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EMOTION, BLAME, AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE IN RELATION TO RADICAL LEADERSHIP AND METHOD.

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IT is not possible exactly to define radicalism. It is a relative matter. The attitudes having to do with conservatism, progressivism, and radicalism grade one into another like the colors of the spectrum, so that it is impossible to say where the dividing line between any contiguous two should be drawn. Whether a given attitude is called conservative, progressive, or radical depends of course upon time and place, and upon the observer's scales of valuation and definition. In general, however, radicalism connotes advocacy of thoroughgoing change in the direction of innovation. Originally, in English politics it was a term of opprobrium, and of late there have not been lacking widespread efforts to universalize this early usage. It would be unfortunate were these efforts to succeed, or were the present popular tendency to regard radicalism and socialism as synonymous to become general, for we should then be put to the necessity of finding another generic term, applicable in all fields of human interests, religious, moral, æsthetic, as well as political and economic, to denote the social attitude based upon desire for thoroughgoing introduction of the new and perhaps untried and unfamiliar.

Thoroughgoing analysis will show that radicalism is in the main the result of some form of maladjustment between the individual and his social environment—a maladjustment manifesting itself in discomfort and restlessness. When this discomfort creates a desire for significant innovations in social organization and processes it is the parent either of progressivism or of radicalism. When desire for change is "balked" or obstructed, the resultant attitude is very likely to be a more or less uncompromising radicalism. It can be shown that the maladjustment or strain incident

to balked desires or interests is removed or minimized by one of three processes: (1) repression of the desire, (2) sublimation, or substitution of other interests and transfer of attention to them, and (3) reinforcement.¹ In the latter case the attention is focussed on the obstructed desire or interest and the resources of the personality brought to bear for its realization. Desire-reinforcement is the main source of active, consistent, and sustained radicalism. Desire-reinforcement is brought about by determination to remove the obstacles to the specific desire or interest obstructed—not to obstacles in general. Since this is the case, its effectiveness in action depends upon the individual's ability to single out the real causes of obstruction, in order that his attack may be intelligently directed. It is therefore of importance to know under what mental strains and stresses and through what apprehensional biases the obstructions are perceived, and whether attention and attack are directed to causes or to symptoms. Effective radicalism depends in the long run on correct diagnosis. A sick person, no matter how skilled a diagnostician, may not be able to diagnose his own ailment correctly. Similarly an angry person can scarcely be expected to make a dispassionate evaluation of the causes of his anger. During the war, for instance, no sensible person expected an unbiased analysis of its causes or an objective estimate of the relative culpability of the various parties to it.

When a desire is balked or an interest impeded, the normal motor response which, in the absence of obstruction, would release the energy of the desire, cannot take place. The emotional accompaniment of such a situation is very likely to be resentment and anger—both productive of the impulse to blame and personal attack. There is always the impulse to kick, or at least to damn, the chair against which you have just barked your shin. The next impulse is to blame the person who left the chair in that place. It is not essentially different in a social situation involving obstruc-

¹ See "The Motivation of Radicalism," by the present writer, in *The Psychological Review*, July, 1921, pp. 280-300.

tion of interest and activity. The normal, naïve, "natural" impulse is to blame some personal agency for the obstruction. And the natural, undisciplined method of attempting the removal of the obstruction is to make an attack upon these personal agencies. The success of the attempt will depend not only upon the character and force of the attack—the strength of the subjective reinforcement of the balked desire, and the objective organization of the attacking forces—but also on whether the right object of attack has been chosen.

Obstructions to desires and interests are complex and not always what they seem to the angry or "hurt" individual suffering from repression.

Obstacles to wish-fulfillment, *e.g.*, to desire for greater personal freedom, for higher standards of living, for real democracy in social control, for new standards in art and literature—in fact the obstacles to progressive ambitions and ideals in general—are embodied partly in the conscious personal opposition of people or classes who can best profit by things as they are, partly in impersonal historico-genetic causes, and partly in physical limitations.

