 Britain controlled Java and the Spice Islands (Moluccas), and was soon to establish itself in Singapore (1819) and in Arakan and Tenasserim in Lower Burma following the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) (map 1). Although Java was handed back to Holland in 1816, Dutch power in Indonesia remained totally dependent on British naval supremacy until the Second World War.

Commerically and militarily Britain owed much to India. British India (pages 194–95) provided the troops for its colonial conquests in Southeast Asia, and Bengal opium was the mainstay of Britain's lucrative trade with China (pages 198–99). Between 1762, when the English East India Company was granted a permanent trading post in Canton (Guangzhou), and the 1820s, when Assam tea production began, total Bengal opium exports increased 1,500 per cent from 1,400 to 20,000 chests per annum, and exports of Chinese tea tripled from 7,000 to over 20,000 tonnes. Britain's interest in Southeast Asia in this period was driven by its need to find trade goods saleable in Canton in exchange for tea, and by its desire to protect its sea lanes.

Elsewhere, before the 1860s, European expansion was slow. Dutch control of fertile Java was only consolidated following the bitterly fought Java War (1825–30), and Dutch finances only improved following the introduction of the "Cultivation System" (1830–70). This required Javanese peasants to grow cash crops (mainly sugar, coffee and indigo) for sale at very low prices to the colonial government. By 1877 this had produced 832 million guilders for the Dutch home treasury, which represented over 30 per cent of Dutch state revenues. In the Philippines, Spanish power was checked in Muslim-dominated Mindanao and Sulu by the strength of the local sultans, while on the main
island of Luzon, the seat of Spanish colonial authority since the late 16th century, the emergence of an educated mixed-race Filipino-Spanish-Chinese elite, known as the *ilustrados* (*the enlightened ones*), began to challenge the political predominance of the Iberian-born friars and the Madrid-appointed colonial administrators.

**SOUTHEAST ASIAN RESISTANCE**

The existence of newly established dynasties and kingdoms, especially in mainland Southeast Asia, complicated the task of the European colonialists. From the mid-18th century onwards Burma, Siam and Vietnam had all experienced extensive political renewal under the leadership of new dynasties. This encompassed a revitalization of Theravada Buddhism and Confucianism; the subjugation of minority populations to new state-sponsored forms of culture, religion, language and governance; the development of Chinese-run revenue farms and commercial monopolies; and the limited acquisition of Western military technology.

The principal reason for the British annexation of Lower Burma between the 1820s and 1850s was to check the expansionist policies of a succession of Konbaung monarchs. French involvement in Indochina, which began with the capture of Da Nang in 1858, was spurred by the anti-Catholic pogroms initiated by the Vietnamese emperor Minh-mang (r. 1820–41) and his successors.

The political and cultural self-confidence of the Southeast Asian rulers went hand in hand with rapid economic and demographic growth. After a century of stagnation, the exports of Southeast Asia's three key commodities (pepper, coffee and sugar) increased by 4.7 per cent per year between 1780 and 1820, with Aceh alone accounting for over half the world's supply of pepper - 9,000 tonnes – by 1824. In the same period the region's population more than doubled to over nine million. This meant that when the Europeans began to move in force against the indigenous states of Southeast Asia after 1850, they encountered fierce resistance. It took the Dutch 30 years (1873–1903) to overcome Acehnese resistance, and when the British eventually moved into Upper Burma in November 1885 and overthrew the Konbaung monarchy, it required another five years of sustained operations to pacify the remaining guerrilla fighters.

In the Philippines the emergence unleashed by the emergence of indigenous resistance movements proved too much for the incumbent colonial administration. Two years (1896–98) of armed struggle by the *ilustrado*-led Filipino revolutionaries brought the Spanish administration to its knees and facilitated the intervention of the United States, which acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris (December 1898). However, three more years were to pass before the military forces of the Philippine Republic were finally subdued in a series of bitter campaigns which required the deployment of over 60,000 American troops.

**NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS**

Apart from the Chakri monarchs in Siam (whose power lasted until 1932) none of the Southeast Asian dynasties survived the height of Western imperialism intact (map 2). Instead, new Western-educated elites emerged to take their place, eventually demanding political rights and recognition of what they saw as legitimate nationalist aspirations.

Between 1906 and 1908 the foundation of the Young Men's Buddhist Association in Rangoon and the "Beautiful Endeavour" (Boedi Oetomo) organization of Javanese medical students in Batavia (Jakarta) led to the development of more radical forms of nationalism. In Vietnam this took the form of the anti-French agitation of the "Confucian scholar activists", such as Phan Chu Trinh and Pham Boi Chau, both of whom advocated the use of violence against the colonial state. Meanwhile, Japan's victory over tsarist Russia in 1904–5 (pages 200–1) had given the lie to the myth of Western superiority. The fact that Western colonial authority rested for the most part on very small numbers of troops and armed police – 42,000 for a population of 62 million in the case of the Dutch in Indonesia – made it vulnerable both to external attack and internal subversion. The rise of Japanese militarism during this period and the emergence of increasingly well-organized Southeast Asian nationalist movements sounded its death knell.

**The heyday of Western imperialism in Southeast Asia was brief, but it left a problematic legacy.** The introduction by the colonialists of Western-style bureaucracies, education, capitalist means of production and communications systems – especially the telegraph (which was introduced into Southeast Asia in 1870–71), railways and steamships – led to the demise of older monarchical forms of authority and the rise of Western-educated, nationalist elites.
The First Opium War was the British response to attempts by the Qing rulers to restrict trade to the government-monitored custom houses of Canton (Guangzhou), and to ban the damaging import of opium. British gunships bombarded Chinese ports along the full length of its coast in 1840 and again in 1841–42, even venturing up the Yangtze to Nanjing, until the Chinese agreed peace terms which allowed for the opening up of "treaty ports." Not satisfied with the outcome, however, the British joined forces with the French in 1856 to exact further concessions in the Second Opium War. China was defeated again by the French in 1885, and lost control of Korea to the Japanese in 1895.

China’s Trade Deficit with India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Value of Imports from India</th>
<th>Total Value of Opium Imported</th>
<th>Total Value of Exports to India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800-1837</td>
<td>1,200,000 pounds</td>
<td>500,000 pounds</td>
<td>300,000 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838-1870</td>
<td>2,000,000 pounds</td>
<td>600,000 pounds</td>
<td>350,000 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-1880</td>
<td>3,000,000 pounds</td>
<td>700,000 pounds</td>
<td>500,000 pounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the period 1800–37 the total value of imports from the English East India Company increased steadily, while Chinese exports remained fairly static. Opium imports grew during this period, leading the Chinese to impose restrictions and the British to use force in order to protect their market. Following the defeat of China in the Opium War of 1840–42, the value of opium imported more than doubled.

During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 the Chinese defenders were easily overcome by the more modern weaponry of the invading Japanese. As a result of the defeat, China was forced to cede the island of Taiwan to Japan.

The 19th century was a turbulent period for China, during which the Western powers posed an ever-increasing threat to the sovereignty of the Manchu dynasty. With most of South and Southeast Asia already colonized, China represented the final target in the Asian world. China had enjoyed sizeable surpluses in trade with the West since the 17th century, exporting increasing amounts of raw materials – in particular tea, sugar and raw silk – in the face of growing competition from Japan and India. However, it had also become economically dependent on the West, as it had few precious metals and needed the inflow of silver from foreign trade to facilitate the expansion of its internal trade. In 1760 the Manchu Qing government had restricted the activities of foreign traders to just four ports, thus facilitating the collection of duties from these traders. By the late 18th century this had led to a system under which Canton (Guangzhou) was the sole port for foreign trade and all activities had to go through the government-monitored chartered trading houses (cohung). Westerners attempted, but failed, to persuade the Qing government to reform its restrictive policies, and it became clear that such policies could not be shaken off by peaceful means as long as Qing sovereignty remained intact.

### The Opium Wars

Western traders soon found ways to get around the cohung system, and smuggling was widely practised. More significantly, the British discovered an ideal commodity to sell in China: opium. In the China–India–Britain trade triangle, China’s tea exports were no longer offset by silver bullion but by opium, and from the beginning of the 19th century a balance of trade rapidly developed in favour of the English.
During the Taiping Rebellion the Qing lost control of much of China's most fertile region, resulting in a 70 per cent drop in tax revenues. The Qing army was largely unsuccessful against the rebels, which were only crushed with the aid of Western troops. East India Company (graph). China's hard-earned silver began to flow out in large quantities, causing severe deflation in the economy. The Manchu Qing, who did not want to see the resulting loss of tax revenue, responded by imposing a total ban on the opium trade. This triggered the invasion, in 1840, of British gunships, against which the Qing armed forces proved to be no match. The First Opium War (map 1) came to an end in 1842 when, under the Treaty of Nanjing, the victorious British secured the lifting of the ban on the opium trade and the opening up to trade of the "treaty ports" (map 2). The state monopoly was over.

The events of 1840 heralded the end of China as a world power in the 19th century. British and French allied forces extracted further concessions from China in the Second Opium War in 1856-60 (map 1), while the Russians annexed around 1 million square kilometres (386,000 square miles) of Chinese Siberia north of the River Amur, and further territory in Turkestan. Furthermore, China's control over its "vassal states" in Southeast Asia was weakened when Annam became a French colony after the Sino-French War in 1883-85, and China was forced to relinquish control of Korea after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95 (map 1).

These successive military and diplomatic defeats cost the Chinese Empire dearly in terms of growing trade deficits and of mounting foreign debts, mainly incurred by war reparations. China was forced to adopt what amounted to a free-trade policy. By the end of the 19th century a series of treaties had resulted in the country being largely divided up by the foreign powers (map 2). Although China remained technically independent, its sovereignty was ruthlessly violated - a situation that led to the anti-foreign, anti-Christian Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901.

**INTERNAL STRIFE**

Partly as a result of the numerous concessions made to the foreign powers, there was an upsurge in nationalism and in the widespread antipathy to the Qing rulers, who originated from Manchuria and were therefore not considered "Chinese". In the struggle for their own survival, the Qing rulers leaned increasingly towards the West, relying on Western troops, for example, to help suppress the Taiping Rebellion (map 3). However, while employing the support of the West delayed the demise of the Manchu Qing government for half a century, in the long term it proved a fatal strategy. In 1911 the Nationalists, who until then had been only loosely organized, rose up in armed rebellion (map 4). The revolution began in Hankou on 10 October 1911, and although the Qing troops recaptured the city on 27 November, the movement to secure independence had by this time already spread across southeast and central China. Bowing to pressure from the Western powers, whose trading interests were likely to be disrupted by civil war, the Qing emperor signed a truce with the rebels on 18 December, which stipulated his abdication and the elevation of his general, Yuan Shikai, to the position of President. The independent provinces recognized Nanjing as their new capital, and elected the Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen as provisional President on 1 January 1912, although he stepped down on 14 February in favour of Yuan Shikai.
THE MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN
1867–1937

As part of the plan to modernize Japan after the restoration of the emperor in 1867, the feudal domains were abolished and replaced by centrally administered prefectures. By 1930 the economy had been transformed into one characterized by urbanization and industrialization.

Japanese acquisitions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries included the Korean Peninsula and the island of Taiwan, both of which provided raw materials for the industrializing Japanese economy. In 1932 Japan added to its overseas possessions by advancing into Manchuria.

The collapse of the Tokugawa regime in 1867 initiated a period of momentous change in Japan, in which society, the economy and politics were transformed. After more than 200 years of isolation, in the 20th century Japan emerged onto the world stage as a major power.

The new leaders believed that to achieve equality with the nations of the West, Japan had to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, and for this it needed a viable and modern military capability, backed up by a modern industrial sector. It would be a mistake to exaggerate the role of the state in the transformation of Japan into a modern industrial power. However, the government played a leading role in setting the tone for change and in laying the framework within which non-government enterprises could take the initiative.

A NEW CONSTITUTION

The new government moved swiftly, rapidly disbanding the old caste hierarchy, abolishing the domains (pages 140–41), and ruling the country from the centre through a system of prefectures (map 1). All this was done in the name of the emperor, who had been the focus of the anti-Tokugawa movement. However, disagreement within the new ruling oligarchy, and problems in dismantling the social, economic and political structures of the Tokugawa government, meant that the new imperial constitution did not take effect until 1890. The constitutional structure arrived at involved maintaining a balance of power between the various elites: the emperor, the political parties within the diet (legislative assembly), the privy council, the military and the bureaucracy. This system remained in place until 1945, with different groups dominant within it at different times.

Democratic participation was limited. Universal male suffrage was not granted until 1925, women were barred from political life, and there were draconian restrictions on labour activity as well as on ideologies and organizations deemed to be potentially subversive. The concept of the "family state" was promoted, according to which the emperor – said to be descended from ancient deities – was the benevolent patriarch of the Japanese. Any criticism of the "emperor-given" constitution was regarded as treason.

Three emperors reigned under this constitution: the Meiji Emperor (r. 1867–1912), who became identified with the national push for change; the Taisho Emperor (r. 1912–26), who was mentally impaired and made no lasting impact; and the Showa Emperor (Hirohito), who took over as regent from his father in 1921, and reigned in his own right from 1926 until his death in 1989.
Modernization of the Economy

In their efforts to compete with the West, Japan’s leaders studied and imitated Western economies, borrowing ideas as they saw fit. The legal and penal systems and the military were all remodelled along Western lines. Financial and commercial infrastructures were “westernized”, and transport networks were improved; railway mileage, for example, expanded rapidly (map 2 and graph). A system of compulsory education was implemented from the turn of the century. Agricultural output (based on rice) increased substantially, and then levelled off from the First World War (1914–18) onwards, but there was sustained growth in commercial agricultural products, especially silk cocoons.

Up to 1914 manufacturing remained largely focused on handicraft production of traditional products for the domestic market, which in turn enabled capital accumulation for the growth of larger-scale, mechanized production. By the end of the Meiji period, factory-based silk reeling and cotton spinning were both major export industries, and the first heavy industrial plants had been established. The First World War gave a major boost to manufacturing growth, and after 1918 the industrial structure was transformed. By 1930 the percentage of the population in many prefectures working on the land or in fishing had fallen substantially (map 1). The relative contribution of agriculture to the Gross National Product had declined dramatically. The service sector had grown, and light industry (especially textiles), while remaining crucial in exports, had been gradually overtaken by heavy industry.

During the 1920s and 1930s some industrial sectors came to be dominated by business groupings called zaibatsu, who controlled multiple enterprises and huge assets. Some zaibatsu came under force attack in the wake of the Depression (1929–33), when falling prices and general instability brought agricultural crisis in some areas, and increasing internal political conflict. Despite the growth of the Japanese economy in the 1930s, living standards were squeezed and the distribution of benefits was unequal.

Japan and the World

One of the most pressing concerns of the new government was to rid the country of the “unequal treaties” imposed on Japan by the Western powers towards the end of the Tokugawa period. These treaties, forcing Japan to open its ports to trade with the West, had been an important contributory factor in the collapse of the Tokugawa regime. Japan eventually achieved a revision of the treaties in 1894, and in 1902 an alliance was concluded with Britain. Relations with her neighbours were rarely harmonious, however, as Japan gradually encroached on their sovereignty (map 3). Conflict with China over interests in Korea brought war between the two countries in 1894–95, resulting in a Japanese victory and the acquisition of Taiwan (Formosa). Tension with Russia culminated in the war of 1904–5. Although the Japanese victory was less than clear-cut, it gave Japan a foothold in Manchuria and the freedom to annex Korea as a colony in 1910. In all its overseas territories, but particularly in Korea, Japanese rule was harsh.

Relations with China remained tense as Japan sought to obtain increasing concessions in the wake of the 1911 Revolution, and to strengthen her control of Manchuria, regarded by the Chinese as an integral part of China’s territory (pages 224–25). In 1927 Japanese troops in Manchuria were involved in the murder of a leading warlord, and in 1931 engineered an “incident”, in the wake of which the Japanese army, acting initially without the sanction of Tokyo, occupied the territory. The following year the puppet state of Manchukuo was established. Tension between Japan and China finally erupted into full-scale war in 1937.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND SINCE 1790

The history of both Australia and New Zealand long predates the arrival of Europeans in the late 18th century. Australia had been inhabited by its Aboriginal population for around 60,000 years, while New Zealand had been home to the Polynesian Maori (who called it Aotearoa) for around 1,000 years. Between the 17th century and the 19th century, Australia and New Zealand were developed as white settler colonies, primarily by British settlers. This development was facilitated by the introduction of the penal system, which sent around 750,000 convicts to Australia in the 19th century. New Zealand, however, was initially treated by the British as an appendage of New South Wales. It only became a separate colony following the controversial Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.

BREAKING TIES WITH BRITAIN

Until the 1950s both Australia and New Zealand retained close political ties with Britain, fighting alongside Britain in the two world wars. Britain’s inability to defend the region adequately during the Second World War, however, encouraged both the United States and the Commonwealth to enter into defensive arrangements with the United States, leading to the ANZUS Pact of 1951.

THE GROWING ECONOMY

Initially, economic activity in Australia was confined to whaling, fishing and sealing, but in the early 1820s a route was developed to the inland plains and, with access to vast expanses of pastoral land, newly arrived free settlers turned to sheep-rearing. The wool they exported to Britain became the basis of Australia’s economy, and further colonies based on this trade were established over the next three decades in Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland.

The ever-increasing demand for pasture brought the settlers into conflict with the Aboriginal population. As well as seizing land and using violence against the Aborigines, the settlers carried with them alien diseases such as smallpox and influenza. These imported diseases had disastrous consequences for the indigenous population, whose numbers certainly declined (to an extent that can only be estimated) and would continue to do so until the 1930s (bar chart). Large-scale immigration of non-convict, mainly British, settlers accelerated from the 1830s, as more agricultural territory was opened up (map 2). It was further encouraged by gold strikes in the 1850s. The development of overseas trade, dependent on coastal ports, and the expansion of mining industries helped to foster an increasingly urban society. Australia’s population grew dramatically from 405,000 in 1850 to 4 million by the end of the century.

The Australian colonies developed political systems based on that in Britain, and most became self-governing during the 1850s. The creation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 promoted freer trade between the states based on that in Britain, and most became self-governing during the 1850s. The creation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 promoted freer trade between the states.
Australia's economy expanded during the 19th century as territory in the east was opened up to dairy farming and, in Queensland, to sugar cultivation. The success of the colony of South Australia, founded in 1836, was based on wool and grain production, and by the 1860s wheat had become an important export product. Such cultivation, however, contributed to the huge decline in the Aboriginal population.

Although New Zealand's economy suffered during the collapse in commodity prices in the 1880s and early 1890s, the government borrowed heavily to subsidize public works, including the railway system. These measures encouraged immigration and led to a decline in the proportion of the population who were Maori - a trend that was reversed somewhat after the 1930s.

Economic ties with Britain also declined after 1945, especially once Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973. Australia and New Zealand have increasingly focused on economic diversification and in developing ties with the United States, Japan and other countries of the "Pacific Rim" (pages 242-43).

Maori and Aboriginal rights
One of the most important recent political developments has been campaigns in both New Zealand and Australia to achieve fairer treatment for the Maori and Aboriginal populations. A cultural reawakening among the Maori was evident by the beginning of the 20th century (in the Ratana movement), and Maori political campaigning began in earnest in the 1920s and 1930s. Participation in the Second World War, urbanization and reviving population figures (bar chart) helped strengthen Maori assertiveness, and in the 1970s legislation was introduced to address grievances dating back to the Treaty of Waitangi. It took another 20 years and further protests, however, before any land was returned to the Maori, most of whom inhabit North Island.

Australia's Aborigines had begun to assert their identity and demand an end to discrimination during the 1930s, but it was not until 1967 that they won equal citizenship. In the early 1970s the federal authorities began to promote the return of land to Aboriginal communities, but although the number of Aborigines is rising, they remain the most disadvantaged sector of Australian society.
At the beginning of the 19th century the interior of the African continent was little known to outsiders, although there had been contact with the wider world since antiquity, especially through trading activity. The North African coastal region was firmly integrated into Mediterranean trading systems, while well-established trans-Saharan trading routes (map 1), based on exchanges of slaves, salt, gold and cloth, secured the dominance of Islam from the north coast to West Africa.

As the century progressed, trade in West Africa continued to be orientated to the north, but the Atlantic slave trade, initiated by the Portuguese in the 16th century, became an increasing focus of economic activity. It is estimated that over 12 million slaves were despatched to the Americas between 1450 and 1870, of whom a quarter were exported during the 19th century. The political, social and economic reverberations of European competition for slaves along the west and central African Atlantic coast extended far into the interior. Slaves were exchanged for firearms, metal goods, beads and other manufactured goods. With the formal abolition by Britain of the slave trade in 1807 (and despite the defiance by other European countries of this ban for many years after), ivory, rubber, palm oil, cloth and agricultural products assumed over greater importance as trading commodities.

In East Africa trading activities were somewhat less developed, as was urbanization and the formation of states. Nevertheless, Indian Ocean ports such as Mombasa, Bagamoyo, Kilwa and Quelimane were important in bringing Bantu-speaking Africans into commercial contact with Arabs, Indians and Portuguese (map 1). The slave trade in this region remained relatively unaffected by its formal illegality until the latter part of the 19th century.

ENCROACHMENTS BY EUROPEANS
At the start of the 19th century the European presence in Africa was largely restricted to the coastal regions of northern, western and southern Africa. The French invaded the Algerian coast in 1830 and also established a presence on the west coast. Spain had been in control of the Moroccan ports of Ceuta and Melilla since the 16th century. The Portuguese were in possession of large parts of Angola and Mozambique. In West Africa, British interests were expanding into the hinterland from the slave-trading regions of present-day Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana. British influence in the region was consolidated after 1807, when the Royal Navy took on the role of enforcing an end to the slave trade and merchants extended the domain of legitimate commerce. A major area of British expansion was in southern Africa, where the Cape Colony was wrested from Dutch control in 1806. The frontiers of this settler society expanded throughout the 19th century and a second British colony, Natal, in the east of the region, was established in 1845.

AFRICAN POLITICS
Dynamic changes occurred, sometimes intensified by European contact, at other times with little reference to encroachment from the outside. In southern Africa the mfecane migrations, occasioned by the rise of the Zulu state...
during the 1820s, caused a massive dispersal of population throughout the region and resulted in the emergence of several new polities or nations, such as those of the Kololo, the Ndebele, the Swazi and the Ngoni (map 1). This political turbulence was exacerbated by the arrival in the southern African interior from the 1830s onwards of migrant Boer Voortrekkers, attempting to escape control by British colonists. They sought to establish independent states, largely in territory depopulated as a result of the zulu in Natal, most spectacularly at the Battle of Blood River in 1838. Many moved on again when the British annexed the republic of Natal in 1845.

In West Africa the advance of Islam, associated with the Fulani jihad of 1804, resulted in the disintegration of long-established kingdoms, such as the Yoruba empire of Oyo and the Bambara state of Segu, though the Fulani were resisted in Borno. By the 1860s the Fulani caliphate of Sokoto was pre-eminent in the region, having absorbed much of Hausaland into its aegis.

In Egypt the autocratic modernization strategy adopted by Muhammad Ali in the early decades of the century transformed this province of the Ottoman Empire into an independent state in all but name; Egyptian authority was extended southwards and the Sudan was invaded in 1820–22 in order to secure the upper Nile and find a more reliable source of slaves.

Around Lake Victoria in East Africa, the kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro and Karagwe were linked by the trading activities of the Nyamwezi to the Swahili- and Arab-dominated coastal region, extending outwards from Zanzibar. To the north, in Ethiopia, the ancient Christian state centred on Axum was fragmented and in disarray until the mid-19th century. Thereafter, under the leadership of John IV and Menelik II, the Ethiopian Empire underwent consolidation and expansion; Ethiopia has the distinction of being the only African state to have successfully resisted 19th-century European colonial occupation.

**Rival Religions**

The creation and expansion of new states and societies, whether originating from within African or from external forces, were accompanied by cultural change and accommodation. Religion was a key aspect of such change (map 2). In North and West Africa, conquest and the spread of Islam were closely associated, although one did not presuppose the other. Christianity had been present in North Africa from the 2nd century and, though checked by the rise of Islam, had become firmly established in Coptic Ethiopia. Efforts to convert other parts of Africa to Christianity had been led by the Portuguese from the 15th century. It was in the 19th century, however, that intense Catholic and Protestant proselytization occurred; some, indeed, see missionaries as crucial precursors of European colonialism. Christianity did not, however, replace indigenous African religious traditions in any simple manner. Adaptation and coexistence were the norm and, in many instances, African forms of Christianity emerged that would later serve as an important ideology in mobilizing resistance to European colonialism.

**European Explorers**

Along with trading and missionary activity, explorers played an important role in “opening up” Africa to Europe (map 3). At the start of the 19th century the interior of Africa was barely known to the outside world. Expeditions, whether motivated by scientific and geographic curiosity or the search for natural resources and wealth, attracted considerable popular interest in Europe; the exploits of travellers and explorers were celebrated both in terms of individual achievement and as sources of national pride. Among the best-known 19th-century expeditions were those that explored the sources of the Nile, the Congo, the Zambezi and the Niger. The exploration and mapping of Africa proved of considerable importance to the drawing of colonial boundaries in the late 19th century.
A The South African (Boer) War of 1899–1902 was one of the longest and costliest in British imperial history. In the initial phase the Afrikaners secured notable victories, but in 1900 their main towns were captured by the British. General Kitchener finally defeated them by burning their farmsteads and imprisoning civilians in concentration camps. In the Peace of Vereeniging (May 1902) the Afrikaners lost their independence. In 1910, however, the Union of South Africa gained independence under the leadership of the Afrikaner general Louis Botha.

Between 1880 and 1914 the whole of Africa was partitioned between rival European powers, leaving only Liberia and Ethiopia independent of foreign rule (map 1). The speed of the process was bewildering, even more so when one considers that most of the African landmass and its peoples were parcelled out in a mere ten years after 1880. European competition for formal possession of Africa was accompanied by intense nationalist flag-waving and expressions of racial arrogance, contributing in no small manner to the tensions that resulted in the outbreak of the First World War.

Many explanations have been given for the partition of Africa. Some lay particular stress on economic factors: the attractiveness of Africa both as a source of raw materials and as a virtually untapped market for finished goods during Europe’s “second” industrial revolution. Others view the partition of Africa in terms of intra-European nationalist rivalry, emphasizing the prestige associated with possession of foreign territory and the ambitions of individual statesmen and diplomats. Another explanation relates to geopolitical concerns, in particular the strategic designs of military and naval planners seeking to preserve lines of communication, such as the route to India through the Suez Canal.
One of the first examples of colonists fighting for freedom from European domination occurred following the discovery of diamonds and gold in territory controlled by Afrikaner farmers (descendants of Dutch settlers, known to Africans as “Boers”). Proponents of all nationalities flooded into the region, and Britain was concerned about a possible alliance between the Afrikaners and the Germans to the west. In October 1899 the Afrikaners took preemptive action, besieging British troops massing on their borders (map 2). British reinforcements won several major battles, but the Afrikaners then adopted guerrilla tactics which were eventually overcome by the ruthless approach of General Kitchener.

RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICANS AND EUROPEANS
The partition of Africa cannot be satisfactorily understood without taking into account the dynamics of African societies themselves. In some instances colonial expansion was made possible by indigenous leaders who sought to enrol Europeans as convenient allies in the struggle to establish supremacy over traditional enemies. Trading and commercial opportunities encouraged certain groups of Africans to cement ties with Europeans. Some African leaders proved adept at manipulating relationships with European powers to their own advantage, at least in the short term; elsewhere, land or mineral concessions were made to Europeans in the hope that full-scale occupation could be averted.

In a number of celebrated instances (map 1), Africans resisted the initial European colonial advance, or rose in rebellion soon after. Common informal means of resistance included non-payment of taxes, avoidance of labour demands, migration, or membership of secret religious societies. Usually, Africans sought some sort of accommodation with the advancing Europeans in order to avoid outright confrontation. Appearances are therefore deceptive: although the map indicates European possession of virtually all of Africa by 1914, in many areas control was nominal. Portuguese control of Mozambique and Angola was especially tenuous. In non-settler societies and beyond major towns and centres, many Africans were more or less able to ignore the European presence and get on with their own lives.