Mass-poverty, for instance, in a country like the United States with "boundless" natural resources, may be due, as the socialists claim, to the unjust distribution of income and gross restriction of output attributable to "business enterprise" under capitalist-class domination. Here the fixation of responsibility—that is, blame—in personal or class terms may be at least in part valid. But mass-poverty in China, involving every once in a while starvation of some millions of people, cannot be attributed to any class conflict or corporate greed and inefficiency. It is patent that the causes there lie almost wholly in actual pressure of population on the land's utmost capacity to provide food. Further analysis shows that the cause of this redundancy of population lies in the historico-genetic tradition of ancestor worship, for which, certainly, no "blame" can attach to individuals. Granting, for the sake of argument, the socialist explanation of poverty in America to be substantially

correct, it would follow that the capitalist-class, business-enterprise, restriction-of-output, production-for-profits obstacle to higher standards of living for the masses might be removed through the agency of blame-fixation and militant attack, accomplishing the removal of capitalism from power. But no militant class conflict in China could by any stretch of the imagination remove the causes of starvation, which could be avoided only by a successful campaign of education for abolition of ancestor worship and the adoption of an intelligent policy of birth control.

Personalistic "blame" explanations of poverty are advanced both by individualists and by socialists. The latter fix the blame on the members of the capitalist-employing class and say that poverty is due to exploitation. The individualists place the blame on the poor themselves and assert that their poverty is due to individual shiftlessness. Both explanations contain some degree of superficial truth, but both are emotional explanations, and fail to satisfy or convince the critically analytical mind, which demands explanation not in terms of blame-fixation but in terms of mechanistic causation. The scientific, behavioristic student of poverty will want to reveal, on the one hand the social or historical causes of "shiftlessness," and on the other the historical and institutional causes or antecedents of "exploitation" and exploitative attitudes; and further he will insist on extending the search for causes to the possible limitations of the physical environment and of man's technological control over nature.

Where, and to the extent that, personal selfishness (as in the case of entrenched vested interests) or unbending personal bigotry is the effective cause of obstruction, personalistic anger-and-blame reaction, with the logically resultant militant attack (either force-or propaganda) will prove the effective and probably the necessary method of radical action, unless the obstructing forces can be diplomatically or politically outwitted. Where, however, the causes are physical, impersonally institutional, and technological, the effective method can be militant, militantly propagandistic,

diplomatic, or political only in so far as personal and class interest obstructs the carrying out of constructive technological reforms and advances. Unfortunately, one of the radical's most telling arguments in favor of militant revolution is the fact that personal and corporate interests do stand in the way of technologically constructive reforms, both in organization and in processes, which could be carried out in workmanlike manner were the properly qualified experts free to apply themselves, unhampered, to the task.

There are, then, but two fundamental methods of removing the obstacles to the attainment of the ends desired by progressives and radicals—conflict, and constructive cooperation. By the conflict method, personal- and class-interest obstructions are removed either by force, by political superiority (more votes and more political solidarity, greater skill in the political game), or by massed strength of organization in non-political lines. By the constructive method, the problems and difficulties of organization and technical processes are critically and scientifically analyzed, and the technologists, whether engineers, medical men, economists or what not, set to work to solve them. Under the constructive method must be placed education of the people with regard to the actual nature of the obstructions, whether personal, institutional, or technological.

Now, while the motivation of most, if not all radicalism, in every field of human interest and activity, is to be found in desire-obstruction, and while anger and blame reaction is the natural accompaniment of such obstruction, it is clear that anger never in itself develops a reasoned policy, and that without a policy neither radicalism or reactionism ever accomplishes anything except discord and conflict. It should be clear that from individuals or classes in whom anger and the impulse to blame, produced by balking of desires, tend to take themselves out on the first, usually personal, objects at hand, trustworthy rational analysis of the situation or singling out of the real cause of obstruction cannot be expected. Individuals momentarily or chronically in such state of mental disequilibrium are incapable

of critical objective analysis. Anger and its correlative emotions are the immediate motives to desire-reinforcement and to radical attack, but rational analysis (in the absence of intuitive understanding) must be the guide to procedure in removing the obstruction. Otherwise the only result of desire-reinforcement may be mere reflex and unreflective violence. The outcome of the balking of interests and of desire-reinforcement will therefore vary with different temperaments and the resulting radical attitudes will be characterized by different procedures.

An effective method must be the result of plan, objective, and discipline. Where the causes of obstruction are obscure, complex, and powerful, and entrenched in human habituation or in oppositions of assumed interests, the need of rational, intellectual discipline and leadership is as necessary to the effectiveness of a progressive or radical movement as is will or determination—the strong, consistent, and lasting reinforcement of desire.

It follows that in temperament, in training, and in discipline are to be sought the characteristics which differentiate the leaders from the followers in radical movements; and the specific kind of contribution which different temperaments are likely to make to progressivism or radicalism.

Contemporary psychologists seem to be exceedingly wary of types and classifications. To speak of mental "type" seems to them to smack of an *a priori*, unscientific attitude, especially if a classification suggests a division into emotional and intellectual types. This caution is perhaps due to the observed fact that the same individual may exhibit a hair-trigger motor responsiveness and a thoroughly undisciplined emotional attitude in one sphere of interests, and a calculating, rational intellectualism in another. The fact that the average mind is compartmentized, and addicted to glaring inconsistencies of attitude and method, makes classification seem futile, or at least dubious. All this may be admitted; and yet, not unscientifically, we may recognize different attitudes, different modes of response, different methods

of attack, when some particular type of interest—say the economic—is balked. With regard to a particular situation, or a specific issue, it is difficult to see how it is possible to escape the conviction that some individuals react in a primarily emotional (praise and blame) way, while others react in a disciplined, rational, manner. Individuals may therefore be classified on the basis of the degree to which, with reference to a particular interest, they habitually subject their instincts and emotions to the control and direction of their intellects and reasoning powers, or in other words, upon the relative extent to which their conduct is determined by unreflective motor and emotional complexes and by judicial or scientific rational analysis. For the purpose in hand, Professor Giddings's classification comes nearest to meeting our needs.² He distinguishes four mental types, ideo-motor, ideo-emotional, dogmatic-emotional, and critically-intellectual. These types correspond roughly to motivation and control by sensibility, emotion, sentiment or belief, and impersonal rational intelligence, respectively.³ The first three types react more to convictions involving personal praise and blame; the last to perception of impersonal causes. The first three, whether they happen to hold any definite conscious convictions as to "free will" or not, tend to reinforce their balked desires as if all obstructions were attributable to responsible personal agencies. The last type recognizes personal as well as impersonal agencies of obstruction, but regards the personal from the behavioristic, as it does the impersonal from the deterministic, standpoint.

We are now in position to understand more fully the significance of types of mind in relation to wish-reinforcement, both with regard to the nature of the obstacles to be removed, and as to the qualifications of radical leadership.

In the two lower types, the ideo-motor and ideo-emotional,

² A Provisional Distribution of the Population of the United States into Psychological Classes, *Psychological Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, July, 1901, pp. 337-349. Also Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology, 1906, pp. 236-239.

³ Cf. Jastrow, *The Psychology of Conviction*, 1918, ch. 1.

the fear-anger emotions attendant upon the obstruction of desire are most likely to find expression in blame. The obstruction is apprehended in terms of personal causation. Blame is in its nature personal, terminating upon supposedly responsible individuals, and may be followed by personal attack upon them. Practically always, there is an element of personification in the blame-reaction.