LABOUR MARKETS AND TRADE
Perhaps the surest measure of the intensity of colonial rule is the extent to which Africa was integrated into the world economy (map 3). In southern Africa, the discovery and exploitation of diamonds and gold created huge demands for African labour. Migrant workers came from as far afield as Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Demands for agricultural labour threatened the viability of indigenous African cultivators in the region, although in some areas - as in the case of cocoa production in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, for example - colonial systems relied on indigenous peasant cultivators, who were frequently able to prosper from their participation in export markets. Forced labour was widely used by agricultural concession companies in Mozambique and Angola, and by the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo.

COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Railway networks were built that linked coastal ports to the hinterland and served as a major stimulus to trade and commodity production. Railways proved particularly important for the development of mining as well as for commercial agriculture. They were also vital for the supply of labour and were crucial for the economic development of the region.

After the initial phase of railway construction, road-building programmes, especially in the inter-war years, brought some of the most remote areas into direct contact with the colonial economy. The arrival of trucks stimulated the re-emergence of an African merchant class, particularly in West Africa. Rapid urbanization, a remarkable feature of the colonial era, was stimulated by the development of transport links and of internal and external trade.

EDUCATION AND RELIGION
In much of colonial Africa the spread of education was closely linked to religious change. Christianity in particular underwent exponential growth. The spread of Western education, building on earlier missionary endeavours, tended to be geared to the requirements of colonial regimes - providing skilled workers, clerks and petty officials. Many Africans eagerly embraced education, often as a means of social advancement. Thus, the spread of literacy opened up new horizons and possibilities that could not easily be controlled by the colonial powers. It is striking that many of the early African nationalists were the products of mission education - men who became politicized when the opportunities opened up by their education were denied them by the inequalities inherent in colonial rule.

Education and Christianity were not, however, universally welcomed by Africans. While offering social mobility to many, these agencies also threatened the power of traditional elites. Frequently, forms of Christianity evolved which combined African belief systems and traditions with Western ones. The Bible also offered fertile ground for reinterpretation in ways that challenged European rule.

Colonialism was the source of great and profound changes: economic, political, social, cultural and demographic. Significant and wide-ranging as these changes were, however, innovations were seldom imposed on a blank slate. Rather, colonial institutions were built on existing structures and moulded according to circumstances. Far from capitalizing to alien rule, many African societies showed great resilience and adaptability in surviving it.
The strengthening of colonial rule was linked to a number of economic and political factors, including the need for raw materials to supply rapidly industrializing economies and the desire to find new markets for manufactured goods.

There was a particularly sharp increase in world trade between 1900 and 1910, with the build-up of armaments by Britain and Germany — and the associated demand for raw materials — a contributory factor.

The late 19th century witnessed dramatic changes, not only in the world economy but also in the relationship between the manufacturing countries and those regions of the world from which raw materials were obtained. The volume of international trade more than trebled between 1870 and 1914 (bar chart 1) alongside large-scale industrialization in Europe and the United States, and the spread of colonial rule, particularly in Asia and Africa. By 1913 Britain had been replaced by the United States as the world’s leading manufacturing nation, but it still handled more trade than any other country (bar chart 2). London remained the world’s leading financial centre through its operation of the international gold standard, which defined the value of the major currencies and so facilitated trade.

Transport and Communications

The enormous expansion of international trade was greatly helped by technological developments, especially in transport and communications. Sailing ships gave way to larger and faster steam vessels, which required coaling stations strategically placed around the globe (map 1), and merchant shipping fleets expanded to cope with the increased volume of trade. Voyages between continents were facilitated by the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) and the Panama Canal (1914). Railways also helped to increase trading activities, notably in North America and Asiatic Russia. The electric telegraph network made business transactions between continents easier (map 2). These technological developments also encouraged massive migrations, including that of 30 million Europeans who emigrated to North America during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The creation of wealth in the industrialized countries led to growing interest in investing some of that wealth in the developing countries. By financing railway building or mining development in these areas, industrial economies helped to increase imports of food and raw materials, and to create larger export markets for their manufactured goods. Britain, France, other European countries and later the United States made substantial overseas investments (map 2 and pie chart), and were anxious to safeguard these from political instability and from rivals.

Factors Influencing Imperial Expansion

In the late 19th century the world economy was becoming more integrated, with different regions increasingly dependent on one another. Inevitably, competition between states intensified, spilling over into the political sphere. Britain’s early lead as the first industrial power was linked, by many observers, to the expansion of the British Empire from the late 18th century onwards, above all in India. Other countries tried to emulate Britain by building up empires of their own. As business conditions worsened in the 1870s and 1880s, a growing number of countries also sought to protect their home markets, imposing tariffs to limit the influx of foreign goods. The attraction of untapped markets in Africa and Asia intensified as a result.

Political factors in Europe also contributed to the growth of imperialism. National prestige was always a major consideration, but it became even more so as international rivalries heightened (pages 216–17). The newly formed countries of Germany and Italy, as well as the declining state of Portugal, saw the acquisition of colonies as a way of asserting their status as world powers. Overseas expansion also helped to divert attention from the domestic social problems created by industrialization and population growth. Further motivation was provided by Christian missionaries, who were effective in lobbying governments to defend their activities overseas.
Political and economic changes taking place within non-European societies created important opportunities for the European powers to increase their influence. Local "elites" – groups who became wealthy through trade and collaboration with European powers – often facilitated the colonization of an area. Territory was sometimes acquired in order to protect existing colonial interests from rivals, or because it was particularly valuable for strategic, rather than economic, reasons. Often, however, the colonizing powers found that in order to support a limited initial claim it became necessary to expand inland from coastal bases and establish further trade links.

Although no single factor can explain the growth of imperialism in this period, the results were nevertheless far-reaching, as evidenced by the "scramble" for overseas territories in the 1880s and 1890s. By 1914 nearly all of Africa had been divided up between the European powers – chiefly Britain, France and Germany – which had also extended their control of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. China, also highly prized by the Western powers because of the enormous potential market it represented, escaped formal partition only because the Western powers could not devise a means of dividing it that was acceptable to all of them. Even here, however, European influence was strengthened following victory for Britain and France in the "Opium Wars" of 1840-42 and 1856-60 and the opening of "treaty ports" (pages 198-99).

The European powers were not alone in their enthusiasm for overseas expansion. After defeating Spain in the war of 1898, the United States inherited many of the former Spanish colonies, notably the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Japan, too, lacking economic resources to fuel its rapid modernization, increasingly looked to China and Korea. It was the Europeans, however, who gained most from this phase of imperialism. By 1914 the British Empire covered a fifth of the world (map 1) and included a quarter of the world's population, while the second-largest empire, that of France, had expanded by over 10 million square kilometres (4 million square miles) since 1870.

Although this phase of activity generated great tension among the colonial powers, aggravating their already existing mutual suspicions and feelings of insecurity, it was accomplished without direct conflict between them. (The partition of Africa, for example, was largely the result of diplomatic negotiation at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.) The actual process of laying effective claim to territories was, however, often accompanied by extreme violence against indigenous populations, in campaigns of so-called colonial "pacification".

The consequences of colonial rule

Imperial control had far-reaching consequences for the new colonies. Their economies became more dependent on, and more vulnerable to, fluctuations in international trade. Transport and other infrastructures tended to be developed to meet the needs of colonial, rather than local, needs. Artificial colonial boundaries frequently included different ethnic or linguistic groups, sowing the seeds of future divisions. Initially, the social and cultural impact of colonial rule was limited, but Western education, medicine and religion eventually led to a devaluing of indigenous cultures. Although the colonial powers lacked the resources to employ force on a routine basis, they maintained their dominance of a region by repeated assertions of their superiority, alliances with local interest groups and occasional displays of firepower.

2 The value of foreign trade 1913

(imports plus exports in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value (in millions of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>$1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The value of foreign trade in 1913 was considerable. In Asia was to ensure a continuing supply of raw materials and to stimulate new markets for finished products. The United States, which was less reliant on overseas trade, made a comparatively small investment given the size of its manufacturing output.

In 1913 the United Kingdom was still the largest trading economy, with Germany second. The United States was by this time the world's leading manufacturer, but with its rich supplies of raw materials and enormous internal market it had less need for external trade.

By 1914 an extensive intercontinental telegraph network facilitated the conduct of overseas business and enabled stock markets to communicate with each other. European nations not only invested in their colonial possessions in Africa and Asia, but also in projects in North and South America and in other European countries.

WORLD POPULATION GROWTH AND URBANIZATION 1800–1914

Population growth in the 18th and 19th centuries was unevenly distributed. Europe's population trebled, with Britain experiencing a near fourfold increase. The United States saw the most spectacular growth, caused by settlers flooding into the country, although the number of Native Americans, already decimated by war and foreign diseases, continued to decline.

High population growth around the world was matched by the development of large conurbations. In 1800 there were some 40 cities in the world with a population of between 100,000 and 500,000, of which nearly half were in Asia. By 1900 many of these had more than doubled in size and new cities had sprung up in the United States. There were now about 80 cities with a population of between 250,000 and 500,000, but only just over a fifth of these were to be found in Asia.

It is estimated that between 1500 and 1800 the world's population more than doubled, from 425 to 900 million. Then, from around 1800 the rate of increase began to accelerate so that the world's population almost doubled in just 100 years, reaching over 1,600 million in 1900. This dramatic increase was unequally distributed around the world (map 1). In some regions it was caused by a higher birth rate, in others by a decline in the death rate, but in most cases it was due to a combination of the two.

Factors contributing to population increase
The birth and death rates in each country were affected by a range of socio-economic factors. One of the main ones was the increasing supply of food, which reduced the number of people dying from malnutrition, and improved people's overall health, causing them to live longer. The Agricultural Revolution in 18th-century Europe had led to the use of more efficient farming techniques, which in turn had increased food production. The expansion of the international economy and improvements in transport also contributed to improved food supplies by enabling large quantities of cheap food to be transported from North America and elsewhere to Europe.

Industrialization was another major factor in the population growth of the 19th century. Although initially it created a new urban poverty, in most industrial countries the living standards of the working classes rose from the mid-19th century onwards as new employment opportunities became available. Medical advances made childbirth less dangerous, and the increasing use of vaccination helped prevent major epidemics. While in western Europe the use of birth control led to a drop in the birth rate from the 1880s onwards, at the same time birth rates in Asia began to rise.

Inter-continental migration
One consequence of the rise in population was an unprecedented intercontinental migration of people (map 2). Although it is usual to distinguish between "voluntary" migrants — including those seeking improved economic prospects — and "involuntary" migrants — such as those ensnared in the slave trade — for many individuals the motives for emigrating were mixed. They might involve both
"push" factors, such as poverty at home, and "pull" factors, such as the availability of work in the country of destination. Between the 1880s and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 around 900,000 people entered the United States alone each year, the majority settling in the industrializing north and east of the country (pages 186-87). Before the 1890s most of these migrants came from northern and western Europe, but subsequently the majority came from central and southern Europe. Europeans were particularly mobile during this period, settling not only in the United States but also in Latin America, Canada, Australasia, South Africa and Siberia.

Migration on this unprecedented scale was facilitated by the revolution in transport, which substantially reduced the cost of transatlantic travel, and by the investment of European capital overseas, which created opportunities for railway building and economic development. Chinese migrants settled in Southeast Asia, Australia and the United States, to work in mines and plantations or to build railways. Pressure on resources in Japan also led many of its citizens to emigrate to Manchuria and the Americas.

**INCREASING URBANIZATION**

In addition to witnessing a large increase in overall population levels, the period 1800-1914 saw an increasing concentration of the world's population in cities (map 1). This was due both to population growth and, especially in Europe and the United States, to the development of new industries in the towns. At the same time, technological change in agriculture, particularly in Europe, led to a contraction in the demand for labour in rural areas.

At the beginning of the 19th century the country with the most rapid rate of urbanization was Britain, with 20 per cent of the population of England, Scotland and Wales living in towns of over 10,000 people (as against 10 per cent for Europe as a whole). By 1900 around 80 per cent of Britain's population lived in towns of over 10,000 people, and London's population had increased to over 5 million. However, despite the fact that by 1900 many large cities had developed around the world, the majority of people still lived in rural areas.

Urban infrastructures were often unable to meet the new demands being made on them, leading to inadequate housing stock, water supplies and sewage disposal. Such conditions were a factor in the cholera epidemics that affected many European and North American cities from the 1840s to the 1860s. As a result, measures to improve public health were introduced in the 1850s, and the last major European outbreak of cholera was in Hamburg in 1892. Improvements in transport, especially in the railway system, encouraged the building of suburbs, which greatly eased the problem of urban overcrowding.
The 20th century is often portrayed as a time of barbarism, when increasingly powerful weapons killed on an enormous scale, oppressive dictatorships flourished and national, ethnic and religious conflicts raged. Yet it was also a time when people lived longer, were healthier and more literate, enjoyed greater participation in politics and had far easier access to information, transport and communication networks than ever before.

The two world wars were responsible for perhaps more than 80 million deaths. The First World War was essentially a European territorial dispute which, because of extensive European empires, spread as far afield as Africa and Southeast Asia. The Second World War also started as a European conflict, but spread to the Pacific when Japan seized territory. In the inter-war period disputes broke out over territory in South America and East Asia, but elsewhere the reluctance of the colonial powers to become embroiled in territorial disputes maintained an uneasy peace.

The devastating Japanese attack on the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941 marked the point at which the Second World War became a truly global conflict.

The world in 1900 was dominated by the nation-states of Europe, of which the most powerful were Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. The country with the greatest industrial output in 1900 was the United States, which for the first half of the century chose to remain outside the struggle for supremacy between the European nations. Power, however, increasingly shifted away from Europe. The colonial empires which underpinned it disintegrated and the United States became the leading world power in the second half of the century.

The first half of the century was dominated by the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the two world wars. The wars resulted in unprecedented numbers of casualties. Eight and a half million people died fighting in the First World War of 1914-18, with perhaps up to 13 million civilians dying from the effects of war. During the Second World War as many as 60 million people are believed to have died, a quarter of whom were killed in Asia and the Pacific (map 1). Of the total number of casualties in the Second World War it is estimated that half were civilians. The scale of the killing was largely due to the increasingly lethal power of weaponry. This reached so terrifying a peak with the invention and use of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War that thereafter the major powers sought to prevent local conflicts from escalating into major international wars.

**THE COLD WAR**

After 1945 there was no reduction in bitter international conflict, but it took a new form. The war in Europe was fought by an alliance of the communist Soviet Union with the capitalist states of Europe and the United States against the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. Following the defeat
of fascism, the United States and Soviet Union emerged as bitterly opposed superpowers with the resources to develop huge arsenals of nuclear weapons. From 1947 a “Cold War” developed between them and their allies, in the course of which they gave support to opposing sides in conflicts in, for example, Korea, Vietnam, Angola and the Middle East, while the two superpowers remained formally at peace. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989–91 brought the Cold War to an end.

**LOCAL CONFLICTS**

While there was no global war in the second half of the century, there were many local wars (map 2), which were waged with increasing technological expertise and precision. Some were wars of independence from colonial powers, most of which had given up their empires by 1970. Other conflicts, such as the Korean War (1950–53) and Vietnam War (1959–75), were struggles for national control between communists and non-communists, each side backed by one of the superpowers. The United Nations, established in 1945 with the aim of stabilizing international relations, failed to bring about world peace, but helped to avert or negotiate the end of some conflicts.

Some of the most persistent campaigns of violence during the 20th century were conducted by powerful governments against people of the same nation but of another political persuasion, social class, ethnic group or religious belief. In the Soviet Union under Stalin (1929–53) tens of millions of people were sent to their deaths in forced-labour camps. In Argentina and Chile in the 1970s thousands of political opponents of the government simply “disappeared”, while in Cambodia in 1975–79, Pol Pot’s brutal experiment in social restructuring resulted in the death of over one million people.

“Ethnic cleansing” was a term first used to describe events in the Balkans in the 1990s, but it is a concept that regularly scarred the 20th century. The Ottoman Turks deported an estimated 1.75 million Armenians from eastern Anatolia during the First World War. In Europe under the Nazis, between the mid-1930s and 1945, six million Jews, along with other minority groups, died in concentration and death camps.
Voting in government elections, which at the beginning of the 20th century was the prerogative of only a small proportion of the world's population, is now considered a fundamental civil right for both men and women. Democracy reached South Africa in April 1994, when the black population was allowed to vote in state elections for the first time.

HEALTH AND WEALTH
During the 20th century enormous improvements in social and economic conditions took place, although the improvements were not evenly distributed around the world. Those countries in Europe, North America and Asia that had gone through a process of industrialization in the previous century reaped the benefits, especially in the more stable economic environment of the years between 1945 and the early 1970s, when there was a general improvement in the standard of living for the majority of their citizens. In other countries, most notably those in Southeast Asia, rapid industrialization took place from the 1970s.

Advances in medical technology transformed the lives of people in, for example, Europe, North America and Japan, but were by no means widely available outside the most affluent nations. The dramatic decline in infant mortality rates and increased life expectancy in many countries during the second half of the 20th century can largely be ascribed to improved living standards, of which better medical care was just one part.

The world's population doubled between 1940 and 2000 (to reach six billion), with 90 per cent of the total growth in the 1990s taking place in the non-industrialized regions of the world. Population increases were often accompanied by rapid urbanization, frequently unplanned and unsupported by improvements in the urban infrastructure. Such rapid demographic change caused increasing social pressures, which could lead to social instability and conflict.

The supply of food and water became an overtly political issue during the later 20th century. Political and environmental factors resulted in periods of famine in some regions of the world, notably sub-Saharan Africa, while in Western Europe and North America improvements in agricultural technology and subsidies led to gluts of certain foods, which were then stored to prevent falling prices. By the end of the century the increasing demand for water was threatening to lead to conflicts as, for example, the damming or diversion of a river by one country caused water shortages in others.

THE WORLD ECONOMY
The First World War profoundly changed European politics and society and destabilized the Europe-dominated world economic system. This led to reduced levels of trade and high unemployment – problems which reached crisis point in the Great Depression of 1929–33 and were still there at the outset of the Second World War in 1939.

Following the war, international agreements and institutions were established to prevent further crises and to stabilize and expand world trade. Partly in consequence, the period from the late 1940s until the early 1970s was an economic "golden age" for the industrialized countries. This economic boom came to an end when oil prices soared in the 1970s. Both rich and poor countries suffered the consequences as unemployment rose to levels comparable with those of the inter-war years. Many developing countries were encouraged to take out huge loans, the
repayment of which had a detrimental effect on their subsequent economic and social development.

THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY
Although at the beginning of the 20th century a number of countries had elected governments, in none of these was there universal suffrage – the right of every adult citizen to vote. A few countries had granted the vote to a high proportion of adult men, but only New Zealand had extended the vote to women. As the century progressed, representative democracy and universal suffrage spread to all continents, although it was frequently fragile as, for example, when military rulers seized control in some Latin American countries in the 1970s, or in several African countries in the 1980s and 1990s.

Authoritarian communist governments, which had ruled in the Soviet Union for over 70 years and in Eastern Europe for over 40 years, collapsed in 1989-91, bringing democratic institutions to more than 400 million people. At the end of the century, however, the fifth of the world's population who lived in the People's Republic of China (established by the Communist Party in 1949 after a long civil war), together with citizens of many Middle Eastern countries, still did not enjoy full political rights.

GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM
The defining feature of the closing decades of the 20th century and the start of the 21st century was considered by some to be “globalization”, with multinational corporations moving their operations around the world in accordance with their needs, and individuals travelling and communicating with one another across frontiers with unprecedented ease.

However, it was questioned whether what was occurring was globalization or the “Americanization” of developing economies and of many aspects of international culture. Others stressed the significance of the new regional economic groupings which had emerged in the second half of the century (map 3).

An equally strong feature was nationalism – expressed both by nations attempting to avoid domination by superpowers, and by groups within nation-states who felt oppressed on economic, religious or ethnic grounds. It was accompanied by the growth of religious extremism and terrorism. The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, were a dramatic indication of the threat posed to the global community by international terrorist groups.
After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 Europe underwent a period of domestic transformation and upheaval that permanently altered its make-up. New nation states such as Italy were created, while the great multi-ethnic empires of the Ottomans and Austria-Hungary began to weaken. For much of the 19th century a balance of power existed in which no single European nation was strong enough to dominate, or attempt to dominate, the whole continent. This balance could not, however, endure for ever.

The Rise of Germany

The great European powers that had fought the Napoleonic Wars – Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria and France – were growing at different rates. The most startling change occurred in the centre of Europe. Prussia, which had been the smallest of the great powers, had by 1871 been replaced by a formidable, dynamic Germany, which single-handedly defeated the Austrian Empire in 1866 and then France in 1871 (resulting in the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine) (map 1). The rise of Germany effectively altered the continent-wide balance of power.

The Industrial Revolution had changed the basis of national strength, making a country's production of coal, iron and steel, and the sophistication of its weaponry, even more important than the size of its population. Between 1871 and 1913 Germany moved from being the second strongest to being the leading industrial power in Europe (bar charts) – an economic strength that from 1890 was combined with a...
confrontational and heavy-handed foreign policy. In 1881 the German Chancellor, Count Otto von Bismarck, had concluded an alliance with Russia and Austria-Hungary, known as the “Three Emperors’ Alliance” – a move intended to keep France isolated. To counterbalance this alliance with Russia (a country that might more realistically be seen as a threat), he also entered into a “Triple Alliance” with Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1882 (map 1). After Bismarck’s fall in 1890, however, German foreign policy became increasingly concerned with the desire for expansion, both in Europe and further afield, in Africa and Southeast Asia. The Germans felt that unless they acquired a large and profitable empire they would eventually be left behind by their giant rivals: Russia, the British Empire and the United States.

The Double Entente
Meanwhile, France, which had been alternately fearful and resentful of German strength since the loss of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871, broke out of its isolation in 1894 by making an alliance with Russia. Neither country was a match for Germany on its own. France had neither sufficient population base nor industrial resources, while Russia, still relatively underdeveloped industrially, could not properly utilize its enormous population and resources, as was demonstrated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 (pages 206-7). The Franco-Russian alliance (the “Double Entente”) was a first step towards the creation of an anti-German coalition, but if Germany’s growing power was to be effectively opposed, Britain had to be included. For much of the 19th century, Britain had tried to distance itself from European affairs – a policy sometimes termed “splendid isolation”. With a massive and growing global empire and the world’s first industrialized economy, Britain saw little profit in actively intervening on the Continent. At the end of the century, however, its isolation seemed considerably less palatable as its economic dominance disappeared with the industrialization of other European countries and the United States. Meanwhile, the criticisms levelled at its role in the South African (Boer) War (1899-1902) (pages 206-7) showed that much of Europe (and a sizeable proportion of the British people) resented its imperial domination.

The Triple Entente
It was by no means certain that Britain would side with the Franco-Russian alliance. France and Russia had been considered Britain’s greatest enemies during most of the 19th century, and in 1901 the British and German governments discussed signing an alliance of their own. However, as German power continued to grow, Britain signed an entente with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907. Neither of these agreements was in fact a formal pledge of British military support for France and Russia in the event of a German attack, but Britain’s resolve was hardened by the growth of the German navy; urged on by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the Germans had, since 1898, been building up their naval strength, and by 1909 it seemed possible that they could achieve naval supremacy. Since naval supremacy had always been one of the cardinal elements of British policy, the British government, led by its very anti-German Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, reacted by dramatically increasing production of modern weapons, including battleships. The subsequent naval construction race, won by the British, increased the rivalry between the countries and made it more likely that Britain would intervene if Germany went to war with France and Russia.

The Balkans
This still did not mean that war was inevitable. For the first part of 1914 Europe seemed peaceful. The issue that broke this calm was a crisis in the Balkans (map 2), an area of southeastern Europe that had been under Ottoman rule for centuries (pages 178-79). During the second half of the 19th century Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania all agitated for independence. Austria-Hungary and Russia both coveted these areas, and in 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia into its empire. Russia was forced to accept this arrangement because of German support for Austria. Bosnia was a multi-ethnic area populated by Croats, Serbs and Muslims of Turkish and Slavic descent. Serbian nationalists opposed Austrian rule in Bosnia, seeking to include the region in a larger Serbian national state. When Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, visited Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, in June 1914, he and his wife were assassinated by a Serbian nationalist. Austria’s response was to set about crushing Serbian nationalism permanently. The Russians opposed Austrian attempts to dominate Serbia, while Germany promised to support any move the Austrians made. When the Russians duly mobilized their entire armed forces, the Germans and then the French called up their armies. As military goals became central to each nation’s policies, the outbreak of the First World War became inevitable.
On 1 August 1914 the German army crossed the Belgian border and the First World War began. The armies of the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) implemented plans drawn up in preparation for any German aggression. The French “Plan 17” called for a lightning invasion of Alsace-Lorraine on Germany's western border, and the Russians began the task of assembling their massive army and launching it against Germany's eastern frontier (map 1). The Germans had devised their famous “Schlieffen Plan”, according to which the German army would move through Belgium into France, sweeping around Paris and encircling the French army (map 2) before the slower-moving Russians could muster their forces on the Germans' Eastern Front.

If executed properly the Schlieffen Plan might have resulted in a German victory in 1914, but although the German army made quick progress through Belgium, their Chief of General Staff, von Moltke, became increasingly concerned about Russian strength and transferred troops away from France to the Eastern Front. The Germans therefore had to turn south sooner than intended, allowing the French army to throw all available troops against their exposed flank on the Marne River (map 2). This “miracle” of the Marne was the first crucial turning point of the war.

The Schlieffen Plan was a political, as well as military, failure for the Germans. By invading Belgium, the Germans had ignored long-standing treaties guaranteeing that country's neutrality, and convinced the British of the need to enter the war. Germany thus found itself hemmed in on two sides by the Entente Powers, with only the support of Austria-Hungary, and later Turkey and Bulgaria.

THE WESTERN FRONT

Stalemate quickly ensued on the Western Front, as the Germans, British and French built long lines of trenches stretching from the Swiss border, through northern France to the English Channel. Long-range artillery pieces, accurate rifles and, most importantly, machine-guns gave the defenders a crucial advantage over the attacking forces. Industrialization and a well-developed railway system also meant that more ammunition and other vital supplies were available than ever before and that large armies could be transported from area to area as the situation dictated. For the next three years the Western Front was a brutal killing field (bar chart). The destructive nature of modern warfare was particularly demonstrated in 1916 when the Franco-German struggle over Verdun and the British offensives on the Somme led to the slaughter of 1.7 million men (map 3). The following year the French offensives against the entrenched German position on the Siegfried/Hindenburg line caused such heavy French casualties that there was mutiny among French troops.
FIGHTING AROUND THE WORLD

The picture on other fronts was more fluid, but just as bloody. On the Eastern Front a large Russian army was heavily defeated at the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914 (map 1), and although the Russians saw limited success in 1915, ultimately their large, but poorly organized, forces were pushed back. The Germans made deep advances into European Russia in 1916, and by 1917 the morale of the Russian army and of its people was beginning to crack. The ensuing Russian Revolution and the triumph of the Bolsheviks led to Russia signing an armistice agreement with Germany at the end of 1917 (pages 222-23).

In the Middle East fighting also moved back and forth over a considerable area. Initially, the Entente Powers fared badly, with British, Australian, New Zealand and French soldiers being pinned down and forced to withdraw from the Gallipoli Peninsula during 1915 and early 1916, and a British Empire force from India surrendering to the Ottomans at Al Kut in April 1916. Soon, however, the tide began to turn. An Arab uprising against Ottoman rule in the summer of 1916 pushed the Ottomans out of much of the Arabian Peninsula, and in December 1917 the British captured Jerusalem. Despite these victories, the events in the Middle East had no decisive influence on the outcome of the First World War, which could really only be decided on the battlefields of Europe.

In Africa fighting broke out in all German colonies, but was most protracted in German East Africa where, in 1916, British, South African and Portuguese forces combined under General Smuts to counter the German forces.

In 1915 the Italian government, a signatory of the Triple Alliance (pages 216-17), joined the Entente Powers, following promises of Austrian territory. In the next two years hundreds of thousands of Italians were slaughtered before an Austrian–German force inflicted defeat on the Italian army at the Battle of Caporetto in October 1917.

THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

By 1917 the fortunes of the Entente Powers within Europe were at a low ebb, and a German victory seemed a distinct possibility. A disastrous German foreign and strategic policy was, however, to throw away their chance of victory.

It had been assumed by both sides before the war began that large fleets of battlehips would engage in a decisive battle for naval supremacy. As it turned out, neither the Germans nor the British were willing to expose their surface fleets unduly, and only one large sea battle took place: the Battle of Jutland in 1916. It was a rather confused affair, with the Germans inflicting the greatest damage but being forced back to port. In the end it changed very little.

In preference to surface fighting, the Germans turned early in the war to submarine warfare as a means of cutting off vital imports to Britain. By sinking merchant ships without warning, however, the Germans inflamed US opinion. At first, after the sinking of the liner SS Lusitania in 1915, the Germans backed off, but in February 1917, in a dangerous gamble, they renewed their unrestricted submarine warfare around the British Isles. They were hoping to knock Britain out of the war before the United States could intervene – a rash gamble that failed when the Americans declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917.

THE FINAL PUSH

Following the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Russians on 3 March 1918, the Germans were able to concentrate their resources on the Western Front. Between March and July 1918 the German army hurled itself against the French and British lines, making significant breakthroughs and advancing further than at any time since 1914. German resources were not, however, sufficient to finish the job. As US troops and supplies flooded into Europe, the German advance petered out, and the German army began to crumble in the face of a counteroffensive. Unable to increase their supply of men and weapons, the Germans realized that they had lost the war. They approached the Entente Powers for peace terms – and at 11.00 am on 11 November 1918 the fighting ceased.
OUTCOMES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1918–29

As a result of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dismantled. Most of it was formed into small nation-states, including the new state of Czechoslovakia. In the south, however, several ethnically distinct regions were amalgamated with previously independent states to form Yugoslavia, under the domination of Serbia. Germany lost territory in the east to the recreated Poland, while a demilitarized area was established along Germany's border with France. The newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, threatened by anti-revolutionary forces, was in no position to resist moves to carve up territory on its western borders.

The First World War changed the map of Europe and the Middle East for ever. Centuries-old empires (map 1) were destroyed and new national states were created. The most important event in establishing the new Europe was the Paris Peace Conference (January–June 1919), which resulted in the Treaty of Versailles. The conference was called by the victorious Entente Powers after Germany had asked for an armistice in November 1918. Most of the countries involved in the war were represented in some way, but the decision-making power was held by the delegations of the "Big Three": the British, led by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the French, led by Premier Georges Clemenceau, and the United States, led by President Woodrow Wilson.

The negotiations were delicate and often stormy. In a desire to destroy German power, the French called for the division and disarmament of Germany and for such huge reparations that the German economy would have been crippled for decades. The Americans, on the other hand, sought to establish a stable Europe and a new League of Nations to guarantee global security. They believed that the peace should be based on President Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points" and should be as magnanimous as possible. The British were stuck in the middle: they wished to see a reduction in German power, but were wary of weakening the Germans so much that they would be completely under French domination or unable to trade. (Germany had been Britain's main European pre-war trading partner.)

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The Treaty of Versailles, when signed in June 1919, represented a compromise between these different positions. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were given to France, while a large slice of eastern Germany was given to the re-established Polish state (map 2). The German city of Danzig, which was surrounded by countryside populated by Poles, was made a "Free City". Germany was also subjected to humiliating internal restrictions: the Rhineland, Germany's industrial heartland, was to be demilitarized (leaving it open to the threat of French invasion), while the German air force was ordered to disband, the army reduced to 100,000 men and the navy limited to a small number of warships. The treaty also stripped Germany of its imperial possessions in Africa and the Pacific, but since this empire had added little to German national strength, its loss did little to weaken it.

For all of its losses, Germany fared much better than its closest ally, Austria-Hungary. This multi-ethnic empire
was broken up by the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919) into a host of smaller national states (map 2): Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, and Hungary. Italy, which had entered the war in 1915 because of the promise of booty from Austria-Hungary, was rewarded with a sizeable chunk of new territory.

**Russian Territorial Losses**

The greatest territorial losses of any country in Europe were those suffered by Russia, which had, under the tsar, been allied to France and Britain, but lost the war against Germany on the Eastern Front. After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the ensuing Russian Civil War (pages 222-23), the Soviet regime found itself incapable of holding on to much of its empire in Europe. Finland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania soon won their independence, while the province of Bessarabia was added to Romania (map 2). The greatest loss of Russian territory was to the newly created Poland, which gained further territory as a result of a brief war with Russia in 1921.

As a result of the Paris Peace Conference, nine new states (including Austria and Hungary) were constructed from various parts of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Russia. Whether or not this was a good thing for the European balance of power remained to be seen. Both Germany and the Soviet Union were eager to regain much of the territory they had given up against their will. In southeast Europe, meanwhile, a variety of different nationalities that had been held in check by Austria-Hungary were now exposed to a whole new set of tensions.

**The League of Nations**

The Versailles treaty also called for the establishment of a League of Nations, an idea championed by President Wilson of the United States. Unfortunately, the American public was not persuaded of its necessity, and after a bitter debate in the Senate the United States decided to stay out of the League and refused to ratify the Treaty. The British and the French had been unable to master German might without American aid, and, despite its losses, Germany retained the potential to dominate Europe—demonstrated by the recovery in its industrial output during the 1920s.

**The Dismantling of the Ottoman Empire**

The First World War finally broke up the Ottoman Empire but still left much of the Middle East in limbo. Most of the region was assigned to British or French control (map 3). Under League of Nations mandates. Even areas that gained nominal independence—Egypt and the new Arab kingdoms—were heavily reliant on Britain for their defence and development. The one state that grew in strength during the immediate post-war period was, surprisingly, Turkey. Shorn of its imperial burdens, the Turks, led by Atatürk, countered an invasion attempt by Greece in 1922, brutally quelled Armenian nationalists sympathetic to the Greeks, drove out the British and French and established the Turkish Republic in 1923 (pages 178–79).

**The Long-term Outcomes of the Peace**

The Versailles treaty has been harshly criticized, and, indeed, has been seen as one of the fundamental causes of the Second World War. In 1923, in response to Germany's inability to pay war reparations, the French moved their army into the Rhineland. The German mark collapsed in value and by 1924 Germany was gripped in a cycle of hyper-inflation that saw some people taking home their pay packets in wheelbarrows. By the late 1920s, however, Europe seemed to be on the way to establishing a new equilibrium; the economies of all the major European countries had recovered and were experiencing strong growth.

The French saw the new eastern European states as a potential future bulwark against Germany and were eager to knit them into a defensive alliance system (map 4). For a while the strategy seemed quite successful, as eastern Europe developed a new stability. Czechoslovakia evolved into a democracy, Poland became a nation-state capable of defeating the Soviet Union and establishing friendly relations with its neighbours, while Yugoslavia seemed able to accommodate a multi-ethnic population. Perhaps if the prosperity of the 1920s had continued for longer, eastern Europe might have become stable enough to survive German and Russian attempts to take back their lost lands.

The Great Depression that started in 1929, and affected the economy of every country in Europe to some extent, brought an end to Europe's brief period of co-operation and recovery. This financial crisis served as the catalyst for the rise to power of the German Nazi party (pages 230–31), which swept aside the settlement laid out in the Versailles Treaty and ended attempts to find peaceful solutions to Europe's complex problems.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
1917–39

The Russian Revolution – one of the formative events of the 20th century – was precipitated by pressures arising from the hardships experienced during the First World War. A popular uprising in March 1917 led to the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the creation of a liberal Provisional Government, which was soon forced to share power with the socialist Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. As the revolution spread, soviets sprang up in many cities, peasants seized land from the gentry and soldiers deserted. A dual system of government developed, with the soviets largely controlling those leaders who took their authority from the Provisional Government. During the subsequent months the ideological rift between the two bodies widened, with the Provisional Government delaying the set up of a Constituent Assembly (which was to decide on major economic and political policies), concentrating instead on a continued war effort. The Petrograd Soviet, meanwhile, came increasingly under the influence of the Bolshevik movement, led by Lenin, which secured popular urban support with its slogans “peace, bread and land” and “all power to the soviets”. In November 1917 the Bolsheviks carried out a successful coup, seizing control of the Winter Palace, seat of the Provisional Government. Lenin then set about establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat and a one-party system.

Civil War
The new Bolshevik government arranged an armistice with the Central Powers in December 1917, formalized in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. Under the terms of the treaty Russia relinquished control of its western territories. Anger at these losses and at the closure of the recently elected Constituent Assembly fuelled opposition to the retitled Communist (Bolshevik) Party. Civil war broke out, during which anti-communist “White” armies and foreign interventionists opposed the Red Army, led by Leon Trotsky (map 1). The Red Army was initially pushed back, but its military superiority over the comparatively disunited White armies enabled it to regain control of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Ukraine, although territory was lost in the war with Poland in 1920. This war did not spread the revolution into Europe, as Lenin had hoped it would. Outside Russia proletarian support for communism was limited (map 2) and when the Soviet Union was founded in 1922 it was confined to the territories of the old empire.

In order to back up the efforts of the Red Army, Lenin took rapid steps to impose nationalization and centralization in a process known as “war communism”. However, revolts by peasants in the spring of 1921 forced him to introduce the New Economic Policy (NEP), based on concessions to the peasantry and a semi-market economy. Although the

1 Revolution and Civil War in Russia

- Boundary of the Russian Empire 1914
- Boundary of area controlled by Bolsheviks
- German occupation line March 1918
- Active areas of Bolshevik activity
- White Russian and interventionist attacks
- Russian advance into Poland August 1920
- Area lost to Poland 1920
- Occupation of towns
- Other international boundaries 1922
- River Don
- Sea of Azov
- Sea of Japan
- Black Sea
- Caspian Sea
- Bosphorus
- Suez Canal
- Map 1: Civil War
- Map 2: Proletarian Support

After sweeping away the Provisional Government in November 1917 the Bolsheviks faced widespread opposition both within and outside Russia. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 ended the war with Germany but led to a civil war in which the Entente Powers initially supported the “Whites” (anti-Bolsheviks) against the “Reds” (Bolsheviks). Admiral Kolchak formed an Eastern Front in Siberia and in 1919 advanced beyond the Volga. In the south, resistance was led by Denikin but he was brought to a halt short of Orel. In the north, Trotsky led his troops to the suburbs of Petrograd, but was then driven back. Wrangel, taking over what was left of Denikin’s forces, defended the area around Sevastopol for some time but was finally forced to withdraw in November 1920.

Meanwhile, the Poles were attempting to gain as much as they could of Lithuania, White Russia (Byelorussia) and Ukraine. They got as far as Kiev but then had to withdraw as the Red Army advanced in turn towards Warsaw. When the Poles regained the initiative Lenin decided to sue for peace and, under the Treaty of Riga in October 1920, 10 million Ukrainians and Russians were assigned to Polish rule. By the end of the year military operations were over and the communized (Bolshevik) government was in control of what was left of Russia.
NEP enabled Lenin to consolidate power, many convinced communists saw it as a slide towards a capitalist society. Lenin, at his death in January 1924, thus left two conflicting models of socialist advance: war communism and the NEP. The struggle for power among his closest followers was to be fought out partly on the issue of which policy should be taken as the true Leninist line.

**Stalin's rise to power**

The struggle was won by Stalin, who outmanoeuvred rivals such as Trotsky and Bukharin. Faced with foreign hostility, and convinced that the revolution should achieve an industrial, proletarian society, Stalin launched his drive to catch up with the West in ten years with a return to the centralization and utopianism of the civil war years. The First Five Year Plan was adopted in 1928, its aims being to develop heavy industry, which had been devastated during the civil war, and collectivize agriculture. Industrial advance was indeed impressive, although at the cost of enormous waste, inefficiency and suffering, as wildly over-optimistic targets for output were set. The population of the big cities nearly doubled between 1928 and 1933, and the urban infrastructure could not keep pace. Targets concentrated on heavy industry, and although they were not met, the economy was transformed. In the Urals, the Donbass and Kuzbass coalfields, the Volga area and Siberia, huge new metallurgical enterprises were developed (map 3). Magnitogorsk, the Turksib railway (between Tashkent and Semipalatinsk), the Dneprostroi hydro-electric complex and the White Sea Canal all date from this time. They were also all built partially with prison camp labour, for the First Five Year Plan saw a vast expansion of the concentration camps of the civil war. The secret police were deeply involved in the economy. The forcible establishment of collective farms, with the deportation to Siberia of kulaks (rich peasant farmers) helped control the peasantry. It was, however, an economic disaster, leading to a catastrophic famine. Opposition to the speed and force of the changes led to the great terror of 1937–38, with show trials of party leaders and the deportation of millions of citizens to labour camps across the country. The scale of the famine, the horrors of collectivization, and the extent of the terror were not revealed to the Soviet public until the late 1980s. In 1939 the Stalin cult of personality was at its height and, to many sympathisers in Europe, this was indeed a brave new world.
From 1934 to 1936 the Communists organized a series of retrenchments in the face of Kuomintang attacks. From their southern bases they embarked on lengthy journeys to the north, by way of the mountainous west. The most famous – known as “the Long March” – was that undertaken by the First Front Army, led by Mao Zedong. The casualty and drop-out rate on the marches was high: of 300,000 soldiers who set out, only 30,000 arrived in Yan-an. The Fourth Army (led by a political rival of Mao) was denied access to Yan-an and sent away to remote Gaotai, where it suffered heavy losses after confronting some well-equipped Kuomintang troops.

Meanwhile, the Japanese, with the help of their Manchu collaborators, were firmly in control of Manchuria (which they renamed Manchukuo) and were poised to launch a full-scale invasion and occupation of the rest of China in 1937.

The Revolution of 1911, which had seen the overthrow of the last Manchu Qing emperor and the establishment of the first Republic, failed to solve any of China's economic or social problems (pages 198-99). The most important and urgent goals for the new government were the unification and defence of the country, but they were not easily achieved. The presidential term of the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen lasted for barely six weeks after his inauguration in January 1912, and in December 1915 President Yuan Shikai attempted to restore the monarchy by crowning himself emperor. The attempt was a failure, as was that made by General Zhang Xun and the dethroned Qing Emperor Xuantong in 1917. Both attempts, however, provided opportunities for local warlords to re-establish their power at the expense of central government. Over the next 30 years, although a fragile equilibrium existed between the various warlords and other interest groups, the Chinese Republic was in virtual anarchy.

CIVIL WAR

The first North-South War broke out in 1917 and resulted in a chain reaction that led to full-scale civil war and the establishment of a number of governing regimes across the country. To challenge the authority of the northern warlords, Sun Yat-sen formed his own southern governments in Guangzhou in 1917, 1921 and 1923. He also set about creating a united Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and forging links with the still very small Communist Party, which was growing under the control of the Comintern (an international communist organization founded in Moscow in 1919). In 1924 Sun Yat-sen was invited to Beijing to discuss the possible unification of China, but he died there in March 1925 without concluding an agreement, and the second North-South War began the following year.

The Kuomintang was nominally unified at the end of 1926 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and gradually gained control of strategic regions. It was not, however, until the end of 1930 that real unification of the party was achieved through the military defeat by Chiang of a rival faction. For Chiang and the Kuomintang the next main task was to deal with the Communists, who now had an effective command structure and were armed. They were also entrenched in their main “Red Bases” in rural areas in the south and had considerable influence over the urban population (map 1).

Despite the fact that both the Kuomintang and Communists had a nationalist goal, they were more often enemies than allies, competing for the same power. Most early Communists were also radical nationalists, and many had been heavily involved in the activities of the Kuomintang under Sun Yat-sen, making them doubly threatening to Chiang’s regime. Consequently, immediately after the unification of the Kuomintang, Chiang launched five military campaigns to encircle and suppress the Communists in a rural area of Jiangxi province, where the communist “Central Soviet Area” was located. In October 1934 he finally succeeded in overpowering the Communists, forcing them to abandon their Jiangxi base and, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, embark on the grueling Long March to the north. During 1935 Chiang’s army was equally successful in expelling units of the Red Army from other Red Bases in the central region of the country, so that by 1936 the Communists who had survived the journey were confined to an area in the province of Shaanxi around the city of Yan-an.
Despite the political and economic turmoil of the first half of the 20th century, China still developed a railway network. Together with the country’s system of navigable rivers, the railways provided transport for the manufactured goods and metal ores produced by the Chinese businesses that thrived as foreign firms, hit by the Great Depression of 1929-33, failed or withdrew from China.

Japanese Aggression

Chiang’s strategy was similar to that of any new ruler: to eliminate political and military competitors and reunite the country. During the 1930s, however, his aims were largely frustrated by domestic and international conditions. In particular, as Japan developed its imperialist policy towards mainland East Asia, successive Japanese governments turned their attention on a weak and fragmented China. From 1894 to 1944 they launched a series of invasions: on Beijing in 1900, Shandong in 1914, Manchuria in 1931 and Rehe in 1933, followed by a full-scale assault on east and southeast China from 1937 to 1944 (pages 234-35).

The Communists, from their stronghold in Yan-an, turned their attentions to fighting the Japanese. They proved themselves a dynamic and efficient political and military force, and took the opportunity to play the nationalist card and thus rebuild their popularity. By contrast, Chiang’s concentration on suppressing his domestic rivals was by now out of tune with the wishes of the general populace – so much so that in December 1936 two of Chiang’s top military commanders mutinied in order to shift Chiang’s attention to fighting the Japanese. This became known as the “Xi-an Incident”, and resulted in the first example of cooperation between the Kuomintang and Communists since the death of Sun Yat-sen. In January 1941, however, the Kuomintang troops ambushed and annihilated the main force of the Communist-controlled New Fourth Army, thus demonstrating just how fragile this co-operation was.

The war against the Japanese (1937-45) created opportunities for communist propaganda, recruitment and military training which proved to be invaluable when the civil war between the Kuomintang and Communists was resumed immediately after the Japanese surrender. This time the Communists were unbeatable: in their three main military campaigns in the second half of 1948, the Kuomintang were finally overpowered (map 2). The Communists gained control of the mainland, the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan, and the People’s Republic was established in October 1949. Putting the unification of China before the defence of China had cost the Kuomintang dearly.

Economic Expansion

During the period between the 1911 Revolution and the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese economy struggled to survive the civil wars, the Japanese occupation of large areas of the country and the mismanagement of the Kuomintang. Some indigenous industrial growth did occur along the coast and main waterways (map 3). This was largely due to the impact of the First World War (1914-18) and the Great Depression (1929-33), when the industrial powers relaxed their grip on the Chinese market, creating opportunities for local businesses to become established. Furthermore, while the Western gold standard collapsed during the Depression (pages 228-29) – resulting in severe financial crises in the West – China, which had its own silver standard, remained largely unaffected.
LATIN AMERICA
1914–45

The first half of the 20th century saw many major changes in the economic and social structure of the countries of Latin America. Export-led growth based on the production of primary products (mostly minerals or agricultural goods), which had resulted in appreciable economic expansion before 1914, was shown to be severely flawed. At the same time, the oligarchies whose socio-political dominance had been well-nigh absolute for most of the 19th century found their control of the state challenged by an emerging middle class. Meanwhile the majority of the population, who had previously been excluded from participation in the state, came to feature in both cultural and political debates. Finally, the dominant imperial power of the 19th century — Britain — was displaced by the United States.

VULNERABLE ECONOMIES

The problems underlying Latin America’s dependence on the production of raw materials were initially felt as a result of the dislocation of world trade during the First World War (1914–18). Latin America, which at this stage relied largely on foreign banks for supplies of credit and on foreign shipping for transporting its goods, found itself isolated from international finance and trade. Production fell, imports (including food) were in short supply, and there was a high level of mass unrest. The disadvantages of export-led growth became increasingly clear: Latin American economies, especially the smaller ones, found themselves over-reliant on one or two products, the prices of which were vulnerable to fluctuations in the weather, the emergence of new centres of production or substitute products and raw materials.

Economic growth tended to follow a “boom-bust” cycle, which made it difficult for countries to plan ahead or allocate resources rationally. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression (pages 228–29) led to the collapse of the world market on which Latin America had relied for its exports. In the 1930s Latin American countries could do little more than try to defend themselves against the effects of the Depression. However, a consensus began to develop — at least in the more advanced economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) where a limited industrial base oriented towards the internal market had already evolved — that Latin America needed to adopt an economic strategy of urgent industrialization.

POLITICAL CHANGE

The early 20th century saw the first active participation by the Latin American middle classes in political life. These disparate groupings of professionals, small business owners, bureaucrats and industrialists indeed the economic power of their counterparts in 19th-century Europe enjoyed as a result of the leading role they played in industrialization. Even so, governments that reflected the expanding political role of the middle classes came to power in most of the leading countries during this period, for example in Argentina (1916), Chile (1920), Peru (1919) and Mexico (1920). Their challenge to oligarchic power was incomplete and compromised — except in Mexico, which in 1910–20 experienced the world’s first major social revolution of the 20th century. The outcome was to consolidate the political and economic dominance of a bourgeoise committed to capitalist modernization. The revolution destroyed the political position of the oligarchy, and their economic strength was eroded over the next two decades by means of a programme of agrarian reform that redistributed large landed estates.

In all the major Latin American countries during the early decades of the 20th century, the issue of how to incorporate the majority of the population into national life began to be debated. Immigration and internal migration meant that the poor were becoming increasingly visible in the rapidly expanding towns and cities (map 1). Intellectuals and politicians, in particular those from the middle classes, became increasingly aware of the political importance of the poorer sections of society. National identities based on “the people” were proposed: images of American Indians and gauchos (Argentine cowboys) were celebrated as national archetypes. This did not necessarily mean that the poor themselves were treated any better, although measures were taken in Mexico to improve the lot of the Indians.

INCREASING US INFLUENCE

The Spanish-American War of 1898, which had resulted in the ejection of Spain from Latin America by the United States, signalled the rise of the United States as an imperial power in the region (map 2). Although Washington was reluctant to adopt a 19th-century style of colonialism (only Puerto Rico was governed as a colony), the United States consolidated its dominance in both trade and investment.
in raw material production, especially minerals. By the end of the 1920s it had effectively displaced the European powers from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.

During the Second World War the US administration ensured the production of raw materials necessary to the Allied war effort by means of Lend-Lease aid agreements. Consequently, by 1945 the United States had also secured hegemony in South America. Increasing US dominance in Latin America during this period is reflected in the fact that, whereas many Latin American states had remained neutral in the First World War (map 3), most followed the United States into the Second World War after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (map 4). By this stage it was apparent to the governments of Latin America that only the United States could launch an effective defence of the western hemisphere.

THE RISE OF THE MILITARY
One final change that occurred during this period, which was to have a major effect on Latin American politics after the Second World War, was the rise of the military. With the consolidation of central state control in most countries during the late 19th century, the armed forces had begun a process of professionalization, mostly with the help of European advisers, which by the 1920s had given them a strong sense of corporate identity. Military coups took place in Argentina, Brazil and Peru in 1930. At this stage the military was content to intervene only briefly in the political process, but it was increasingly acquiring the conviction — subsequently to prove so detrimental to the maintenance of democracy in Latin America — that it alone was the institution which could best serve the national interest.

At the beginning of the 20th century the United States professed itself reluctant to become a colonial power along the lines of some European countries in Africa and Asia. However, it was anxious to protect its own economic interests in the Caribbean and Central America. The "Platt Amendment", a clause in the Cuban Constitution of 1901 and in the treaty of 1903 between the United States and Cuba, entitled the United States to intervene in Cuban internal affairs - a right it exercised on more than one occasion. Elsewhere, it moved swiftly to repress regimes it felt might jeopardize favorable trading arrangements.

During the period 1920–50 the capital cities of all Latin American countries increased in size by between 100 and 300 per cent. Rapid urbanization was caused in part by the large number of European immigrants, but also by the movement of people from rural areas into the cities. By 1950 over 50 per cent of the populations of countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela lived in urban areas.
The Great Depression of 1929-33 was the most severe economic crisis of modern times. Millions of people lost their jobs, and many farmers and businesses were bankrupted. Industrialized nations and those supplying primary products (food and raw materials) were all affected in one way or another. In Germany and the United States industrial output fell by about 50 per cent, and between 25 and 33 per cent of the industrial labour force was unemployed.

The Depression was eventually to cause a complete turnaround in economic theory and government policy. In the 1920s governments and business people largely believed, as they had since the 19th century, that prosperity resulted from the least possible government intervention in the domestic economy, from open international economic relations with little trade discrimination, and from currencies that were fixed in value and readily convertible. Few people would continue to believe this in the 1930s.

The main areas of Depression
The US economy had experienced rapid economic growth and financial excess in the late 1920s, and initially the economic downturn was seen as simply part of the boom-bust-boom cycle. Unexpectedly, however, output continued to fall for three and a half years, by which time half of the population was in desperate circumstances (map 1). It also became clear that there had been serious over-production in agriculture, leading to falling prices and a rising debt among farmers. At the same time there was a major banking crisis, including the “Wall Street Crash” in October 1929. The situation was aggravated by serious policy mistakes of the Federal Reserve Board, which led to a fall in money supply and further contraction of the economy.

The economic situation in Germany (map 2) was made worse by the enormous debt with which the country had been burdened following the First World War. It had been forced to borrow heavily in order to pay “reparations” to the victorious European powers, as demanded by the Treaty of Versailles (1919) (pages 220–21), and also to pay for industrial reconstruction. When the American economy fell into depression, US banks recalled their loans, causing the German banking system to collapse.

Countries that were dependent on the export of primary products, such as those in Latin America, were already suffering a depression in the late 1920s. More efficient farming methods and technological changes meant that the supply of agricultural products was rising faster than demand, and prices were falling as a consequence. Initially, the governments of the producer countries stockpiled their products, but this depended on loans from the USA and Europe. When these were recalled, the stockpiles were released onto the market, causing prices to collapse and the income of the primary-producing countries to fall drastically (map 3).

New Interventionist Policies
The Depression spread rapidly around the world because the responses made by governments were flawed. When faced with falling export earnings they overreacted and severely increased tariffs on imports, thus further reducing trade. Moreover, since deflation was the only policy supported by
economic theory at the time, the initial response of every government was to cut their spending. As a result consumer demand fell even further.

Deflationary policies were critically linked to exchange rates. Under the Gold Standard, which linked currencies to the value of gold, governments were committed to maintaining fixed exchange rates. However, during the Depression they were forced to keep interest rates high to persuade banks to buy and hold their currency. Since prices were falling, interest-rate repayments rose in real terms, making it too expensive for both businesses and individuals to borrow.

The First World War had led to such political mistrust that international action to halt the Depression was impossible to achieve. In 1931 banks in the United States started to withdraw funds from Europe, leading to the selling of European currencies and the collapse of many European banks. At this point governments either introduced exchange control (as in Germany) or devalued the currency (as in Britain) to stop further runs. As a consequence of this action the gold standard collapsed (map 4).

**Political Implications**

The Depression had profound political implications. In countries such as Germany and Japan, reaction to the Depression brought about the rise to power of militarist governments who adopted the aggressive foreign policies that led to the Second World War. In countries such as the United States and Britain, government intervention ultimately resulted in the creation of welfare systems and the managed economies of the period following the Second World War.

In the United States Roosevelt became President in 1933 and promised a “New Deal” under which the government would intervene to reduce unemployment by work-creation schemes such as street cleaning and the painting of post offices. Both agriculture and industry were supported by policies (which turned out to be mistaken) to restrict output and increase prices. The most durable legacy of the New Deal was the great public works projects such as the Hoover Dam and the introduction by the Tennessee Valley Authority of flood control, electric power, fertilizer, and even education to a depressed agricultural region in the south.

The New Deal was not, in the main, an early example of economic management, and it did not lead to rapid recovery. Income per capita was no higher in 1939 than in 1929, although the government’s welfare and public works policies did benefit many of the most needy people. The big growth in the US economy was, in fact, due to rearmament.

In Germany Hitler adopted policies that were more interventionist, developing a massive work-creation scheme that had largely eradicated unemployment by 1936. In the same year rearmament, paid for by government borrowing, started in earnest. In order to keep down inflation, consumption was restricted by rationing and trade controls. By 1939 the Germans’ Gross National Product was 50 per cent higher than in 1929—an increase due mainly to the manufacture of armaments and machinery.

**The Collapse of World Trade**

The German case is an extreme example of what happened virtually everywhere in the 1930s. The international economy broke up into trading blocs determined by political allegiances and the currency in which they traded. Trade between the blocs was limited, with world trade in 1939 still below its 1929 level. Although the global economy did eventually recover from the Depression, it was at considerable cost to international economic relations and to political stability.
n the years between the two world wars, a political and socio-cultural phenomenon known as fascism arose in Europe. Its exact form varied from country to country, but it was most commonly characterized by chauvinistic nationalism coupled with expansionist tendencies, anti-communism and a ruthless repression of all groups presumed dissident, a mass party with a charismatic leader who rose to power through legitimate elections, and a dependence on alliances with industrial, agrarian, military and bureaucratic elites.