When natural persons are at hand to whom blame may be attached, the emotional temperament, undisciplined to the scientific method and attitude, makes them the scapegoats. Anthropology furnishes boundless illustration of this personalistic fear-anger reaction, from the blame and punishment of mothers of twins⁴ to the burning of witches and the deportation of bolsheviks. These blame-reactions are naïve methods of removing the obstacles to wish-fulfillment, especially to the desire for safety. When natural persons cannot be blamed for an evil, supernatural personal agencies are created for the purpose, and the world is populated with evil spirits, devils, demons, and ill-dispositioned gods. Belief in spirits and gods then redirects fear-anger and blame to natural persons, who are held responsible for displeasing the gods and bringing down their wrath upon the social group. Uncritical, naïve personification, or personalistic symbolization, is by no means limited to naturefolk or to the realm of religion. The naïve socialist, however well-read in his Marx and Engels he may be, nevertheless welcomes the hog-jowled capitalist of Art Young's cartoons as a personal object, not wholly of a merely symbolical significance, upon whom his hatred may find momentary release. In the same way the conservative, his equanimity and comfort disturbed by labor unrest, vents his blame on the "agitator." It was noticeable that the armistice day parades in 1918 carried many black coffins labeled "the Kaiser," or "Wilhelm"—a striking example of symbolization and blame-fixation through personification. Respectable citizens blame the political boss for corruption and bad govern-

⁴ Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, 2d edition, abridged, 1897, pp. 323-328.

ment when the real responsibility should attach to their own apathy and absorption in their own selfish interests. Such personal scapegoats, found or created as objects for blame and hate, serve, in emotional minds, as definite stimuli of reinforcement and motor attack. They give definite objective for the aggressive disposition aroused by the balking of desire. In less aggressively emotional temperaments they are not so likely to stimulate motor attack. Such minds find release in objugation or verbal attack, which serves in part as momentary release of anger complexes and in part as a defence mechanism against consciousness of fear and disinclination to fight—that is, against self-reproach.

We are now in position to understand that mere disorderly, violent attack upon institutions or persons who happen momentarily to be the termini of anger and resentment releases does not constitute radicalism. Discomfort, release of repressed energy, transference, and reinforcement may lead merely to hysteria and emotional slashing about, mob violence, and purposeless feudism. A lynching mob is usually composed of conservative citizens. The machine smashers in the English textile industries during the industrial revolution were not radicals; usually machine smashing was the result of reflexive anger expressing itself in rioting.⁵ Whatever else it may betoken the breaking up of Non-Partisan League meetings by members of the American Legion does not represent radicalism, nor does the widespread recrudescence of organized violence under the Ku Klux Klan.

Violent methods may be used in the interest of either radicalism or reactionism, but radicalism as a social attitude involves the persistent desire for thoroughgoing and fundamental innovation, usually against opposition. Explosive release of repressed desire or impulsive anger-and-blame attack will occasionally take place in the rank-and-file representatives of conservative and reactionary, as well as the

⁵ In one instance, however, it seems to have been the outcome of a definite plan, organization, and reactionary motives. See Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*, 1907, p. 662.

radical, attitudes. Nevertheless, violent action is to be expected somewhat more frequently in those social classes in which there is the greater amount and intensity of desire-repression and obstruction of interest and ambition. For these classes have, in consequence of repression and obstruction, the strongest emotional impulses to resentment and blame, and the broadest rational ground for desiring thoroughgoing change. The comparatively untutored masses may not know exactly what they want and may not be intelligent judges of the best means of improving their condition. Neither are they always reliable and persistent in their attachment and loyalty to particular programs of reform. They are in fact hard to organize and by the very reason of their many repressions and obstructions are not always conspicuously amenable to discipline in a common cause. In the absence of organization and the discipline of skilled leaders, their desire-reinforcement is directed largely at random, and is likely therefore to be relatively futile in bringing about effective change. That there is a vast reserve of energy damned up in the obstructed and repressed desires of the masses for a better way of living few will dispute. It is kept from effectiveness largely by the futile propensity to personification, personal blame, and pointless objurgation, which serve as partial, momentary, and somewhat rhythmic release of anger, and scatter, rather than focus, the energies of the obstructed interests. Ill-considered and ill-timed industrial strikes, and waves of popular zeal to "clean out" corrupt political rings or inefficient city governments are illustrations in point.

If the obstructed energy of these temperaments were to be released under organized direction and held to concerted action for definite objectives, it would obviously be a force not lightly to be held in contempt or trifled with.