**Fascism in Italy**

Fascism first gained prominence in Italy, where the National Fascist Party (PNF) was founded by Mussolini in 1921. Mussolini possessed a talent for arousing enthusiasm and giving a sense of power and direction to a society in crisis. Through coercion, indoctrination and the creation of the cult of himself as “Il Duce” (the leader), he was able to balance the different interests of his supporters. His nationalist rhetoric attracted war veterans, while his promise to deal with the threat of revolutionary socialism won the support of the lower middle classes and a proportion of the peasantry. Some workers saw the fascist syndicates as an appealing alternative to socialist unions, while landowners and industrialists made large donations to fascist groups because they battered peasant and labour organizations into submission. Most importantly, the political establishment tolerated fascism and helped pave the way for Mussolini’s rise to power; with the much celebrated “March on Rome” in 1922, Mussolini, now Prime Minister, signalled the beginning of a new era.

Mussolini’s foreign policy wavered between aggression and conciliation. In 1923, two weeks after capitulating to

![Benito Mussolini started his political life as a socialist and was imprisoned for his opposition to Italy’s expansionist activities in Libya in 1911-12. By the 1920s, however, he had changed his views and used his considerable rhetorical powers to whip up popular support for his fascist policies of nationalism, anti-socialism and state control of industry and the economy.](image)

As part of his plan to revive Italian national pride, Mussolini sought to create an Italian empire comparable to those of Britain and France. He not only expanded Italy’s Libyan territory, but in 1935 launched a successful assault on Ethiopia.
the British over the "Corfu incident", he occupied Fiume (map 1), before concluding a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia in a failed attempt to break the "Little Entente" (pages 220–21). In 1935 Italy formed an accord with France and joined in condemnation of German rearmament before invading Ethiopia in October 1935, thereby alienating itself from both Britain and France. A rapprochement with Germany was inevitable, and in 1936 the "Rome-Berlin Axis" was formed. Italy joined Germany in assisting the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, further alienating itself from the rest of Europe, and in May 1939 signed the "Pact of Steel" with Germany. In April 1939 it attacked Albania.

**Fascism in Germany**

Hitler's rise to power in 1933 can be seen partly as a product of the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which placed an enormous noose round the neck of the Weimar Republic. The Great Depression in the early 1930s (pages 228–29) weakened the Republic further, while Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party (the "Nazis") was increasing its support. In 1932 it became the largest single party and Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933.

Hitler's absolute belief in the superiority of the "Aryan race" led to a series of legislative measures (1933–38) aimed at excluding Jews from German government and society, culminating in a programme of extermination: the "Final Solution" (pages 232–33). The regime's emphasis on ideological conformity led to heavy censorship, while the Nazis mobilized the German youth to provide a new base of mass support. The first phase of Hitler's economic plans aimed to reduce the level of unemployment, while in the second phase Germany was intended to achieve self-sufficiency both in industry and agriculture, a goal by no means realized.

Hitler's foreign policy was, however, more successful (map 2). With the backing of an army that had been increased to more than twice the size allowed by the Treaty of Versailles, he managed to end German isolation in Europe through the Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935 and to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936. In 1938 Austria was virtually incorporated into the Reich, as was the German-populated Sudetenland - an act accepted by Britain and France with the signing of the Munich Agreement in September 1938. Further gains took place in March 1939, and the signing of the Pact of Steel with Italy in May 1939 was followed by the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in August. Confident that Britain would not intervene, Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. The Second World War had begun.

**The Spanish Civil War**

The Spanish Civil War (1936–39) arose following the collapse in 1930 of Miguel Primo de Rivera's seven-year dictatorship, and the three-year rule of the left-wing Prime Minister Azaña, whose egalitarian reforms provoked bitter opposition on the part of the Establishment. In 1933 Azaña's government was succeeded by a series of centre-right coalition governments, which dismantled his reforms and resulted in social unrest. By the time of the 1936 elections Spain was polarized into two political camps, each consisting of a broad alliance: the Popular Front (Republicans) - made up of socialists, communists, liberals and anarchists - and the National Front (Nationalists) - comprising monarchists, conservatives and a confederation of Catholics. The Popular Front won the elections and Azaña formed a new government, intending to reintroduce all his earlier reforms. The army resolved to take action against the Republic. General Franco, previously exiled by Azaña to the Canaries, invaded Spain from Morocco and laid siege to Madrid in November 1936 (map 3). He was supported in his campaign by the fascist Falange, a party founded in 1933 by de Rivera.

The conflict attracted international interest, with Italy and Germany supporting the Nationalists and the Soviet Union the Republicans. The German bombing of the Basque town of Guernica caused an international outcry, but neither Britain nor France was prepared to confront Hitler over his assistance to Franco. When the Soviet Union decided to end its assistance to the Republicans, a Nationalist victory was assured. By spring 1939 Franco's government was recognized by most of Europe, and Spain entered an era of ruthless repression.

**Right-wing dictatorships**

In the 1920s and 1930s a number of right-wing dictatorships were established in Europe, both in agrarian and industrialized societies (map 4). They were undoubtedly influenced in their rhetoric and practice by the German and Italian models, but were also shaped by each country's indigenous features. Many of these dictators were uncharismatic figures, who actually regarded fascist movements and organizations as a threat to their rule. Only the Nazi dictatorship, with its aggressive expansionism, racism, and nationalist and militarist ideology, represented the full expression of fascism.
A During the Second World War almost the whole of Europe came under Axis control. After Germany's invasion of western Europe, and its attempts to bomb Britain into submission, for three years the war was concentrated on the Eastern Front, with German troops sweeping across the western Soviet Union. During 1942, however, they became bogged down, with losses in the north outweighing gains in the south. In February 1943 the Soviet Union broke the siege of Stalingrad and the Germans were forced to retreat. At the same time, their forces in North Africa were also fleeing to the safety of Italy. The Germans fought a strong rearguard action, however, in the east, in Italy and, from June 1944, in western Europe, with the Allied troops eventually meeting up just west of Berlin in May 1945.

The war in Europe (1 September 1939 – 7 May 1945) was not one war but many. It began as a struggle for supremacy in Europe, but soon engulfed North Africa, the Atlantic and the Soviet Union. In December 1941, with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war against the United States (pages 234-35), the conflict became truly global.

The French and British decision to contest Hitler's bid for European hegemony, after his invasion of Poland, took the Nazi leader by surprise. The practical implications were, however, limited. Belated rearmament meant that France and Britain could do little to prevent Germany and the Soviet Union dismantling Poland under the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. Nevertheless, the Allies - at this stage, Britain, France and the Polish government in exile - were confident that Hitler could be forced by economic pressure into compromise. The initial seven-month period of calm, known as the "Phoney War", thus favoured the Allies - at this stage, Britain, France and the Polish government in exile - were confident that Hitler could be forced by economic pressure into compromise. The initial seven-month period of calm, known as the "Phoney War", thus favoured the Allies - at this stage, Britain, France and the Polish government in exile - were confident that Hitler could be forced by economic pressure into compromise.

During the next year Berlin consolidated and extended its political influence and control. Hitler's fascist partner, Mussolini, brought Italy into the war on 10 June, and the "Axis" was further strengthened with the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan on 27 September. The Balkan states soon became German satellites (map 2), and the remaining neutrals were forced to grant substantial economic concessions. Berlin, however, failed to achieve its strategic objectives. Against expectations, Britain refused to sue for peace and withstood the Blitz over the autumn of 1940. Unable to mount an invasion of Britain, the German foreign ministry and navy embarked on an "indirect strategy" against Britain.

Germany's submarine fleet was given the task of severing Britain's tenuous communications with the neutral United States. However, although the U-boats cut deep into Britain's reserves and posed a danger until the early summer of 1943, the indirect strategy failed to meet German expectations. Moreover, Italian efforts in 1940-41 to carve out a Mediterranean empire complicated rather than complemented Germany's war plans. Britain's maritime and imperial resources allowed it to inflict a series of humiliating setbacks on Italian forces in Egypt and Greece. Hitler was compelled to come to the aid of his ally and was drawn into campaigns of little strategic importance and marginal economic benefit, which ultimately delayed his invasion of the Soviet Union by several weeks.

The Eastern Front

On 22 June 1941 Hitler began his attack on the Soviet Union (long regarded as the Nazis' principal ideological opponent, despite the 1939 pact). As well as massive military casualties, over three million Soviet prisoners of war were deliberately killed, through starvation or overwork,
A During the final months of the war a race took place between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union for control of German territory. The two armies eventually met west of the German capital Berlin and the territory. The two armies eventually met and the Soviet Union for control of Germany was forthcoming from Britain and the United States, and was maintained largely to placate Soviet demands for a second front. In November 1942, however, Anglo-American forces landed in French Morocco and Algeria and, in conjunction with British forces in Egypt, drove the Axis back to Tunisia (map 1). After five months of fighting, the two Allied pincers met outside Tunis and finally ejected Axis forces from North Africa by mid-May 1943.

Against the wishes of the Soviet Union and the United States, both of whom favoured landings in northern France, Britain insisted on mounting landings in Sicily and Italy. While these campaigns knocked Italy out of the war, they failed to provide a strategic breakthrough into central Europe. Competing strategic priorities and the U-boat menace to the Atlantic convoys meant that it was only in June 1944 that the Western Allies felt sufficiently confident to create a second front by landing forces in Normandy.

German defences did not, however, crumble. Despite the Allies' massive economic, military, intelligence and technical superiority, dogged German resistance forced the Allies to fight every step of the way. In the face of inevitable defeat, an opposition cabal tried to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, but was quickly crushed. Indeed, only in the Balkans and France did armed resistance to German domination meet with any real success. Nazi Germany had to be ground down by aerial bombardment and huge land offensives.

The political consequences of the total defeat of Germany were enormous. Mutual suspicions between the Allies quickly emerged as thoughts turned to the post-war world and the division of the spoils (map 2). Culturally, the war dealt a blow to western European civilization and confidence from which it has struggled to recover. Though it began, and was largely fought, in Europe, the Second World War had a profound impact across the globe.

The “Final Solution”

The war against the Soviet Union allowed Hitler to set in train the second component of his racial war: the elimination of European Jewry and those considered “defective”. During 1942 death camps were erected in the occupied territories to exterminate Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and other “racial enemies” (map 2). By the end of the war some six million Jews, along with hundreds of thousands of other victims, had been gassed in the death camps, or starved, executed or worked to death in concentration camps. Of those that survived the camps, many died as they were forced to march away from the advancing Allies.
The war in Asia can be seen as a series of conflicts that eventually escalated, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia in December 1941, into a single element within a larger global conflagration. It began in September 1931 when the Japanese army set about seizing Manchuria as a first step in Japan’s construction of an economically self-sufficient bloc under its control. By 1933 the conquest of Manchuria was complete and for the next four years there was relative peace in East Asia.

**The Sino-Japanese War**

In 1937 an incident outside Beijing rapidly developed into a full-scale war between Japan and China (map 1). The Japanese forces proved to be superior in battle to their Chinese counterparts and by the end of 1938 Japan had seized large areas of China and forced Chiang Kai-shek’s government to retreat to Chongqing. However, despite the scale of the defeat, the Chinese refused to surrender, a fact which Japan blamed on Western support.

- Fierce fighting took place following the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, but despite a series of defeats, the Chinese refused to surrender.

![Map of East Asia showing the war in Asia 1931-45](image_url)

- The rate of the Japanese advance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific took the Allied forces by surprise. Dutch, British and US territories fell like dominoes until Japan over-stretched itself in the Battle of Midway in June 1942. French Indochina, under the Vichy government, was sympathetic to Japan, as was Thailand. Japan ruled over its new territories with an iron fist and engaged in atrocities against both native populations and European prisoners of war.
Japan's answer to this problem was to try to use the war in Europe to its own advantage. In the summer of 1940, following the German offensive into western Europe (pages 232–33), Japan sought, through diplomatic means, greater access to the raw materials of the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina and Thailand. At the same time, in an effort to deter the United States from intervening in East Asia, it signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In response, the United States and Britain introduced a policy of economic sanctions, culminating, in July 1941, in an embargo on oil exports to Japan. Faced with complete economic collapse or war with the Allies, the Japanese chose the latter and on 7 December 1941 launched a rapid offensive into the western Pacific and Southeast Asia in the hope of establishing an impenetrable defensive perimeter.

The speed and effectiveness of the Japanese attack, symbolized most notably by the assault on Pearl Harbor, took the US, British and Dutch forces by surprise and led to a series of humiliating defeats for the Western Allies in the first six months of the war. In February 1942 the British fortress at Singapore surrendered and by May the last US garrison in the Philippines had capitulated (map 2). Japan's victories led it to portray itself as the "liberator" of Asia from European imperialism. During the course of the war nominally independent states were established in Burma and the Philippines, and Japan's ally Thailand was allowed to annex areas of Indochina, Burma and Malaya. In reality, however, Japan ruled over its newly conquered territories with an iron fist and engaged in atrocities against the native population and European civilian detainees and prisoners of war.

The euphoria of victory was shortlived. In June 1942 Japan suffered its first major reverse when its naval expedition to seize the island of Midway ended in disaster with the loss of four aircraft carriers. From this point Japan was on the defensive and was out-maneuvered strategically by the United States, which, through its "island-hopping" campaign in the western Pacific, was able to isolate the major Japanese bases such as Truk and Rabaul (map 3). In addition, Japan's war effort was undermined by the fact that it lacked the resources to replace its losses, with US submarines cutting the supply routes to Japan.

By 1945 it was clear that Japan was on the retreat, but the Americans feared that it would still cost many more lives to bring about its defeat. This was confirmed when the invasion of Okinawa in the spring of that year led to 10,000 American casualties. At first it was hoped that conventional bombing of Japanese cities and Soviet entry into the war in Asia would persuade Japan to capitulate, but by the summer hopes had turned to the use of the newly developed atomic bomb. The dropping of atomic bombs in early August on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – which resulted in the death of 140,000 people – and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, proved to be the final blows for Japan, and on 15 August Emperor Hirohito announced the country's surrender.

Although Japan's attempt to carve out an empire had been defeated, the region did not return to the pre-war status quo. In Southeast Asia the war helped to inspire the rise of indigenous nationalism, which in turn laid the seeds for the wars of national liberation that were to continue into the 1970s (pages 250–51). In China the ineffectiveness of Chiang Kai-shek's regime and its dismal war record led many to look to the Chinese Communist Party as an alternative government and civil war soon erupted (pages 254–55). For the United States the war demonstrated the importance of the western Pacific to its national security and led to a permanent commitment of American forces to the region. Japan, meanwhile, eschewed militarism and sought economic expansion by peaceful means.
The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War victorious, but devastated by the loss of 26 million people. Despite territorial gains in the west (map 1) there was a severe shortage of labour, aggravated by the deportation to Siberia or Central Asia of returning prisoners of war, intellectuals from the newly gained territories and whole nations accused of collaboration with the Germans (including the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars and Chechen-Ingush). The post-war Soviet Union consisted of 15 soviet republics, some of which also contained autonomous republics, regions and national areas (map 2).

After 1945 Stalin sought to re-establish control of the Soviet Union. Collective farms that had been destroyed during the war were reinstated, efforts were made to develop heavy industry, and the government returned to the use of terror as a way of controlling the population. Stalinism was extended wholesale to Eastern Europe, and by 1948 communist parties were in full control throughout the region (map 1). The economic development of the Eastern Bloc was regulated from 1949 onwards by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and defence aims were unified in 1955 with the signing of the Warsaw Pact. Only Yugoslavia, where Tito had come to power independently of the Red Army, developed a non-Stalinist form of communism.

**KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV**

Stalin died in March 1953 and by 1956, following a secret speech criticizing Stalin, Khrushchev had triumphed over his rivals. Political prisoners were released from the labour camps, and fresh emphasis was placed on the importance of agriculture, housing and the production of consumer goods. In order to achieve this economic change of direction at least partial decentralization was considered necessary. At the same time, Khrushchev poured money into nuclear and space research: the Sputnik satellite was launched in 1957, and in 1961 Yuri Gagarin made the first manned space flight.

The results of this new approach were mixed. Increased liberalization led to dissident movements in Russia and revolts across Eastern Europe. In 1956 both Poland and Hungary rose against Soviet rule. In Poland the Communist Party, under Gomulka, persuaded Khrushchev that a reformed communism would not threaten party control, but Hungary, which wanted to leave the Warsaw Pact, was invaded. Khrushchev improved relations with Yugoslavia, but his policies led to a split with China by 1960. Despite Khrushchev's successful visit to the United States in September 1959, relations with the West were soured by the shooting down of a US reconnaissance plane over the Soviet Union in 1960, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the siting of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 (pages 242-43).

Khrushchev was ousted by the Politburo in 1964, but economic reforms continued under Brezhnev and Kosygin until the invasion, in 1968, of Czechoslovakia, where Dubček threatened the Communist Party's monopoly on power. The Soviet Union then settled into a period characterized by a return to a centralized economy, with quotas that enforced quantity rather than quality. With the growing competition in armaments and space technology, and the Soviet Union's intervention on the side of the socialists in the Afghani Civil War, the Cold War intensified.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

The post-war period saw a whole series of grandiose plans for scientific management of the economy. Although Stalin's plan for the "Transformation of Nature", through windbreaks and shelter belts across the Ukraine, was shelved in 1953, Khrushchev's "Virgin Lands" scheme to grow maize across northern Kazakh SSR (map 3) was implemented. The resulting soil erosion ruined 40,000 square kilometres (15,440 square miles) of land and forced the Soviet Union to import grain. His scheme of the early 1960s for supranational economic sectors across Eastern Europe, with the north concentrating on industry and the south on agriculture and raw materials, failed due to
Romanian nationalism and caused Albania to establish closer links with China. A plan in 1971 for a giant computer grid to manage the whole Soviet economy was never implemented, and neither was the scheme to build a canal system that would have reversed the flow of several Siberian rivers in order to irrigate Central Asia.

Since 1917 “progress” had been envisaged as smoking factory chimneys and increased industrial production. However, Soviet economic growth rates of 5-6 per cent in the 1960s dropped to 2.7 per cent in 1976-80, and to 0 per cent in the early 1980s. Defence costs, the Afghan War and support for the countries of Eastern Europe were more than the economy could sustain. Rising expectations and a widespread black market led to labour unrest. Subsidies on food and housing took up large parts of the budget, and poor-quality consumer goods left people with little on which to spend their wages, resulting in money being put into private savings instead of back into the economy.

There were, however, successes in military and space technology, and in drilling for oil and natural gas, although exploitation of the Eastern bloc’s rich mineral resources led to serious pollution – both in industrial areas and in previously untouched landscapes (map 3). The dangers inherent in using poorly built and inadequately managed nuclear power to generate electricity were brought home to the world by the explosion at the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in 1986, although a larger, but unreported, nuclear accident had already occurred in 1957 at the test site “Chelyabinsk 40” in the Urals.

In Eastern Europe economic decline also set in from the mid-1970s onwards. As loans from Western banks became harder to arrange, and the Soviet Union ended its subsidized oil exports in the mid-1980s, wages in Poland fell by 17 per cent in the period 1980-86. In Yugoslavia wages fell by 24 per cent over the same period. Declining living standards, environmental issues, pollution and related health concerns heightened demands for a release from Soviet domination.

**MIKHAIL GORBACHEV**

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 it was clear that the economy needed radical reform and that the cost to the environment and to people’s health had been catastrophic. Pipelines were leaking oil into the permafrost across northern Russia, and most of Russia’s major rivers were polluted, in particular the Yenisei estuary around Norilsk. Grand projects, such as the building of the Baikal-Amur railway, had enabled the development of further mining enterprises, but in so doing had contributed to the destruction of the fragile ecosystem of Siberia. Damage to Lake Baikal from industrial effluent was an issue on which a growing green lobby focused, as was the drying-up of the Aral Sea, which lost 75 per cent of its volume and 50 per cent of its area between 1960 and 1989 due to overuse of its tributaries for irrigation.

Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost (openness), perestroika (restructuring) and democratization initiated reforms that were to lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, and to the ending of Soviet control of Eastern Europe.
In the five decades after the end of the Second World War, Western Europeans experienced an unprecedented increase in material prosperity. This was the outcome of almost uninterrupted economic growth which, by the end of the 20th century, had led to average per capita incomes more than three and a half times as high as in 1950, with the income gap between “rich” and “poor” countries within Western Europe much smaller than in the immediate post-war years. This rise in the material standard of living was associated with the increasing integration and interdependence of the European economies and their reliance on economic links with the rest of the world, underpinned by a profound structural transformation in which the relative importance of the agricultural sector declined. It was also associated with increasing political integration.

Problems of post-war economic reconstruction
At least 40 million people died throughout Europe during the Second World War and there was extensive damage to factories, housing, transport and communications systems. In 1945 Western European countries were faced with implementing the transition from war to peace, reconstructing industries and re-establishing international trade and payments. The length of time it took for pre-war output levels to be restored largely corresponded to the amount of damage inflicted on individual economies by the war (map 1).

The immediate post-war period saw severe food shortages and a large number of displaced people. Economic reconstruction was pursued with the support of the Marshall Plan, which provided financial assistance to the European countries. The European Economic Community (EEC) was set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and was renamed the European Community (EC) in 1967. As a step towards stabilizing European currencies, the European Monetary System came into force in 1979. The Treaty of European Union was signed at Maastricht in February 1992, and the single European currency system (Euro) was launched on 1 January 1999.

A: Those countries that experienced land fighting ended the war in 1945 with real GDP levels below those of 1938, while those that had not been subject to land fighting came out of the war with real incomes above their pre-war levels (the United Kingdom and neutral Spain, Sweden and Switzerland).
recovery was soon got under way. A major constraint, however, was that Western Europe relied heavily on imports, especially from the United States, but had neither the currency reserves nor export dollar earnings to pay for them. To preserve their foreign currency reserves, European governments restricted imports from neighbouring countries, resulting in a low level of intra-European trade. In order to combat these problems and build Europe into a strong trading partner for the future, the United States announced the European Recovery Program (ERP or Marshall Plan). From 1948 to 1951 ERP funds enabled the countries of Western Europe to continue importing goods from the United States, and thus helped speed up the process of economic recovery. In return the United States put pressure on Western Europe to build and maintain constitutional democracy as a bulwark against the spread of communism and the revival of fascism.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the ERP was the revitalization of intra-European trade through its support, in 1950, of the European Payments Union (EPU). This restored limited convertibility between European currencies while allowing member countries to maintain controls on imports from the dollar area. By 1958 the EPU had fulfilled its role, but the rapid expansion in trade had resulted in the increasing integration of the European economies – a process that many sought to take further.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Early French post-war plans for reconstruction called for the expansion of the national steel industry, while relying on unrestricted access to coal from the German Ruhr area. In 1950 France suggested the formation of a common market for coal and steel. With the "Benelux" countries, West Germany and Italy, it negotiated the Treaty of Paris which, in 1951, created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSO). Its success encouraged member states to push economic integration further to create a customs union and common market – the European Economic Community (EEC) – which began to operate in 1958. This increased the liberalization of internal trade and provided access to a larger market, while offering a protective shield against non-members; it also enabled the implementation of common policies. The EEC grew, via the European Community (EC), into the European Union (EU) of 15 countries in 1995 (map 2). In 2004 this was enlarged by the addition of a further ten countries.

In 1959 the United Kingdom, which at that point had not signed up to the EEC, founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and was joined initially by six other countries (map 2). Unlike the EEC/EC/EU, with its supranational institutional arrangements, EFTA was intergovernmental in nature. Yet with many of its members eventually joining the economically and politically more powerful Community, EFTA gradually lost its significance.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POST-WAR EUROPE
Between 1950 and the mid-1990s all of Western Europe experienced an increase in material prosperity (bar chart), despite variations in the rates of economic growth between countries. Moreover, by 1994 the gap in per capita income between the poorest and the richest economies was much smaller than in 1950. After 1973 practically all these economies experienced a slow-down in growth whose extent, however, differed between countries.

Western Europe's post-war growth was closely associated with changes in the employment structure that saw a large-scale shift of resources out of agriculture and industry, especially into services (map 3). In 1975, but was followed by the restoration of the monarchy of King Juan Carlos, and free elections in 1977. Greece experienced a bitter civil war, a military coup in 1967, and seven years of dictatorship that gave way to a democratic system only in 1974. Democracy did not come to Portugal until 1985. Elsewhere in Western Europe democratic systems did not escape problems. Post-war France went through frequent changes of government until stability was achieved under Charles de Gaulle in the 1950s. Italy not only had many short-lived governments throughout the second half of the 20th century but endured a serious crisis of corruption at all levels of government in the 1990s.

The 1960s saw short-lived left-wing activism, especially in Italy and Germany. In Germany the environmentalist Green movement had limited electoral success in the 1970s. The challenge to constitutional democracy in the 1980s and 1990s came from extreme right-wing, essentially racist, movements, which were most successful electorally in France and Italy. Through most of the period from 1945 to the end of the century, power swung like a pendulum, or was shared, between moderate social democratic or Labour parties and moderate conservative parties. This was the case under voting systems based on proportional representation that encouraged negotiation between political groupings and, as in Britain, a "first-past-the-post" adversarial system that encouraged competition between them.
Since 1900 there have been many dramatic changes in the nature of society in the United States. In 1900 the population was around 76 million, of whom more than half lived in the northeast or Midwest (pie chart). Over 87 per cent were white and just over 10 per cent were African American. The life expectancy of an American born in 1900 was 47 years, and only 4 per cent of the population was over 65 years old. A large percentage still lived on farms, and in the years before the motorcar the railroads served as the lifeline of the nation.

Over the coming decades great social, racial, technological and economic changes were to create a very different country. By the end of the century there were more than 270 million Americans. They were more racially diverse, more spread out (map 1), lived longer (176 years on average), were older (nearly 13 per cent were over 65) and generally richer (with an average Gross National Product per capita over five times that of the world average).

During the 20th century huge numbers of Americans migrated to the west and southwest in search of new jobs and greater opportunities. This mobility of labour helped the USA to remain a more flexible and productive economic power than other countries and was part of a realignment in the economy which saw the percentage employed in agriculture fall from 25 to 5 per cent and in industry from 35 to 19 per cent.

**IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS**

Immigration to the USA reached a peak in the early years of the 20th century, but from the 1920s onwards a more restrictive approach was adopted. A quota system was introduced for each nationality, based on the percentage of the existing US population of that nationality. This enabled northern European immigrants to be favoured at the expense of those from other regions of the world.

In 1965 the quota system was replaced by a permitted annual total of immigrants. There was an increase in the number of Hispanic Americans (people originally from Latin America, Cuba and Puerto Rico) in US society. By the end of the century they made up over 10 per cent of the population and were the fastest-growing group in the country. The size of other ethnic groups also increased dramatically, in particular those from Japan, the Philippines, South and Southeast Asia. The Native American population also grew in the last decades of the century, although less dramatically: at the end of the 20th century they made up around 1 per cent of the population.

In 1900 African Americans were politically and socially marginalized, the majority living on farms in the Deep South (map 2) where their parents or grandparents — if not they themselves — had been slaves. While they were supposedly guaranteed equal rights by the constitution, most southern states, politically dominated by whites, enforced segregation. In many places they were discouraged from voting by poll taxes, literacy tests and other intimidatory tactics. The industrial boom of the early 20th century, coupled with two world wars, created a need for factory workers in the northeast and Midwest. Many African Americans migrated there to find work and established neighbourhoods, with their own traditions and cultures, in cities such as New York, Detroit and Chicago. Their political power was still curtailed and, with the famous exception of Henry Ford's automobile plants, African Americans were usually given less prestigious and lower-paid jobs than whites.

The Civil Rights movement began in the 1950s with pressure both from above and below. In 1954 the famous Supreme Court decision Brown v Board of Education attacked the notion of state segregation. In the 1950s African Americans protested against enforced segregation and in Montgomery, Alabama they forced the town authorities to let them sit with whites on town buses (map 3). Subsequently, not only the South but the USA as a whole was forced to confront the issue of racial inequality. The 1960s were particularly turbulent, with legal victories for equality being won in the face of continuing racism.

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

These social changes acted as a catalyst for some important political changes in the USA. At the beginning of the 20th century the country's two major political parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, were more sectional groupings — often with competing interests — than ideological entities. The Democrats were loyally supported by the bulk of southern whites, for reasons stretching back to Republican rule during the Civil War, and were also often backed by a large number of farmers from poorer western states and different ethnic coalitions in the large cities. By
Encouraged by a ruling of the Supreme Court in 1955 against state segregation in education, the African-American citizens of Montgomery, Alabama followed the lead of Rosa Parks, who refused to give up her bus seat to a white man. They began a boycott of the city's segregated bus system that lasted more than a year, ending in a legal victory. In 1960 sit-in protests started in restaurants and retail outlets, while in 1961 Freedom Rides—buses filled with protesters against segregation—began crossing the Deep South, culminating in a march on Washington in 1963 by 250,000 people. African-American discontent was expressed in urban riots from the mid-1960s onwards, spreading to California on the west coast.

In 1900 African Americans remained concentrated in the southern states. Native Americans were scattered throughout the West, on reservations and territories to which they had been forcibly resettled in the 19th century. Hispanic Americans lived mainly in states that had been part of Mexico before 1848. By the end of the 20th century the population of many states had become more ethnically diverse (map 3). The non-white percentage of the population in the northeastern industrial regions, and in California, Texas and New Mexico, had increased markedly, partly as a result of internal migration, but also due to a large influx of migrant workers, many of whom were illegal immigrants. Successive US governments have placed restrictions on immigration, starting with the law of 1862 prohibiting Chinese immigration. However, illegal immigrants continue to find their way into the country, the majority crossing the border from Mexico, while others brave the dangers of the sea crossing from Cuba.

contrast, the backbone of the Republican Party was the middle-class business community and farmers in the northeast and Midwest, though the party also garnered a large part of the working-class vote. There were other, smaller, parties, including the Socialists, but they invariably performed poorly at election time.

The situation began to change significantly during the era of the Great Depression (1929–33) and the subsequent New Deal policies of Democrat President Franklin D. Roosevelt (pages 228–29). Previously, African Americans had, when allowed to vote, almost always supported the Republicans (the party of Abraham Lincoln), but Roosevelt's massive increases in government social spending caused both they and many working-class white voters to switch allegiance to the Democrats. As a result, the Democrats took over the Republicans' previous role as the natural party of government, and from the 1930s regularly won a majority of the seats in Congress, especially in the House of Representatives. However, during the 1980s a reverse migration of southern whites, often evangelical Christians, into the Republican Party created a situation of approximate balance. The parties have now developed more distinctive ideologies, with the Republicans on the whole supporting fewer taxes, less government regulation and smaller government welfare plans than the Democrats.

Many of the changes that have occurred since 1900 have led to an ongoing and emotional debate about what exactly it means to be “an American”. The traditional idea of a “melting pot”, whereby immigrants were expected to shed many of their old customs in order to become fully American, has been challenged, particularly on the Left, by the idea of a “great mosaic”. Ethnic minorities are now encouraged by some to maintain their separate identities, although other factions have fought this idea, believing that it could undermine the cohesion of the American nation.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD SINCE 1945

As the United States has become more powerful economically it has extended its area of involvement beyond the American continent to Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. Although it has sometimes considered it necessary to employ force to defend its interests, in many instances economic backing or, conversely, the threat of trade sanctions has been sufficient to achieve its objectives.

At the end of the Second World War the United States dominated the globe. It not only had the world's largest navy and air force, but it also dwarfed all other national economies. With most major European and Asian countries devastated by war, the United States produced half of the world's goods in 1945. The question facing the United States was what it should do with its tremendous power.

Before the Second World War US foreign policy had been unpredictable. With much of the country firmly isolationist, there was no national consensus as to what part the United States should take in world affairs. Most Americans seemed content to play a dominant role in North, Central and South America (pages 226-27) but had little interest in intervening in conflicts elsewhere. After the Second World War many of those responsible for US foreign policy, such as President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall, considered isolationism untenable given the strength of the Soviet Union.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union had been allies during the war, this relationship had been forced on them by necessity and a huge ideological rift still existed. In the period following the end of the war the Soviets increased their domination of Eastern Europe (pages 236-37), and many Americans worried that if the USA withdrew its forces from Western Europe the USSR would eventually dominate the whole continent. The USA, committed to free enterprise, and hitherto dependent on Europe for a large part of its export trade, was alarmed at the prospect of communist governments restricting trade with the non-communist world. Likewise, the Soviet government, led by Stalin, was suspicious of a Western Hemisphere dominated by the USA, and expressed doubt that capitalism and communism could peacefully coexist for long.

The Cold War Years

The perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union eventually proved decisive in the development of the United States into an economic and military world power. President Truman committed the USA to a policy of “containment”, involving resistance to the spread of communism anywhere in the world. In 1949 the USA played a key role in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (map 1), which committed it to defending Western Europe. By this time the “Cold War” between the USA and the USSR was a reality and would continue to dominate international relations for the next four decades (pages 244-45).

There was a slight thaw in relations during the 1970s, when the USA (under presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter) and the USSR (under General Secretary Brezhnev) adopted a policy of “detente”, whereby the two countries tried to establish closer links of mutual understanding. However, this policy proved very controversial in the United States; many saw it as a capitulation to communism and called for greater confrontation with the USSR. In 1980 Ronald Reagan, one of the harshest critics of detente, was elected US president. He committed his country to rolling back the “evil empire”, as he described the Soviet Union, and began the largest peacetime military build-up in the history of the United States. Reagan and his advisers gambled that they could bankrupt the Soviet Union without causing all-out war and without damaging the US economy. In the end the policy seemed to work. The USSR, even though it devoted a far larger proportion of its economy to military expenditure than did the USA, found it impossible to match the advanced technology of its rival. By 1989 Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev recognized that drastic changes were needed in order to reduce international tension and expand the Soviet economy. Gorbachev’s liberalization led ultimately to the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 (pages 262–63), as a result of which the United States lost its major adversary and the Cold War came to an end.

Intervention Worldwide

The policy of the United States during the Cold War was eventually successful in destroying Soviet power, but it had...
In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met at Yalta to discuss plans for the post-war division of Europe. As the leading superpower, the USA realized that its pre-war isolationist policy was no longer tenable, and that it had a major role to play in the reconstruction of Europe and in the encouragement of democratic regimes.

damaging repercussions for US international relations in some parts of the world. The USA often felt it necessary to overthrow or undermine regimes largely because they were influenced by communist ideas, while at the same time supporting manifestly corrupt and oppressive right-wing regimes considered friendly to the USA. Cuba, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama all had their governments either supported or besieged according to whether they were perceived by the US government as loyal or threatening (map 1). The most extreme example of US intervention was the Vietnam War. President Kennedy committed US ground troops to Vietnam in the early 1960s in an effort to "save" Vietnam and its neighbouring countries from communism (pages 250-51), but even with more than 500,000 troops fighting in Vietnam the US government could not "save" a people who did not wish to be saved. During the war 60,000 US military personnel and two million Vietnamese lost their lives, with millions more Vietnamese left wounded, orphaned, and homeless.

TRADING LINKS AND GLOBALIZATION

The United States strengthened trade with its American neighbours during the second half of the 20th century, and also looked westwards to the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia and East Asia. Various trade agreements reflected this shift of focus: the founding of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992 (effective from 1994), and the founding of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Organization in 1989 (map 2). In the 1990s, US economic recovery encouraged the nation to play a leading role in the push towards more open global trading markets.

THE WAR ON TERRORISM

On 11 September 2001, terrorists piloted two passenger aircraft into the World Trade Center, New York City. Millions watched on television as the towers collapsed. A third aircraft destroyed part of the Pentagon in Virginia, and a fourth jet crashed in Pennsylvania. More than 3,250 people died in the attacks. The United States produced evidence linking the attacks with Osama bin Laden, a Saudi dissident based in Afghanistan and leader of al-Qaeda, a loose network of terrorist groups.

On 8 October 2001, after building an international coalition against terrorism, US President George W. Bush launched air strikes against Afghanistan, targeting al-Qaeda bases and the Taliban government, which had refused to hand over bin Laden. In December 2001, Afghan opposition forces, backed by US and British special forces, overthrew the Taliban regime and an interim government took office. President Bush pledged a huge increase in US military spending to continue the "war on terrorism".

As part of this war, a US-led invasion of Iraq was launched on 20 March 2003. The regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed within three weeks and the invaders became an occupying force. This was still in place when a democratically elected Iraqi government was formed in 2005.
The Cold War was an ideological, political and diplomatic conflict in the years 1947-91, between the United States and its allies on one hand and the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union on the other. Characterized by extreme tension and hostility, it had a detrimental effect on international relations in this period.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain had agreed that free elections would be held throughout Eastern Europe. It soon became apparent, however, that the Soviet Union under Stalin intended instead to fill the political vacuum in Eastern Europe with communist governments loyal to Moscow. By 1948 the governments of Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia had been transformed from multiparty coalitions, as envisaged by the Yalta Declaration, to governments composed entirely of communists who adhered strictly to the ideologies, policies and practices of the government in Moscow (pages 236–37). The “Iron Curtain”, dividing the communist regimes from the rest of Europe, had fully descended.

### THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Despite these events in Europe, President Truman of the USA hoped that some form of co-operation with the USSR could continue. In February 1947, however, when the British announced that they were no longer able to provide economic and military support for the Greek and Turkish governments, the USA felt compelled to intervene. Not to do so might allow Greece, in particular, to fall to the communists, thus creating a threat to US global interests and national security. The result was the “Truman Doctrine”, which stated that the USA would oppose any further expansion of communist territory and would provide a financial package to help Greece and Turkey defend themselves from external interference. This was followed by the Marshall Plan, which provided $13.5 billion in economic aid to the war-torn countries of Europe. It was hoped that this would combat the spread of communism across the continent, but it was only partially successful because the states in Eastern Europe remained under the control of a communist-led government.

### THE DEEPENING OF THE WAR

Following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the Cold War deepened (map 1) with the Berlin Blockade of 1948–49, a communist uprising in Malaya in 1948, and the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, when the Chinese communists, led by Mao Zedong and supported by the USSR, finally defeated the US-backed forces of the Nationalists (map 2). This was followed by the Sino-Soviet split in 1950, when the Chinese and Soviets fell out over the issue of who had the right to lead the communist parties of the world. This resulted in the Cold War turning from a political and ideological conflict to a military and economic one, with the USA and the USSR each trying to build up their nuclear arsenals. In 1953 the Korean War ended, with the USA and the USSR each claiming victory.

### THE THAWING OF THE WAR

Over the next 20 years both superpowers attempted to ease tensions and “thaw” the Cold War. The resulting “detente” produced superpower summit meetings and agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, competition between the superpowers continued in Vietnam where, between 1964 and 1973, the US deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to fight communist North Vietnamese forces who were attempting to unify their country (pages 250–51).

In 1979 detente was abruptly ended when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, producing a new period of tension and hostility between the superpowers, and a fresh arms race. This lasted until 1985 when the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, began to de-escalate the Cold War by reviving summit meetings and arms negotiations with the USA. He also began a process of internal reform in the USSR itself and gradually relaxed the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe. This resulted in the collapse of communist regimes throughout the Eastern European bloc following the “People’s Revolutions” of 1989 and 1990 (pages 264–65), and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (pages 262–63). With the demise of the USSR and the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the Cold War came to an end.
A In 1962 US reconnaissance flights detected evidence that the Soviet Union was building nuclear missile bases on Cuba, within range of the US mainland. A US naval blockade, and a tense period during which nuclear war appeared likely, eventually resulted in the USSR, under Khrushchev, agreeing to dismantle the nuclear bases.

The Cold War was a period of political and economic confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies. The area of highest tension was along the “Iron Curtain” that divided Eastern Europe, but the two sides’ opposition to each other was played out in conflicts—some of a military nature—all over the world.

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THE BREAKDOWN OF EMPIRES
SINCE 1945

1 COLONIES AND MANDATES 1939

Before the Second World War the European colonial empires seemed largely secure (map 1). Despite independence movements in India (pages 248-49) and French Indochina (pages 250-51), and the growth of trade unions and early political movements in Africa and the Caribbean, colonial rule was widely expected to continue well into the 21st century. Yet within 20 years of the war's end most colonies had become independent, leaving only a few outposts whose future had still to be resolved (map 2).

The war's corrosive effects on colonialism were initially seen most clearly in Asia. Some colonies, such as Malaya and French Indochina, experienced invasion and occupation by Japanese forces, unleashing anti-colonial nationalism which could not be reversed after the war. The African colonies, meanwhile, became vital sources of military manpower and raw materials for the Allied war effort, the mobilization of which involved economic and social change. Colonial governments were forced to depart from their traditional approach of working through local political rulers and to adopt a more interventionist approach. This laid them open to local criticism of wartime restrictions, food shortages and many other hardships - grievances that often escalated into early forms of political protest.

Paradoxically, although the war weakened most of the colonial powers, it also increased their desire to utilize colonial resources to assist their own economic recovery after the war. The colonial powers sometimes used force in the face of growing local resistance to their rule, as seen in the unsuccessful attempts by the French and Dutch to re-establish control of Indochina and Indonesia respectively, and in Britain's ultimately successful campaign to defeat a communist insurrection in Malaya.

2 DECOLONIZATION 1945-98

Most of sub-Saharan Africa became independent between 1956 and 1962. Partly responding to the "winds of change" of African nationalism, Britain accelerated its plans for decolonization, and most of its African colonies became independent in the early 1960s (map 2). The major obstacle proved to be the resistance of white settlers to African
majority rule in East and Central Africa, and Zimbabwe’s legal independence was delayed until 1980. By the 1970s only the Portuguese dictatorship seemed determined to retain its African colonies, fighting a series of protracted wars against guerrilla movements. The financial and human cost to Portugal was enormous, provoking a military coup and revolution in 1974, with the new government committed to rapid decolonization.

After 1945 colonialism increasingly became an international issue. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had traditionally been hostile to European colonial rule and had put pressure on their wartime allies, Britain and France, to make a commitment to reform. In the immediate post-war period the colonial powers attempted to raise the living standards of the indigenous peoples in their colonies, hoping thus to appease both local feeling within the colonies and the international community. As the Cold War intensified (pages 244–45), the superpowers competed for influence in the developing world, both in ex-colonies and in colonies soon to become independent. Moreover, the United Nations, now responsible for the territories mandated by the League of Nations, became an important forum for criticism of colonialism. Arguments for faster decolonization intensified as former colonies themselves became members of the UN.

Another consideration was the shifting pattern of international trade. By the late 1950s economic integration in Western Europe (pages 238–39) was giving rise to serious doubts about the likely returns from large-scale colonial investment. Moreover, as the French demonstrated, it was possible to decolonize while preserving many of the advantages, commercial and otherwise, of formal colonial rule. A major consideration influencing British and French policymakers, therefore, was the hope that their respective colonies would opt after independence to join the Commonwealth of Nations (map 3) or the French Community. The great majority of former British colonies did choose this form of continuing association, so that decolonization seldom represented an abrupt change in relationships. Despite the effective collapse of the French Community in 1960, France has maintained close economic, diplomatic and military links with many of its former possessions.

**Small island states**

Decolonization posed the question of whether small island states, particularly those in the Caribbean (map 4) and the Pacific, could achieve viable independent nationhood. One solution was to group small territories together into larger political units. The Federation of the West Indies was formed in 1958 after many years of negotiation, although British Guiana and British Honduras opted not to join. However, when its larger, more prosperous members, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, gained separate independence in 1962 the Federation was dissolved. Other island territories, such as Gibraltar, had originally been acquired for their strategic value, but this declined as Britain wound down its overseas defence commitments in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The remaining European dependencies (map 2) are mostly small territories, often islands. In some cases, notably the Falkland Islands/Malvinas (claimed by Argentina) and Gibraltar (claimed by Spain), the issue of sovereignty remains unresolved. In the case of Hong Kong and Macau, the return of sovereignty to China was agreed through negotiated settlements. Some small islands, especially in the Caribbean and Pacific, have opted for a limited form of independence, retaining association with their former colonial power in matters such as defence and diplomacy, while others, including many islands in French Polynesia, have rejected offers of independence.
During the 1920s and 1930s a struggle developed between Britain, determined to maintain control over its empire in India, and the growing force of Indian nationalism. Political reforms in 1919, which were ostensibly a step towards eventual self-government, gave elected Indians limited responsibility in provincial government, but failed to satisfy nationalists. Indian protests centred on the campaigns of non-violent civil disobedience organized by the nationalist leader Mohandas Gandhi, seeking Indian self-rule. Gandhi, and the largely Hindu Indian National Congress Party, mobilized nationwide mass support, undermining British authority and causing alarm among India's large Muslim minority. By the late 1920s Congress was demanding complete independence. Britain's response was to combine repression (involving the detention of nationalist leaders – among them Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru) with constitutional reforms in 1935. These gave substantial power to autonomous provincial governments, while keeping overall control in British hands. In the 1937 provincial elections, Congress won power in a number of provinces (including the largely Muslim North West Frontier Province) (map 1).

The Second World War transformed the situation. In India Britain suspended talk of constitutional change until after the war and Congress ministers resigned in protest at India's involvement in the war without prior consultation. The cost of mobilizing India's economy to support the war effort was high, and was paid for by the victims of the Bengal famine of 1943 in which over one million people died. In 1942, faced by a possible Japanese invasion, Britain offered India independence after the war, in return for its wartime support. Congress replied with the massive "Quit India" protest campaign, which resulted in its leaders being imprisoned until 1945. Meanwhile, the Muslim League committed itself to forming a separate Muslim state (Pakistan).

By 1945 Britain, lacking the will or the resources to rule by force, sought to accelerate India's independence. Britain hoped to maintain Indian unity through a federal structure, but Congress insisted on a strong, centralized government, while the Muslim League demanded greater provincial autonomy. In the face of violence between the Hindu and Muslim communities, Congress agreed to the partition of India, with the creation of a separate Pakistan from the mainly Muslim western provinces and Bengal. In August 1947 India and Pakistan became independent (map 2), and millions of Hindu and Muslim refugees subsequently sought safety in the two new states. At least one million people died in attacks and reprisal killings carried out by one or other of the opposing religious groups. Despite the mass migration, India's population still includes a substantial proportion of Muslims (pie chart).

India since independence

Since independence India has remained the world's largest democracy. During the premiership of Nehru (1947–64), his government introduced five-year plans, and controlled foreign and private enterprise, in an effort to increase agricultural and industrial production. Given India's rapidly growing population (bar chart 1) it was imperative to boost food production and the late 1960s saw the beginnings of a "green revolution", in which modern farming techniques were employed with some success (bar chart 2). Attempts were made to attack poverty and social underprivilege, although measures to emancipate women and the lower castes were seen as challenging traditional Hindu values.

In 1966 Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, became prime minister. Her attempts to tackle mass poverty and encourage birth control alienated conservative opinion. She was found guilty of electoral corruption in 1975 and declared a state of emergency. Briefly imprisoned in 1978, Mrs Gandhi regained power in 1980. During the 1980s communal tensions re-emerged, with minority groups demanding greater recognition (map 3). Growing Sikh separatism led to Mrs Gandhi's assassination by Sikh extremists in 1984. Tensions also emerged between the central government and India's Sikh, Tamil and Muslim communities.
Pakistani began life as two ethnically distinct territories physically separated by India (map 2). The country faced poverty and political division, aggravated by West Pakistan's attempts to assert its dominance over East Pakistan. Whereas India was a leading force in the non-aligned movement, Pakistan aligned itself with the Western nations. While the Indian army remained non-political, Pakistan's army, which first seized power in 1958, often intervened in politics. During the 1960s the economic gap between West and East Pakistan widened. In East Pakistan separatism developed under Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, whose Awami League triumphed in the 1970 elections. When West Pakistan sent troops to restore order in 1971, civil war broke out and India intervened on Mujib's behalf. Pakistan was defeated and an independent Bangladesh was created in January 1972. Continuing political instability and military interventions have since added to Bangladesh's problems of mass poverty.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's modernization programme in the early 1970s alienated many in Pakistan, and in 1977 he was ousted in a military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq, who sought to create a more Islamic state. Through subsequent periods of military rule and democracy, the country faced the problems of Islamic fundamentalism and separatism.

Sri Lanka
The British colony of Ceylon contained, in addition to its majority Buddhist Sinhalese population, a large Hindu Tamil minority. When it became independent in 1948, the government attempted to make Sinhalese the official language alienated the Tamil minority, who campaigned for autonomy. In 1960 Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike became the world's first woman prime minister. She changed the country's name to Sri Lanka in 1972 and pursued radical socialist policies. Her successor, Junius Jayawardene, reversed this trend and tried to appease the Tamil community. However, in 1983 long-standing ethnic tensions erupted into a prolonged civil war which Indian military intervention in 1987 failed to end.

Territorial disputes
Since independence, South Asia has witnessed several major territorial disputes (map 3). Relations between India and Pakistan were soured by their rival claims to Jammu and Kashmir. Immediately after the formation of India and Pakistan, from which Kashmir initially remained independent, the new Pakistan government sent troops to lay claim to the predominantly Muslim state. The Hindu maharaja, Sir Hari Singh, immediately acceded the state to India, who sent troops in his support, forcing the Pakistanis into a partial withdrawal. The United Nations intervened and ruled in 1949 that a plebiscite should take place, but the two sides failed to reach agreement on how this should be administered. In 1965 serious fighting between India and Pakistan culminated in a Soviet-arranged truce, and in 1972 each country accepted that the dispute should be solved bilaterally. Violent protests in Kashmir for greater autonomy have, however, persisted since the 1980s.

Territorial disputes between India and China escalated after China absorbed Tibet in 1959. In October 1962 China invaded India in Arunachal Pradesh, forcing Indian troops to retreat before a ceasefire was arranged. These regional tensions have led both India and Pakistan to maintain large armies and to develop nuclear weapons. In 2002 there was a threat of war between the two countries over Kashmir. Since independence in 1947 India and Pakistan have continued to dispute control of Jammu and Kashmir. China also claims a small area of this mountainous region. Elsewhere, border disputes have occurred between India and China, and between Bhutan and China. In 1971 East Pakistan broke away from West Pakistan to form the independent state of Bangladesh, and both Pakistan and India have experienced claims for autonomy from people within their borders, among them the Baluchis in Pakistan and the Nagas in Assam. The subcontinent's most serious separatist activity has been that of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, where an estimated 65,000 people were killed in a 20-year civil war before the declaration of a ceasefire in 2002.

Improvements in agricultural practices in India, known as the “green revolution”, led to marked increases in productivity from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the amount of wheat harvested more than trebling.
ASIA
SINCE 1920

n 1920 Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia that was not under Western colonial administration, although indigenous anti-colonial movements had been established in most parts of the region, even if in rudimentary form. The next 55 years were to be dominated by the struggle for self-determination – a process which differed markedly from country to country (map 1).

At one extreme was the peaceful transfer of power in the Philippines, which had become a colony of the United States at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898. The United States, with its strong anti-colonial tradition, was uncomfortable with its new responsibilities and moved rapidly to transfer political and administrative powers to Filipinos. In 1935 it established the Philippine Commonwealth, granting the Filipino government control of internal affairs, and promising full independence on 4 July 1946. To a large degree, the process of decolonization was driven by the colonial power itself.

At the other extreme was the turbulent situation in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, where anti-colonial agitation was, for much of the 1920s and 1930s, vigorously suppressed by colonial administrations. Between the two extremes was Burma, where, under pressure from the constitutional advances being made in India (pages 248–49), the British transferred some administrative responsibilities to the Burmese in the early 1920s.

The Western colonial presence in Southeast Asia was shattered by the Japanese military advance into the region between December 1941 and April 1942 (pages 234–35). The fiercely anti-Western sentiments expressed by the Japanese, and their effective destruction of the myth of white supremacy, influenced the political aspirations of the indigenous populations of the region. Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Dutch and French faced severe opposition to their attempts to re-establish control over their former colonies. In the Dutch East Indies a fierce military and political battle was waged between the Dutch and the forces of the newly declared Republic of Indonesia until, towards the end of 1949, the United States – acting through the United Nations – put pressure on the Dutch to withdraw.

Burmese achieved independence early in 1948, but was almost immediately riven by ethnic and political splits. In 1962 it became a military-led state in which all dissent was ruthlessly crushed. British rule in Malaya came to an end by peaceful negotiation in 1957, although from 1948 to 1960 British and Commonwealth troops were involved in the suppression of a major communist rebellion in the country.

The Vietnamese struggle for independence from the French resulted, in 1954, in the division of the country into communist North Vietnam and US-backed South Vietnam. North Vietnam attempted to overthrow the southern regime and reunify the country. The United States, anxious to prevent the spread of communism, became militarily involved in the 1960s but was eventually defeated by the Vietcong's guerrilla tactics.

The Vietnam War

From 1955 a strongly anti-communist government was established in
In the late 1950s communist North Vietnam began the armed struggle to overthrow the southern regime, funneling supplies of men and arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail – in reality a shifting complex of jungle routes – into the South. The United States first committed ground troops to Vietnam in 1965, although much of its military might took the form of mass bomber raids from bases in Thailand and aircraft-carriers in the South China Sea against the Ho Chi Minh Trail and urban centres in North Vietnam. In early 1968, while celebrations were underway for the lunar New Year (Tet), the communist Vietcong launched fierce attacks against urban centres across South Vietnam – the “Tet Offensive”. However, despite some striking successes – including Vietcong fighting their way into the compound of the US Embassy in Saigon – the offensive failed to dislodge the southern regime and its ally. In 1970, in an attempt to protect its forces in the south, the United States launched an invasion into eastern Cambodia with the aim of destroying the communist sanctuaries there. It was now clear, however, that the United States could not defeat the Vietcong and, following strong domestic pressure, US forces were withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of March 1973. In April 1975 communist troops entered Saigon, the southern regime collapsed, and Vietnam was united under communist rule.

THE POST-COLONIAL ERA

The period since the mid-1960s has seen an extraordinary economic transformation in large parts of Southeast Asia. From being principally exporters of agricultural products and minerals, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and, to some degree, the Philippines, have developed a substantial industrial base, exporting manufactured goods – including electrical and electronic goods, clothing and footwear – to markets across the world (map 3). This was largely achieved through heavy investment by East Asian, European and American multinational companies, which took advantage of Southeast Asia’s low wage costs. High economic growth rates were sustained over a number of decades, with a particularly rapid spurt in the late 1980s.

The industrialization of Southeast Asia was mirrored by the rapid pace of urbanization. Cities expanded rapidly (bar chart), with the result that a high proportion of the population now live in shanty towns surrounding the prosperous commercial centres. Rapid economic growth created fortunes for Southeast Asia’s tycoons, with large urban middle class and those living in rural areas also benefiting. Southeast Asia’s long boom was brought to a sudden halt in the middle of 1997. Beginning with the Thai baht, many of the region’s major currencies came under intense speculative pressure and were forced to devalue. Stock markets plunged and banks crashed. In the wake of the financial meltdown unemployment soared and large sections of the population faced severe economic hardship. The causes of the crisis differed from economy to economy, but the over-commitment of largely unregulated banks, widespread corruption and unsustainable budget deficits by governments with over-ambitious spending plans were clearly important factors.

The economic crisis had serious political consequences in 1998. Riots in Indonesia in May led to the end of President Suharto’s 30-year period in power, and in Malaysia a split in the dominant political party, coupled with popular protest against corruption, provoked a serious challenge to the prime minister, Mahathir bin Muhammad.
Defeat in the Pacific War (1941–45) left Japan without an empire and with an industrial economy in ruins. The Allied (predominantly American) occupiers moved swiftly to incorporate democratic reforms into a revised constitution. The emperor was retained as a ceremonial figure, but power was exercised by a legislature elected by universal suffrage. The great industrial combines (zaibatsu) that had dominated the pre-war economy (pages 206–1) were broken up, labour unions were legalized, and the power of rural landlords was destroyed by wholesale land reforms that favoured small family farms.

The reforming zeal of the occupying authorities was, however, of little immediate significance to most ordinary Japanese, for whom the economic hardships of war and its aftermath were compounded by the repatriation of millions of former soldiers and colonists, and the post-war "baby boom". The failure of the economy to recover sufficiently to meet the day-to-day needs of the population soon led to revisions in economic policy, and these changes were reinforced by the political fallout from the victory of the Communists in China and the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 (pages 244–45). By the time the United States administration ended in 1952, Japan had been redefined as a bastion of anti-communism in East Asia, and expenditure of around $3.5 billion by the United States military during the Korean War had stimulated the economy into growth.