Effective leadership and organization, holding the volatile-minded rank and file to a steady program, is supplied by the more persistent temperament of the dogmatic-emotional minds, whose motor and emotional releases are of a less hair-trigger type. Such minds are also given to intense

resentments, but their resentment is steadier and often amounts to sustained moral indignation. They are given to personalistic fixation of blame, but they may also have very considerable perception of the non-personal causes of existing evils and obstructions and may consequently make use of the objective scientific analyses furnished by the relatively disinterested critical intellectuals not engaged in the actual "movement." In the characteristics of the dogmatic-emotional attitude we have, accordingly, the key to the explanation and the requirements of the actual, effective leadership of radical movements. Most active radical leaders, so far as concerns the movement that claims their major interest and attention, are of this type of mind. It is therefore desirable to review its salient characteristics with some care.

The dogmatic-emotional mind holds to its beliefs, valuations, and "principles" with intense conviction and unswerving loyalty. Its principles may have been arrived at through objective processes of investigation and inductive logic. Its observational and reasoning processes are more or less strongly influenced by its emotional interests, and, while usually biased by them, may be at times aided by them, *e.g.*, by sympathetic insight, where the colder critical-intellectual would fail to sense essential realities. In any case, its convictions, once formed, are held to with dogmatic persistency. Argument will not dislodge them. They become the premises of its reasoning, and, by emotional attachment, are placed beyond the reach of criticism. In the more intense dogmatic-emotional types, convictions are held to with religious devotion. We all know single taxers, socialists, "open shop" propagandists, defenders of the classics, advocates of vocational education, feminists and anti-feminists, high protectionists, eugenists, devoted Christians, and sincere atheists of this type.

The dogmatic-emotional mind is rarely cynical, as what passes for the critically-intellectual sometimes appears to be, for cynicism is an emotional complex serving as a defence attitude, and the dogmatic-emotional individual is usually

something of a fighter. If it is ever pessimistic its pessimism is not the kind that paralyzes the will to action. It may be vindictive and domineering and it generally has an inward austerity and capacity for self-denial, which, however, may be disguised under a genial exterior. It may or may not be capable of deep and active sympathies. Where it is, they help to intensify its perception of social wrongs, and furnish part of the explanation as to why it is more persistently and intensely motivated by moral indignation than are the other, either lower or higher, mental types. It tends more than the intellectual to attach blame to persons or to classes of persons, and is more likely to conceive reform and revolution in terms of militant combat (*e.g.*, class struggle), or of diplomacy and political intrigue, than is the intellectual.

When such a mind gets set in a conservative channel it supplies the stalwart, sincere conservatives, who are so, not so much from personal interest, as from strong moral and intellectual conviction. Firmly believing that this or that institution is the foundation of social welfare, they oppose any essential change in it, and hold in more or less personal antipathy those who do not see it as they do. From the ranks of such sincere conservatives from principle, have been drawn, for instance, some of the staunchest defenders of private property, protective tariffs, the established church, manhood suffrage, and national military preparedness.

When, however, the dogmatic-emotional mind happens to get directed into the radical channel, either because of balked personal interests, or because its keen sympathy makes the wrongs and obstructed interests of others its own, it attacks institutions with vigor equal to that with which the dogmatic conservative defends them, and conceives an equally strong antipathy, expressed in terms of personal blame, toward those who represent and defend the offensive institutions.

Since the dogmatic-emotional radical holds to his principles, be they economic, political, or moral, with religious devotion, it follows that he will not easily be drawn off from

the attempt to put them into practice. That is, he reinforces his balked desires with vigor and determination. Obstruction and opposition merely increase his reinforcement and intensity his resentment, until finally his "cause" is made a matter of truly religious significance, of religious hope, and may even come to have some of the mystical and militant accompaniments of religion in the narrower sense.

Not all dogmatic-emotional radicals become leaders, of course. But the emotional and intellectual qualities of this type of mind fit it for the development of the specific characteristics necessary in the successful active leadership of an unpopular radical movement. Such leadership calls for unremitting hard work, sacrifice of all narrow and immediate personal interests, indifference to rebuffs and to the misunderstanding, contempt, and insults of respectability, patience to withstand the strain of waiting, without pessimism or cynicism, during the long, slow period of growth of an unpopular movement, ability to visualize distant ends, capacity for organization and inspiration, and above all, such reinforcement of desire or interest as will create that quality of dogged persistence and determination which finally accomplishes the aim of the movement, if such accomplishment is humanly possible.