**Economic expansion**

Over the next two decades Japan enjoyed an extraordinary period of economic expansion. Industrial production had recovered to pre-war levels by 1955, and during the 1960s average annual growth rates exceeded 10 per cent. This success, which became a model for other Asian economies, rested on a fortuitous combination of external and internal circumstances. Japan's deficiencies in mineral resources were of little importance in an era when cheap raw materials could be acquired easily from overseas. The United States offered a ready market for manufactured exports, made more competitive by an increasingly undervalued currency. It also provided access to industrial expertise for Japanese technologists. Foreign policy focused overwhelmingly on trade promotion, although one important territorial issue was resolved with the return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty by the United States in 1972.

The "family state" of pre-war times was replaced by a "developmental state", in which a stable political regime under the conservative Liberal Democrats allowed major industrial groupings to re-emerge under the guiding hand of an elite bureaucracy. Large-scale movements of population from the countryside to the cities (map 1) guaranteed a supply of youthful and well-educated workers for Japan's factories; labour relations based on company unions and employment for life helped to secure support for economic growth as the primary goal of the nation. A high rate of savings ensured adequate supplies of capital. As wealth accumulated, domestic demand became an increasingly important source of growth.

By the late 1960s it was apparent that such unrestrained economic expansion had environmental costs, with outbreaks of illnesses caused by industrial pollution—such as "Minamata Disease" and "Yokkaichi Asthma"—serious enough to attract international attention. Labour shortages in Japan's cities reinforced pressure for industry to relocate or raise productivity (map 2). Trade friction with the United States and a sharp revaluation of the yen preceded the oil crises of 1973–74 (pages 272–73). Japan's vulnerability to disruption in the supply of an energy source on which it had become almost wholly dependent was exposed amid panic buying of daily essentials by the public, rapid inflation and the temporary cessation of growth.

Japan responded quickly and effectively to these challenges. Energy-intensive heavy industries were obliged to raise their efficiency and clean up their effluents or move overseas, as Japan felt the effect of competition from Korea and the other emerging industrial economies in East Asia. Small, fuel-efficient cars were suddenly in demand, and

![Rapid population increases in prefectures within the Pacific coast belt between Tokyo and Osaka, and absolute losses in remote rural areas, reflect a massive redistribution of population through internal migration, which peaked in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s. With the highest employment growth in the service sector, large cities have been popular destinations for economic migrants.](image)
exports responded quickly, until the threat of protective tariffs from countries in North America and Europe on cars exported from Japan forced Japanese car manufacturers to increase their production in these regions. Industry shifted towards "knowledge-intensive" sectors such as electronics (graph), in which Japan established international standards and dominated world markets. Growth did slow from the heady rates of the 1960s, but still averaged over 4 per cent per annum in 1974 to 1985, and Japan was able to weather the second oil crisis of 1978.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND TRADE

As the 1980s progressed, relations with the United States became more problematic. The cost to the United States of protecting Japan during the Cold War was high, while Japan grew ever richer on burgeoning trade surpluses. The United States became sensitive to the effect of imports from Japan on job prospects at home. It put restraints on trade in manufactured goods between the two countries, and pressure on Japan to open up its markets to US farm produce, such as rice. Japanese agriculture itself was by now heavily subsidized and plagued by inefficiencies linked to the small farms inherited from the land reforms of the 1940s. It attempted, unsuccessfully, to adapt to competition from imports by changing the crops that it produced.

The Plaza Agreement of 1985, between the United States, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, sought to resolve global trade imbalances by expanding Japan's domestic demand. The rapid appreciation of the yen was also expected to make Japanese products less competitive in international markets and to boost imports to Japan. Yet again, however, Japanese industry responded by shifting up a gear: in a flurry of direct investment in East and Southeast Asia, manufacturers sought to avoid high Japanese wages by moving production overseas (map 3).

This process was known as "hollowing out". It was matched by a rapid expansion in Japan's foreign aid, the aim of which was to support infrastructural improvements in neighbouring countries. This facilitated production of, and created additional demand for, Japanese products in these countries. Japan became the centre of a regional manufacturing system tied together by trade flows of raw materials, components and manufactured goods. Tokyo was transformed into one of the world's three great financial centres.

Investments at home and overseas were buoyed up by low interest rates and the willingness of banks to lend against property assets, which soared in value. This speculative "bubble economy" finally burst in the early 1990s as land prices collapsed, obliging the government to shore up the ailing banking sector. The banks' problems were compounded by the subsequent economic crisis in Southeast Asia (pages 250-51) as loans to finance new factories in Thailand, Indonesia and elsewhere turned sour. In the latter half of the 1990s Japan, with the world's highest life expectancy, was beginning to adjust to social changes brought about by a population in which the proportion of older people was growing (bar charts). Its politicians were attempting to relax bureaucratic control of domestic markets and to continue the reform of its financial systems. Such changes were a necessary counterpart to the growing climate of openness in Japan's trade and financial relations with the outside world.

The popular opposition to military participation in the Gulf War of 1991, and Japan's inability to counter the threat posed by North Korean missiles, indicated the mismatch between Japan's status as a pre-eminent global economic power and its low political and military profile. The occupation by Russia of the islands to the northeast of Japan also remained a sensitive issue at the end of the century.

- The major industrial regions in Japan were established before the Second World War. Investment was concentrated there in the 1960s to take advantage of the existing infrastructure. However, labour shortages, high land prices and pollution controls in large cities, plus competition from overseas, fuelled a relocation of industry within Japan to areas that had not previously proved attractive to investors.

- The Plaza Agreement of 1985, between the United States, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, added a new dimension to Japan's economic ties to other countries in the region, which had previously been dominated by imports of raw materials, and exports of products manufactured in Japan.
China’s population almost doubled during the period of Mao’s leadership (1949–76), although the period of the Great Leap Forward (1958–62), which caused extreme famine in some areas, shows up on a slight slowing of the growth rate. Attempts were made during the 1970s to restrict the size of families, culminating in a law passed in 1979 (generally considered to have failed) limiting married couples to one child. As in many other developing countries, a falling death rate has ensured that, despite a reduced birth rate, the population continues to grow - officially at around 1 per cent per year, although this takes no account of a large, mobile, unregistered population, mainly to be found in rural China. The country’s urban population has grown steadily as a proportion of the total, except for the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–72), when it declined.

China has the largest population of any country in the world. At the time of Mao’s death in 1976 the majority were clustered, as they had been for centuries, in the rich agricultural regions, with around 20 per cent of the population in cities.

In the mid-1960s Mao Zedong successfully reasserted control over the Communist Party by empowering Chinese youth in his Cultural Revolution. The Little Red Book, containing Mao’s political axioms, became a symbol of revolutionary zeal, not only in China but also around the world.

The People’s Republic of China was founded on 1 October 1949, following the defeat of the Japanese invaders and the unification of the country under a single government. The immediate priorities were to establish law and order, implement land reforms, balance the state budget, stabilize prices and nationalize industry. Having gained public support for these essentially nationalist policies, from the mid-1950s onwards Chairman Mao Zedong began to introduce communist reforms. Initially, the communist programme was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, with whom China had signed a pact in 1950. It involved wholesale rural and urban collectivization, with the assets of large property owners being taken over by the state. Those of smaller property owners were given to communes, supervised by the Communist Party. Other radical social measures were passed, including giving women equal legal status with men in terms of marriage and employment.

The Five-Year Plans
The main thrust of the programme was industrialization, formalized into a series of five-year plans. During the first of these (1953–58), over 100 industrial projects were set up with the help of machinery and expertise from the Soviet Union. The aim was to create an economy that did not depend on imports from capitalist countries, and the policy was initially effective in changing China’s economy from one based on agriculture to one based on heavy industry.

In his second five-year plan, known as the “Great Leap Forward”, Mao rejected the Soviet model and developed a specifically Chinese communism based on peasant labour. He instructed collectives to build and run small-scale iron and steel foundries. However, not only did it prove impossible to produce metal of an acceptable standard, but the scheme also took labour away from the agricultural sector. Production of food dropped as a consequence, leading to a nationwide famine that claimed tens of millions of lives (bar chart 1). The plan also seriously backfired in the industrial sector, with production dropping by up to 50 per cent, forcing the government to de-industrialize the economy. China’s economic growth was temporarily halted.

The Cultural Revolution
Chairman Mao’s main concern was to promote his ideology and increase his power, leading him into conflict with other, more pragmatic, members of his government, in particular President Liu Shaoqi. Mao launched his Cultural Revolution in 1966 in an attempt to revive his control over the party and society. Party officials, teachers and factory managers were among those in authority who were verbally and physically attacked, imprisoned or sent to work in labour camps.

There they were joined by millions of young people, whose schools and universities had been closed. Industrial production was severely disrupted, and the economy brought near to bankruptcy during the ten-year process.
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MAO
Immediately after the revolution of 1949, China allied itself with the Soviet Union and gave assistance to independence movements in Southeast Asia. It also provided troops to assist the North Koreans in their efforts to unify their country in 1950, and aided the Vietnamese in their battle to expel the French from Indochina in the early 1950s. From the early 1960s, however, China's relations with the Soviet Union soured, mainly due to Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalin's policies. At the same time, China also lost support among the neutral, newly independent countries of the developing world when it crushed anti-Chinese opposition in Tibet, and entered into a border dispute with India. The Cultural Revolution was a period of intense xenophobia, but in 1971 Mao, in an apparent reversal of policy, welcomed President Nixon's initiative to normalize relations with the United States. In October of that year the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan in the United Nations and re-entered the world stage.

CHINA AFTER MAO
Mao's death in 1976 initiated a power struggle between the "Gang of Four" (which included Mao's widow) and Deng Xiaoping. Deng emerged the victor, and during his era (1978-97) pragmatism prevailed. Faced with a rapidly expanding population (map 1 and bar chart), economic growth became the stated priority, to be brought about by a policy of "four modernizations" (in industry, agriculture, science and technology, and the army). China's industrial output rose steadily during the 1980s, and increased dramatically during the 1990s by over 20 per cent each year. In the agricultural sector China made important gains through the reform of farming practices. Although the total land area committed to agriculture remained much the same, yields improved enormously (map 2).

From 1978 onwards state ownership and planning were reduced, "the market" was respected and nurtured, and property rights were gradually defined. Communes were abolished and citizens permitted to run private businesses and engage in market activities. Instead of attempting to make China self-sufficient, the new regime adopted an export-led growth strategy, copied from other newly industrialized countries.

DEMANDS FOR DEMOCRACY
As China became more open to Western economic principles and ideology during the 1980s, many people, in particular students, began to demand modernization of the political system. Although the paramount leader Deng resisted these demands, Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang was more open to change. Hu's demotion and subsequent death triggered pro-democracy demonstrations in many major cities during April 1989. Throughout May demonstrators occupied the vast Tiananmen Square in Beijing, demanding Deng's dismissal and political reform. With the world's press watching, the Chinese government held back for several weeks. However, overnight on 3-4 June the army moved in to disperse the demonstrators. Hundreds were killed and thousands were injured; arrests, imprisonments and executions followed. The international outrage that resulted soured China's relations with the outside world and briefly affected foreign investment, which had, since the 1980s, been channelled through China's "Special Economic Zones" and "open cities" (map 3 and bar chart).

In July 1997, shortly after Deng's death, Hong Kong was returned to Chinese rule (and designated a "Special Administrative Region"). Later that year the Chinese government decided to privatize state-owned enterprises operating at a loss—a roughly 30 per cent of the state sector. With mounting unemployment from the collapse of the public sector, the trend towards a semi-capitalist society continues in uneasy contrast to the strict party control, creating a great deal of uncertainty about the political and economic future of the world's most populous nation.
During the heyday of colonial power in Africa in the 1920s and 1930s, it looked as though European control would survive into the far distant future (pages 206-7). The ease with which African countries were drawn into the Second World War highlighted their status as European possessions. North Africa became a major theatre of conflict, and many African soldiers served with the Allied armies. African colonies were also used as major sources of vital raw materials and foodstuffs.

The war stimulated economic development in Africa. Industrialization and urbanization increased markedly, as did the production of foodstuffs and cash crops by African cultivators. In political terms, the refusal of the colonial powers to extend to Africa the democratic ideals for which they had fought in Europe sharpened Africans' sense of the injustice of colonialism. The independence granted to India in 1947 and other countries in Asia around this time encouraged African nationalists to press for similar political freedoms in their own continent. The rise of an educated African elite, which took advantage of new economic opportunities and skill shortages in the colonial bureaucracy, provided a social base for the developing anti-colonial consciousness. A growing desire for independence was also fuelled by the fact that in the years immediately after the war, Britain and France relied on African raw materials, purchased at artificially depressed prices, to rebuild their shattered economies. Between 1945 and 1951 Britain made a profit of £140 million on commodity transactions with its African colonies, while injecting only £40 million in return via the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.

**The Gaining of Independence**

The speed with which the process of gaining independence swept through Africa was in many ways a mirror image of the hasty 19th-century partition of Africa among the colonial powers. Libya gained independence in 1951 largely because the United Nations could not agree who should control the former Italian colony. The vast British-controlled Sudan gained independence in 1956, as did the French colony of Tunisia. It was, however, the achievement of independence by the Gold Coast as Ghana in 1957, spearheaded by the charismatic pan-Africanist leader
Kwame Nkrumah, that sparked off a wave of decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana provided a model of relatively peaceful transition to independence, while in French-controlled Algeria and British-occupied Kenya protracted and bitter insurrection was waged by the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Mau Mau movement respectively. Most African colonies gained their independence in the years between 1956 and 1962 (map 1). In some instances the process was hurried and unplanned. The hastily granted independence of the Belgian Congo (Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1960 resulted in the attempted secession of the copper-rich southern region, giving rise to political instability and foreign interference that characterized the post-independence history of many African states.

Not all African countries gained independence during the first wave of national liberation. The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique finally won independence only after a coup d'etat in Lisbon in April 1974, led by General Spinola. The struggle in Guinea-Bissau (which had claimed its independence a year earlier) persuaded Spinola that the Portuguese African empire could no longer be sustained. A bitter guerrilla war was also fought in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), against a white colonial regime that had proclaimed its own independence from Britain in 1965. After Zimbabwe, where black African rule was finally achieved in 1980, the only African states still to achieve freedom for blacks were South Africa and its illegally occupied satellite, Namibia (map 3). Although Namibia won its independence in 1990, black South Africans did not vote in a national election until 1994, when Nelson Mandela (who had spent 27 years as a political prisoner) became president (map 4).

AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The upsurge of African nationalism, which brought so many countries to independence, also engendered huge optimism and unrealistic expectations of rapid economic development. All too often, however, the new governing elites were ill-prepared for office, ambitious development plans went awry, expectations of rapid industrialization were misplaced, and political instability became endemic. During the Cold War (pages 244–45) competition for influence in Africa became an important proxy for global conflict, and former colonial powers could exert great economic power. Foreign aid was often provided in the form of military training and weaponry, rather than as a stimulus to economic development.

When the Ghanaian president Nkrumah was deposed in a coup in 1966, much of the early optimism for independent Africa began to wane. The civil war that broke out when Biafra sought to secede from Nigeria in 1967 highlighted the problems of military involvement in civil affairs, and of the failure of nationalism to supersede ethnic divisions.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Many African countries have made significant progress since independence, with massive provision of primary and secondary schooling, and the extension of basic health facilities. Growing networks of rural clinics and the availability of cheap drugs have done much to enhance life expectancy and improve infant mortality figures, although the rapid spread of AIDS in some regions is effectively undoing many of these advances (pages 274–79).

Following independence, countries such as Ghana and Mozambique adopted the rhetoric of socialist transformation; others, such as Kenya and the Ivory Coast, proclaimed the benefits of capitalism, while Tanzania sought to disengage itself from the world economy and concentrate on autonomous development. Although none of these approaches proved particularly successful in the long run, many African countries made considerable economic progress in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of relatively high commodity prices. In Nigeria the exploitation of oil reserves provided spectacular wealth for its political elite.

Africa suffered a major economic crisis in the 1970s as a result of massive increases in oil prices (pages 272–73). Falling commodity prices and increased interest rates severely affected those economies that had been encouraged to borrow on international markets. By the mid-1980s some, such as Zambia, were so stricken by debt that they had no option but to accept “structural adjustment programmes” proposed by the International Monetary Fund, remodelling their economies on free-market principles and enforcing cuts in social provision. As a result, large parts of Africa experienced economic stagnation during the 1980s.

In the early 1990s optimism replaced the euphoria of the independence era and the gloom of the 1980s, as several civil wars ended and democratic elections were held across the continent. As the decade wore on, however, such optimism appeared ill-founded as bitter ethnic and religious disputes and civil wars broke out and the prospect of democracy and development receded in several key states.
Since 1945 the countries of Latin America have adopted two quite distinct strategies of economic development, the first embracing the idea that the state is the most effective engine of growth, and the second rejecting this idea. Until the mid-1960s, most countries were committed to state-led industrialization, with the aim of achieving virtual self-sufficiency in both manufacturing and heavy industry. Economic nationalism was a dominant ideology, with governments seeking to maximize their control over the production of raw materials. During the 1960s, largely as a consequence of the debt crises that had by then hit all the Latin American economies, neo-liberal orthodoxy swept the region, with most governments implementing policies of deregulation, privatization, encouragement of foreign investment and fiscal reform.

FAILURE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

The industrialization strategy, known as import-substitution industrialization (ISI), which had been officially endorsed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in 1949, was deemed a failure within 15 years (pages 272–73). By the mid-1960s government-led industrialization had not only failed to generate the anticipated number of jobs, but had also not progressed much beyond light industry and proved unable to compete effectively in local or international markets. This was partly the result of weaknesses within the strategy itself, which required Latin American countries to import more in the short term in order to establish their industries, leading to balance of payments difficulties. Another problem was Latin America's enduring technology and communications gaps: the more developed economies produced goods that were not only of higher quality, but were also marketed with far greater sophistication. The politicization of economic decision-making by Latin American states also had a detrimental effect on industrialization policies. Some Latin American countries did become more industrialized during the 1950s and 1960s (bar charts), but were still far more dependent on the production of raw materials (map 1) than had been anticipated when the policy of ISI was launched.

INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS

The failure of the industrialization model was one factor contributing to the debt crises that hit Latin America in the early 1980s. The major cause, however, was the disintegration, during the 1960s, of the system of international financial regulation that had been in place since 1944. When oil price rises in 1973 led to a surplus of “petrodollars” on the international lending markets, Latin American countries, which had never succeeded in generating internally the levels of capital needed for development, appeared to be ideal targets for loans. With economic depression and inflation in the developed economies, these loans were effectively set at very low, or even negative, interest rates. When US interest rates rose dramatically in the early 1980s, Latin American countries found themselves unable to service their debts. As bankers hastened to call on the services of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), most debtor countries were obliged to sign stabilization agreements with the IMF as a prerequisite to the rescheduling of their debts. The aim of these agreements was to cut spending and increase exports, thereby maximizing revenue to make interest payments.

The 1980s are referred to as “the lost decade” of Latin American development; economies contracted and there was a huge net transfer of capital out of the region. In the 1990s capital investment returned to Latin America, and it is now accepted that much of the original debt will probably not be repaid. However, Latin America could continue to be burdened by interest payments well into the 21st century.
Politically, this period saw the introduction of full suffrage throughout the region, with women granted the vote by the mid-1950s in all Latin American countries, and literacy qualifications gradually dropped, although not until as late as 1989 in the case of Brazil. However, for much of the period the democratic process was compromised at best, and completely suspended at worst. Most countries were governed by populist regimes in the 1940s and 1950s which, although elected, tended to use dictatorial methods once in power. Argentina’s Juan Domingo Perón (1946–55) was the classic example. Nevertheless, populism generated a level of political activity among the masses which alarmed those in the property-owning classes to such an extent that most were prepared to support military coups in the 1960s and 1970s.

Such fears were shared by US governments, whose longstanding concerns about political stability in Latin America had acquired particular urgency because of the Cold War (pages 244–45). During the late 1940s and 1950s, the United States had taken care to consolidate not only its political alliances with Latin American nations (in the Organization of American States) but also its military links, with the USA supplying most of Latin America’s weapons and military training (map 2). In these circumstances, the military coups of the 1960s and 1970s ushered in regimes influenced partly by the management techniques and development economics learned either in the USA itself or at national military training schools based on the USA model. The military leaders argued that only they were capable of bringing about national development and that the democratic process would have to be suspended until the country was “ready” for electoral politics. The repression for which these regimes became internationally condemned was directed initially at the Left, but gradually acquired a random nature designed to inhibit all political activity, even among moderates.

Although the military stayed in power for lengthy periods of time (Brazil 1964–85, Argentina 1976–83 and Chile 1973–89), they proved no more able than civilian politicians to achieve economic development; indeed, they presided over the debt crises (and, in many cases, their purchases of weapons contributed substantially to the debt). A process of redemocratization began in Latin America in 1980, and by 1990 there were elected governments in every country of the region apart from Cuba.

Most Latin American countries are still some distance away from being fully consolidated liberal democracies, with civilian control over the military, respect for civil rights, freedom of the press and broadly representative political parties. The process of resisting authoritarianism stimulated a wide range of grassroots organizations concerned with, for example, human rights, women’s issues and neighbourhood self-help, many of which are reluctant to be recruited by formal political parties. The question of ethnic identities (map 3) also assumed an increasing significance, particularly in 1992, the quincentennial of the European “conquest”, “discovery” or “encounter” with the Americas. (The very term used to describe Columbus’s landing in 1492 is highly disputed, reflecting the intractability of the ethnic and cultural issues at stake.) There is still a potentially dangerous gap between the concerns of the people and of the government in many Latin American countries.
The Middle East Since 1945

An estimated 70 per cent of the world's known oil reserves are located in the Middle East and North Africa, mainly on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Gulf. The resultant oil boom facilitated the rapid modernization of the producer states. It also contributed to the economic development of the surrounding countries, partly through the wages paid to immigrant workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and partly through the provision by the oil-rich countries of politically motivated development aid. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose most powerful members are in the Middle East, attempts to ensure a minimum price for crude oil by controlling supplies.

During the Second World War calls for independence intensified from the territories in the Middle East held as mandates by the French and British. Lebanon and Syria, both promised independence by the Free French government during the war, achieved this status by 1946 (map 1). In the same year Britain relinquished its mandate of Jordan, but was left with the growing problem of its mandate in Palestine.

The New State of Israel

The issue of whether a Jewish State should be established in Palestine became a focal point of international politics. The mass influx of refugees from Nazi-occupied territories and the suggestion by the United Nations that Palestine be divided into Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem as an international zone (map 2), exacerbated tensions (already high in the inter-war period) between the growing Jewish immigrant community and the Arab inhabitants of the region. A civil war between Arabs and Jews from November 1947 escalated into an international war between Israel (proclaimed a state on 14 May 1948 after the British withdrawal) and the Arab countries of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, which ended in an Arab defeat and armistice agreements by July 1949.

More than 700,000 Palestinians fled to refugee camps in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (the remaining Arab parts of Palestine, annexed by Jordan in 1950), Gaza (occupied by Egypt), and other Arab countries. Further wars between Israel and its neighbours, in 1956, 1967 and 1973, resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights (map 3). Sinai, captured by Israel in 1967, returned to Egypt under a peace treaty in March 1979. In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began a guerrilla war against Israel, and in 1987 a Palestinian intifada (uprising) increased pressure on Israel to negotiate. The Oslo Agreement (1993) led to limited self-rule for the Palestinians in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip vacated by Israeli forces. Peace talks stalled over the status of the city of Jerusalem, terrorist attacks on Israel, and the continued building of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. In 2000, after the breakdown of peace negotiations, a second intifada broke out and the cycle of violence continued. However, in January 2005 a new president of the Palestinian Authority was elected on a platform of renewing the peace process.

Events in Lebanon

The Arab-Israeli conflict spilled into neighbouring Lebanon, where a delicate balance of power existed between Maronite Christians, and Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims. After 1970, Lebanon became a major base for Palestinian guerrilla warfare.
against Israel. In 1975 civil war erupted between the Christian Phalangists, backed by the Israelis, and Lebanese Muslims, backed by the Syrians and the PLO. Although the Agreement of Ta’if (1989) prepared the ground for peace, fighting only ended in 1991, with victory for the Muslims. In 2000, Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon, and Syria-backed Hizbollah forces moved in.

SOCIALISM, NATIONALISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM

Defeat by Israel in 1949 served as a catalyst for the emergence in Egypt, Syria and Iraq of army-led, nationalist, secular regimes that advocated socialist reforms to improve living conditions for the countries’ rapidly growing populations. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt became the champion of Arab nationalism, advocating non-alignment, with some co-operation with the Soviet Union, as a way of curtailing the influence of Western powers in the Middle East. In 1956 Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal led to a failed attempt by Israel, British and French troops to gain control of this vital sea-route. Egypt’s anti-Western approach was opposed by Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran, who saw Egypt’s growing power as a threat. The conflict was played out in a proxy war, when Egypt and Saudi Arabia supported opposing sides in the civil war in Yemen in 1962-69 (map 1).

The tensions arising from the widening social rifts in many oil-rich states resulted in the emergence of “political Islam”, which combined radical religious teaching of Islam with the desire for social and political change. The Iranian revolution of 1979 under Ayatollah Khomeini, with its specifically Shi’ite character, encouraged other Islamic opposition movements. These erupted across the Middle East, from Egypt to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Islamic groups fought the Soviet intervention of 1979 before engaging in a civil war which resulted in the Taliban establishing a fundamentalist government in 1997. In 2001, the United States launched air strikes against Afghanistan after the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan and leader of the al-Qaeda terrorist network which was held responsible for the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (pages 242-43). In December 2001, opposition forces, backed by US and British special forces overthrew the Taliban, and formed an interim government.

WARS IN THE GULF REGION

The Iranian revolution caused particular concern in neighbouring Iraq, which feared a similar rebellion from its own large population of Shi’ite Muslims. Both countries also included large Kurdish populations, and Iraq accused Iran of supporting an uprising of the Iraqi Kurds in 1979. The main motive for an Iraqi attack on Iran in 1980, however, was to expand into the oil-rich region on their joint border (map 4). At the end of an eight-year war in which an estimated one million people died, neither side had made significant gains. During the war, Iraq received aid from most of the Arab states and, shortly before the end of the fighting, used chemical weapons against its own Kurdish population, some of whom had supported Iran.

Debts incurred by Iraq in its war against Iran, territorial claims, disputes over the price to charge for oil, and loss of prestige were all factors that contributed to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Ignoring international condemnation, Iraq annexed Kuwait and could not be persuaded by United Nations sanctions to withdraw. In January 1991 an international alliance led by the United States declared war on Iraq, initially concentrating on an aerial bombardment of Iraqi military installations. On 24 February, ground forces moved in, and by the end of February Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait. Iraq’s subsequent suppression of revolts by Shi’ite Muslims in the south and Kurds in the north led to UN-backed “no-fly zones” for Iraqi aircraft north of the 32nd and south of the 36th parallels. Rivalries among Kurdish groups, Iraqi intervention, and repeated invasion by Turkish troops seeking to suppress the revolt in Turkish Kurdistan by eliminating camps in Iraq, reduced the Kurds to abject poverty. The whole Iraqi population suffered from punitive economic sanctions, imposed in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to comply with UN requirements to eradicate its weapons of mass destruction. In 2003, US-led forces invaded Iraq over its alleged possession of such weapons and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein. A democratically elected government was established in 2005 but civil order was still a long way from being restored.
Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party – and as such supreme ruler of the Soviet Union – in March 1985. He appointed reformers such as Yavlinsky, Bykov and Shevardnadze to positions of power, and introduced a policy of perestroika (economic restructuring), which attempted to introduce competition and market forces into the planned economy. Although heavy industry and collective farms remained under state control, private individuals could form co-operatives. Non-profitable firms were no longer propped up by the state, but allowed to go bankrupt. Nevertheless, economic growth continued to fall, while crime, inflation and unemployment rose. Strikes among miners in 1989 were the first sign of popular discontent at the Soviet Union's economic problems, exacerbated by the devastation caused by the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986 and the Armenian earthquake of 1988.

DEMOCRATIZATION

Gorbachev also introduced a policy of glasnost (openness), leading to an almost free press which, ironically, undermined his hopes of reviving support for a reformed Leninism. Democratization of the Communist Party apparatus allowed a choice of candidates in elections, followed by the participation of other parties in the Congress of People's Deputies in the summer of 1989. Finally, Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, which guaranteed the Communist Party a monopoly of power, was abolished in February 1990, and Gorbachev was appointed President of the Soviet Union. His radical approach to internal affairs was matched by his foreign policy. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988-89, negotiations with the United States to end the arms race, and encouragement of, or tacit support for, the countries of Eastern Europe in their bid to free themselves from Soviet domination in 1989-90 had a tremendous effect on world politics. However, while Gorbachev was praised abroad for his bold foreign-policy decisions, his popular support at home was waning. The economic crisis within Russia in the autumn of 1990 proved a turning point. A "500-day plan" for rapid market reform was rejected by Gorbachev, as a consequence of which reformers left the government, and under pressure from political hard-liners and military and industrial leaders, Gorbachev appointed more reactionary communists to power.

Meanwhile, Popular Fronts to support perestroika were formed in the republics, enabling dissidents to stand in elections in the Socialist Republics in March 1990, and leading to non-communist gains in areas such as the Ukraine and Lithuania (map 1). By 1989 there were conflicts between Moscow and the republics over religion, language and control of the economy, between republics and their own minorities, such as that between Georgia and South Ossetia, and between the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (map 2). The Baltic States demanded outright independence but Gorbachev was desperate to keep the Soviet Union together, and force was used in Vilnius (Lithuania), as well as in Tbilisi (Georgia) and Baku (Azerbaijan). The rise of Russian nationalism allowed Boris Yeltsin, sacked by Gorbachev from the position of Mayor of Moscow in 1987, to return to politics, first as head of the Russian Supreme Soviet and then as democratically elected, anti-communist President of Russia, in June 1991.

THE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION

Gorbachev's plan for a new Union Treaty, which recognized the independence of the Baltic States and decentralized power to the republics, sparked off a hard-line communist coup against him in August 1991 (map 3). Yeltsin managed to gain the support of the Russian parliament.
Ethnic tensions and rivalries in the Caucasus region, held in check by the centralized control of the Soviet Union, broke out into armed conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. Many smaller regions within the larger republics battled to achieve autonomy. Chechenia declared independence from Russia in 1991, but although Grozny and the surrounding region was extensively bombed, the Russian army failed to defeat the guerrillas and the republic achieved de facto independence in 1997. Georgia was also the scene of armed conflict, both for control of the republic (1991–93) and as a result of successful attempts by the regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia to assert their independence. The republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan waged a bloody war over control of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia won.

against the rebels, and his defiance was largely responsible for the failure of the coup. Thus Yeltsin’s position was strengthened, and although Gorbachev was reinstated his power was diminished. The Ukrainian independence referendum in December 1991 made the continuation of the Soviet Union untenable, and when Yeltsin and the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Soviet Union collapsed into 15 independent republics (map 1). Gorbachev resigned on 25 December 1991.

Yeltsin’s Presidency

Yeltsin, as President of the Russian Federation, inherited the unresolved problems of his predecessor. Although he introduced rapid market reform, including privatization, the economic decline continued. Inflation reached 245 per cent in January 1992, while industrial output slumped. Some people made huge profits but savings were wiped out, leading to real hardship among the population. The Orthodox Church gained support, as did nationalist, right-wing parties such as Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democrats. Yeltsin did not call new elections for the communist-led Supreme Soviet, now called the duma (parliament), but ruled by decree instead. Furthermore, he did not form his own political party, and neither did the democrats, thereby weakening the democratic system. Yeltsin’s banning of the Communist Party in 1991 was declared unconstitutional, and led to its rebirth under Zyuganov. From December 1992 there was open conflict between Yeltsin and the duma, and Yeltsin replaced his reformist prime minister with the more conservative Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Yeltsin won public support in a referendum in April 1993, but conflict with the duma continued and in September it was dissolved. The political leaders within the duma retaliated by proclaiming Yeltsin’s removal from the presidency, with the result that in October they were besieged in the parliament building. Their response was to order an attack on the Kremlin and other key buildings, leading to a three-hour battle. The army rescued Yeltsin and shelled parliament, leaving 145 dead and over 700 injured. New elections were called once again in October, a majority for the Nationalists–Communists, but Yeltsin, although in ill-health, won the presidential elections of June 1996. His reformist policies failed once again to improve the economy.

A financial collapse in the summer of 1998 discredited the market reformers and brought a new conflict between Yeltsin and the duma, with the latter rejecting Yeltsin’s attempt to restore Chernomyrdin as prime minister. The following year Yeltsin resigned in favour of Vladimir Putin.

Nationalist Demands

Nationalism, responsible for the break-up of the Soviet Union, also threatened the Russian Federation. Autonomous republics, such as Tatarstan and Yakutia (now Sakha), demanded “sovereignty”, in which their own laws would take precedence over those of Moscow. Yeltsin’s Union Treaty of March 1992 compromised by granting them considerable autonomy, and finally even Tatarstan signed in February 1994. Chechenia split from Inghetia and declared independence after the August 1991 coup. At the end of 1994, Yeltsin sent in Russian troops, which were forced to withdraw in 1997 (map 2). In 1999 a fresh Russian offensive was launched against the separatists, but it failed to end their military and terrorist campaign.

Conflict continued on the peripheries of the old Soviet Union. The so-called Dnestr Republic (map 1) rejected Moldovan rule with Russian military support, and there was conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea and over which country should control the ships of the former Soviet navy, based in the Black Sea. Newly independent republics brought in citizenship laws that discriminated against Russian residents, causing a migration of ethnic Russians into Russia (map 1). In Georgia, President Gamsakhurdia’s extreme nationalism led to his overthrow in 1992. The new president, Shevardnadze, clamped down on civil war and joined the CIS, but lost Abkhazia when the province rebelled with Russian support (map 2). Azerbaijan and other oil-rich states in Central Asia attracted Western investment, but a revival of Islamic fundamentalism led to civil war in Tajikistan. At the beginning of the 21st century the future of the region remained uncertain, both in economic terms and in relation to democratic reform.

In August 1991 Moscow experienced street fighting unprecedented since the “October Revolution” of 1917. Hard-Line communists tried to oust the Communist Party’s monopoly of power and prevent President Gorbachev’s proposed Union Treaty from being signed, but the people of Moscow took to the streets in support of the government and barricaded the streets around the Russian parliament (the White House). Three of them were killed by the army, which was divided in its support. With Gorbachev a prisoner in his summer retreat in the Crimea, Boris Yeltsin, then President of Russia, eventually persuaded the army to stand firm behind Gorbachev, and thus defeated the communists’ rebels.
Throughout the 1980s the communist regimes of Eastern Europe underwent a profound crisis. They experienced increasing economic difficulties as a result of inefficiency, low productivity and declining growth, compounded by the growing environmental crisis affecting, in particular, parts of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland (pages 236-37). The un-elected communist governments had always had trouble maintaining their legitimacy in the eyes of their electorates, but since the radical reforms introduced in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev they could no longer threaten critics with the ultimate sanction of Soviet military intervention.

In the second half of 1989 all the communist regimes collapsed, although they did so in various ways (map 1). In the most reformist of the communist regimes - Hungary - the demise was gradual and was managed by the communist government itself. Some of its increasingly radical measures had a profound effect on other communist governments. The decision, for example, to open the borders with Austria and let thousands of East German “tourists” depart for the West forced the East German government into belated attempts to save itself by offering concessions of its own. In Poland, where the Solidarity movement challenged the hegemony of the state as early as 1979, the end of communism was negotiated and brought about by partial elections held as a result of negotiations between government and opposition. The East German and Czechoslovak regimes both collapsed as a result of public demonstrations. In Bulgaria the government fell following a coup, which overthrew Todor Zhivkov, and in Romania the end of the Ceausescu regime was brought about by a violent uprising.

**Political and economic transition**

All the post-communist countries embarked on the construction of a democratic system of government and the conversion of a centrally planned economy into one that was market-led. One of the major problems was their lack of experience of democratic government. Although some institutional and legal changes, such as a multiparty system and free elections, were introduced quite rapidly, the development of a democratic political culture proved more difficult. The bulk of the electorate still expected the state to guarantee not just security but also their well-being. Increasing inflation and declining Gross Domestic Product (map 2) caused most people’s living standards to decline. In this economic climate former communists gained significant popular support with promises to minimize the negative consequences of economic change.

The problem was how to liberalize and privatize an economy under conditions of relative instability. Major disagreements existed between the proponents of the gradualist approach and those who advocated the “short, sharp shock treatment” involving simultaneous radical liberalization of prices and large-scale privatization. Some countries – particularly those in which former communists still held power, such as Romania and Bulgaria – adopted a slow and often inconsistent approach; others, such as Poland, adopted a radical path. Although the West provided some financial and technical help, this was not on a scale to make a significant difference, except in East Germany where, after the reunification of Germany in 1990, the transition process was financed by a massive influx of West German capital.
A further aim of the post-communist countries was a "return to Europe". In this respect Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic proved more successful than countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. Not only were they in the first wave of new entrants to NATO in 1999, but were also among the first group of applicants from Eastern Europe to be accepted into the European Union in 2004 (map 2).

**The effects of nationalism**

Developments since 1989 have largely completed the process – started in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and accelerated by the Second World War – of the creation of ethnically homogeneous states in the region (bar chart). In post-communist Czechoslovakia the national grievances felt by many Slovaks resurfaced and were compounded by the fact that the process of industrialization undergone by the region of Slovakia since 1945 had left it largely dependent on markets in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. This placed it at a disadvantage in a country that was increasingly seeking Western European trading partners. Furthermore, while the Czechs preferred a centralized state, the Slovaks sought a loose confederation. These differences proved intractable and the Czechoslovak state broke up on 1 January 1993 into two national states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

In Yugoslavia the federal system developed by President Tito in the 1950s and 1960s gave some credence to national autonomy while controlling nationalist self-assertion in the constituent republics. With the decline of communist power, the economic disparities between the constituent republics and the pressure for democratization gave rise to nationalist resentments. Demands were made by Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia for a large measure of sovereignty, and by Serb nationalists for a larger Serb state (to include parts of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with a Serb population of 2 per cent of the total, achieved independence peacefully in 1991. The process of independence in Slovenia, which also included a Serb population of around 2 per cent, was accomplished in 1991 with only a brief intervention by the Yugoslav (Serbian) army. In Croatia, however, the conflict that broke out in 1991, following the Croatian declaration of independence, was more violent, with the Yugoslav army fighting on behalf of a Serbian minority of around 12 per cent of the total.

The bloodiest conflict occurred in ethnically and religiously mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the 1991 census showed that 31 per cent of the population were Serb, 17 per cent Croat, and 44 per cent were classified as "Bosnian Muslim" (although some of these were of no religious persuasion). An organized campaign of "ethnic cleansing" was undertaken, principally by the Serbs, with the aim of creating ethnically homogeneous regions in Bosnia as a prelude to its dismemberment and incorporation into Serbia and Croatia. The war, and the terrorist methods used against the civilian population, resulted in large-scale movements of populations (map 3).

In Kosovo, a region in southern Serbia where the large ethnic Albanian population sought independence, violence erupted in 1998 between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Yugoslav army. Attempts to bring about a negotiated settlement failed and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo became the target of a Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing. In June 1999, following a NATO campaign of air strikes, Serbian forces withdrew as NATO troops entered Kosovo. The UN then took over the administration of the province.

Significant Hungarian minorities remain in Romania and Slovakia, and the Bulgarian population is around 10 per cent Turk. There is also still a sizeable Roma population in Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, although accurate figures are difficult to come by. The Roma people are subjected to a variety of forms of discrimination, and a significant increase in violent incidents arising from anti-Roma feelings since 1989 has encouraged many to attempt to emigrate to Western Europe.
The first purpose of the United Nations, enunciated in the UN Charter, is to maintain international peace and security, and its founders originally envisaged the creation of a UN security force dedicated to doing this. When negotiations between the superpowers — the United States and Soviet Union — over the creation of such a force failed, various alternatives were suggested. "Peacekeeping" emerged as an improvised response to this failure and to developing international crises, in particular the 1948 crisis in Palestine. The term is used to describe efforts made by the United Nations to diffuse civil and regional conflicts.

In 1948 the United Nations Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, requested that the Security Council authorize the creation of the first UN ground force to police the truce in the Middle East: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (map 1). In the period 1948–56 other UN peacekeeping forces were established in areas of dispute, although it was not until 1956 that a fully fledged peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force, was established by the General Assembly to police and monitor the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. This provided the model for future operations: the creation of an impartial UN force composed of troops contributed by member countries, serving under the UN flag, interposed with the consent of the protagonists, and resorting to arms only in self-defence. In such operations, members of the peacekeeping force have acted as intermediaries, with responsibility for helping the belligerents negotiate a settlement.
The island of Cyprus, only 100 kilometres (55 miles) south of Turkey but with 80 per cent of its population Greek-speaking, has been divided into two since the invasion of Turkish forces in July 1974. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, which arrived on the island in 1964 in overt civil war, polices the “green line” between opposing Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces.

**“CLASSICAL” PEACEKEEPING**

Following the success of UNEF I, this type of peacekeeping became a popular UN policy option. Used in cases of inter-state conflict, it is known as “first” or “classical” peacekeeping. It attempts to bring about an end to the fighting, separate the opposing forces and encourage the creation of a lasting peace. Such operations have usually included the supply of UN humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population. From the 1960s to the late 1980s classical peacekeeping was used in the majority of peacekeeping operations, including that of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (map 2), deployed on the island in 1964 in order to separate warring Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, sent to supervise the Syrian Golan Heights in 1974, following the Arab–Israeli War.

All of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts between 1948 and 1990 were, however, constrained by the existence of the Cold War (pages 244–45), during which the majority of conflicts were affected to some degree by rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither of whom wanted UN involvement if this compromised its own national interests.

**“SECOND GENERATION” PEACEKEEPING**

Since the end of the Cold War new opportunities have arisen for UN action in dealing with threats to peace, and this has stimulated an increase in the form of operation known as “second generation” peacekeeping. This occurs when the UN becomes involved in intra-state conflicts in “failed states”, where governmental functions are suspended, the infrastructure is destroyed, populations are displaced and armed conflict rages. In these circumstances the UN has performed three different peacekeeping roles.

First, it has acted as a neutral force and honest broker between the warring factions, seeking to encourage the negotiation and implementation of a peace agreement and to prepare and conduct national elections as a means of furthering reconciliation and stability. This was the case with the United Nations Angola Verification Missions from 1989 onwards and the UN mission to Cambodia in 1991–95.

Second, it has interposed itself between warring parties to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the war-torn populations, as in the case of the United Nations Operations in Somalia in 1992–95. Finally, “second generation” peacekeeping has been used to create a stable environment for the re-establishment of democracy, as was the purpose of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia in 1989–90 and the United Nations Mission in Haiti in September 1993.

These “second generation” peacekeeping missions have become more common since the end of the Cold War, and have led to an increase both in the number of forces deployed and in the total expenditure on peacekeeping (table). In the case of the UN operations in Bosnia (map 3), Somalia and Rwanda, however, the UN did not have the consent of the various warring factions. Rather, the UN was forced by the international community to act in the interests of the civilian populations. The UN’s hasty reaction to such demands resulted in clouded mandates, which made the implementation of peacekeeping problematic.

Peacekeeping is inherently risky, and almost 2,000 peacekeepers have lost their lives since 1948. The UN’s role has also at times been compromised by a failure to remain neutral, as when a large force, sent to the Congo in 1960 by the Security Council, lost its impartiality, and became involved in fighting against the Soviet-oriented, democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. At other times failure has resulted from lack of military strength and restrictions on its freedom of action, such as when the United Nations Protection Force was unable to enforce the “Safe Areas” it had created in Bosnia in 1993 (map 3).

UN peacekeeping operations have generally worked well where the task is fairly limited and clear cut—such as the patrolling of ceasefire lines in Cyprus—but when the situation is more complex, as in Rwanda or Bosnia, the UN peacekeepers have often found themselves out of their depth. Nevertheless, peacekeeping has, in many cases, assisted in ending war and in creating the conditions in which the causes of the war can be addressed through diplomacy, and the economic and social reconstruction of a war-torn country can commence.
In 1998 the United Nations celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the preamble of which asserts that the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." The Declaration, according to the General Assembly of the United Nations, was to be a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations", and during the second half of the 20th century efforts were made to define, articulate and enforce the fundamental rights of all peoples of all nations.

DEFINITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The United Nations, chartered in 1945, was not the first body to recognize and assert basic human rights. The first ten amendments to the US Constitution, the Bill of Rights (ratified in 1791), outline what early Americans believed to be their inalienable rights. The League of Nations, the international organization established as a result of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), drew up conventions on slavery and forced labour. Yet the United Nations was the most powerful force within the field of human rights in the 20th century, and the breadth of conventions created in the first 50 years of its existence surpassed those of any prior body. They cover areas such as employment, the rights of children, refugees, development, war crimes and the eradication of the hunger and malnutrition. The earliest conventions were generally concerned with civil and political rights, while more recently the UN has turned its attention to the rights of people to economic and social development and to peace and security.

ELECTIVE DEMOCRACY
In the first half of the 20th century most democratic governments (those resulting from multiparty elections) were to be found in countries in Europe and in North and South America (map 1), although in some of these countries sections of society were still barred from voting for reasons of ethnic origin, gender or income. After the Second World War, and in particular in the last two decades of the 20th century, elective democracy spread to the great majority of countries in the world, although the fifth of the world's population who live in the People's Republic of China were still not able to exercise full democratic rights.

It remains to be seen how the spread of democracy will affect human rights. Governments that can be voted out by their electorate are less likely to abuse their citizens (as demonstrated by the contrast between the democratic society of Chile in the 1990s, and the society under the military dictatorship of Pinochet in the preceding two decades). In countries where political opposition is not tolerated, however, governments often go to great lengths to ensure that political rivals are silenced, and human rights abuses, including a ban on the freedom of speech, imprisonment without a fair trial, torture and execution, are common.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
The right to practise the religion of one's choice is enshrined in a UN Declaration of 1981, yet persecution on religious grounds is still prevalent throughout the world (map 2). Discrimination on the basis of religion often occurs when a religious group is seen as a threat to the status quo because of demands for autonomy, although it is difficult to distinguish it from discrimination on ethnic or political grounds.

An example of an area riven by sectarian conflict is Ireland (map 3), where British rule and domination by Protestants was resisted by Catholic Nationalists for centuries. A guerrilla war, fought by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against British forces from 1918, came to a temporary end in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish Treaty, under which the British agreed to a large area of Ireland (in which Catholics predominated) becoming an independent state (initially within the Commonwealth). Six of the nine northern counties of Ulster remained part of the United Kingdom, albeit with their own parliament. Although Protestants predominated in much of the north, there was still a sizeable Catholic minority, which found itself under-represented in the political system, and in the allocation of public housing and of public investment.

These factors led to the development of a Catholic civil rights movement in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s and to clashes between Protestant and Catholic paramilitary groups and civilians, as a result of which the British army was deployed in the province. The introduction of internment (imprisonment without trial) in 1971 was seen by many Catholics as a transgression of their civil and political rights and an escalation of political violence ensued. On 30 January 1972 the British army killed 13 Catholics in
what became known as “Bloody Sunday”. In March 1972 the Northern Ireland parliament was dissolved and direct rule imposed from London. The subsequent 25 years, during which over 2,750 civilians, soldiers and RUC officers lost their lives, saw several peace proposals and peace movements gain support and then founder. On Good Friday 1998 an agreement was brokered between political representatives of the two sides, which established a Northern Ireland Assembly with both Catholic and Protestant representation. However, the new assembly and accompanying executive were subsequently suspended amid further disagreement between Protestant and Catholic leaders.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES

Between 1970 and 1995 the world’s refugee population increased by over 900 per cent to 27 million people. This was partly due to wars (map 2), but also due to people seeking refuge from poverty, persecution and economic and environmental disasters. Refugees often end up in the poorest countries, which lack money to support their own citizens, let alone refugees. These displaced populations are a growing concern to the international community.

With so many nations still struggling to develop economically and politically, the provision of basic human rights on a world scale seems an immense task. A strong international legal foundation has been laid for the respect of human rights. However, the reluctance of the international community to use economic and military sanctions against governments that abuse human rights – and the ineffectual nature of these sanctions – means that worldwide transgressions of human rights are likely to continue.
THE POSITION OF WOMEN SINCE 1914

In 1893 New Zealand became the first country to grant universal suffrage to women. Today few women anywhere in the world are excluded from political participation, and most women are able not only to vote in national and local elections, but to run for office as well (map 1). In some countries, such as the United States and most Western European nations, the female franchise was preceded by long fights for political equality; in other countries women were granted the right to vote partly in recognition of the contribution they made towards the struggle for independence from colonial rule.

Improving women's lives has become an international concern in the 20th century. Women's lives differ from men's in every area, including education, health and employment, in ways that have not always been readily apparent. Gender inequality means different things in different cultures, but the use of gender as a category of analysis in measuring the quality of people's lives has greatly changed perceptions of the social interactions of women and men.

THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR WOMEN

The first United Nations Decade for Women took place between 1976 and 1986. During this period the UN began to compile statistics on women for regional and international comparison, in relation to such areas as maternity and reproduction, leadership and decision making, family life, economics, education and health. These statistics have served as a focus for discussions, and have helped to identify areas needing attention and improvement.

The increased desire in the 20th century to recognize the importance of women's daily lives has also led to greater scrutiny of the employment of women and the ways in which work is measured. International statistics on employment, for example, indicate the extent to which women are participating in paid employment (map 2), and the type of job in which they are employed. However, the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing stressed the importance of valuing unpaid labour. In the industrialized world work is often valued by the remuneration attached to it. Volunteer, domestic and childrearing work (unpaid labour that is most often performed by women) has been devalued and, in terms of statistics, gone unreported. Activities such as subsistence production and housework, in which a large proportion of women in developing countries are involved, are now being measured more effectively, although progress remains to be made.

Statistical information on women's lives has revealed not only that governments have invested less in females than in males, but that women provide more care to children and older people, have different access to education and employment from that of men, and usually work longer hours in and out of their homes throughout their lifetime than men. In short, women often experience a poorer quality of life than their male counterparts.

Although overall there has been a global trend towards improvement in the provision of secondary education for girls (map 3), this disguises the fact that within individual countries attendance at school may be affected by war or by economic difficulties. Furthermore, when assessing improvements in women's lives it is necessary to look at more than one variable. Even in countries that awarded women the vote relatively early (such as Turkey and Japan), men may still be represented in fewer than 10 per cent of administrative and managerial jobs, whereas in countries that granted women the vote relatively late (such as Switzerland, Honduras and Botswana) more than 30 per cent of women are in such employment.

One indication of women's status in society is the number who are political representatives, specifically those holding ministerial-level appointments. There have often been long periods between a country's enfranchisement of women and the election of the first woman to the national parliament. At the end of the 20th century there was still little female representation worldwide. Even in a country such as the United States, where over 50 per cent of women
were employed in administrative and managerial posts, relatively few women had been elected to Congress (map 4).

In order to understand change in women's lives it is necessary to appreciate how different aspects of women's lives are interwoven: how a girl's physical and mental development will affect the woman she will become; how a woman's status in relation to that of a man changes throughout the different phases of her life; and the difficulty in disentangling the inter-relationship between education, employment, fertility and contraception. For example, in many instances there is a clear correlation between a high female literacy rate and low birth rate (bar chart). There seems to be a two-way effect whereby education gives women the information and confidence to make family-planning decisions, and access to contraception gives young women the opportunity to fulfill their educational potential before starting a family.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Many of the changes brought about in women's lives have come not from governments but from grassroots activists. Although women may be poorly represented worldwide in the traditional spheres of national politics, women have found that they can bring about change through participation in professional groups, trade unions, locally elected bodies and a growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), of which there are estimated to be 30,000 worldwide. Such groups have allowed women's concerns to be voiced and supported on local, national and international levels, enabling them to build the skills necessary to exert political pressure and to collect the statistical information required to persuade governments to act.

Although disparities between the lives of men and women still exist, and progress remains to be made in the way in which men and women live and work together, the past century has witnessed vast changes in the way some men and women perceive women's roles. Women's rights have become human rights and the work of women has begun to be recognized as having no less an impact on society and the economy than that of men.

The first women in the world to be given the vote were those in Wyoming in 1869, but female enfranchisement was only granted in all US states in 1920, after the passing of the 19th Amendment. Although the US Constitution did not actually prohibit women from standing for office, the first female Representative was not elected until 1917. The majority of Congresswomen have come from the eastern states and the west coast, although in 1998 Vermont, New Hampshire and Delaware were among those which had still never elected a woman.

There is a strong correlation between the percentage of a country's women who are literate and its fertility rate. Women in industrialized nations, where literacy rates are much higher, have smaller families than those in non-industrialized areas, where educational provision is often fairly limited and that for girls is particularly poor.
The comparative wealth of the major economies of the world changed during the second half of the 20th century. Although the United States maintained its position as the world's wealthiest nation, countries such as Argentina, Uruguay and Mauritius, whose wealth was largely based on the export of raw materials, had slipped out of the "top 20" by 1970. The oil-producing countries of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela both featured in 1970, but were overtaken in 1990 by the newly industrialized countries of Western Europe and East Asia.

The oil crisis of 1973-74 arose largely as a result of the Arab-Israeli War. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) controls the majority of the world's oil exports and in 1973 its Arab members persuaded the organization to place an embargo on the supply of oil to those nations that supported Israel. The subsequent shortage of oil to the industrialized world severely disrupted production and oil prices soared.

The Second World War left the economies of continental Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan ravaged, with manufacturing and agricultural output severely disrupted. The US economy remained strong, however, and its strength became a mainspring of recovery in Europe. The European Recovery Programme (or "Marshall Plan") provided US investment for Western European economies from 1948 to 1951 - effectively speeding up the process of economic recovery. In giving aid to Germany and Austria, as well as to the victorious Allied nations, it also engendered a more positive spirit than the one which emerged from the punitive Versailles agreement of 1919.

Co-operation between Europe and the United States aided recovery to the extent that by 1951 all Western European economies had at least recovered to their highest pre-war level of output and were entering a "golden age" of growth that was to last until the first oil crisis in 1973. Japan also received US financial support, and found its economy boosted by demand for supplies to support the UN troops in the Korean War (1950-53). New institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (for the financial system), the World Bank (for developing countries) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (for the trading system), were designed by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in 1944 in order to support the recovery.

In the decades following the Second World War the world economic situation changed markedly, with countries that were wealthy in pre-war times being overtaken by newly enriched nations. The United States was, and has remained, the wealthiest economy in the world, and for the early part of the post-war period it was also the major source of technological change; large US companies took their innovations abroad and invested in new plants in less advanced economies. In 1975 the total value of such multinational's overseas stock was 4.5 per cent of world output, rising to 9.5 per cent by 1994. About a quarter of the stock is located outside the major industrialized nations, spreading new technologies to newly industrializing countries.

The golden age of growth 1950-73
Between 1950 and 1973 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita grew on average by 4 per cent a year in Western Europe as a whole. This growth was based on high levels of investment and technological change. In the 1970s OPEC engineered two further substantial increases in the price of oil, largely through the tactic of restricting supply. The price of oil subsequently dropped again from the mid-1980s onwards as member nations ignored OPEC's limitations on exports. Fears are growing of a worldwide shortage of oil in the 21st century.
productive investment, the import of US technologies, and improvements in the quality of the workforce through education and training. In France, for example, there was a two-year rise in the average length of time spent in primary and secondary education (to 11.7 years), while in West Germany there was a rise of more than one year (to 11.6 years). The increasing integration of the European economies through the "Common Market" (EEC) also stimulated growth (pages 238-39). By 1970 the 20 countries with the highest GDP per capita were mainly to be found in Europe, and the world's wealth was concentrated largely in the North Atlantic.

Developments in East Asia, however, were just as remarkable, with Japan entering the "top 20" economies for the first time in 1970. Japan's output had grown by more than 9 per cent a year since 1950, driven by high investment and the rapid adoption and adaptation of US technology. The skills of the workforce had also improved rapidly, with the average length of time spent in primary and secondary education rising from 9 to 12 years.