In this effective reinforcement of desire the combative instinct plays an important part. The active militant leaders of progressive or radical movements opposed by powerfully entrenched personal and corporate interests, probably must not only be motivated by deep desires strongly obstructed, but also somewhat amply endowed with the fighting spirit. Such a temperament has its advantages and disadvantages. It will avoid the refinement of analysis, the meticulousness of judgment, which sometimes put the intellectual in the position of Buridan's ass, starving between two haystacks for want of decision. It will proceed to push a plan of reform through to success against the determined obstructionist tactics of conservatives and reactionaries, where the more philosophical, critically-intellectual temperament would fail, either because of indecision

and lack of personalistic aggression or because of inadequate desire-reinforcement.

The combative temperament is likely, in its vigorous attack upon the personal agents of obstructive institutions, to conceive the problem of reform or revolution wholly in terms of conflict or of politics, whereas the fundamental obstructions may be of an impersonal nature and may require for their removal not merely the combating or political outwitting of personal opposition, but painstaking scientific analysis of the whole situation. The less decisive and combative intellectualist may in the long run delve deeper in critical evaluation of the obstructions to progress, find the impersonal forces back of personal attitudes, and by attention to these more fundamental causes, lay the foundations to thoroughgoing social transformation while the more combative and emotional mind is planning a campaign to crush its enemies. It is evident that both types of leadership are necessary, as long as men are ruled by emotion so much more than they are by reason and scientific knowledge.

The purely critical and intellectual mind, did such a thing exist, would be devoid of any emotions save those involved in the functioning of curiosity, the pursuit of knowledge, and the instinct of workmanship. Actually, however, the only difference between the critical-intellectual and the dogmatic-emotional mind is that while the former may have strong conflict emotions and impulses they are so far as possible kept in subordination to the critical reason, to the spirit of scientific objectivity and balance, and to the instinct of workmanship. More especially are the combative tendency and the fear-anger complexes kept under control, in the interest of clearness of vision, analysis of the causes of desire-obstruction, and to lesser extent, of the rational evaluation of the desire itself. The critically-intellectual mind is typically the scientific mind, pursuing the scientific method and guided consistently by the one article of scientific faith—faith in the universality and dependability of the law of cause and effect. This means that it is thoroughly deterministic, and in its approach to psychology essentially

behavioristic. Human attitudes and conduct must be as essentially the result of mechanistic sequence as are other phenomena of nature. Hence, there is fundamentally no room left for praise or blame, except as agencies of expedient social control, as devices in the management of men.⁶ The scientist, bent on analysis and explanation, wastes no time in praising or blaming (personalistic relations), but pushes on to lay bare the larger and deeper impersonal causes operative both in institutions and technological processes and in the specific attitudes and behavior of individuals. The physical and impersonal obstacles to progressive desires, which are very likely to be overlooked by the dogmatic-emotional and lower types of mind, must be brought to due attention, if progress, even under the intense emotional devotion of the sincere and self-sacrificing radical, is to be surely grounded. Other obstacles—perhaps on the whole those of most significance and resistance—lie in “human nature,” which it is the function of deterministic behaviorism to analyze. Fear, habit, personal interest, active combative opposition, all have to be met by the radical reformer or revolutionary on the field of practical human affairs, and they can be met more effectively by leaders who, through the results of scientific analysis of behavior, know their genetic and social causation than by leaders who act wholly or in larger part under the guidance of personalistic praise-and-blame philosophy and combat-attitudes.

Here, then, we arrive both at the critically-intellectual mode of desire-reinforcement and at the function of the scientific mind in relation to progressive or radical leadership. The scientific reaction to an obstruction to wish-fulfillment, even though that obstruction consist in the attitudes of persons, is not personalistic. The obstruction is taken “philosophically” and regarded with scientific interest. While as a man, with desires, emotions, interests, and passions like other men, the critically-intellectual in-

⁶ Praise and blame, when indulged in by the critically-intellectual mind, are to be associated with the instinct of workmanship (organization, contrivance) rather than with the combative instinct.

dividual is tempted to personalistic, blame-combat reaction, as a scientist he displaces personal blame with genetic explanation. As a man, his impulse is to damn the obstructive traits and persons; as a scientist his attitude is one of ordered curiosity. *Why* do these people assume the obstructionist attitude? And *is* the obstruction due wholly to the whims, habits, prejudices, and special interests of *persons*?

Having answered these questions to the best of his knowledge and research ability, having laid bare the real causes so far as he can, the critical scientist—also, be it remembered a human being probably with balked interests of his own and presumably not devoid of sympathy for the obstructed ambitions of others—may co-operate with the active progressive or radical leader to the extent of passing on to him the results of his knowledge, and of suggesting a workmanlike program, first for the removal of the obstruction, personal or otherwise, and then for the positive constructive organization and processes necessary to the realization of the obstructed interest.

This is probably as far as the typical critically-intellectual, scientific mind will, or should, go. In the interest of scientific objectivity it must protect its intellectual processes from the emotional strains and stresses of actual combat. It can furnish data, and to a certain extent sympathy and moral support, but it must ordinarily inhibit its very human impulses to objurgation and attack. It follows that the critically-intellectual fails to function unless the results of his work are taken up and applied by the active leaders. The only exception to this is found in those comparatively rare individuals who can lend their active aid, and actively take sides in public issues and movements, without losing their scientific, open-minded objectivity.

As a matter of fact, the open-minded critical intellectual, when his investigations and thought are turned to social organization and relations, very often does become a radical. In the first place he does not take popularly accepted principles uncritically, at their face value. He is "critical of premises as well as of logical processes." He is

in position to see the scientific groundlessness of many popular superstitions, beliefs, and convictions. He notes a lack of correspondence between theory and reality. He sees into the chicane and claptrap of much of our public life and conventional posing. He has balked interests of his own—perhaps, for instance, restrictions on freedom of speech and of research—and he naturally turns the light of scientific analysis upon the causes and sources of these obstructions. He also, like others, may be a man of wide and sensitive sympathies, perceiving the unnecessary restrictions and limitations to which people less fortunately situated than himself are subject. If he be socially minded, he will, under some complex of motives probably derived jointly from sympathy and the instinct of workmanship, survey and evaluate the possible methods by which such limitations can be removed. Social injustice and exploitation will stimulate both his emotions and his intellectual processes, and social inefficiency will be offensive—and consequently stimulative—to his instinct of workmanship. Such a man, or woman, has to be constantly on his guard to keep a proper balance and relation between his sympathies and his critical faculties. The scientific necessity for a deterministic philosophy and a behavioristic psychology are the greatest aids in this task. Taking these standpoints, he knows, if he “explodes” occasionally in a tirade of objurgation of human obstinacy, selfishness, and ignorance, that such explosion is only a temporary catharsis for his overcharged or over-controlled emotions. When it comes to using blame as a social goad to get people to recede from their obstructive attitudes and tactics, he knows how to use it. But blame as fixation of responsibility in any other sense is replaced simply by the stream or nexus of genetic causation. Responsibility for obstruction, in this sense, is divided between personal characteristics, the influence of institutions and the mores (“the system”), and historical evolution.

Some very important practical considerations flow from all this. The way must be cleared for the full, free functioning of scientific research—co-operative if necessary—

into the nature of the obstructions to progress; and no restriction must be permitted on the publication and popularization of the results. Finally, when we have a sufficient diffusion of substantially unbiased adequate knowledge as to the nature of the obstructions and the motives of the obstructionists, it will be time to call in the services of the constructive engineering minds, as Veblen and others are now so pointedly suggesting.⁷ Perhaps, indeed, it is already high time they were called in.

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⁷ *Engineers and the Price System*, 1921. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, 1920.