THE SLOWING OF GROWTH RATES SINCE 1973

The golden age had been supported by low oil prices and cheap commodities, with the advanced economies becoming increasingly dependent on imported fuels as their incomes rose (map 2). The extent to which this made them vulnerable became all too apparent in 1973 when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) - a cartel whose Arab members were the most powerful - placed an embargo on oil exports to the nations that supported Israel in the Arab-Israeli War. Oil suddenly became scarce and prices rose sharply (graph), causing major disruption in the United States and Europe.

A major slowdown in activity followed, and it took the advanced economies time to recover. They were just doing so when oil prices rose again in 1979. The richer European countries had largely caught up with the United States by this time, with the result that their growth was beginning to slow from 4 per cent per annum to a figure closer to the US level, which had dropped from 2.4 to 1.7 per cent following the 1973 oil crisis. With a post-1979 growth rate of only 1.7 per cent in Western Europe, unemployment rose sharply. In Japan growth remained high at 3 per cent, although this was well below the level of 8 per cent during the golden age.

**OPENNESS AND GROWTH IN THE MODERN WORLD**

Countries adopted different growth strategies after 1950. Those in Latin America, many in Africa and some in Asia - such as India - opted for a more self-sufficient approach, substituting home-produced goods for imports. The Europeans and many countries in Southeast and East Asia, on the other hand, opted for a strategy centred on openness to trade - importing and exporting a large share of their GDP (map 3). The open strategy made it necessary for these countries to react to external demands, and to adjust their methods of production accordingly. As the world moved, especially after 1970, beyond simple mass production towards the specialized production of high-technology products, the countries that had adopted the strategy of openness became increasingly successful.

Lessons have been learnt, and trading arrangements that remove barriers between member nations are becoming more common. The European Union, one of the oldest trading blocs (pages 238-39), expanded in 2004 to include ten eastern European states. Its barriers to external trade stimulate inward investment by countries such as Japan. More recently formed regional trading blocs include the North American Free Trade Area (pages 242-43) and Mercosur (comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). The East Asians have set up an outward-looking bloc in APEC (pages 242-43), in an attempt to stimulate trade. However, as they learnt in the economic crisis of 1997-98, openness may aid growth, but it can leave their economies vulnerable to the vagaries of the world market.

A country's openness to trade is calculated by adding together the value of exports and imports (trade), and dividing the total by its Gross Domestic Product. In countries such as Argentina (with the lowest "openness" score) trade represents less than 12 per cent of its GDP, while others, of which Singapore is the prime example, import manufactured parts, assemble them into products, and export the finished goods. This has the effect of producing a ratio of trade to GDP of over 100 per cent.

In general the economies of those countries that have been open to trade (especially the smaller nations) have expanded most rapidly, as seen in the contrast between the low growth rates in some countries of South America and Africa, and the high growth rates in Southeast Asia. The western European economies have also grown rapidly because trade barriers have fallen within the region, with much of Europe becoming one large market.
Population growth is unevenly spread around the globe, with many of the more established industrial nations experiencing increases below 50 per cent since 1950. The populations of many of the newly industrialized nations, on the other hand, have increased by over 250 per cent in the same period. The Gulf states in the Middle East have seen the largest increases, mainly because of the economic expansion arising from their oil revenues.

The human population has more than doubled since 1940, with the total at the end of the 20th century standing at around six billion (graph). Despite indications that the rate of growth is slowing slightly, projections put the total population for the year 2025 as high as 8 billion. The majority of the growth since the mid-20th century has been in developing countries (map 1), with the increase in these regions contributing over 75 per cent of the world total growth in the 1980s, and over 90 per cent in the 1990s.

Population growth
The population explosion of the 20th century is not only the result of more babies being born, but also of better health care, nutrition, education and sanitary conditions, all of which have led to increased life expectancy. These conditions have aided population growth even in the face of disasters such as famines and epidemics. However, high population growth rates can also put greater pressure on public services and lead to a fall in living standards, poor nutrition, inadequate education and high unemployment.

Urbanization of the World
Urbanization is one of the most extreme changes to have affected the world in the 20th century. In 1900 there were only a handful of cities with populations of over a million. By 2000 such settlements were scattered literally around the globe.
safe water and health services increases as the population grows. Furthermore, the inability of a country to provide for its citizens’ basic needs affects its chances of maintaining or achieving economic and social growth. Balancing the growth of the population with the Earth's resources and society's ability to provide these basic necessities is crucial for a healthy population and continued development.

With a growth rate of 0.5 per cent per annum, the human population is set to double in 139 years; a growth rate of 1 per cent reduces that time to 69 years, 2 per cent to 35 years and 3 per cent to 23 years. Thus, what may appear as low rates of growth per annum can actually result in significant increases in population over a few generations.

Recognition of the adverse effects of our burgeoning population assisted in reducing growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s. This was achieved through a combination of improved education and the wider availability of contraceptives. However, while growth rates in developing regions have decreased, many will remain as high as 3 per cent or more in the 21st century. European countries currently reflect the lowest rates of growth (mostly below 1 per cent), with some countries – such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Latvia and Estonia – actually experiencing negative growth rates, leading to population decline. When coupled with the migration of people into cities, population decreases affect rural communities most severely.

**URBANIZATION AND MIGRATION**

Population growth in the developing world has been accompanied by an increasing number of people living in the cities of these regions, making urbanization a global phenomenon. Before the 20th century comparatively few people lived in cities, and the urbanization that occurred was largely the result of industrialization. Urbanization is now also a result of migration into the cities of people from agricultural areas unable to support them financially.

In the 1960s most of the world's largest cities were in industrialized countries, whereas now the majority are to be found in Central and South America, Asia and Southeast Asia (map). This rapid urbanization of the world has resulted, among other things, in increasing levels of urban air pollution and waste, rapid growth in slum settlements, homelessness, insanitary water supplies and vast changes in the landscape (pages 280–81).

Populations have not only moved from rural environments to cities within their own country. During the 20th century substantial migration took place (for economic and political reasons) across national boundaries (map). In many cases these migrations have resulted in significant minority cultures developing in the host nation. Many countries in the developed world now have multicultural populations, and people with racially mixed backgrounds are becoming more common.

**DEMOGRAPHIC AGING**

The populations of many developed countries are getting older as a result of falling birth rates accompanied by improved health and healthcare, and the same process is predicted to occur in developing countries, assuming current improvements in life expectancy. At the beginning of the 21st century the number of people aged over 65 stands at around 900 million, but is projected to rise to 800 million by 2025, representing 10 per cent of the predicted population. Latin American and Asian countries are likely to experience increases of 300 per cent by 2025 in the number of people over 65 years old.

This demographic shift towards societies in which older people predominate can be a positive reflection of a country's health and prosperity, but it also signals the need for changes in the structure of the labour force, and for a shift away from a youth-centered culture towards one in which better health and social services are a priority. Growing and demographically changing populations have many implications for societies around the world in terms of standards of living, trends in health and ill-health, and the quality of the environment.
IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH
Better nutrition, improved access to health care and greater understanding of disease control have allowed people to live longer, healthier lives. Since the 1980s life expectancy has increased by over 50 per cent in developing regions and by 12 per cent and higher in industrial countries, to approximately 63 and 74 years respectively. Global immunization programmes have reduced the occurrence of diseases such as tuberculosis (TB) and measles, and have helped to contain the spread of many controllable diseases. Although the percentage of infants immunized against TB and measles in 1994 was as low as 20 per cent in some African countries, estimates for developing regions as a whole include rates of 70-90 per cent. These health measures have contributed substantially to a fall in infant and child mortality rates (map 1), and new and better vaccines are continually being developed.

POVERTY, HEALTH AND ILL-HEALTH

While the world’s population has grown, disease and poverty have continued to claim a heavy toll. Infectious diseases such as AIDS and Hepatitis G, had spread across the world, while epidemics of older infections, such as cholera and yellow fever, had also broken out. Treatment of bacterial infections - after making huge advances with the introduction of penicillin in the 1940s - had been complicated by the evolution of drug-resistant bacteria. Health services are now widely recognized as crucial to economic development, but they are often the first to be axed by governments in the face of economic instability.

CAUSES OF ILL-HEALTH

Improved health for some has been accompanied by greater ill-health for others, and a major cause of this has been poverty, which at the end of the 20th century affected over one billion children and adults throughout the world. Lack of funds for basic needs naturally leads to undernourishment and higher susceptibility to disease. Some of the most extreme poverty is to be found in the growing number of urban centres (pages 274-75), where public health systems cannot keep up with the demands placed on them by growing populations. Both poverty and wealth can lead to ill-health. The high death rates from cancers, heart and circulatory diseases in developed countries (bar chart 1) are partly due to greater life expectancy, but they are also undoubtedly related to unhealthy lifestyles. While wealthier, industrialized countries often have better education, more advanced medical technology, access to better health care and the higher incomes to pay for it, their populations as a whole also tend to have unhealthy diets, indulge in excessive drinking and smoking, and suffer from lack of exercise. The populations of industrial countries, and of large cities throughout the world, are also plagued by pollution, in particular air pollution, which is thought to be causing an alarming rise in respiratory problems such as asthma.

In developing countries, by contrast, infections and parasitic diseases account for the majority of deaths. AIDS is one example of a modern plague. Since the 1980s health professionals have watched the disease spread worldwide, into all sectors of society, but in particular to the poorest, and estimates suggest that in the late 1990s over 33 million people were infected with the HIV virus that is believed to lead to AIDS, of whom 95 per cent lived in the developing world (bar chart 2). Water-borne diseases (such as cholera, typhoid, diarrhoea and guinea worm disease) are also common. In the 1990s the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 76 per cent of people living in developing countries still had no access to safe water. Despite world food surpluses, death from malnutrition, often caused by drought, remains a problem in many regions (map 4).

Shortage of water is projected to become an increasing problem in the 21st century, with populations growing in areas where there is little available. Advances in agricultural science and practice are being made in order to make the best use of limited resources, but international conflicts threaten to break out over use of river water.
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

The promotion of preventive health care was one of the greatest achievements of the last two decades of the 20th century. Instead of just treating illness, health promotion programmes help people take steps to improve their overall health. Widespread immunization programmes, better education and nutrition, and increased access to family planning services all contributed to reductions in the infant mortality rate during the latter part of the 20th century (map 3), particularly in parts of Africa and Asia.

One area where preventive health practices are fighting for a stronger foothold is in the use of addictive substances. Nicotine is one of the most widely used drugs; WHO statistics indicate that nearly one third of all adults smoke (and nearly half of all men), with most people starting before they reach the age of 20. Many developed countries have seen a significant decline in consumption since the 1970s (although the popularity of smoking among young people, in particular young women, gives cause for concern), but the tobacco industry continues to seek an expansion of its market. As a consequence, cigarette smoking in industrialized countries is on the increase (bar chart 3), and health departments and practitioners expect to see an upsurge in smoking-related heart disease and cancers.

Human health is possibly the most important issue facing the world in the 21st century in that it is both affected by and has an impact on environmental and demographic changes, and on social and cultural developments.

In the period between 1955 and 1995 the number of deaths per live births or children aged under one year decreased by 60 per cent worldwide, from an average of 148 deaths per thousand live births in 59. Most of the developed countries managed to reduce their rates by over 60 per cent between the 1960s and the late 1990s. While the developing world has, on the whole, not managed such large percentage drops, in many countries the infant death rate has been cut substantially in real terms.
STANDARDS OF LIVING
SINCE 1945

The Gross World Output (the total amount of money generated worldwide) in 1950 was $3.8 trillion. In the mid-1990s it was estimated to be $30.7 trillion. This near-tenfold increase was not, however, distributed evenly around the world. At least half of the extra wealth was created by the United States, Japan and the countries of Western Europe, where per capita incomes (the amount of money generated by a country divided by its population) grew markedly. By contrast, elsewhere in the world economic underdevelopment and high population growth rates resulted in per capita incomes actually decreasing.

WEALTH AND POVERTY

The result of this unequal growth is an increasing disparity between the national wealth of the richest and the poorest countries (map 1). Equally noticeable, however, is the disparity within a country between those with an income sufficient to provide a decent standard of living and the poorest members of society. The gap between rich and poor is most pronounced in the developed countries, where the average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population may be as little as a quarter of the average per capita income (bar chart).

Poverty can be defined in different ways. In the United States the "poverty line" is calculated in relation to the cost of providing a nourishing diet for one person for one year. In 1996, 15 per cent of the US population was considered to be living below the poverty line, with a disproportionate number from the minority ethnic groups. In some European Union countries poverty is defined in relative terms, giving a typical figure of between 2 and 6 per cent.

THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

Despite the wide disparity of incomes within the industrialized countries, the majority of their populations have their most basic health and educational needs met. In many non-industrialized countries, the other hand, free (and easy) access to doctors and schools is by no means universal. The disparity between the conditions experienced by the populations of the richest and the poorest nations of the world prompted the United Nations in 1990 to develop an index that defined and measured human development. The Human Development Index (HDI) is based on figures for 1994, showed Canada at the top of the scale, scoring 0.96 out of the maximum possible score of 1, with Sierra Leone at the bottom, scoring 0.176 (map 2).

LIFE EXPECTANCY

The Human Development Index scores a country on the basis of the age to which a baby born in that country might be expected to live. In so doing it takes into account not only the general health of the population, but also infant mortality rate. While the latter has improved dramatically since 1960 (pages 257-77), at the end of the 20th century it was still over 10 per cent in many non-industrialized countries, resulting in an average life expectancy at birth of between 40 and 50 years of age. However, those who survive the early years of life can expect to live well beyond their forties. For example, in Malawi, where the infant mortality rate is around 14 per cent, a girl who has survived until 15 years of age can expect to live, on average, until she is 62 years of age. In many countries improved health care, including vaccination, has resulted in substantial increases in life expectancy for both children and adults. Programmes to provide access to fresh water are also helping to improve the health of young and old people alike, and thus not only improving life expectancy but also to raise the quality of people's lives.

EDUCATION AND LITERACY

In 1959 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed that "The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages." Education became, for the first time in history, the right of young people worldwide. In 1962 the UN went further and attempted to remove barriers to education for such reasons as sex, religion, ethnic group and economic conditions. Education thus became the right of all people, but the extent to which they are given the opportunity to exercise that right remains highly variable, depending on where a person lives and whether they are male or female.

It is difficult to compare the amount of money spent on education by the different nations of the world. Expenditure on education as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) gives an idea of the importance a country attaches
to education; it indicates, for example, that some of the poorest nations of the world recognize how vital literacy is to their economic development and so invest a comparatively high proportion of their GNP in education (map 3). Their resources are meagre, however, in comparison with those available to the countries of the industrialized world.

**Rising enrolment in education**

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has estimated that during the second half of the 20th century student enrolment rose from 300 million to more than 1 billion. Enrolment in primary education, which begins at any time between the ages of 5 and 7 and provides the basic elements of education, increased markedly, with the result that the majority of children now receive some form of schooling. Secondary education (enrolment at ages 10-12 years) and tertiary education (enrolment at ages 17-19 years), in institutions such as middle and high schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities, experienced an even more startling increase during the second half of the 20th century, with enrolments more than doubling. The take-up of higher education was highest in North American countries, and at its lowest in such areas as sub-Saharan Africa and China. High primary education enrolment levels did not necessarily mean high levels of post-primary education.

Many countries experienced setbacks in educational progress in the 1980s as war and decreased aid and trade led to cutbacks in government provision of free education. Enrolment in school often drops if parents have to shoulder the burden of paying for their children's education, and even where education is free, parents may keep their children at home to provide vital agricultural labour, or because they cannot afford to clothe them properly.

At the end of the 20th century education was just one of the necessities denied to many of the world's population – pointing to the need for a redistribution of monetary wealth and natural resources on a worldwide basis. However, the focus of each country continues to be on how it can best provide for its own citizens and operate in a growing global economy.

*In many countries half the population have not achieved basic standards of literacy. Some of the poorest nations spend over 6 per cent of their GNP on education, but this is still not enough to guarantee free access to a decent education for all.*

The Human Development Index scores each country according to how close it is to a target standard: an average lifespan of 85 years, universal access to education and a reasonable income for all. It also ranks the countries of the world according to both their development score and their GNP per capita. Some countries (particularly those in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) achieve a much higher development ranking than would be expected from their GNP per capita, while the development rankings of other, comparatively wealthy, countries (in particular many of the Arab oil states) are lower than expected.

*For many of the world's children an outdoor classroom is the best they can hope for at school. Many do not even have desks, while books, paper and writing equipment are all in short supply.*
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
SINCE 1945

Human activity has always had an impact on the natural environment, but the industrialization, urbanization and a rapidly increasing population of the last two centuries have had far-reaching adverse effects never before experienced. Changes in the environment range from those readily visible - such as deforestation, desertification and air pollution or smog - to less visible phenomena, such as climate change, damage to the upper ozone layer, mineral depletion, water pollution, and the extinction of plants and insects. Although these changes began to occur before the 20th century, it is only since the 1960s that they have been brought to public attention.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Government policies regarding the environment, and various environmental conferences since the 1970s, including the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (the “Earth Summit”), have brought world leaders together to discuss the state of the environment and draw up plans of action. For cultural, economic and geographic reasons, numerous divergent views are held on the state of the environment, but it is generally agreed that some environmental monitoring and action is necessary. One of the most important concepts in environmental theory at the beginning of the 21st century is that of “sustainable development” – an approach to the use of the Earth’s natural resources that does not jeopardize the well-being of future generations.

GLOBAL WARMING
Among the most widely publicized environmental problems in the 1990s was that of global warming (graph). A layer of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the Earth’s atmosphere traps heat from the sun's rays in a naturally occurring process known as the “greenhouse effect”. Although the Earth’s average temperature has always fluctuated naturally, many believe that emission of CO2 from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil is increasing the greenhouse effect and have been responsible for a rise of around 0.5° Celsius (1° Fahrenheit) during the 20th century.

Emissions of CO2 have risen steadily since the 1950s. The larger industrial countries emit most (map 1), although many are now working towards curtailing, or at least stabilizing, their emissions. However, countries that have industrialized only recently are reluctant to restrict their industrial development or invest in new technology necessary to bring about a reduction. Predictions vary as to the amount by which temperatures are set to rise over the next century, and the possible effects of further global warming. It is likely, however, that global warming will cause the temperature of the world’s oceans to increase and thus expand, causing flooding in low-lying areas (map 2).

Forests naturally absorb harmful CO2, and deforestation also contributes to rising CO2 levels. Rainforests have been destroyed at an increasing rate since the 1960s, with those in South America and Asia the most heavily affected (map 3).

The nuclear power industry has provided an alternative to the use of fossil fuels, generating 350 per cent more power worldwide in 1990 than in its early days in the 1960s. Nuclear power is not without its risks, however. The accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979 and at Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986, coupled with the problems associated with the disposal of nuclear waste, have led many to see the nuclear industry as one of the major threats to humans and to the environment.
Industrialization and Globalization

An increasing demand for electricity is made by the world's industries. While providing many benefits, such as increased wealth, employment and self-sufficiency, industrialization can also lead to an increase in air and water pollution, to changes in land use and to rapidly growing urban environments. One of the effects of industrialization has been increased emission into the atmosphere of sulphur and nitrogen. This falls back to Earth, either as dry deposits, or, combined with natural moisture, as "acid rain" (map 4), not only damaging trees and natural vegetation but also affecting crops and fish stocks in freshwater lakes.

Technological developments, particularly in areas such as transport and electronic communication, have helped to create a global economy in which people, products and information can move easily around the world. However, aircraft, ships, trains, passenger and heavy goods vehicles all pollute the environment, and require large-scale changes to the landscape. They can also lead to environmental disasters, such as oil and chemical spills (map 5).

Oceans are particularly susceptible to environmental damage. Since the 1960s regulations have been established regarding such activities as offshore oil drilling, navigation and fisheries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in 1994, not only gives countries economic control over their coastal regions, but also the obligation to monitor and regulate marine pollution.

Global efforts are being made to conserve land and protect ecosystems, but preservation or protection is costly and may be hard to achieve in countries whose resources are already insufficient to meet population needs and whose economies are racing to catch up with those of the richer nations. The notion of sustainable development requires changes in the way people live their lives, and in the relative importance they assign to consumption over protection of the Earth's resources — changes that are difficult to achieve.

Acid deposition is caused by high levels of sulphur and nitrogen being discharged into the atmosphere by industrial processes and combining with water vapour and oxygen to form acids. The acidic particles can fall close to the site of their source, causing pollution and erosion of city buildings, or be carried hundreds of kilometres away by prevailing winds, to affect vegetation in rural areas. Despite attempts by many governments to clean up the air in their cities, the increasing use of motorized transport has contributed to unacceptable levels of pollution in many of the world's cities.

Among the many causes of water pollution are the dumping of industrial waste and sewage in rivers and seas, and oil spillages from tankers — although the number of major oil spillages reduced markedly during the 1980s from a high of 750,000 tonnes in 1979 to under 50,000 tonnes in 1990. Coral reefs (which cover less than 1 per cent of the ocean floor, but provide habitats for about 25 per cent of marine life) are susceptible to damage caused by destructive fishing techniques, recreational use, changing sea levels and chemical pollution.
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION
SINCE 1945

When the American Wright brothers made the first flight in a motorized aircraft at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina in 1903, their invention was recognized as a milestone in transportation history. At the beginning of the century steamboats and trains were well-established methods of transport worldwide, and use of the recently invented telephone and car was spreading through the industrialized nations. However, the manner in which people travel and the methods by which they communicate have changed dramatically since then, and in particular since the 1980s.

High-speed trains, planes and cars, mobile phones, personal pagers, computers, electronic mail and the Internet have all contributed to an ease of travel and immediacy of communication that has created what has been termed a "global village". At the same time, in vast areas of the non-industrialized world, millions of people continue to live in real villages, excluded from, or touched only lightly by, the technological wonders of the late 20th century.

THE TRANSPORT REVOLUTION

Car ownership and production in the industrialized nations grew at an enormous rate during the 20th century. Cars were initially owned only by the well-off, but the innovation of mass-produced, and therefore relatively inexpensive, cars greatly expanded their ownership in North America and Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. Even so, in 1950 the number owned worldwide was still below 100 million, whereas 40 years later it was approaching 600 million.

Japan, in particular, saw a boom in car production and ownership from 1965 onwards, and by the end of the 20th century China had also increased its car production, from 80,000 cars a year in 1970 to around 1.5 million. Nevertheless, at the end of the 20th century the main mode of transport for millions of people, in China and elsewhere, was still a bicycle or other non-motorized vehicle. While car ownership has almost reached saturation point in many industrialized nations, with one car for fewer than five people and some cities forced to place restrictions on car use, in large areas of the world there is only one car per 1,000 people (map 1).

Alongside the marked increase in car ownership, air travel has also become the norm for those in the industrialized world. The total number of kilometres flown each year continues to grow (graph), as people venture further and further afield for reasons of business and pleasure (map 2).

Increased vehicle ownership and a general decline in the availability of public transport led to over-stretched road systems and to more frequent traffic jams throughout the industrialized world at the end of the 20th century.

Both the number of flights taken each year and the distances flown have increased as people have become accustomed to travelling further for recreation and business. It is now the norm for many Europeans, North Americans and Australians to fly to foreign destinations for their holidays, with the more "exotic" locations in relatively inaccessible areas becoming more and more popular. In large countries, such as the United States, Canada and Russia, people travelling to destinations within their country have increasingly turned from rail to air travel.

NUMBER OF PASSENGER KILOMETRES FLOWN 1970-95 (in millions)
The manner in which we travel has an impact on the environment. The construction of roads, railways, waterways, and airports often requires extensive changes to the landscape, and cars and trucks, aircraft, ships and trains all produce pollutants that are released into the atmosphere (pages 280–81). In order to reduce environmental pollution, governments, town planners and vehicle manufacturers are being urged to consider these issues when designing new transport networks and developing new models.

**COMMUNICATION**

At the beginning of the 20th century the quickest way to send a message across the world was by telegraph, via a network of overland and underwater cables (pages 208–9). The invention of the radio-telephone in 1902 and subsequent improvements in the quality of transcontinental telephone signals enabled the human voice to travel huge distances. However, the most significant advance in this sphere was the development, during the 1960s, of a network of communications satellites that allowed not only aural, but also visual, signals to be sent up into space and bounced back, greatly enhancing telephone links and enabling live television broadcasts to be made from one side of the world to the other. Several hundred active communications satellites now orbit the globe, and without these none of the major developments in communications of the late 20th century would have been possible.

Mass television ownership enables people worldwide to share programmes. American and British soap operas are shown, for example, dubbed, on Russian television. Major events, such as the football World Cup Finals, are watched simultaneously by hundreds of millions of people. For those without access to a television set, the radio often provides a link with the outside world. The BBC World Service alone had an estimated 140 million regular listeners worldwide in the late 1990s, enabling people to obtain news they might otherwise be prevented from hearing. 

The most spectacular development in international communication since the 1980s has been the Internet, giving millions of people in the industrialized world almost instant access to a vast network of information, and the means to communicate with each other speedily and cheaply. It has been made possible largely through the development of the microprocessor, which enabled small personal computers to be manufactured from the mid-1970s onwards. By the mid-1990s these machines had become powerful enough for their users to be able to access the Internet, a worldwide computer networking system. First developed in the 1970s for the United States Department of Defense, it was subsequently extended to the academic community, commercial organizations and the general public. By the end of the 20th century there were more than 130 million users of the “worldwide web”, created in 1994, with millions more using electronic mail (e-mail).

Technological advancement is the province of the rich nations, with, for example, almost 50 per cent of the world’s personal computers to be found in the United States (map 3). The technological gap between rich and poor nations is an enormous challenge for those in the process of industrializing, although it may also be to their advantage if there is sufficient money to buy the latest technology. In China, for example, where until recently few households had a telephone, the old telecommunications technology, involving the laying of cables, is being bypassed in favour of the installation of radio masts for mobile telephones.

**CULTURAL INTEGRITY**

All forms of communication require language and there are estimated to be over 5,000 languages in use. Of these, English, Mandarin Chinese, Hindi, Spanish and French are the most widely spoken, but far more people use them as their official language than as their mother tongue (bar chart). Although there are, of course, benefits to a country having a common language, there are also disadvantages. There has been a sharp decline in the number of different African languages spoken, leading to a disintegration of the cultural values and traditions attached to those languages.

Cultural integrity is also challenged by developments in global communications, which have provided the most technologically advanced countries with a powerful means of spreading their ideologies and culture.

The extent to which countries can participate in the “global village” will affect their future prosperity. There is no question that modes of transportation and communication will continue to evolve at great speeds, but whether they will become universally available remains uncertain.
INDEX

THE SPELLING OF PLACE NAMES
While every effort has been made to standardize the place names in this atlas, the fact that they can differ so much over time—as well as with language—means that variations inevitably exist. (These variations are given in the index.) In applying the basic guidelines outlined below, a commonsense approach has been adopted that allows for deviations where they serve a purpose.

The conventional Anglicized spelling, without accents, is used for large and familiar places (e.g., Munich rather than München, Mecca rather than Makka). For smaller places in countries that use the Roman alphabet, the local form is given (e.g., Kraków). However, in keeping with current academic practice in the United States, accents are omitted from the Spanish forms of American-Indian place names dating from before the 16th-century contact.

Where a name has changed due to political creed or ownership, this is often reflected in the maps. Thus St Petersburg is sometimes shown as Petrograd or Leningrad in maps of 20th-century Russia, and Strasbourg is spelt Strassburg when it was under German rather than French control.

If a country was once known by a name that differs from the one it holds at present, this is where used appropriately. Thus Thailand appears as Siam on many of the maps dating from before 1938 when it adopted its present name.

For Chinese names the increasingly familiar Pinyin form is used throughout. However, where appropriate, the former spelling adopted under the Wade-Giles system also appears (e.g. Guangzhou is also labelled Canton on maps relating to Chinese colonial activity in China). For the sake of clarity, diacritics are generally omitted from names derived from other non-Roman scripts by transliteration—notably Arabic and Japanese.

THE INDEX
The index includes the names of people and events as well as place names. To avoid unhelpful references to maps, place names are indexed only when the place is associated with a particular event or is marked by a symbol included in the key.

Alternative place names are given wherever appropriate, either in brackets or after the words "see also". References to indices are marked by italics (e.g. 119/3 refers to map 3 on page 119, as are references to pictures.)
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